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論説

ペン・セントラル鉄道救済計画と連邦準備制度（1969-1970年）
— 国防生産法に基づく融資保証に注目して —

須藤 功*

**The Penn Central Railroad Bailout Plan and Federal Reserve System,
1969-1970: Focusing on Loan Guarantees under the Defense
Production Act**

By ISAO SUTO

The Penn Central Railroad was established in 1968 after the merger of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the New York Central Railroad. In June 1970, however, the company filed for re-organisation, which at that time was the largest corporate failure in U.S. history. The mainline railroads were subject to enduring regulation and protection by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Considering a request for aid from Penn Central, the Nixon administration launched a bailout programme under the Defense Production Act, which was passed during the Korean War. Nonetheless, it faced opposition from Congress and was unsuccessful in securing a loan guarantee from the Federal Reserve Bank. Some have argued that Penn Central's rescue was a precursor to 'too big to fail' or 'systemic risk' policies. This paper verifies these assertions by re-evaluating the events that led to the Penn Central Railroad bailout programme. First, the railroad's 'bankruptcy' was made possible by a unique historical context. Second, the Federal Reserve not only indirectly rescued operating companies by providing commercial bank loans to avoid a commercial paper market collapse but also considered the use of direct loans as fail-safe. Thus, the Penn Central Railroad bailout was a failure. Nevertheless, it was the catalyst for subsequent discussions of the bailouts of Lockheed (1971), Chrysler (1979), and even Continental Illinois Bank (1984).

1 はじめに

ペン・セントラル鉄道（正式名称はペン・セントラル輸送会社 Penn Central Transportation Co.）は、1968年2月、ペンシルベニア鉄道とニューヨーク・セントラル鉄道が経営統合して誕生した。1957年に統合計画が公表されてからほぼ10年が経過していた。ペン・セントラル鉄道は資産65億ドル、従業員約10万人、路線2万マイル強、全米第11位の企業規模を有する公益事業会社であった¹⁾。しかし、経営統合後わずか2年4か月

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1) Beshers [1989], p. 1. 全米第6位の企業とも言われる。例えば、BIS, *41st Annual Report*, Basle, 1971, p. 19.

あまりの1970年6月21日、同鉄道は連邦破産法第77条に基づき更生を申請し、当時としてはアメリカ史上最大規模の企業破綻であった。期待とは裏腹に、経営統合の効果が実現する前に同鉄道は財務危機に直面してニクソン政権に支援を求め、運輸省が主導し、国防総省の協力と財務省の支援のもと、国防生産法（Defense Production Act of 1950）に基づく救済計画に着手した。ところが、連邦政府の救済計画は撤回を余儀なくされた。民主党が多数派を占める連邦議会の批判を突破できず、また連邦準備銀行の融資保証も得られなかったからである。

財務危機に直面したペン・セントラル鉄道が拠り所とした資金調達手段は、巨額のコマmercial・ペーパー（無担保単名手形）の発行とユーロダラーの借り入れであった。同鉄道の経営破綻は、コマmercial・ペーパーの償還不能を契機として金融市場の流動性危機を誘発した。連邦準備制度はコマmercial・ペーパー市場の崩壊を阻止するため、加盟銀行に対する緊急融資など「最後の貸手(LLR)」機能を発動した。ペン・セントラル鉄道は、銀行融資やコマmercial・ペーパーの発行が困難になるなか、ユーロダラーの借り入れに向かった〔須藤 2024〕。米銀ロンドン支店や外国銀行から環流したユーロダラーはこうして活用され、国際収支赤字を抑制する一助となる一方で、ペン・セントラル鉄道破産によるユーロダラーの債務不履行は、海外投資家の米国証券への魅力を脅かす事態となった²⁾。

ペン・セントラル鉄道救済計画は破綻したが、ほぼ同時期に経営危機に直面していた軍事企業ロッキード社は、1971年8月、連邦政府の支援を受けて救済された³⁾。さらに1979年には三大自動車会社の一角を占めたクライスラー社が、そして1984年には大手コンチネンタル・イリノイ銀行が連邦政府の支援によって救済され、「大きすぎて潰せない(TBTF)」政策がクローズアップされることになる⁴⁾。倒産後もペン・セントラル鉄道は破産管財人のもとで営業を継続し、1973年地域鉄道再編法により他の鉄道会社6社と統合され、翌年コンレールとして事実上の国有化が行われた。

ペン・セントラル鉄道の救済計画は、1970年の段階で実現しなかったこともあり、実際に救済された上記事例と比較して注目されることは少ない。しかし、ペン・セントラル鉄道救済計画には、長年にわたる州際通商委員会(ICC)の規制と手厚い保護のもとで「TBTFの幻想」[Holzweiss 2003]が生まれていたとの指摘がある⁵⁾。また「“Too big to fail”

2) こうした懸念は証券取引委員会も共有していた。U.S. House, Securities and Exchange Commission [1972], p. V.

3) 詳しくは、以下を参照されたい。西川 [2008] および坂出 [2010]。

4) 差し当たり、須藤 [2020] を参照。

5) ICCの鉄道規制は1920年代には独占規制から鉄道保護に転換している。詳しくは須藤 [2022] を参照。

ドクトリンの原点」[Schwartz 1992]、「システミック・リスク」対策の最初の事例[Brimmer 2007]との指摘さえある。

そこで本稿は、ペン・セントラル鉄道を中心とする「ペン・セントラル複合体」⁶⁾の資金調達や国防生産法に基づく融資保証に焦点を当て、ニクソン政権による救済計画をTBTF政策やLLRの側面から再検討する。以下、第2節では国防生産法に着目しつつ、ペン・セントラル鉄道の支援要請から連邦政府の救済計画の立案とその撤回に至るプロセスを検証する。とりわけ、救済計画が事実上破綻した後の、ニクソン政権による連邦準備銀行に対する直接的な働きかけと、連邦準備制度の姿勢に注目する。第3節では、ペン・セントラル鉄道破綻に起因するコマーシャル・ペーパー市場危機による金融不安の払拭に乗り出した連邦準備制度に焦点を当てる。最後に、本稿の考察をまとめた上で、ペン・セントラル鉄道のユーロダラー借入れとその債務不履行を国際金融市場との関係から展望する。

2 ニクソン政権のペン・セントラル鉄道救済計画

(1) ペン・セントラル鉄道の救済要請


ペン・セントラル鉄道の母体、とりわけペンシルベニア鉄道はICCのガイダンスのもと水平的統合を繰り返し、1960年代前半からは多角化戦略を積極的に展開した。その結果、図1に示すように⁷⁾、持株会社(Penn Central Co.)の下にペン・セントラル鉄道を置き、投資会社(Pennsylvania Co.: 略称Pennco)、鉄道会社、各種の事業会社を重層的に配置した——石油パイプライン(Buckeye Pipe Line)、不動産開発(Great Southwest Corp.; Macco Realty Corp.; Arvida Corp.)、国際航空輸送(Executive Jet Aviation, Inc.)、トレーラー・バン(Strick Corp.)、アパレル(Kayser-Roth Corp.)。統合後も、レジャー施設(Madison Square Garden)や石油会社(Southwestern Oil & Refining Co.; Royal Petroleum Corp.)へと事業を拡大した⁸⁾。こうした事業の多角化は、鉄道と競合する関連事業の拡大を軸に進められたが、石油精製やアパレル、レジャー施設などへの事業拡大は公益事業の枠組みを逸脱する方向でもあった。

6) 『証券取引委員会スタッフ報告書』(U.S. House, Securities and Exchange Commission [1972], p. 2)が用いた用語で、本稿は誤解のない範囲内で「ペン・セントラル」も同様の意味で用いる。

7) 以下には何層にもわたる詳細な組織図が示されている。U. S. Senate, Committee on Commerce [1973], p. 394.

8) U. S. Senate, Committee on Commerce [1973], p. 394.

図1 ペン・セントラル社の組織図 (1970年)



(注) () 内の%は出資割合を示す。

(出所) U.S. House, Securities and Exchange Commission [1972], p. 2 をもとに筆者作成。

鉄道事業における水平的統合は、ICCの運輸政策の規制のもとに行われた。ペン・セントラル鉄道も例外ではなかった。鉄道会社が旅客輸送サービスを経営悪化の要因とみなして廃止を申請しても、多様な利害関係者の影響を受けたICCは受理しない路線も多かった⁹⁾。経営統合の条件としてペン・セントラル鉄道は、旅客輸送収入の割合が高く、しかもトラック輸送と激しい競争にさらされて経営難にあったニューヨーク・ニューヘブン・ハートフォード鉄道の編入を、政治的な妥協で受け入れた¹⁰⁾。ICCは旅客輸送事業が抱える問題点を認識して、1969年には詳細な調査を実施した。その上でICCは、同年「7月17日、鉄道会社と政府の双方が全面的な改革を行わない限り、都市間鉄道旅客サービスは今後数年間も存続できないだろうと議会に警告した。ICCは、旅客列車を走らせ続けるためには、政府からの補助金、その他の形態の連邦政府の援助が必要かもしれないと示唆し

9) Hilton(1975, p. 14) は、ICCは政治的の圧力を受け、弱体化した鉄道の撤退を回避するため鉄道統合を選択したが、ペン・セントラルはその典型事例であったと指摘し、Peritt(1983, p. 278) は、「労働者の反対を防ぐため、鉄道会社は合併後の路線で働くすべての労働者を保護すべく、23の組合と協定を結んだ」と強調する。

10) 合併当時、このニューヘブン鉄道は年間200万ドルの赤字を出していた (Beshers [1989], p. 1.)。ペンシルベニア鉄道会長兼CEOのサンダース (Stuart T. Saunders) は、「1964年8月のロバート・ケネディ司法長官との会談で、ペン・セントラルの統合に対する反対を司法省が取り下げれば、ニューヘブンを受け入れることに同意するとした」 (Holzweiss [2003], pp. 15-16)。

た」¹¹⁾。これを受けて、連邦議会には旅客輸送事業の赤字を連邦政府が補填するなどの法案がいくつか提出された¹²⁾。

1967年に新設されたばかりの運輸省では¹³⁾、長官ヴォルペ（John A. Volpe）が“Railpax”構想を立ち上げ、1969年末までに東部地区の鉄道会社の旅客輸送を新設する半官半民法人の大都市間旅客鉄道会社に統合しようとしていた¹⁴⁾。しかし、利益を目的とする会社の設立構想であるとして、1971年3月初旬まで、ホワイトハウスの承認を得るに至らなかった。一方で、上院商務委員会ハートキー（R. Vance Hartke、民主党）小委員長が旅客輸送サービスに無期限の運営補助金を約束する法案を承認したことから、1970年4月末までにホワイトハウスは“Railpax”への反対を撤回し、商務委員会も妥協案を打ち出した¹⁵⁾。下院州際外国通商委員会が公聴会を開催するなかの6月21日、ペン・セントラル鉄道の破産申請は、結果的に鉄道旅客サービス法の成立（1970年10月30日）に決定的影響を与えることになった¹⁶⁾。

経営統合した1968年後半から年末にかけて、早くもペン・セントラルは財務問題に直面した。経営陣は財務危機を回避するための重要な手段として長期と短期の両面で資金調達を企てたが、いずれも困難に直面することになった。表1に示すように、1968年末のペン・セントラル輸送会社（鉄道）は、コマーシャル・ペーパー5000万ドルや回転信用（revolving credit）1億ドル、ユーロダラー5000万ドルなど多額の短期負債に依存した¹⁷⁾。表1では、これらは長期負債（1年超）であるかのように区分されているが、短期負債（1年以内）に区分すべき項目であった。

スタッガース（Harley O. Staggers、民主党）率いる下院州際外国通商委員会は、ユーロ

11) “Passenger Trains,” in *CQ Almanac 1969*, 25th ed., pp. 383-84, Washington, DC: *Congressional Quarterly*, 1970 (CQAL69-1248264).

12) 以下を参照。CQAL69-1248264; Davis [2020].

13) 運輸省設置法（1966年）は、運輸省の管轄を「最低コストで、迅速、安全、効率的かつ便利な輸送の提供に資する国家運輸政策およびプログラムを開発すること」に限定し、ICCの管轄は、運輸省に移管したハイジャックや環境汚染など「安全」に関する事項を除き、運輸に関する経済規制の権限を保持した。さしあたり、須藤 [2022] を参照。

14) この構想は、1965年高速地上輸送法（High Speed Ground Transportation Act）によるニューヨーク/ワシントン間を結ぶ高速旅客輸送列車（1969年末から「メトロライナー」として運行を開始）の開発にペンシルベニア鉄道、そしてペン・セントラル鉄道が組み込まれ、運輸省がこれを推進していた。Churella [2022], pp. 11-32.

15) “U.S. Rail Aid is Set for Intercity Lines,” *New York Times*, April 29, 1970, p. 1.

16) 最終的に“Railpax”に対する連邦政府支出4,000万ドルと融資保証7,500万ドル、その他鉄道に対する融資保証が2億ドルとなった（Public Law 91-518）。

17) 条件付売買契約（conditional sales agreement）は、買手（ペン・セントラル）が資産を所有するが、その所有権と抵当権は購入代金が全額支払われるまで売り手（銀行）に留保される融資の取り決めであり、ローンの担保としては利用できなかった。U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce [1972], p. 356.

ダラーの安易な取り入れを問題にした。すなわち、「米国の大手企業へのユーロダラーの提供は、米国からの投資の流出を抑制する上で重要な役割を果たしている。また、ヨーロッパの個人投資家をアメリカの資本市場に紹介する役割も果たしている。ペン・セントラル社は、米国内の合理的な資金源をすべて使い果たした後、他の米国企業が築いた信用により、海外での借入れが可能となった。海外の投資家が、米国人投資家に保証された保護に頼ることができなければ、米国投資に対する信頼は維持されないだろう」と指摘した¹⁸⁾。実際、表2に示すように、1970年6月にはユーロダラー市場の規模はドル建が494億ドル（欧州通貨建127億ドル）に上り、アメリカの大手銀行はロンドン支店から122億ドル（24.6%）の預金を受け入れていた。

表1 ペン・セントラル鉄道の債務残高*（1,000ドル）

		1968年末	1969年末	増減
1 年 以 内	社債	6,486	6,470	-16
	施設信託証券	15,780	14,474	-1,306
	施設：条件付売買/繰延支払契約	49,318	51,355	2,037
	融資	2,400	30,400	28,000
	その他	2,732	3,359	627
	計	76,716	106,058	29,342
1 年 超	社債	684,819	682,576	-2,241
	施設信託証券	100,133	85,497	-14,636
	施設：条件付売買/繰延支払契約	386,197	408,365	22,168
	融資契約	30,400	0	-30,400
	ユーロダラー	50,000	50,000	0
	回転信用	100,000	250,000	150,000
	コマーシャル・ペーパー	50,000	100,000	50,000
	その他	6,061	9,145	3,084
計	1,407,610	1,585,585	177,975	

(注) * ペン・セントラル輸送会社単体の負債で、(1969年末)株主資本1,805,371(000)ドル、経常負債498,455(000)ドル、災害等控除192,603(000)ドル、その他の負債408,568(000)ドルを除く。

(出所) Penn Central Company, *Annual Report for 1969*, Supplement: Statistical and Financial Data Selected Companies, p. 3, in: U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [1970], p. 625.

18) U.S. House, Securities and Exchange Commission [1972], p. V.

表2 ユーロダラーの市場規模と米国親銀行による取入高（100万ドル）

年月日	ユーロダラー市場の規模			米国親銀行 取入高 (D)	(D)/(A) (%)
	ドル通貨 (A)	欧州通貨* (B)	合計 (C)		
1966年12月	14,770	3,570	18,340	4,036	27.3%
1967年12月	18,120	4,150	22,270	4,241	23.4%
1968年12月	26,870	6,660	33,530	6,039	22.5%
1969年3月	29,880	7,420	37,300	9,621	32.2%
1969年6月	37,960	9,110	47,070	13,269	35.0%
1969年9月	41,540	9,940	51,480	14,349	34.5%
1969年12月	46,200	10,170	56,370	12,805	27.7%
1970年3月	46,050	11,030	57,080	11,885	25.8%
1970年6月	49,440	12,700	62,140	12,172	24.6%
1970年9月	50,230	14,620	64,850	9,663	19.2%
1970年12月	58,700	15,870	74,570	7,676	13.1%
1971年12月	70,820	16,590	87,410	909	1.3%

(注) * BIS 報告の欧州8か国（ベルギー/ルクセンブルク、フランス、西ドイツ、イタリア、オランダ、スウェーデン、スイス、イギリス）銀行の外貨建て債務をドル換算。

(出所) (A): BIS, *Annual Report*, 1969-74, passim; (C): FRB, *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, Jan. 1971, Table 21, p. A86, Jan. 1974, Table 22, p. A88 より筆者作成。


インフレ抑制を目的に金融引き締め政策が取られるなかで、大手銀行はロンドン支店に高金利の——1969年6月には3か月物金利が12%に達した(図2参照)——ドル建て預金(譲渡性預金 negotiable CD)を形成する一方で、ロンドン支店は預金金利規制(レギュレーションQ)や預金準備率規制を免れたドル(ユーロダラー)を積極的に買い集めて本国の本店に預け直した。管理不能のユーロダラー市場の拡大を嫌って、連邦準備制度理事会(FRB)は1969年10月にユーロダラー再預金の増加額に対して必要準備金(当初10%)を課し、1970年1月には国内預金(90~179日の定期預金)に対するレギュレーションQ上限規制を6%から7%に引き上げた。その結果、ユーロダラー取入高(米国銀行海外支店に対する親銀行の債務)は1969年末から急減した(表2)¹⁹⁾。さらに、ペン・セントラル鉄道が破

19) アメリカやヨーロッパの銀行によるユーロ・カレンシーの供給に加えて、この時期から開発途上国の金融当局にとって、外貨準備の有利な運用利回りが期待できるユーロ・カレンシーは恒常的な関心事となっ

産申請した翌日（1970年6月22日）には10万ドル以上の預金の上限金利規制が停止され、金利規制の終焉（1986年）に向けた一歩を踏み出すことになった²⁰。

ペン・セントラル鉄道の経営陣は資金調達に奔走する一方、他方で1970年2月末から3月初旬には連邦政府による財政支援の道を探り始めていた。親会社のペン・セントラル社（持株会社）の取締役会で、取締役の一人（E. Clayton Gengras, Security Insurance Corp. 会長兼社長）がヴォルペ運輸長官を訪ねて、政府の支援を要請するよう進言した。この提案は3月12日にヴォルペ長官の執務室での第1回会合として実現し、ペン・セントラル側は運輸省に対して、(1)旅客サービス、(2)廃線、(3)州税、(4)他輸送手段への多角化、(5)運賃値上げについて支援を求めた。4月30日の第2回会合では、1970年の見通しと借入能力が限界に達していることを説明し、サンダース会長は設備に対する融資援助に関する法案を要望した。しかし、運輸省は懸案の旅客支援法案（Railpax 法案）に悪影響を与えかねないとして難色を示すとともに、現金不足に関する情報提供を求めた²¹。

図2 ロンドンおよびニューヨークにおけるドル預金金利（年利%）



（出所）BIS, *4th Annual Report*, Basle, 1970, p. 161.

た。BIS, *41st Annual Report*, Basle, 1971, p. 166.

20) Slivinski [2009], p. 8.

21) 連邦政府への支援要請の経過については、以下を参照。U.S. House, Securities and Exchange Commission [1972], pp. 170-172. ペン・セントラル鉄道とその持株会社（ペン・セントラル社）の取締役は基本的に同じ人物で構成された。

その後、5月8日、財務担当幹部オヘロンがヴォルペ長官を訪ね、最高財務責任者ベヴァン（David C. Bevan）とサンダースによる「真の危機を説明する覚書」を手に経営危機の深刻さを訴えた。ヴォルペ長官の仲介で、5月19日と25日、サンダース、ベヴァン、オヘロンらは緊急融資についてケネディ財務長官に訴える機会を持った。銀行家や政府との広範な交渉も続いた。主要融資銀行のファースト・ナショナル・シティ銀行（First National City Bank of New York: FNCB）とケミカル銀行が、ペン・セントラル鉄道による連邦政府への融資保証の要請を知らされたのは、最後の回転信用5000万ドルを引き出すと告げられた5月25日のことであった。ペン・セントラルの定例取締役会で連邦政府の融資保証の交渉についての了承を得たのち、6月8日、「銀行と政府からの圧力を受け、取締役会はサンダースとベヴァンを解任した」²²⁾。

1970年5月25日、ペン・セントラル経営陣とケネディ財務長官、ニクソン大統領の補佐官フラニガン（Peter Flanigan）、FRB議長バーンズ（Arthur F. Burns）らとの会談を経て、5月28日に全債権者銀行会議がFNCBで開催された。この会議でベヴァンは、1億ドルの社債募集の停止と政府保証付き融資への参加を要請し、FNCBが幹事行として政府高官との交渉にあたることになった。6月5日、新聞は「ペン・セントラル社の役員は、先週スコット上院議員に、鉄道が1億ドルの25年無担保社債を公売できないことへの懸念を伝え、何らかの連邦政府援助を得るための協力を要請したはずである」²³⁾、と伝えた。また別の新聞によれば、「ニクソン政権がペン・セントラル社の救済に乗り出したのは、このような大企業の破綻が経済全体に有害な衝撃を与えかねないという懸念があった」こと、さらに「景気後退が半ば公然と認められ、一般に企業の流動性…が極端に低下しているこの時期に、政府が何もしなければ「ドミノ」現象が起こるのではないかという懸念が内々にささやかれて」いたからであった²⁴⁾。

(2) 国防生産法による救済案

ペン・セントラル鉄道の中心母体となったペンシルベニア鉄道の国防生産法によせる期待は当初からあった。同鉄道の運行担当副頭取サイムズ（James M. Symes）は1951年11月、銀行関係団体の年次大会で国防生産法をテーマに講演している²⁵⁾。その中でサイムズは、

22) U.S. House, Securities and Exchange Commission [1972], p. 103.

23) “Federal Backing for Penn Central on Loans Pledged,” *New York Times*, June 10, 1970, p.1.

24) “Nixon Plans \$200 Million Penn Central Loan Guarantee,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 10, 1970, p. 3.

25) James M. Symes, “Defense and the Railroad Problem,” An Address before the Fifth Annual Conference of Bank Correspondents at St. Louis, Mo., November 6, 1951, pp.14-18. サイムズは、1930年代後半にペンシルベニア鉄道勤務を中断してアメリカ鉄道協会副会長に就き、戦後はペンシルベニア鉄道取締役会長としてニュー

ICCが国防輸送の拡大に不可欠な鉄道事業収益を抑制していると批判し、同時に鉄道産業の「政府所有」や「社会主義的官僚主義（socialistic bureaucracy）」に向かうことへの脅威を表明していた。大手の幹線鉄道会社の主な収益源は貨物輸送で、ペン・セントラル鉄道も例外ではなかった。同鉄道は、東海岸から中西部一帯に広大な路線網を展開し、表3に示されるように、鉄鋼や自動車、石油や化学などアメリカを代表する大企業を主な顧客としていた。

表3 ペン・セントラル鉄道の主要顧客と収益*（1969年）

企 業	業 種	収益（ドル）	割合（%）
General Motors Co.	自動車	84,574,000	17.7%
Bethlehem Steel Corp.	鉄 鋼	77,607,000	16.3%
U. S. Steel Corp.	鉄 鋼	67,581,000	14.2%
Ford Motor Co.	自動車	46,671,000	9.8%
National Steel Corp.	鉄 鋼	32,506,000	6.8%
Chrysler Corp.	自動車	31,267,000	6.5%
Jones and Laughlin Steel Co.	鉄 鋼	23,575,000	4.9%
Continental Oil Co.	石 油	22,000,000	4.6%
Armco Inc.	鉄 鋼	14,582,000	3.1%
Allied Chemical Corp.	化 学	14,376,000	3.0%
Union Carbide Corp.	化 学	14,206,000	3.0%
Republic Steel Corp.	鉄 鋼	13,080,000	2.7%
Peabody Coal Co.	石 炭	12,989,000	2.7%
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.	鉄 鋼	12,745,000	2.7%
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.	電 力	9,808,000	2.1%
合 計		477,567,000	100%

(注) * 上位15社（アメリカ政府を除く）を示す。

(出所) U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [1970], p. 756より筆者作成。

朝鮮戦争の勃発を契機に成立した1950年国防生産法（Public Law 81-774）は、特定の物資および施設を民生用から軍事用および関連目的に転用すること、民間の需要を満たすために必要なレベルを超えて生産設備を拡張することを目的に（第2条）、陸軍省、海軍省、空軍省、商務省などの機関を「保証機関」と定め、連邦準備銀行を含む公的または民間の金融機関による融資の元本や利息を保証することができると規定した（第301条a項）。さ

ヨーク・セントラル鉄道との統合を取りまとめ、その後、同鉄道会長職をサンダースに譲った。“James M. Symes, 79, Dies; Chairman of the Pennsy,” *New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1976, p. 34, by Robert Mcg. Thomas Jr.

らに同法第302条で、民間企業に対して、能力の拡大、技術プロセスの開発、または戦略物資および重要金属の探査・開発・採掘を含む必須物質の生産に向けた融資を可能とした²⁶⁾。

連邦政府の支援がICCでも運輸省でもなく²⁷⁾、国防総省が担うことになった理由は、ヴォルペ運輸長官から国防副長官に宛てた書簡に、次のように記載されている。「議会指導部に対して、当該企業の財務状況は、そうした新しい法律の制定前に追加融資が必要であることを指摘した。かかる資金調達には、政府の保証なしでは不可能であること、そして現在国防生産法301条に含まれているV-ローンの権限は、司法省の書面による意見に基づき、国防総省がローンの暫定保証をするために利用可能である…。当面の間、国防総省がこのような保証を行うのに十分な資産を持つ唯一の機関であることは明らかであり、議会指導者らは、国防総省が想定される短期間の間、かかる融資の保証人となることを受け入れる意向を示していることに留意すべきである」。「ペン・セントラルはわが国の鉄道網に不可欠であり、主要な軍事施設や防衛産業に貢献していることは事実だが、ペン・セントラル鉄道の存続に対する政府の関心は、国防総省にとどまらないという私の認識を、指導者は共有してくれた。わが省は、国防に影響を及ぼすものを含め、輸送に関する問題で指導力を発揮することを法的に命じられている」²⁸⁾。ヴォルペ長官は、このように述べて、協力を依頼した。

6月10日に公表された連邦政府のペン・セントラル救済計画は、1950年国防生産法に基づき、ペン・セントラル鉄道に対する9銀行の5000万ドルの（繋ぎの）短期銀行融資を国防総省（海軍省）が保証し、その後さらに暫定融資2億ドルの即時保証を実施し、最終的に7億5000万ドルの（ペン・セントラル鉄道に限定されない）融資保証を行う法案を準備するというものであった。5000万ドルの繋ぎ融資保証は、FNCBを代理人とし、海軍省が銀行コンソーシアムによる上限2億ドルの繋ぎ融資を最大100%保証する「V-ローン」契約とされた（償還期限は1970年10月末）²⁹⁾。また、この2億ドルつなぎ融資契約（V-ロー

26) なお1951年7月、国防生産法を延長する改正案が成立し(Public Law 96-131)、中小企業の国防生産への貢献を促すため、復興金融公社(RFC)の中小企業向け融資制度を継承する中小国防工場庁(SDPA)が設置された[浅野2021]。

27) ICCの役割が限定的であった点については、須藤[2022]を参照されたい。

28) John A. Volpe to David Packard, Deputy Secretary of DoD, June 9, 1970, in U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [1970], pp. 767-768.

29) “Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy,” dated June 17, 1970, from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [1970], p. 648. 1951年5月10日の下院銀行通貨委員会におけるFRB議長マーチンの証言によれば、これは第2次世界大戦中に戦時生産資金の調達に使われた、いわゆるV-ローン・プログラムの復活であった。「V-ローン保証は、防衛契約に必要な資金を調達できないような小規模の請負業者にとって特に有用であった。しかし、当時のマーチン議長の懸念は、むしろ「国

ン契約）書案には、このユーロダラー融資の返済も盛り込まれていた³⁰⁾。

ニューヨーク連邦準備銀行で開催された参加銀行会議（6月10日）には、ペン・セントラルからはサンダースの後任会長ゴーマン（Paul Gorman）が出席した。V-ローン銀行コンソーシアムは、FNCBなど10銀行が運営委員会（steering committee）を構成し、32銀行が参加することになっていた。会議では2億2500万ドルの融資を各行が比例配分すること（FNCBが20%、その他8銀行がそれぞれ10%）³¹⁾、現行の債務のモラトリアムについても大筋で合意に達した。会議の最後に財務次官ポール・ボルカーが登壇し、国防生産法を利用し、1971年10月31日までの償還期限で融資を保証するという政権の意向を説明した³²⁾。2億ドルに変更されたV-ローン銀行コンソーシアムの参加銀行は拡大され、74銀行になっていた³³⁾。

しかし、V-ローンによる暫定融資保証案は国防生産法の更新（改正）を前提とし、同法はパットマン（Wright Patman、民主党）委員長率いる下院銀行通貨委員会の管轄であった。パットマンは国防生産法に基づく融資保証に強く反発した。下院銀行通貨委員会スタッフ報告書には、その理由が端的に示されている。第1に、国防生産法は防衛契約にわずかに関与しているだけの大企業の倒産を防ぐためのものではなく、むしろ中小の請負業者が生産能力を拡大することで、重要な防衛生産ニーズに応えることを立法趣旨としていること。第2に、融資保証の是非を判断する上で重要だったのは、債務不履行の際に政府は他の一般担保付債権者と同等の担保権を持つだけであること。第3に、ペン・セントラル鉄道が破産しても「更生期間中も鉄道は運行を続け、従業員には給料が支払われること」。

防以外の公的・私的支出が制限されない限り、…物価のさらなる上昇」が予想されることで、それゆえ「現在実施されているインフレ防止プログラムを継続し、強化すること」にあった。Martin [1951], pp. 490, 494.

30) 銀行コンソーシアムの参加銀行は12行とされるが、確認は以下の10銀行だけである。First National City Bank of New York, First National Bank of Chicago, Irving Trust Co., Chemical Bank, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee, National Bank of Detroit, United California Bank, Bank of America. U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [1970], pp. 11, 673, 826, 840. 以下も参照。Congressional Record, 91st Cong. 2nd Sess., Vol. 116, Part 19, July 22, 1970, p. 25371.

31) 8銀行は下記であった。Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Chase Manhattan Bank, Chemical Bank of New York Trust Co., Chemical Bank of New York Trust Co., Irving Trust Co., First National Bank of Chicago, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., Mellon Bank, Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [1970], p. 648.

32) 6月10の会議では、コンソーシアムの融資額は2億ドルではなく、2億2500万ドルであった。U.S. House, Securities and Exchange Commission [1972], p. 227. なお、6月17日付のV-ローン繋ぎ融資5000万ドル契約書案および2億ドルの融資契約書案からはBankers Trust Co.が抜けて9銀行となった。U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [1970], Appendix B, p. 677.

33) U.S. House, Committee on Banking and Currency [1972], pp.13-14.

詰まるところ、救済案は「ペン・セントラル社の経営陣とその金融関係者を救済しようとするものであり、過去何年にもわたってペン・セントラル社で行われてきた不始末と事態の悪化を隠蔽する」ものであると痛烈に批判したのであった³⁴⁾。

議会民主党関係者の批判³⁵⁾ や行政府内での不安³⁶⁾ があるなかで、6月17日付でニューヨーク連邦準備銀行によるペン・セントラル鉄道に対するV-ローン保証申請に関する報告書が示された³⁷⁾。V-ローン保証の内容と条件は、融資額：2億ドルの回転信用、満期：1970年10月31日（1972年6月末まで延長の可能性あり）、保証割合：100%、金利：代理銀行のプライムレート（現在8%）、保証料：ペン・セントラル鉄道支払い（現在3%）、約定手数料：0.5%、担保：①借手の資産のうち重要な担保価値があると判断されるもの、②借手の売掛金、③ペンシルベニア社（子会社の「ペンコ」）の資本株式に対する第二抵当権、親会社ペン・セントラル社の保証：5,920万スイス・フラン・ローンの返済後の担保、以上であった³⁸⁾。ニューヨーク連邦準備銀行の詳細な報告書の結論は、「…このような法律が議会で制定され、政府による会社への資金援助が5億ドルという提案された金額で長期間利用できるようになれば、経営陣は当社の状況を大幅に改善するのに十分な時間と資金を確保できるように思われる」³⁹⁾ というものであった。表4は、ニューヨーク連銀がフィラデルフィア連銀と共同で調査した報告書において、主要金融機関等がペン・セントラル

34) U.S. House, Committee on Banking and Currency [1972], pp. 12-14. 1970年8月15日成立の国防生産法改正法 (Public Law 91-379)は、1回の融資保証を2,000万ドルに制限し、「主に企業の財務的破綻や倒産を防ぐため」に使用することを禁止する（ただし、そのような企業の破綻が国防生産に直接かつ実質的に不利な影響を与えることを大統領が証明し、その証明を10日前に議会に通知する場合を除く）ものとなった (p. III)。

35) 下院州際外国通商委員会スタッガース委員長 (Harley O. Staggers, 民主党)も、6月10日の段階で同「委員会が特に迅速に動くことはないだろう」と述べていた (“Nixon Plans \$200 Million Penn Central Loan Guarantee,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 10, 1970, p. 3.)。また新聞記事によれば、ペンシルベニア州の民主党の間には「ペン・セントラルは共和党の鉄道だ」との批判が起こり、長年にわたる州政治に巻き込まれてしまった (Fred L. Zimmerman and Richard F. Janssen, “Penn Central Rescue Plan is Arousing Ire in House,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 12, 1970, p. 2)。

36) 「国防次官のパッカード (David M. Packard) は、パットマンの反対を抑えようと努力していたが、このような約束をすると、他の企業、特に経営不振に陥っている巨大企業ロッキード社が政府の援助を求めてくるのではないかと心配していた。」“A Penn Central Director’s View,” *Washington Post*, June 26, 1970, by Frank C. Porter, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce [1970], p. 616.

37) 以下は、U.S. House, Committee on Banking and Currency [1972], pp. 16-22.

38) U.S. House, Committee on Banking and Currency [1972], p. 20. ペン・セントラル鉄道によって、同鉄道の持株会社（親会社）ペン・セントラル社の子会社 Penn Central International, N.V.が、1970年にスイス・フラン建5900万ドル、金利10.1%で振り出した約束手形が債務不履行状態に陥り、ペン・セントラル社はその元本2800万ドルを保証していた。この約束手形のうち700万ドルを保有していたアメリカの金融機関2社 (American Express International Banking Corp. と Union Bank of Los Angeles) が、翌年、詐欺罪で R. W. Pressprich & Co., UFITEC, Algemene Bank N.V.などを告訴した。“Pennsy Sees Debt Pact,” *New York Times*, Feb. 25, 1971, p. 53.

39) U.S. House, Committee on Banking and Currency [1972], p. 21.

に持つ債権をリストアップしたものである。

表4 主要金融機関等のペン・セントラルに対する債権*

(1970年6月17日、100万ドル)

融資銀行等		債権の種類	融資日	満期日	債務金額
ペン・セントラル鉄道	FNCB他51銀行	回転信用・タームローン	1969.4.1	1971.1.1	300.0
	FNCB他11銀行	ユーロダラー無担保回転信用	1968.11.14	1973.10.31	50.0
	FNCBその他銀行	無担融資残高	1965.5.6	1971.1.31	30.0
	Manufacturers Hanover & Cleveland Trust	無担融資残高			12.5
	個別26銀行	コマーシャル・ペーパーのバックアップ信用			46.5
	多数の債権者	コマーシャル・ペーパー	*1970.6.2	1970.12.16	108.3
	計				547.3
ペンコ社	Chemical Bank他9銀行	1億ドル社債発行用の回転信用	1970.5.28	1972.6.11	50.0
	Chemical Bank & Morgan Guaranty Trust	タームローン		1971.2.1	2.5
PCI	欧州・米国銀行など	スイス・フラン建約束手形			59.2
合計					659.0

(注) * ニューヨーク連邦準備銀行報告書の調査による。ペンコ社（ペンシルベニア社）はペン・セントラル鉄道の完全保有子会社、PCI(Penn Central International, N.V.)はペン・セントラル社の海外子会社（図1参照）。

(出所) Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Summary Report on Application for V-Loan Guarantee on Connection with Loan to Penn Central Transportation Company,” June 17, 1970, in U.S. House, Committee on Banking and Currency [1972], pp. 17-18.

3 コマーシャル・ペーパー市場の危機と連邦準備制度

FRBは6月18日、結局、ペン・セントラル鉄道に対する直接融資の返済は不可能と判断して拒絶した。ニューヨーク連銀の報告書は、ニクソン政権がFRBにペン・セントラル鉄道への直接融資を要請したことへの回答であった⁴⁰。その翌日、ニクソン政権はペン・セントラル鉄道救済のための融資保証と繋ぎ融資保証の計画を撤回し、21日に同鉄道は

40) Mishkin & White [2016], pp. 243-244.

破産を申請した。鉄道会社は破産管財人のもとで営業運転を継続し、ICCが推進してきた地域鉄道システムへの統合（国有化）の道を歩むこととなった⁴¹⁾。一方、親会社のペン・セントラル社（持株会社）は保険業を核とする小規模コングロマリットとして存続した。

ところで、1970年7月23日開催の上下両院合同経済委員会公聴会のために用意した陳述書でFRB議長バーンズは、連邦準備銀行の直接融資に含みを持たせていた。すなわち「連邦準備制度は、異常かつ緊急の状況下において、連邦準備法が付与した限定的な権限を活用し、借り手は信用に足るが他からの信用を確保できない場合に限り、政府債務証券またはその他の適格書類を担保として事業会社に直接融資を行うことができる」と述べている。さらに質疑の中で、現在破産状態にあるペン・セントラルや、現在政府に多額の融資を求めているロッキード社に直接融資をするつもりかと問われ、バーンズは、「私がこのステートメントを書いた目的は、このような権限が存在することに注意を喚起するため」であると返答している⁴²⁾。

その後バーンズは、11月14日の上院商務委員会公聴会で、ペン・セントラル鉄道に対する直接融資を拒否した理由について、次のように発言した。「連邦準備銀行がペン・セントラルに融資を行う可能性のある現行法の唯一の条項は、連邦準備法第13条(3)項である。この条項は、理事会が『異常かつ緊急の状況』において、少なくとも5人の理事会メンバーの賛成票によって、連邦準備銀行が個人、パートナーシップ、企業に対してある種の直接融資を行う権限を与えるものである」。しかし、バーンズは「…法律上の制限や法律の意図に関する背景を考慮し、ペン・セントラルの現在の財務状況、ニーズ、見通しに関する入手可能な情報を慎重に検討した結果、理事会は、連邦準備法第13条(3)項を行使して連邦準備銀行がペン・セントラル鉄道への信用供与を許可することは適切ではないと結論した」⁴³⁾。バーンズは続けて、それは「経営不振を救済するため、あるいは債権者や株主の利益を守るために提供されるべきではない」。しかし、連邦準備銀行による直接融資ではなく、他の連邦政府の支援で「民間ローンを連邦政府が保証する」ことは支持するし、「ペン・セントラルのケースでは国益が最優先される」と述べている⁴⁴⁾。

41) 差し当たり、須藤 [2022] を参照されたい。


42) Arthur F. Burns, Statement to Congress, July 23, 1970, in U.S. Joint Economic Committee [1970], p. 586. この点は財務次官ヴォルカーも認め、次のように回顧している。「ロッキードについては、連邦準備制度は何もしなかった。すべて議論されていたが、連邦準備制度の資金を使うという現実的な問題はなかったと記憶している。検討はされたはずだが、却下されたと思う。ペン・セントラルの場合、アメリカ政府は1950年国防生産法を論拠に、ペン・セントラルが軍需物資を輸送しているという理由で、最後まで融資するつもりだった。国防総省はこの理屈をあまり喜ばなかった」。Volcker [2008], p. 158.

43) U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce [1970], p. 773.

44) U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce [1970], p. 773. 連邦政府による2億5000万ドルの融資保証を受けたロッキード社の場合、安全保障を担う「公共の利益」が名目とされた（西川2008, 197頁）。

ペン・セントラル鉄道救済案の撤回は、連邦準備制度自らが金融システムの動揺に対処せざるを得ない事態を引き起こした。コマーシャル・ペーパー市場の危機である。図3は、大恐慌前の1927年からフロート制移行後の1975年までのコマーシャル・ペーパーと銀行引受手形の発行残高の推移を示している。連邦準備制度の創設にあたって、高リスクの無担保単名約束手形ではなく、イギリス型の商業手形の割引市場を軸とする信用システムを構築するべく、連邦準備銀行は銀行引受手形の割引・購入を促進した。しかし1930年代半ば、特に第2次世界大戦以降、アメリカ固有のコマーシャル・ペーパー市場が銀行引受手形を大きく上回る規模に成長し、1970年末の発行残高は331億ドルに達した。その背景には、GEやフォードなど巨大企業の金融子会社などが銀行融資より安価な資金調達手段として活用したこと（表5）、また金融機関を含む巨大企業が有休資金の運用先としたこ

図3 コマーシャル・ペーパーおよび銀行引受ドル手形の発行残高
(単位：100万ドル)



(注) 1975年は10月末、その他は12月末のデータ。

(出所) U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, passim より筆者作成。

とにあった⁴⁵⁾。

表5 コマーシャル・ペーパーを発行する主要金融子会社（1961年9月）

単位：1,000ドル

金融子会社（親会社の業種）	資本金*	順位**
Allis Chalmers Credit Corporation（産業機械）	122,844	24
Appliance Buyers Credit Corporation（家電製造販売）	31,265	63
B-W Acceptance Corporation（自動車部品）	104,889	30
Caterpillar Credit Corporation（建設・鉱山機械）	-	-
Clark Equipment Credit Company（産業・建設機械）	73,458	40
John Deere Credit Company（農業・建設機械）	102,358	32
Ford Motor Credit Company（自動車）	1,051,200	2
General Electric Credit Corporation（電力・電気機器）	465,480	10
General Motors Acceptance Corporation（自動車）	1,763,003	1
International Harvester Credit Corporation（農業機械）	239,216	13
Montgomery Ward Credit Corporation（総合小売）	216,624	15
Motorola Finance Corporation（通信機器）	-	-
Philco Finance Corporation（総合家電）	-	-
RCA Credit Corporation（電気機器）	-	-
Redisco, Incorporated（?）	-	-
Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corporation（総合小売）	494,673	8
Westinghouse Credit Corporation（電力）	163,477	19
Yellow Manufacturing Acceptance Corp.（自動車）***	-	-

（注）* 1972年末のデータ。 ** 1972年末の金融会社の資本金額による順位。 *** 親会社のYellow Truck & Coach Manufacturing Co.は1926年にGMトラック・コーチ部門に吸収。

（出所）金融子会社は、Selden ed. [1963], Table 11, p. 37；資本金とその順位は、U.S. House, Banking and Currency Committee [1973], Table 32, pp. 126-127より筆者作成。

ペン・セントラル鉄道もまた、規制監督機関(ICC)の承認を得て、ゴールドマン・サックスをディーラーにして、巨額のコマーシャル・ペーパーを発行した。そして破産直前には、1億830万ドルのコマーシャル・ペーパー負債を抱えていた（前掲表4参照）。その結果、破産申請した6月21日以降に満期を迎える同鉄道発行のコマーシャル・ペーパーは、7月1日まで数日間隔で7回分、合計9,795,000ドルに達した⁴⁶⁾。6月23日開催の連邦公開市場委

45) 1969年末のコマーシャル・ペーパー発行者は、金融会社65.2%、非金融企業21.5%、銀行関連会社13.3%、コマーシャル・ペーパー保有者は、非金融企業73.4%、商業銀行15.5%、生命保険・投資会社11.1%であった。Schadrack & Breimyer [1970], Table I & II, pp. 282-283. また本稿注46も参照されたい。

46) U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce [1970], p. 96.

員会(FOMC)では、ペン・セントラル鉄道が6月22日に満期のコマーシャル・ペーパー170万ドルを償還できなかったことに関連して、次のような報告がなされた。「満期を更新することも難しくなる発行体が増えることは明らかである。当然のことながら、銀行システムに対する与信需要も増加し、財務状況が芳しくない企業の中には、信用需要を満たすことが不可能になるところも出てくる」として、「流動性問題への懸念は依然として広がって」いる⁴⁷⁾。こうした認識から、6月24日付で「満期が30日から89日の10万ドル以上の譲渡性預金…について、加盟銀行が支払う金利の上限規制を一時停止」することを発表した。そして翌7月21日のFOMCでは、この危機を乗り切ったことが報告された。すなわち、「ペン・セントラルの破産に伴うコマーシャル・ペーパー市場からの大規模な信用シフトは、水面下では多くの必死の交渉が必要とされ、深刻な問題がまだ残っているものの」、連邦準備制度は次の3つの方法でこれに対処した。第1は、短期の譲渡性CDに対するレギュレーションQの上限規制を迅速に撤廃したこと、第2に、必要な場合には割引窓口が利用できるという安心感を加盟銀行に与えたこと、そして最後に、公開市場操作により快適な金融市場の状態を維持したことである⁴⁸⁾。

マニュファクチャラーズ・ハノーヴァー・トラストの上級副頭取ハンナ (Paul J. Hanna) によれば、以上の連邦準備制度の政策方針に基づき、「銀行は迅速に対応し、20億ドル以上の新たな信用供与を約束する救済プログラムを立ち上げた」。これらの資金は、以下の方法で利用された。①追加の銀行融資枠（一部はカナダとヨーロッパの銀行からのもので、銀行が借り入れた資金の現在のコストに基づいた変動金利）、②顧客の未払い割賦契約の売却、③保険会社がコマーシャル・ペーパーを購入し、特定の企業の市場をサポートする特別な取り組みであった⁴⁹⁾。FRB理事ブリーマーは、「これが、システムック・リスクを食い止めるという理事会の方針の最初の適用であった。銀行のためにリスクを引き受けるのではなく、市場のためにリスクを相殺し、市場を安定させた」と回顧している⁵⁰⁾。この緊急融資を特に必要とした企業は、クライスラー社の金融子会社 (Chrysler Financial Corp.) とコマーシャル・クレジット・カンパニーの2社であった⁵¹⁾。

47) Federal Open Market Committee, Memorandum of Discussion, June 23, 1970, p. 50 and Attachment A.

48) Federal Open Market Committee, Memorandum of Discussion, July 21, 1970, pp. 17-18.

49) Charles N. Stabler, "Banks Mounted \$2 Billion Rescue Mission Aid Firms in Penn Central Crisis," *Wall Street Journal*, October 14, 1970, p. 29; "City Bank to Cut Eurodollar Debt," *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1970, p. 65, by H. Erich Heinemann.

50) Brimmer [2007], p. 200. 「バーンズ議長は、割引窓口を、流動性危機を防止する鍵と考えており、必要であれば『バススルー』融資を明示的に直接行うというFRBのコミットメントを、適切なフェイルセーフ措置と見なした」(Calomiris [1993], p. 19)。

51) ウォルト・ディズニー・プロダクションは、ペン・セントラル鉄道発行のコマーシャル・ペーパー145万ドルを保有しているが、これを償却して税引後で約75万ドルの損失となる可能性があると伝えられた。

連邦準備制度の救済プログラムを受けて、商業銀行側で主導的役割を果たしたのはモルガン・ギャランティ・トラスト銀行であった。当時FRB理事であったマイセル(Sherman J. Maisel)は次のように回顧している。「商業信用の主な貸し手であるモルガンは、貸し手会議を招集したが、そこには40人か50人、あるいはそれ以上の貸し手がいた。当時、コマースシャル・ペーパーを発行するには、通常、銀行のバックアップが必要であった」。この会議で、「何人かの小銀行家が立ち上がり、それは株主に対して不公平だ。リスクが大きすぎる。バックアップ契約から資金を引き出すことは認められない」と言った。その時モルガンの頭取が立ち上がって、「わかった、それでいい。君たちの分け前は除くが、二度とモルガンには近づくな。それがビジネスのやり方なら、二度と取引しない」と言った。すると、2人の小銀行家は、「ああ、いや、いや。融資しますよ。コミットメントは撤回しない」と言った⁵²⁾。

バーンズは、連邦準備銀行が事業会社に対する直接融資を覚悟していたにしても、ペン・セントラル鉄道への直接融資を拒否した。その影響でコマースシャル・ペーパーの更新に困難を来した企業に、連邦準備銀行は取引銀行を誘導して市場金利以下で融資をすることにより、間接的に救済した。連邦準備銀行が監視することのない非金融企業に対する融資のリスクを取引銀行に転嫁することで、「過度なリスクテイクに繋がりがねない潜在的なモラルハザードを回避する」ことができたのであった⁵³⁾。

4 おわりに—TBTF or LLR?—

国防生産法に依拠した連邦政府のペン・セントラル鉄道救済計画は失敗した。ペン・セントラル鉄道の事例は、ロッキード社やクライスラー社の救済事例と果たして比較できるのか、あるいはコンチネンタル・イリノイ銀行のような金融機関の救済とどこが異なるのであろうか。最後に、ペン・セントラル鉄道救済計画とその破綻を、そしてその後のコマースシャル・ペーパー市場危機に対する連邦準備政策を、「大きすぎて潰せない(TBTF)」政策および「最後の貸手(LLR)」機能の側面からまとめてみたい。

アメリカ最大の鉄道会社で、全米第11位の企業規模を有するペン・セントラル鉄道の破綻は、利害関係者の多くに衝撃を与えた。ほぼ同時期に経営難を抱えたロッキード社に対する連邦政府の支援も予想され、ペン・セントラル鉄道の救済計画は不況が深化する懸

“Walt Disney Confirms It May Write Off \$1,450,000 Penn Central Commercial Paper,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 28, 1970, p. 32.

52) Maisel [2009], pp. 30-31.

53) Mishkin & White [2016]は、こうした中央銀行による最後の貸手機能を「非バジレット流動性ファシリティ」としている (pp. 244-245)。

念のなかで、軍事物資を輸送する「国益」から進められた。しかし、自動車や航空機などの輸送手段との競争で衰退の一途を辿っていた鉄道会社を広域鉄道への統合構想を進めていた規制機関(ICC)にとって、ペン・セントラル鉄道の破産申請はそれを推し進める機会を提供した。また、「ペン・セントラルが倒産しても、列車は走り続けるだろう」との新聞記事のように⁵⁴⁾、なお重要な産業基盤であり続ける鉄道への手厚い保護と規制により営業運行を半ば強制されていたことも、救済計画を断念させる要因となった。とはいえ、ペン・セントラル鉄道のケースは、その後の巨大製造企業や巨大銀行の救済問題を議論する端緒となった。

議会会計監査院(GAO)は、1970年代に連邦政府が巨大企業の救済プログラムを実施したにもかかわらず確固たるガイドラインがないとして、「これらのプログラムに関わった100名以上の人々の回顧と経験から、この種のプログラムの構成、実施、管理、監督に関するガイドラインを作成した」。GAOは民間企業の救済において、連邦政府が介入する国益上の関心事項として9項目を設定した。表6は、各企業の救済がどの項目に該当するかを示している。詳細は省くが、GAOは、ペン・セントラル鉄道は「破産が許された」唯一の事例であり、ロッキード社への資金援助プログラムはその後の企業救済のための根本的な障害を取り除くことで、重要な前例となったと見る⁵⁵⁾。GAOのガイドラインは、コンチネンタル・イリノイ銀行の救済が世論を賑わす直前に公表されたことでも注目に値する。

連邦準備制度は連邦政府の国防生産法に依拠したペン・セントラル鉄道への直接融資を拒否する一方、他方で、巨額のコマーシャル・ペーパー発行残高を有する同鉄道の破産に起因する流動性危機に直面して、迅速かつ積極的な金融政策に着手した。連邦準備銀行は伝統的な「最後の貸手」として割引窓口を用意することに加え、コマーシャル・ペーパーの更新危機に直面した企業には、商業銀行を経由して間接的に融資する手法でモラル・ハザードも回避した。これまで実施されなかったことで軽視されてきた、連邦準備銀行による事業会社に対する直接融資もまた、フェイルセーフとして準備されていたのであった⁵⁶⁾。

54) Frank C. Porter, “A Penn Central Director’s View,” *Washington Post*, June 26, 1970, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce [1970], p. 616.

55) U.S. General Accounting Office [1984], pp. 10, 17, 28.

56) アメリカ金融史の第一人者メルツァー [Meltzer 2008] は次のように理解している。「Fedはその95年の歴史の中で、破綻に対する対処方針を明確に打ち出したことはない。FRBは銀行や投資銀行を存続させるために支援を提供することもあれば、金融機関を閉鎖することもあった。問題を抱えた金融機関は、救済されるのか、それとも首を絞められるのか、事前を知る術はない」。

表6 民間企業の救済で連邦議会が考慮すべき国益上の理由

国益とする理由	ペン・セントラル*	ロッキード (1971年)	クライスラー (1980年**)
サービス/製品の継続性の維持	○		○
雇用の維持	○	○	○
防衛関連企業の維持		○	○
技術力の維持		○	○
外国企業の市場参入阻止			○
産業集中の拡大阻止		○	○
同盟国との良好な関係の維持		○	
金融市場/金融機関への悪影響の軽減	○		○
地域/社会/経済的コストの低減	○	○	○

* コンレール（1974-81年）を救済とみなす。 ** Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979の成立が1980年1月7日であるため。

出所：U.S. General Accounting Office [1984], p. 28より筆者作成。

経営危機に直面したペン・セントラル鉄道とその関連会社は、最後の頼みの綱として高金利のユーロダラー（ユーロカレンシー）の取り入れに向かった。ペン・セントラル鉄道の破綻は、連邦預金保険の適用外であるユーロダラーの預金者（貸手）に、したがってまた、500億ドル規模に成長したユーロダラー市場に衝撃を与えた。ペン・セントラル鉄道が経営破綻に向かう過程で、FRBは譲渡性CDの上限金利を引き上げ、ユーロダラー預金に対する必要準備規制を導入して、ユーロダラー金利の急落、米銀行のユーロダラー取入れの急減をもたらした。他方で、金融引き締め政策をとる西ドイツへの過度のユーロダラー流入は、ドイツ連邦銀行のドル買打ち切りに帰結する。国内規制から逃れた自由な金融市場と見なされるユーロダラー市場もまた、国内金融規制の影響から逃れることはできなかった⁵⁷⁾。そして、ペン・セントラル鉄道破綻の14か月先にはニクソン・ショック（金・ドル交換停止）が待ち受けていたのであった。

57) 矢後 [2006] は、ユーロカレンシー市場の位置づけをめぐり、無規制の自由な「ジャングル」かあるいは規制に囲まれた「牢獄」か、という新自由主義者の問題提起を、1960年代後半のBISに焦点を当て多面的に考察している。

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イスラエルのガザ侵攻とリベラリズム

佐原 徹哉*

The Western Liberalism and the Israeli War in Gaza

By TETSUYA SAHARA

The Western support of the Israeli war in Gaza has brought about dispute over the political hypocrisy of the leaders. The marked difference between their attitude to the Russian atrocities in Ukraine and those to the Israeli in Gaza may undermine the rule of law in the international affairs. Moreover, the antiwar activities of the Jewish citizen have raised question over the validity of the equation of the Antizionism with the Antisemitism. The Western approval of the Israeli massacre of the Palestine citizen as “collateral damage” even hint their racist preoccupations. To sum up, the Israeli war has jeopardized the liberal principles of democracy and human rights as a whole.

1 はじめに

イスラエルによるガザ侵攻によって、多数のパレスチナ人が亡くなっているが、アメリカをはじめとする西側諸国はイスラエルの軍事行動を支持し続けている。この事態を、国連事務総長のアントニオ・グテレスは「人道主義自体の危機」と呼んだ。本論は、この発言に鑑みて、ガザ侵攻に対する西側諸国の対応が民主主義と普遍的人権概念に与える影響について考察する。

2 未完のジェノサイド

イスラエルのガザ侵攻は過去のジェノサイド事件と酷似している。イスラエル政府は、ガザのパレスチナ人全体に10月7日の事件に対する集団的責任を負わせ、無差別な空爆と地上戦によって民間人を大量に殺害し、ガザ地区を封鎖して食糧・水・燃料の供給を制限することで生存困難な条件を強要し、衰弱死させている。これは植民地時代のナミビアで、ドイツ当局がヘレロ人の反乱の責任を民族全体に負わせ、「抹殺指令」に基づいて無差別処刑を行い、生存に必要な飲料水の供給を遮断し、「野蛮人」とみなして生存不可能な砂漠に追放して消耗死させたヘレロ・ナマクワ虐殺事件（1904～5年）と酷似している。ドイツはこの事件を2021年にジェノサイドであったと公式に認めている。イスラエルはまた、

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パレスチナ人を最初はガザ北部から強制的に南部に移動させ、更に南部の避難場所にも無差別の空爆を行い、生存に必要な衣料・食糧・飲料水・燃料・医療サービス等を遮断することで、多数のパレスチナ人が病死・餓死しつつある。これは、第一次世界大戦でオスマン帝国が戦闘地域からの「避難」を口実にアルメニア人をアナトリア東部からの強制的に移動させ、シリア南部の砂漠地帯に追放して大量死させたアルメニア大虐殺（1914～5年）に酷似している。アルメニア人大虐殺は欧州議会と米国議会がジェノサイド事件であると断定している。イスラエルは戦争以前からパレスチナ人の土地と財産を奪い、ガザ地区に閉じ込め、国連等の支援物資に頼って暮らさざるを得なくしてきた。これはボスニア内戦でセルビア人勢力によって国連の安全地帯に追い込まれたスレブレニツァと周辺地域の住民の状況に酷似している。セルビア人勢力は更に「住民がそこで暮らし続ける希望を失わせる」ためにスレブレニツァ地区の包囲を段階的に縮小して住民を狭隘な地域に追い込み、水も食料も与えずに女性と子供に「自発的避難」を受け入れさせ、成人男性を処刑した。この行為は旧ユーゴ国際刑事裁判所によってジェノサイドと認定されているが、パレスチナ人をガザ南部の狭隘な地域に追い込んだ上で、他国への追放を構想しているイスラエル政府の態度と比較可能である。暴力を用いて特定の地域から「望ましくない」住民を強制的に追放する行為はボスニア内戦では民族浄化と呼ばれたが、現在のイスラエルの政策は遥かに大規模なものである。

以上のことから、イスラエルによるガザ攻撃は、極めて大規模な民族浄化であると断定することができる。現在の死者数はガザ地区の住民の1～2%ほどであることを考えると、ジェノサイドが行われたと断定することはできないが、強制移住を余儀なくされた人々の数はボスニアのケースを遥かに凌ぎアルメニア人大虐殺に匹敵するものであり、ナミビア事件とも共通する要素が多いことを考えると、ジェノサイドに発展する可能性が高い。現在の状況は未完のジェノサイドと呼ぶべきである。

3 西側諸国と「国際社会」の責任

ジェノサイド条約第一条は「締約国は、集団殺害が平時に行われるか戦時に行われるかを問わず、国際法上の犯罪であることを確認し、これを、防止し処罰することを約束する」と規定している。イスラエルのガザ攻撃がジェノサイドに発展する可能性が高いことに鑑みて、締約国はイスラエルの未完のジェノサイドを防止する義務がある。特に、米国の場合、「エリ・ヴィーゼル・ジェノサイドと残虐行為の防止法」（2018）によって残虐行為の防止が米国の国益であると定めているので、単独でもイスラエルの攻撃を阻止する義務がある。次の前例を想起すれば尚更であろう。

2014年夏にIS（「イスラム国」を名乗るジハード主義組織、ISILはその前身）はイラク北部のクルド人地帯を制圧し、ヤズィディ教徒を悪魔崇拝者として迫害した。男性は処刑され、女性と子供は奴隷にされたため、迫害を逃れてスィンジャル地方の数千人のヤズィディ教徒が水も食料もない山岳地帯に避難し、大量に消耗死する危機に陥った。これを受けて米国大統領バラク・オバマは8月7日に次のような演説を行った。

ここ数日、(イラクの)スィンジャル地方のヤズィディ教徒の女性、男性、子供たちが命からがら避難している。数万人が僅かな衣服を身につけただけで山に隠れている。彼らは食糧も水もなく、飢えている。一方、ISILはヤズィディの人々の根絶を唱えている。これはジェノサイドになりうる。我が国はこうした状況を目の当たりにしており、我が国だけが虐殺を回避する力を持っている。私は米国には見て見ぬ振りはできないと信じる。我々は潜在的なジェノサイドを防止するために慎重かつ責任感を持って行動できるのだ。(WH 2014)

オバマはこれを根拠にISに対する空爆を実施した。アメリカの軍事行動はイラク領内ではイラク政府が米国に軍事支援を求めていたので、合法的な軍事力の行使と見なすことができるが、シリア領内での軍事作戦はシリア政府の承認を受けずに行われているため、国際法に違反する行為であるが、オバマ政権の行動がジェノサイド条約第一条の義務履行であると解釈すれば、シリアもこの条約を批准しているので許容しうる行為ということができるかもしれない。アメリカは現在でもシリア国内に軍事基地を建設し、不法な占領を続けているが、ジェノサイドの防止義務がそれを担保していると考えれば、他の未完のジェノサイドを防止する義務はより一層重くなる。バイデン政権はイスラエル近海に空母を含む艦隊を派遣しているので、イスラエルの軍事拠点を破壊し、ガザ攻撃を中止させる十分な能力を有しており、これを行使せずにジェノサイドの可能性を放置しているとすれば、ジェノサイド条約とエリ・ヴィーゼル法の双方に違反していることになる。

(1) ガザ攻撃を巡る西側諸国の態度

このことを踏まえて西側諸国のイスラエルに対する態度を確認しておこう。バイデン大統領は10月7日の事件を受けてホワイトハウスでテレビ演説を行い、ハマスの攻撃を強く批判し「イスラエルには、自国と国民を守る権利がある。イスラエルの安全保障に対する我が政権の支持は揺るぎない」と発言すると共に、ネタニヤフ首相と電話で会談し「イスラエル政府と国民へ、あらゆる適切な支援を提供する用意がある」と伝えた (WH 2023a)。ブリンケン国務長官、オースティン国防長官、サリバン大統領補佐官もそれぞれ別々の回路でイスラエル側に全面的に支援を約束した (USDS 2023)。バイデンは10月18日にイス

ラエルを訪問してネタニヤフと会談し、「私はシオニストだ」と宣言して閣議に参加し（Reuters 2023a）、25日には、パレスチナ人の犠牲者数を信用できないと語って被害を矮小化し、パレスチナ人の犠牲がイスラエルによる軍事作戦の結果ではなく、付随的な被害にすぎないと発言した（Telhami 2023）。バイデンは10月9日、フランス、ドイツ、イタリア、英国の首脳とともに「われわれの国々はこのような残虐行為から自国と自民を守ろうとするイスラエルの努力を支援する」との声明を出し（WH 2023b）、22日にも同じ顔ぶれにカナダを加えて同様の立場を確認した（WH 2023c）。バイデンはこれらの発言だけでなく、イスラエルによるパレスチナ人の大量虐殺が明らかになっても、殺害に使われるミサイルと爆弾を含む大量の軍事物資をイスラエルに提供し、140億ドルのイスラエル支援を議会に要請するなどイスラエル軍のガザ攻撃に実質的に関与している。更に、ガザの休戦を求める10月18日と12月8日の安保理決議案に拒否権を行使し、同様の内容の国連総会決議でも反対票を投じるなど、その影響力を使って国連がイスラエルのジェノサイドを予防する努力を妨害してきた。12月12日にも「我が国のイスラエル支援は揺るがない。我々はイスラエルへの軍事支援を続ける。我々は全力をもってハマスに責任を取らせる。奴らは動物だ」とも発言している（2023d）。12月22日に安保理は「即時に自由で安全で大規模な人道支援を行える措置を講じ、持続的な戦闘休止の条件を整える」という決議を採択したが、バイデンはその二日後に行ったネタニヤフとの電話会談で停戦を求めず、ネタニヤフの「全ての目的が達成されるまで戦争を続ける」意思を容認した（TI 2023d）。以上のような対応に鑑みて、アメリカ政府はジェノサイドの防止義務を怠るだけでなく、イスラエル政府のガザに対する民族浄化を支援し、ジェノサイドの可能性を助長していると言える。将来的にイスラエルのガザ侵攻がジェノサイドの段階に至った場合、アメリカ政府はジェノサイドの共謀の責任を負うことになる。

他の西欧諸国の指導者の主な対応も見てみよう。欧州委員長フォン・デア・レーエンは10月14日にイスラエルを訪問し、ハマスの行為は「ホロコースト以来ユダヤ人が被った最も凶悪な攻撃」でありヨーロッパはイスラエルの側に立ち、イスラエルには自衛する権利があると発言した（European Commission 2023）。10月17日、ドイツのオラフ・ショルツ首相は「我が国は、ドイツの歴史とホロコーストへの責任を踏まえてイスラエルの安全保障と生存権を守る義務がある」「罪のない市民への残虐な攻撃と処刑、幼児の殺害、女性、男性、子供の誘拐は血も凍るような悪事である」と発言した（TI 17.10.2023）。イギリスのルシ・スナク首相も10月19日にイスラエルを訪問し、「このイスラエルにとって最も困難な時期に我が国は友人としてそれを支えることを誇りに思う。我が国はイスラエル国家と国民と連帯し、あなた方の勝利を望んでいる」と発言した（TI 19.10.2023）。フラ

ンス大統領エマニュエル・マクロンは10月23日、ネタニヤフと会談し「イスラエルには合法的な自衛権がある。これは正義であり、決定的なものだ」と発言した (Nabli 2023)。

こうした発言に鑑みると、西側諸国もイスラエルの残虐行為を容認していると判断できる。これはジェノサイドの防止義務に違反し、ジェノサイドを助長する態度と言える。特にドイツは2024年1月にイスラエルへの砲弾の供給を計画しており、実施された場合はジェノサイドへの共謀行為を犯すことになる (Reuters 2024b)。

(2) 西側諸国のモラルハザード

イスラエルのガザ攻撃がジェノサイドに発展する可能性が高く、アメリカ政府にはそれを阻止する義務があるという結論は本論だけの見解ではない。南アフリカ政府は、2023年12月28日に国際司法裁判所に対してイスラエル国家をジェノサイド罪で告発した (ICJ 2023)。これを受けて国際司法裁判所は2024年1月26日にイスラエルにガザへの人道支援を許可し、ジェノサイドの防止に努めるよう暫定的命令を下したが、その根拠としてガザのパレスチナ人がジェノサイドから守られるべき権利を有することに蓋然性があると述べている (ICJ 2024:19)。アメリカの人権団体「憲法的権利センター」も10月18日にカリフォルニア連邦地裁に対して米国政府とバイデン大統領がジェノサイド条約に基づく、ジェノサイドの予防義務を怠っていると告発した。それによると、イスラエルの政府と軍の高官たちはガザのパレスチナ人を破壊する意図があることをはっきりと露呈する発言を繰り返し、集団罰として空爆によって人道危機を作り出しているのがジェノサイドであり米国政府にはそれを防止する義務があるという (CCR 2023)。

フランスの国際法学者ベリグ・ナブリも11月14日『オブセルヴァトゥール』に「ガザ、国際法の墓場」と題する寄稿文を掲載し、その中で、イスラエルのガザ攻撃は「合法的な自衛」権の枠を超えており、国際人道法に逸脱した戦争犯罪であるとした上で、西側諸国がロシアのウクライナ攻撃とは対照的な態度をイスラエルのガザ攻撃にとることで国際法と普遍的人権の双方の信用を失墜させていると批判した (Nabli 2023)。この指摘に鑑み、ロシアのウクライナ戦争に対する西側指導者たちの言説を確認してみよう。2022年2月24日にロシア政府はウクライナ領に対する「特別軍事作戦」を開始した。西側諸国はロシアの行為を侵略と非難し、ウクライナ市民に対する攻撃に次のような発言を行ってきた。3月24日にブリンケン国務長官はロシア軍がマリウポリの住民を水も食料もない状態に放置し「意図的に市民を標的にした無差別攻撃を行っていることを示す多数の信頼すべき証拠がある」と発言し、バイデン大統領も「プーチンの侵略戦争の被害を受ける、特に女性、子供などの弱い立場にある人々に食糧と水と避難場所と医療サービスを確保するために全

力を傾ける」と述べた（WH 2022）。バイデンは更に4月13日に「ロシアの行為はジェノサイドだ。プーチンはウクライナ民族が存在するという考えを払拭しようとしている。その証拠は無数にある」とも発言している（BBC 2022）。12月2日にはフランスのマクロン大統領と共同でロシアがウクライナで行っていることは戦争犯罪であると非難する声明も出している（Reuters 2022b）。副大統領のカマラ・ハリスも2023年2月19日のミュンヘン安全保障会議でロシアの行動は「我々の共通の価値観に対する攻撃である…我々はウクライナでのロシアの行動をよく知っており、法的基準も弁えている。それらが人道に対する罪であるのは明白だ」と発言した（BBC 2023）。欧州委員会議長のフォン・デア・レーエンも10月19日に欧州議会で「ロシアはウクライナで民間のインフラを攻撃している。これは明らかに戦争犯罪である」「男子、女性、子供たちを水や電気や暖房から切り離す目的で民間のインフラを標的とした攻撃を行うことは純粋なテロである」と発言した（Reuters 2022a）。ドイツのショルツ首相も、10月20日に、ロシアの無人機によるウクライナの都市への攻撃と民間人の殺害は戦争犯罪であり「民間人への無差別の攻撃は戦争犯罪である」と断言した（DW 2022）。英国のスナク首相も2023年5月17日に「我々はロシアにこの恐るべき戦争犯罪の責任を取らせねばならない」と発言した（DM 2023）。このように、西側指導者たちは、ロシアによるウクライナ市民の迫害は戦争犯罪であるとはっきりと断言し、ナブリの言うようにガザに対する態度とは明らかに異なる発言を続けてきた。

日本政府の対応も確認しておこう。岸田文雄首相は、ハマスの攻撃を受けて10月8日に「罪のない一般市民に多大な被害が出ており、強く非難する」とSNSに投稿した。外相の上川陽子も攻撃を非難する談話を発するとともに「これ以上の被害が生じないように、全ての当事者に最大限の自制」を求め、イスラエルとパレスチナの双方に働きかけを強め「事態の早期沈静化に向けて尽力する」ことを強調した（日経08.10.2023）。岸田は11月1日にイスラエルのイサアク・ヘルツォグ大統領と会談した際に、ガザ地区の情勢をめぐり「人道状況を改善するための物資の搬入の必要性を指摘し、国際人道法を含めた国際法を順守すべきだ」とする日本の立場を伝え（NHK 01.12.2023）、11月6日にネタニヤフと電話で会談した際にも「国際法を順守し、民間人の被害の最小化や事態の沈静化などの重要性を伝えた」と報じられている（NHK 06.12.2023）。これらの発言から見て、日本政府は今回のパレスチナ・イスラエル戦争に対して西側諸国ほどはっきりとイスラエルの軍事行動を支持する姿勢を示してはいないが、その一方で、11月1日の参院予算委員会で「イスラエルによるパレスチナ自治区ガザへの空爆、地上作戦は国際法違反か」との質問に対し、岸田は「現実の状況をしっかり確認できない立場にあるわが国として、法的な判断をする立場にない」と述べ、11月3日にイスラエルを訪問した上川もイスラエルの戦争犯罪に対し

て「わが国として確定的な法的評価を行うことは控えたい」(東京新聞09.11.2023)と話したように、日本政府はこの問題に無関心を装うことでジェノサイドの防止義務を逃れようとしている。日本はジェノサイド条約を批准していないが、この条約は国際的規範となっているのでそれに従う道義的責任は負っている。これとは対照的に、ロシアのウクライナ侵攻を巡っては、岸田は「明白な国際法違反で、断じて許容できない」(首相官邸、20.02.2022)、「市民を殺害することは戦争犯罪だ」(NHK 07.04.2022)といった発言を繰り返しており、西側諸国と同様の二重基準を採用していると言える。

国連ウクライナ人権監視使節によると戦争開始から2023年11月21日までのウクライナの民間人の死者は1万人以上で(560人の子供を含む)であるが(UN 2023b)、ガザのパレスチナ人の犠牲者は現時点で2万6千人以上(その内、女性と子供が七割以上)なので、その二・五倍を超えている。それにもかかわらずロシアは非難するがイスラエルを非難しない西側諸国のリーダーたちの態度は国際的なモラルハザード(倫理崩壊)を引き起こす可能性がある。パレスチナ国連大使のリヤド・マンスールはアメリカの拒否権発動で不採択となったガザに対する停戦決議の安保理審議で次のように発言しているが、この問題を的確に指摘していると言える。

「ガザで行われていることの目的が民族浄化であることを知らないふりをしようとするのか。イスラエルは残虐行為を繰り返して、人々に安全のために南に移動するよう命じたがそこでも空爆を行っている。これはイスラエルの極右勢力の連合体であるネタニヤフ政権の(侵略)戦争だ。犠牲者の七割が女性と子供であるのにハマスとの(自衛)戦争だと嘯くことはできない。イスラエルはハマスがとった人質をパレスチナ人へのテロを正当化する根拠にしているが、イスラエルは2百万人のガザの人々を人質にしているのではないか。人種や宗教や民族に優劣は存在しないし、第二次世界大戦の惨事をガザの惨事を正当化する根拠にすることは許されない。イスラエルは特権的振る舞いを即座にやめねばならない。国際社会はイスラエルの犯罪を免罪するために国際法を書き換えるような行為はやめねばならない」(UN 2023c)。

つまり、重要なのは、西側諸国がイスラエルによるガザ市民の大量虐殺を容認する態度が、1) イスラエルだけ特別待遇を与えられているのではないか、2) 犠牲者のパレスチナ人は劣等人種と見られているのではないか、3) 二重基準が広がれば国際法の規範が変わってしまうのではないか、ということである。次にこの問題を検討してみよう。

4 なぜイスラエルは特権視されるのか？

アメリカを始めとした西側諸国がウクライナとガザで対照的な態度をとる理由を説明す

一つの仮説は、安全保障上の立場に由来するというものである。ロシアは西側の仮想敵国であるがイスラエルは事実上の同盟国であるから、敵であるロシアが加害者の場合はジェノサイドであり、味方であるイスラエルの場合はジェノサイドとはみなされないということになる。しかし、アメリカは過去のジェノサイド事件で、敵・味方の論理とは無関係にジェノサイドに相当する行為を非難してきた。例えば、アメリカ政府は1958年にアルメニア人大虐殺をジェノサイドと認定したが、被害者であるアルメニアはアメリカに敵対するソ連の構成国であり、加害者として非難されたのは同盟国のトルコであった。この例は加害主体が敵であるか味方であるかとは無関係にジェノサイドを非難する態度として評価できるし、ジェノサイド概念が陳腐化することを防ぐことにもつながる。しかし、そのためにはイスラエルに対してもトルコと同様の態度を取ることが不可欠であるが、米国も西側諸国もそれを拒否している。

イスラエルが特別視される理由は何なのだろう。この問題を考える上で2023年10月に起こった一つの「事件」がヒントとなる。10月23日の国連安保理でグテレス事務総長は「我々はガザで明らかな国際人権法違反を目撃している」とイスラエルを批判し、「ハマスの攻撃が何も無いところから起こったのではない。パレスチナ人は56年間も息の詰まるような占領を受けてきた。彼らは自分たちの土地が移住者によってどんどん奪われてゆき、暴力に晒されてきた。経済は困窮し、人々は強制追放され、家が破壊されてきた。政治的解決への彼らの希望は消えつつある」と発言した（UN 2023a）。これに対して、イスラエルの駐米大使のエルデンは「事務総長は事実を歪めている」としてその解任を要求し、イスラエル政府は翌日から国連職員へのビザ発給を停止した。イスラエル外相のエリ・コーエンはグテレスとの面会をキャンセルし、「グテレスは自身と国連の名誉を傷つけた」とのコメントをSNSに発信した。イスラエル国会の外交委員会委員長ユリ・エデルSTEINはグテレスの「イスラエルに対する偏見に満ちた歪んだ態度」は「完全に狂って」おり、世界中で反ユダヤ主義者の憎悪を煽ることになると主張した。ホロコースト記念館長のダニ・ダヤンも、ハマスによる10月7日のユダヤ人虐殺はジェノサイドを意図しており「ホロコーストと異なるのは現代のユダヤ人が国家と軍隊を持っており、他人によって運命を弄ばれる無力な存在ではない点だ」と述べ、グテレスは最近イスラエルを訪問して「二度と起こしてはならない」と誓ったはずなのに、ホロコーストの歴史を理解していないと批判した（TI 25.10.2023）。これらの発言に共通するのは、イスラエルを批判する行為は反ユダヤ主義であり、ホロコーストの擁護だという主張である。ユダヤ人がホロコーストの犠牲者であったことを根拠に、イスラエル批判はユダヤ人一般に対する偏見に基づいた誹謗中傷であるという論法は歴代のイスラエル政府が好んで用いてきたものであるが、今

回もガザ攻撃批判を封じるために同じ論法が採用されている。

この論法はホロコーストの歴史的意味と東京・ニュルンベルク裁判以降に形成されてきた国際人道法の基盤の双方を掘り崩す危険なレトリックである。ダヤンの「二度と起こしてはならない」という誓いの意味をグテレスが理解していないという発言は、イスラエル当局がこの言葉をどのように理解しているかを明らかにするからだ。「二度と起こしてはならない」という有名な一節は、その対象が明示されないので二通りの解釈が可能である。一つは、ホロコーストのような惨劇はどのような人々に対しても起こってはならないという解釈で、ジェノサイドの防止という精神に通じる。これが一般的な理解であるが、ホロコーストのような迫害がユダヤ人に二度と起こってはならないという別の解釈も可能である。この解釈には、ジェノサイドとはホロコーストだけであり、他の大量虐殺事件と比較することはホロコーストの歴史的意義を歪曲するという主張も含まれている。イスラエルの歴史家イラン・パペはイスラエルの建国によってパレスチナ人が追放された事件（ナクバ）を「民族浄化」と呼んだ著作を発表したために（Pappe 2006）、「売国奴」と非難されイスラエルの大学を追われイギリスに移らざるを得なくなった（Guardian 2008）。イスラエル政府はアルメニア人大虐殺もジェノサイドとは認めておらず、米国下院のアルメニア・ジェノサイド決議の後でもイスラエル外相は「アルメニア民族の恐ろしい被害と悲劇」と表現したがジェノサイドとは呼ばなかった（Haaretz 2022）。更に、イスラエルではホロコーストの被害者はユダヤ人だけであるという解釈も一般的で、例えばロマの大量殺害をホロコーストの一部と見做さない人が多い。ホロコーストだけがジェノサイドでジェノサイドの被害者はユダヤ人だけであるということになれば、他の民族はジェノサイドの被害者となることはあり得ず、加害者となる可能性しかないことになる。ダヤンがハマスの行為はジェノサイドであるが、イスラエルの行為はジェノサイドではないことをグテレスに「正しく教えよう」としたのは、彼の思考がこうした構造だからである。ネタニヤフも10月17日に同様の論理を展開した。この時、ネタニヤフはハマスによる10月7日の攻撃は「二度と起こしてはならない」ことが起こってしまったのであり、ハマスはナチス以上の絶対悪であるから、人類共通の敵であり、国際社会は「文明世界」を防衛するためにイスラエルを支援しなければならないと述べた（GI 2023）。つまり、イスラエルを批判するものは全てがナチであり「反ユダヤ主義者」であり「文明の敵」と言う論法である。

この論法はアメリカ政府の判断にも影響を与えているようだ。例えば、アメリカ国家安全保障会議戦略広報調整官ジョン・カービーは11月20日の記者会見で次のような発言を行った。この会見でカービーはバイデンが「ジェノサイド・ジョー」と呼ばれていることに対する見解を求められたが、それに対して「ジェノサイドを望んでいるのはハマスだ。

奴らはイスラエルを地図から消そうとしている…10月7日に起こったことは自宅や音楽祭での無辜の人々の殺害、殺戮だ。これはジェノサイドの意図がある」と答えた。これに対して記者から、既にイスラエル人の犠牲者を大幅に上回るパレスチナ人の犠牲者が出ているのではないかとの反論を受けると「確かに、ガザでは過剰な市民の犠牲者が出ている。確かに、その数は多すぎる。確かにあまりに多くの家族が苦しんでいる…しかし、イスラエルはパレスチナ人を地図から消そうとはしていないし、ガザを地図上から消そうともしていない。イスラエルはジェノサイド的なテロリストの攻撃から自衛しているだけだ…あなたたちはジェノサイドという言葉の使い方を間違っている」と答えた（JP 2023）。ここでカービーがネタニヤフと同じ詭弁を弄しているのは明らかだ。ネタニヤフを含むイスラエルの高官たちはガザのパレスチナ人を一掃すべきだとの発言を繰り返しており、パレスチナ人へのジェノサイドの意思を明らかにしている。カービーのいう「ジェノサイドという言葉の正しい使い方」とはジェノサイドとはイスラエルに対する攻撃だけだという意味である。この解釈を受け入れてしまうと、ジェノサイドとはイスラエルの敵を非難する便利なレッテルに過ぎなくなり、人類全体に対する敵対行為という本来の意味が変わってしまう。こうした解釈は、イスラエルがジェノサイドの被害者という「特権」を行使してパレスチナ人を迫害しているという批判の根拠になるからだ。

「平和のためのフランスのユダヤ人ユニオンUJFP」は、イスラエル国家は反ユダヤ主義を制度的に利用することによってパレスチナ占領政策とアパルトヘイト政策を西側諸国に無条件で支持させていると批判し、この政策はイスラエルへの批判を強め、世界中のユダヤ人の存在を危うくすると警告している（UJFP）。この指摘の通り、ムスリム諸国では、イスラエルがパレスチナ人に対して何をしていても被害者「特権」によって西側諸国から免責されていることへの報復として、ユダヤ系市民が迫害されてきた。今回のガザ攻撃でも、アルカイダ系のメディア「叙事詩的戦いのための電腦軍」が10月18日に「ガザの人々に連帯する戦い方」なるパンフレットをネット上に掲載し、「世界中のどこでもユダヤ人を攻撃せよ […] 近所に住んでいるユダヤ人家庭を見つけ出し、あらゆる手段で殺害せよ」と呼びかけたし、ISのニュース機関「アル・ナバア」も翌日に「ユダヤ人と戦うための実践的方法」と題するパンフレットを公開して世界中でユダヤ人を攻撃するよう呼びかけた（MEMRI 2023）。より「穏健」なイスラム主義者たちも今回の事態を宣伝材料に利用している。トルコの新聞『イエニ・シャファク』の論説委員のセルチュク・トュルクユルマズは、ガザ侵攻によって「陰謀論を根拠に構築された<二度と起こしてはならない>というスローガンには根本的な弱点がある」ことが明らかになり、西側とイスラエルの免責特権は崩壊したと論じているし（Türkyılmaz 2023）、大統領のエルドアンは、イスラエルのガ

ガザ攻撃が人道に対する罪であることを西側諸国は「イスラエルに借りがある」ので批判できないが、トルコはそうではないので「イスラエルはテロ国家だ」とはっきり言えるのだと豪語している (TCC 2923)。彼らの目的は、人権と民主主義は西側帝国主義のイデオロギーでありイスラム的正義こそが普遍的価値であると言う持論を普及させ、「ハマスはテロ組織ではなく、土地と祖国を守るために戦う民族解放グループである」という主張を正当化することにある (Yeni Şafak 2023)。

(1) イスラエルを批判するユダヤ人は反ユダヤ主義者なのか？

ガザ侵攻を受けて、2023年12月5日に米国下院が採択した「反シオニズムが反ユダヤ主義であると明確かつ断固として宣言する」(USHR 2023) 決議は、エルドアンのような主張をするものたちにとって一層の追い風になると考えられる。イスラエル批判を反ユダヤ主義として封じ込めることで、反ユダヤ主義の意味自体が陳腐化するからである。アメリカで展開されているガザ反戦運動とシオニスト保守派の言説を検討することによって、その理由を説明しよう。

昨年の10月中旬以降、アメリカのユダヤ系団体「平和を求めるユダヤの声JVP」はイスラエルのガザ攻撃に反対する抗議活動を活発に展開している。10月16日にはワシントンの議事堂前でガザ停戦を求める集会を開き、「イスラエル軍はガザの200万人のパレスチナ人を包囲し<地獄の門を開く>という宣言通りに全面的な攻撃を行っている。イスラエル政府は完全なジェノサイドを推進しようとしている。我々は即座の停戦を要求しなければならない」と訴えた (JVP 2023a)。10月27日にはニューヨークの中央駅を占拠し (JVP 2023b)、11月6日には自由の女神像の下で座り込みを敢行し (JVP 2023c)、12月14日には全米8都市で8つの橋を封鎖する抗議行動を行なっている (JVP 2023d)。

これに対して保守派のユダヤ系組織「反誹謗中傷同盟ADL」会長のジョナサン・グリーンブラットは、JVPを「ヘイト集団」と呼び、彼らの抗議活動を「反ユダヤ主義事件」に分類した。ADLは「イスラエル批判それ自体は反ユダヤ主義ではない」としつつも「現代の反シオニズムはしばしばイスラエルの生存を支持する人々を中傷し排除する特徴を持つので反ユダヤ主義である」(ADL 2022) という立場をとっており、この論理を敷衍すると、イスラエルを批判するユダヤ人は反ユダヤ主義者であるから、ユダヤ人ではないという奇妙な論理に帰着する。実際、ADLの広報官は「JVPはユダヤ人の過激派で、ユダヤ人であるからと言って反ユダヤ主義が免罪されるわけではない」(Intercept 2023) と発言したし、トランプ政権のイスラエル大使だったデイヴィッド・フリードマンは「この集会に参加したアメリカのユダヤ人はユダヤ人ではない」と言っている (Guardian 2023)。

こうなってくると反ユダヤ主義とは何なのかという疑問が湧いてくる。これに対して、欧米諸国を中心とする43カ国が加盟する国際ホロコースト記念同盟（IHRA）が2016年に制定した「反ユダヤ主義」の定義は次のように答える。反ユダヤ主義とは、1) ユダヤ人の殺害や迫害を主張する思想、2) ユダヤ人に対する偏見、3) 一部のユダヤ人の犯罪を民族としてのユダヤ人に責任に転嫁する行為、4) ホロコーストの否定、5) ホロコーストを捏造したとユダヤ人を非難すること、6) ユダヤ人が売国奴であるとする事、7) ユダヤ民族の自決権の否定、8) イスラエルへの二重基準の適用、9) イスラエルの中傷、10) イスラエルの政策をナチスと比較すること、11) イスラエル国家の行動に対してユダヤ人に集団的責任を負わせること、である（小森 2023）。これを見ると、IHRAの考える反ユダヤ主義の大半がイスラエルを批判する行為であることが分かる。更に注意してみると、この定義では「人種」や「人種主義」という表現は使われておらず、反ユダヤ主義を人種主義の一種であるとは必ずしも考えていないことが分かる。ADLもIHRAの反ユダヤ主義の定義が「人種主義とは少しずれている」（ADL 2004）ことを認めているが、それを批判することはなく、反ユダヤ主義は人種主義と共通性を持つが他の差別とは異なる固有の特徴を持つという奇妙な論理を展開している。ユダヤ人とユダヤ教徒に対する差別・偏見・迫害はある意味で「超歴史的」とも言え、人種主義が出現する以前から存在しているので、そう言いたい気持ちも理解できるが、人種主義との関係を曖昧にすることは人種主義への批判を鈍らせることに繋がりがかねない。なぜなら、反ユダヤ主義は間違っているという言説は、この思想が人種主義だから間違っているという解釈だけでなく、間違った人種主義だと解釈する余地があるからだ。

アメリカのユダヤ系団体「人種的及び経済的正義を求めるユダヤ人たちJFREJ」は、この問題を的確に指摘している。それによると、欧州起源の米国のユダヤ系移民とその子孫たちは、20世紀後半から「白人」として遇されるようになったので、自分たちは「白人」であるという意識を持ち、米国のユダヤ人口の11～20%を占める有色のユダヤ人に人種的差別を行なっているという（Ferguson 2017）。

アメリカの多数派ユダヤ系市民の人種差別に対する無自覚さは、人種主義の定義をめぐるADLの最近の迷走にも見ることができる。ADLは元来、人種主義を「人間集団の社会的道徳的特質は生まれつきの生物学的性質によってあらかじめ決まっており、特定の人種が他より優れている、あるいは、劣っていると信じること」と定義していた。しかし、BLM運動を受けて、2020年7月に「白人を特権視する社会的に構築された人種の階層秩序に基づいて有色人種を疎外したり抑圧したりすること」という表現に改めた（Young 2022）。この方が以前のものよりアメリカの実情には合っているのだろうが、これではア

アメリカのユダヤ人の大半は白人なので人種主義の被害者ではないということになってしまう。しかし、ADLは2022年1月に女優のウーピー・ゴールドバーグのスキャンダルが起こるまでそのことに気づかなかった。ゴールドバーグはABC放送のトーク番組で、ホロコーストは「人種差別とは無関係で、白人同士の問題だった」と発言した (People 2022)。後に、ゴールドバーグはこの発言がユダヤ人の歴史に対する無知に基づく軽率なものだったと謝罪したが、ADL会長のグリーンブラットは2020年の定義に則ればゴールドバーグの発言が間違いではないことに気づいた。そこで彼は定義を変更し「人種主義は個人や組織が人種やエスニシティに基づいて個人や集団を、より好意的な評価したり、そのように扱ったりすることによって起こる」というものに変えた (Greenblatt 2022)。しかし、これではあらゆるエスニック集団が人種主義者だということになってしまう。自らの「生得文化」に愛着を抱かない人間はあまり存在しないからだ。人種主義の本質は他の集団を劣等視することで支配を正当化することであって、単なるエスノセントリズムではない。

これと比べて、左派のユダヤ系団体の反ユダヤ主義と人種主義に対する考え方は簡潔で誤解の余地がない。JVPは反ユダヤ主義とは人種主義の一種であると言い切っているし (JVP)、UJFPも反ユダヤ主義との戦いは人種主義と戦いであると述べている (UJFP)。彼らは、シオニスト保守派が「白人」であるユダヤ人への人種差別は間違っているが、劣等人種のアラブ人・パレスチナ人への人権侵害は許されると信じ、イスラエル政府のパレスチナ政策批判を封じ込めるために反ユダヤ主義の意味を変えようとしていると批判する。JVPは「パレスチナの正義を求める運動は、反人種主義の運動であり、反ユダヤ主義に対する戦いでもある。反シオニズムとは、パレスチナ人を追い出してユダヤ人だけが権利を持つ排他的な国民国家を建設する思想に反対することであり、パレスチナ人の権利と帰還権を擁護しパレスチナの土地に全ての民族が自由で安全で平等に暮らせる社会を作る運動である」 (JVP) と主張している。

保守派のシオニストたちは、こうした「思想」を「反ユダヤ主義の台頭を助長する」 (ADL 2022) と非難して封じ込めようとしているが、こうした態度は短期的にはイスラエルの極右政権の延命に寄与するかもしれないが、長期的に見ると自殺行為である。JFREJが指摘するように、アメリカの白人至上主義者は決してユダヤ人を「白人」とは認めていないし、近代の反ユダヤ主義はユダヤ人を「劣等人種」とみなしてきたからだ。

(2) 「ユダヤ陰謀論」の助長

2023年11月19日に発覚したバーヴァード大ロースクールのオンライン・ジャーナルを巡るスキャンダルも同様の問題を炙り出した。この事件は、ジャーナルの編集部がパレス

チナ人の弁護士ラベア・エグバリアに依頼した査読済み論文「現在進行中のナクバ、パレスチナ問題の法的枠組みのために」が拡大編集委員会の決定によって不掲載となったものである。論文は、まず「ジェノサイドが最悪の犯罪であるという概念は、西洋の同盟国が非西洋人にそれを行った場合にも適用されるのだろうか。これこそパレスチナが国際的な法秩序に突きつけてきた最も重要な問題である」との提起を行った後、「ガザは包囲され、住民が強制移住させられ、飢餓に苦しみ、水すらない230万人の人々が大量爆撃を受ける大虐殺が行われているが、アメリカの代表的なロースクールや法学者たちが沈黙を続け、曖昧な言葉で虐殺を否定している」のは「西洋の学術研究を貫く道徳的偽善」の一種であり「西洋の司法制度が未だに植民地主義的条件のもとで機能しているという事実を露呈」するものだと主張を展開してゆく。著者によれば、従来のヨーロッパのジェノサイド概念では「ユダヤ人・イスラエル人の命は究極の犠牲者」として扱われているのに「パレスチナ人が人間として扱われるチャンス」はなく、ガザの事態でも国際的な法秩序の中でユダヤ系イスラエル人が「哀れな市民」として保護される一方でパレスチナ人は保護の対象として扱われたいと言う。著者はその理由が西側の司法界にパレスチナ人を「野蛮な人獣」とみなす人種的偏見が蔓延っており、そのために「文明世界」であるイスラエルは「文明の敵」であるパレスチナ人に対してジェノサイドを行うことが許されているのだと論ずる。著者はこれを踏まえて、ガザの事態をジェノサイドやアパルトヘイトと認めたくないならば、ナクバという新しい犯罪概念を創設すべきだと提案して論を締め括っているが、著者の批判は法学者だけにとどまらず、アムネスティ・インターナショナルやヒューマンライツウォッチなどの人権団体を含む「西洋のリベラルな言説」総体の欺瞞にも向けられており、それらの言説には21世紀になっても「植民地主義的条件」が生き続けており、パレスチナはそれが最も明確に現れる場なのだと主張していた（The Nation 2023）。

編集部は、この論文が掲載見送りとなった理由を、その内容ではなく「編集者たちの個人的な事情」であったと釈明したが、著者は「個人的な事情」とは論文が掲載されることによって編集委員会とロースクールに対してハラスメントや身元の公開その他の脅迫が起こることを危惧したからであろうと推測している。当時のバーヴァードではこれを裏付けるような事件が起こっていた。発端となったのは「ハーヴァード・パレスチナ連帯グループ」を名乗る学生有志が10月7日の事件を受けて以下の公開書簡を発表したことである。

「我々はイスラエルの体制が現在展開中の全ての暴力に責任があると考えます。今日の事件は何もないところから起こったのではない。過去20年間、200万人以上のガザのパレスチナ人が屋根のない刑務所に無理やり閉じ込められている。イスラエル当局は「地獄の門を開く」と約束し、その言葉通り、ガザでは虐殺が行われてきた。ガザの

パレスチナ人は避難する場所も逃げる場所もない。今後、パレスチナ人はイスラエルの全面的な暴力の矢面に立たされるだろうが、アパルトヘイト体制こそが問題の本質なのだ。過去75年間、パレスチナ人の生活のあらゆる側面がイスラエルの暴力によって構造化されてきた。それは徹底的な土地の掠取に始まり、日常的な空爆、軍事検問所での好き放題の身柄拘束、強制的な家族の離散、そして意図的な殺害にまで及んでいる。パレスチナ人は緩慢かつ急速な死の状態に無理やり放置されてきた。今日、パレスチナ人の惨状は未曾有の領域に突入した。今後は植民地主義的な報復に確固たる反対を唱えねばならない。我々はハーヴァード大の構成員に現在進行中のパレスチナ人の抹殺を止めるために行動するよう呼びかける」(HPSG)

これに対して、ハーヴァード大の卒業生でヘッジファンド・マネージャのビル・アクマンが公開書簡に署名した学生を雇用しないのでの身元を公開せよとSNSで発言し、これにスイート・ガーデンの最高経営責任者のジョナサン・ネマンとイージーヘルスの最高経営責任者のデヴィッド・ドゥエルが同調し (Forbes 2023)、元学長で財務長官を務めたこともあるローレンス・サマーズも書簡に対して大学当局が糾弾声明を出すよう求める (New Yorker 2023) などユダヤ系の財界人から非難の声が相次いだ。ロースクール事件がこうした事態を懸念したものだったとする推測には妥当性がある。大学に対する圧力はその後も続き、12月5日行われた議会の公聴会で「反ユダヤ主義」に対して曖昧な態度を取ったとして、ハーヴァード大とペンシルベニア大の学長が辞任に追い込まれる事件も起こった (Reuters 2023b, 2024a)。

ガザ攻撃に反対する人々を「反ユダヤ主義者」とみなし言論の自由を封殺しようとする動きは、ヨーロッパでも広がっている。フランス政府は親パレスチナのデモを「公共の秩序を乱す恐れがある」として全面的に禁止し参加者に罰金を課すと発表し (France 24 2023a)、ドイツ連邦政府もパレスチナ連帯のデモや集会を弾圧し、ベルリン州などの幾つかの地方政府がデモを禁止した (WSWS 2023)。

フランスのユダヤ系団体「ツェデック」が指摘しているように、現在の反ユダヤ主義の最大の原因は、イスラエルの植民地主義と占領政策であり、それによってユダヤ人一般に対する反感が助長されていることに鑑みると (Tsedek 2023)、ユダヤ系経済人たちと西側政府が歩調を合わせて「反ユダヤ主義」の特殊な解釈を用いてイスラエル批判を封じ込めようとするのは非常に危険な行為と言えるだろう。こうした発言は世界経済をユダヤ人が支配しており、それに操られた西側政府はイスラエルのジェノサイドを容認しているという「ユダヤ陰謀説」に説得力を与えることになりかねないからだ。事実、10月18日のワシントンの反戦集会には白人至上主義者の国民正義党も加わっていた。このグループの

リーダーのマイク・ペイノヴィチは悪名高い2017年のシャルロットヴィルの反ユダヤ集会の主催者の一人であるが、18日の集会でも「イスラエルは純粋なジェノサイド国家であり、アメリカ人はユダヤ人が支配する銀行とメディアと政治家たちに操られているのでイスラエルを支持させられている」と発言している（Vice 2023）。

5 リベラルな価値観の危機

(1) 「新たな反ユダヤ主義に抗うマニフェスト」

保守派のシオニストと西側の指導者たちがハマスとパレスチナ人を「ジェノサイド主義者」だとするキャンペーンも極右人種主義者にとって追い風となる。「ツェデック」はこの仕組みを次のように説明している。「アラブ・ムスリム大衆の反ユダヤ感情がイスラエルの占領政策と破壊によって生まれたものであることを無視して、これをナチに代表されるヨーロッパ流の人種主義的反ユダヤ主義と同じだと決めつけてしまうと、この概念の濫用を制度化してしまう。ハマスのイデオロギーだけが反ユダヤ主義だとすれば、欧州で台頭するネオナチ思想を是認することになるし、10月7日の事件をホロコーストと同等だと主張するような思想は、イスラムがナチと同一だとする偏見を助長する」（Tsedek 2023）。つまり、反ハマス・キャンペーンは、ムスリムのユダヤ人に対する反感だけを「反ユダヤ主義」とみなすことで（イスラムとは宗教を装った全体主義だとする）「イスラモファシズム」論を掲げる極右と、その人種主義思想を受け入れ可能なものにしてしまう可能性があるのだ。

2023年11月12日にフランス各地で実施された「反ユダヤ主義に反対する国民行進」は、この懸念を裏付ける出来事であった。このデモはガザ侵攻以来急増したユダヤ系市民の襲撃事件やユダヤ系施設の破壊に抗議するという両院議長呼びかけで実現した超党派の行動で、パリのデモには首相のエリザベス・ボルヌを始めとした現職閣僚たちと前大統領のオランドとサルコジに加えて数人の元首相が参加するなど錚々たるメンバーが顔をそろえた。その中には、反ユダヤ主義者として知られる国民連合のマリーヌ・ルペン、人種主義者のエリック・ゼムールとマリオン・マレシャルも含まれていたのに対し、「不屈のフランス」のジャン＝リュック・メランションを始め、幾人かの著名な左派グループの代表は含まれていなかった。右派のメディアは、これによって「左翼イスラム主義者」が反ユダヤ主義者であることが露呈したと評したが、左派は次のように反論した。

「反ユダヤ主義に反対する国民行進は道徳的衛生という問題がある。人種主義に反対するために明らかな人種主義者と共に行進することはできない。[...] ゼムールやルペンが信奉する大代替理論はムスリムを主な標的にしているが、これは人種主義

そのものだ。[...] 反ユダヤ主義を非難しながら、アラブ人差別やイスラム差別を糾弾しないのは、人種主義には深刻なものと程度の軽いものがあるという考え方を助長する。それは結局「人種主義としての」反ユダヤ主義を助長することになる」(Grams 2023)。

左翼がこのように警戒するのは、フランスの極右がユダヤ人擁護を装って世論をイスラム移民排斥の方向に誘導する手口を熟知しているからだ。事の発端は2018年に起こった「新たな反ユダヤ主義に抗うマニフェスト」を巡る論争である。この文章は2018年4月21日に『ル・パリジアン』に掲載されたもので、『シャルリ・エブド』前編集長のフィリップ・ヴァルが起草し、サルコジや首相経験者を含む三百名近くが署名した。その内容は、イスラム主義者の反ユダヤ主義事件が頻発し、フランス各地でユダヤ系市民に対する「静かな民族浄化」が起こっているにもかかわらずリベラル派のメディアと政府はそれを黙認している。その原因はムスリムを犠牲者として擁護する左翼の反シオニズムとムスリムの有権者に迎合する政治家にある。ヨーロッパの歴史と文化に決定的な役割を果たしてきたユダヤ思想が一掃されれば「フランスはフランスでなくなる」ので反ユダヤ主義との戦いは「全国民の大義」である。「こうしたことに鑑みて、我々は、ユダヤ人やキリスト教徒や無宗教者を殺し迫害するよう唱えているコーランの章句は時代遅れなものだとの刻印がイスラムの神学の権威によって押されることを要求する」というものであった (Le Parisien 2018)。このマニフェストは「反ユダヤ主義」と戦うという触れ込みだが、本当の目的は信仰としてのイスラム全般を「テロの動機となる宗教」として禁止することであり、この思想信条の自由の否定に繋がる要求も「反ユダヤ主義」との戦いを掲げれば受け入れ可能になると目論まれていた (Le Monde 2018)。UJFPが指摘するように、「反ユダヤ主義」の特殊な解釈はムスリム差別を正当化するためのものであり、人種主義を助長することに繋がるのだ。

(2) 「カーゴパンツをはいたナチ」

イスラエルのガザ攻撃を容認する態度は、人種主義の台頭を助長するだけでなく、リベラルな価値観そのものを空洞化させる危険性も孕んでいる。ウクライナ戦争との対比によって普遍的な人権と民主主義の擁護というリベラルな言説総体の欺瞞性が露呈してしまうからだ。

先に確認したようにイスラエルの侵攻以後、西側諸国の指導者たちのウクライナとガザに対する対照的な態度が倫理崩壊を引き起こしつつあるが、それに加えて、西側メディアの関心がウクライナから中東に移ったことで、ウクライナ支援に対する関心も低下してい

る。イタリア首相のジョルジャ・メローニの最近の発言は、この状況の下で西側政府がゼレンスキー政権に対する態度を変化させる兆候と見ることができる。メローニは、首相就任後に持論である親ロシア路線を封印してEUの親ウクライナ路線に歩調を合わせてきたが、ロシアのコメディアンがイタズラ電話に引っかかって「ウクライナ戦争の長期に誰もが疲れ果てていると思う。正直に言って、終わりにすべきだと皆が気づく時が近づいている」と本音を漏らしてしまった（RIA 2023a）。

米大統領選の共和党候補者討論会でのヴィヴェック・ラマスワミの発言もこうした潮目の変化を示すものと解釈できる。2023年11月8日に行われた討論会でラマスワミは「ウクライナ戦争を善と悪の戦いと考えるべきではない。プーチンが悪党だからといってウクライナが善玉とは限らない。ウクライナは民主主義の模範ではないからだ。この国は11の野党を活動禁止にし、全てのメディアを国営放送に一本化した。これは民主主義ではない。更に、ウクライナはアメリカ国民がもっと金を出さないなら今年の選挙を行わないとも脅している。この国はカーゴパンツをはいたコメディアンがナチを高い地位につけて賛美している。そいつの名前はゼレンスキーだ」と発言した（Business Today 2023）。ゼレンスキー政権が腐敗したオリガルヒと極右勢力の影響力下にあって権威主義化しつつあるのは周知の事実であるが、西側メディアはこれに触れずにきた。ウクライナがロシアの権威主義体制の脅威から民主主義世界全体を防衛しているという価値観が力を持ってきたからだが、候補者討論会という衆目の集まる場でその欺瞞を公然と口にできるようになったという事実は、ラマスワミが泡沫候補に過ぎないということを差し引いても、世論の変化を示す兆候と言える。また、この発言が左派やリベラル派からではなく、保守派の共和党から出ていることも重要である。リベラル的言説の欺瞞性を「ポリティカル・コレクト」と批判するのは保守主義者の常套手段であり、ラマスワミ発言の真意は、民主的でないウクライナを支援するバイデン政権の欺瞞を批判することにあるからだ。これはリベラル民主主義自体を解体する試みと捉えることができる。

こうした西側の言説の綻びはウクライナ戦争でのロシアの立場を強化することに繋がる。ガザでの事態を容認している西側にはウクライナ戦争でロシアを批判する資格はないと反論する余地が生まれるからだ。既にプーチンは2023年12月14日の公開討論会で、世界中がガザの残虐行為を目にしているが「ロシアの特別軍事作戦とガザで起こっていることが全く違うのは[誰が見ても]分かるはずだ。あんなことはウクライナでは起こっていない」と語っている（President 2023）。セルゲイ・ラヴロフ外相も12月28日のインタビューで、イスラエルはガザ侵攻でロシアの「特別軍事作戦」と同じことをしているのに批判を受けていないが、ロシアもイスラエルを手本にして、反ナチを口実にすれば国際的に非難され

ない手口を学ぶべきだと発言したり)。こうした論法が他の国々にも採用されてゆけば、非人道的行為が容認される状況が一般化することになりかねない。

6 むすびにかえて

イスラエルのガザ攻撃は極めて規模の大きな民族浄化であり、ジェノサイドに発展する可能性が高い。それにもかかわらず西側諸国のリーダーたちは攻撃を容認し、ジェノサイドを防止する義務を怠っている。このことがもたらすモラルハザードの影響は深刻となるだろう。イスラエルを批判するのは「反ユダヤ主義」であるという論理でガザでの民族浄化を容認すれば、人種主義を助長するからだ。ハマスの攻撃を「ジェノサイド」と表現し、イスラム主義を反ユダヤ主義と同義とみなすキャンペーンは、既に極右の人種主義の台頭を促進している。ユダヤ人とムスリムへの人種差別は人種主義以前から存在するヨーロッパのキリスト教文化を背景とした異教徒への差別を基盤にしており、反ユダヤ主義と反イスラム主義は同根である。そもそも反ユダヤ主義とは反セム主義であり、人種主義者はユダヤ人とアラブ人を共にセム人種に分類してきたのだから、反イスラム主義が拡大すれば必然的に反ユダヤ主義も拡大する。左派のユダヤ系団体が主張するように、人種主義との戦いに優先順位はなく、反イスラム主義との戦いは反ユダヤ主義との戦いでもある。人種主義は北米・欧州・オセアニア全体に拡大しており、ムスリムだけでなく、アジア人一般に対する差別も高まっていることを考えると、この問題は日本にも無関係ではない。

ガザ攻撃によってリベラルな言説の信用が失墜しつつある状況もこうした懸念を深めている。極右勢力はリベラルな規範を陳腐化させることで人種主義的で排外主義的な制度を根付かせようと画策しているからだ。それを防ぐためにもガザ戦争を早期に終結させ、ネタニヤフ政権の幹部たちをジェノサイド罪で裁くことが必要だ²⁾。もちろん、それだけで

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- 1) ラヴロフの発言の詳細は以下の通り：「ネタニヤフはハマスを軍事的に根絶せねばならないと宣言したが、これはウクライナの非武装化と似ている。ガザから過激派を一掃しなければならないとも宣言したが、これは脱ナチ化と似ている。それなのに、ライル・ラビド前首相が外相時代に我が国の特別軍事作戦に示した反応には驚いた。「ロシアは厚顔無恥にも併合したウクライナの領土で市民に武力を行使している」と言ったのだ。これは不実な発言だと私は彼に言った。ネタニヤフは世界中で批判されているが、ロシアに対して言われているようなことを言わせない。だから我が国はイスラエルと共通する歴史に対して、特にナチズムとの戦いに対して慎重に対応しなければならない。両国が歴史的な背景で結びついているのは重要なことだ」(RIA 2023b)
 - 2) 国際刑事裁判所ICCは2021年にイスラエルとパレスチナ武装勢力の戦争犯罪の調査を開始したが、10月7日以降の攻撃を捜査対象に加えた。ICCの主席検事カリム・ハンは11月17日に広く情報提供を呼びかけ、12月3日に捜査を強化すると発表した。ICC prosecutor vows to ‘further intensify’ Gaza probe, France 24, 03/12/2023：ICCの情報提供要請に応じて、デモクラシー・アラブワールド・ナウDAWNは12月20日に人道に対する罪の容疑者としてイスラエル軍の40人の司令官の名簿を提出した。その中には防衛相ガラント、軍政責任者アリアン、406機械化旅団司令官ドヴィル・エドリが含まれている。International

はパレスチナ問題の根本的な解決にはならない。その答えはイスラエルとパレスチナの人々が出すべきものであるが、JVPの主張を紹介しておきたい。二国解決が現実的と見られているが、選択肢はそれだけではないからだ。

我々はアメリカとパレスチナを含む世界の全ての人々が自由で公正で平等で尊厳を持って生きられることを目指している。我々は全ての人々の解放のために戦っている…我々はユダヤ系イスラエル人がパレスチナ人を抑圧するために徴兵されたり、他者を脱人間化して自分自身の人間性を劣化させたりしないよう解放されることを願っている。我々は、ユダヤ系イスラエル人が優位性ではなく平等に基づき、支配に代わって尊厳を重んじ、略奪ではなく民主主義に根差した公正な社会を、全ての命が尊重される社会を、パレスチナ人と共に建設することを思い描いている（JVP）。

Criminal Court: Investigate These Israeli Suspects in War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity Probe, Democracy for the Arab World Now, December 20, 2023

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The Israeli War on Gaza from a Comparative Genocide Studies Perspective

By TETSUYA SAHARA*

The Israeli war on Gaza has resulted in very heavy civilian casualties. Some people have called the war “horrific,” the “deadliest,” or a “humanitarian catastrophe-tsunami.” Others claim that it is a genocide. In order to grasp the extent of the war’s brutality, this article compared it with three cases that are recognized as genocides either by international institutions or Western authorities: the Herero and Nama massacre (1904–5), the Armenian deportation (1915–6), and the fall of Srebrenica (1995). The analysis found many common aspects among the four cases. The scale of violence of the recent Israeli war has already exceeded the initial stages of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and is becoming an immense ethnic cleansing comparable with the Armenian case. In light of the bellicose discriminatory discourses of the Israeli leaders, systematic destruction of civilian targets, forced starvation, and rapidly deteriorating hygiene conditions in Gaza, there are ample grounds to believe that the war on Gaza will develop into a full-fledged genocide if unchecked.

The Israeli military campaign against the Gaza Strip, following the October 7 attacks, has claimed (at the time of writing of this article) more than 26,000 Palestinian lives, mostly women and children. Experts have described the campaign in the following terms: “horrific” (AA 2023b), “outpacing any other conflicts” (Axios 2023), “unparalleled and unprecedented” (UN 2023d), “the most destructive” (CBC 2023), the “deadliest in the 21st century” (WP 2023), and “a perfect kind of humanitarian catastrophe-tsunami” (FT 2023). Some Muslim and Latin American leaders have even called it a “genocide.”¹ Probably one of the harshest denouncers is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has not only repeatedly used the G-word but even described Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu as no less evil than Adolf Hitler (AA 2023d). The frequent use of the G-word, however, does not seem effective to deter the Israelis from acting more brutally against the Gazans.

There is another concern: The political instrumentalization of the word “genocide” risks

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¹ Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi accused the campaign as being “genocide” against Palestinians (Reuters 2023). Former Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, posted on X on December 5, 2023: “What we are seeing is an attempt by the Israelis to commit genocide on the Palestinians.” Ramzan Kadyrov, President of Chechnya, commented that “What is happening in the Gaza Strip is clear evidence of the genocide of Palestinian Muslims” (Caucasus Watch 2023). Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro called on the world to “react and say no to the genocide against the people of Gaza.” Cuban President Miguel Diaz Canel accused the “Zionist barbarism” for “the genocide that is being perpetrated against the Palestinians.” Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva referred to “a genocide that led to the killing of [thousands of] children who had nothing to do with this war.” The Minister of the Presidency, Maria Nela Prada of Bolivia, condemned the Israeli campaign of “genocide unfolding inside the Gaza Strip” (Cradle 2023).

the banalization of the term and makes obsolete the notion as the crime of crimes. In exchange for Erdoğan's slander, for example, Netanyahu replied that "Erdogan, who is committing genocide against the Kurds, is the last person who can preach morality to us" (GI 2023k). For Netanyahu, it is Hamas who are committing a genocide, and "Hamas are the new Nazis" (TI 2023a). Therefore, Netanyahu asserted that the Israeli military is "the most moral army in the world," fighting to eliminate "the most abhorrent and brutal terrorist organization in the world" (GI 2023k). Some Western leaders echoed his views. For instance, Ursula von der Leyen, head of the European Committee, described the October 7 attacks as "the most heinous assault against Jews since the Holocaust" (European Commission 2023). John Kirby, US National Security Council spokesperson, when asked by a journalist about his response to those who called the US President "Genocide Joe," remarked that "What Hamas wants is genocide ... Israel is trying to defend itself against a genocidal terrorist threat ... If we are going to start using that word [genocide], fine, let's use it appropriately" (JP 2023). The proposal for an appropriate use of the term sounds nice, but one may wonder if Kirby's and Netanyahu's use of the word is appropriate?

I. What is a genocide?

According to the International Criminal Court (ICC), a genocide is a crime committed with the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a "national, ethnic, racial or religious group" by killing its members or by "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group" (ICC). The definition is rather vague; therefore, it is necessary to establish eligible criteria based on concrete examples. Since it started in 2002, however, ICC has filed only one person for genocide, Omar Bashir, former Sudanese President, and the case remains in the pre-trial stage. The other cases judged as genocides by international judicial organizations are those concerning the massacre in Rwanda in 1994 and the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992–5. Thus, to date, we have very few examples of genocide confirmed as such by international law courts. Looking back in history, however, there are many cases that are believed to be applicable to the ICC rulings. The widest accepted case is the Holocaust—the Nazi persecution of European Jews before and during WWII. The 1930s–40s saw several other atrocities on a genocidal scale, such as "Holodomor" (1932–3), the Rape of Nanking (1937), the Serb massacre by the Independent State of Croatia (1941–5), the "Devil's satiety" of the Japanese 731 unit (1940–5), and the mass deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the Chechens, and the Ingush by the Stalin regime (1944–8). Later, the Khmer Rouge atrocities in Cambodia (1975–9), the elimination of the East Timorese (1974–99) and the Guatemalan Mayans (1962–96), and the Sabra and Shatila massacre of the Palestinian refugees (1982) are often classified as genocides.

Just mentioning a handful of cases, we can notice that these incidents are grossly dissimilar, taking place in different socio-political contexts, with a variety of scale and quite diverse methods of atrocities. This testifies that every genocide is unique in essence. Yet those diversities may perplex the people who are looking for a simple answer or a certain reference point. However, of what use is a reference point for genocide and for gauging the degree of genocidalness of respective cases? Does it make sense to say that one case is more genocidal than the other? Or is it morally acceptable to say that "It's

acceptable, because this case is less genocidal than that”? Of course not. Instead, it is our moral duty to condemn and prevent any atrocity against anyone. Having said that, however, the discussion does not exclude any attempts for comparison. Quite the contrary. Indeed, one cannot grasp the nature of what is taking place in front of his/her eyes, without taking into consideration similar incidents from the past. The importance of comparative genocide studies lies in this context. The comparison of past genocidal incidents enriches our knowledge of human atrocities and helps us find the way to prevent them from recurring.

What will be the starting point? Before starting our discussion, it is prudent to define the notion of comparison. A comparison is an act of taking up different things to find similarities and dissimilarities among them. This is quite different thing from an equation which considers one thing to be the same as another. To compare a past genocide with another does not mean equating them. Unfortunately, there is a dominant trend for this type of confusion in a wide circle of intellectual societies. The ungrounded reproach against Masha Gessen for her essay on the Holocaust is one of the latest examples of the confusion. Gessen, a well-known Russian-American journalist of Jewish origin, who had been awarded the German *Hannah Arendt Award for Political Thought*, was treated with displeasure by the two sponsors of the prize, the Heinrich Boll Foundation and the City of Bremen, because she compared the Warsaw Ghetto with the Israeli policy concerning the Gaza Strip (Gessen 2023). Tarik Cyril Amar criticizes the “extremely aggressive lobbies in the West” who set the rules that “comparing the Holocaust with anything is absolutely verboten” (RT 2023). His alarm is especially pertinent, as we are witnessing such people as Erdoğan preaching about what democracy is, based on the assumption that the West has given Netanyahu a free hand in Gaza, because “The slightest criticism [of Israel] is suppressed by attaching [to it] the label of antisemitism, and is considered a crime” (AA 2023d).

Apart from such emotional reactions, there are at least two reasons that make it better to avoid a comparison with the Holocaust. First, the Nazi policy of exterminating European Jews was a very complex phenomenon that had several different phases and dimensions. In a way, one can say it was a set of genocidal incidents, albeit committed by a single body politic. Second, the Holocaust was exceptionally immense and dwarfs all the other atrocities ever committed in human history. It was the genocide of genocides. This very fact, however, makes it unsuitable to be a “model case,” with the attendant risk of saying that no other incidents are genocide because they are less atrocious than the Holocaust. To properly assess the Israeli campaign in Gaza, it is necessary to find other reference points. To this end, the author takes up the following three cases: the German colonial massacre of the Herero and Namaqua people in Namibia (1904–5), the Armenian deportation by the Ottoman government during WWI, and the Serb atrocities against Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s. There are many other (possibly more suitable) cases for comparison, but the author picks up the three on the basis that they are relatively well-documented studies and widely, if not unanimously, accepted as cases of genocide.

Before entering into a close comparison among the four cases, it may be useful to survey the general course of events of the respective cases and to highlight the essence of their brutalities.

II. Israeli military operations in Gaza

The Gaza Strip was a part of the Ottoman administrative unit, the Kudüs Sancağı (Jerusalem district) or Filistin (Palestine). During the Ottoman rule, Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs comprised the overwhelming majority (more than 90% at the beginning of the 20th century). After WWI, Palestine became a British mandate of the League of Nations, and many European Jews immigrated to Palestine. Their share increased from 12% in 1922 to 31% in 1947 (Hagopian & Zahlan 1974). In the wake of WWII, the United Nations proposed the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. As Arab countries rejected the plan, the first Arab–Israeli war broke out in 1948. The victorious Israel annexed 77% of the territory, and more than 700,000 Palestinians were forced to flee their homes. Many of them took shelter in Gaza. After the 1967 war, Israel took possession of the Strip and put the Palestinians under its occupational regime. As a result, the Gazans were to endure constant oppression, economic exploitation, and confinement. In 1987, Gaza Palestinians started the First Intifada. The protest continued until the early 1990s and eventually gave rise to the Oslo Accords, which were signed in 1993 (King 2007). However, as Israel did not fulfill its promise of the two-state solution, the Second Intifada broke out in 2000. Weary of the strenuous mass resistance, Israel unilaterally announced the withdrawal of its military and settlers, leaving Gaza for the Palestine Authorities in 2005. The next year, Hamas won the elections and subsequently took control of Gaza. In response, Israel introduced a heavy blockade. During the long siege, restrictions were tightened on the movement of people and goods, making life unbearable—families were separated, medical and educational services were degraded, the economy slumped, and poverty and unemployment were perpetuated (Vox 2023). The UN chief, Antonio Guterres, pointed out that “The Palestinian people have been subjected to 56 years of suffocating occupation. They have seen their land steadily devoured by settlements and plagued by violence; their economy stifled; their people displaced and their homes demolished” (UN 2023g). Additionally, Israeli troops killed more than 3,000 Palestinian civilians in the four consecutive invasions (2008–09, 2012, 2014, and 2021). According to Human Rights Watch, the Israeli occupation of Gaza was characterized by unlawful killings, forced displacement, abusive detention, unjustified confinement, and other discriminatory policies—major violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (IHRW 2016). Amnesty International has described these situations as “apartheid” (AI 2022). It is prudent to say that the Israeli policies mentioned are the background to the October 7 incidents.

Let us take a brief look at the Israeli military operations in Gaza that have started since October 7, 2023. At 6:30 a.m. local time, Palestinian militants launched massive attacks against the border posts manned by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). After neutralizing military bases, the Palestinian militants infiltrated Israel, killing 375 IDF soldiers and 764 civilians, and took some 248 persons hostage. Although the main force was the al-Qassam Brigades, a military wing of Hamas, the raid was in fact a joint operation of six different groups, including Communist DFLP (Flashpoint 2023). Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu tweeted a state of war, and his government formally declared war against Hamas the next day, mobilizing 300,000 reservists with the aim to “eliminate Hamas.” As part of their tactics, Israel started a siege against Gaza. On October 9, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced a total blockade of the Strip, and Israeli authorities began cutting electricity and stopping the entry of food and fuel. As a result, the sole power plant in Gaza stopped its operations on October 11. The Israeli government reiterated that Gaza would

not receive water, fuel, or electricity so long as the hostages were not freed. On October 15, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) announced that drinking water was running out in Gaza. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who visited the Rafah Crossing on October 20, stated that “Two million people are suffering enormously, have no water, no food, no medicine, no fuel, under fire, that needs everything to survive” (UN 2023b). Subsequently, human aid was allowed to enter Gaza, but the amount was far from adequate. On December 7, a UN representative declared its aid program no longer functioning (UN OCHA 2023c), and civic order began to “break down” (Guardian 2023). As a result, many Gazans began to starve. According to a UN report on December 21, over 570,000 people were starving (France 24 2023). The UN aid chief warned of a serious risk of starvation and famine, saying that “Half the people in northern Gaza and more than one third of displaced people in the south are simply starving” (UN 2023f). Furthermore, the abrupt breakout of a large number of refugees seriously deteriorated the sanitary conditions in the Strip. The UN rights chief Volker Türk remarked on December 28 that “The lack of food and basic essentials as well as poor hygiene are making the already dire living conditions of displaced people even worse and fueling disease.” Indeed, as the Israelis had inflicted serious damage on hospitals, medical service was unavailable for most Gazans. The UN emergency relief coordinator Martin Griffiths warned that “Gaza is a public health disaster in the making” (UN 2023h).

In the meantime, the Israelis intensified military operation. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has been conducting massive air strikes over Gaza since October 7, destroying a large number of residential buildings, including schools, universities, and refugee camps. More than 70% of Gazan homes had been destroyed by the end of 2023 (Aljazeera 2023d). The oldest church (the Greek Orthodox St. Prophyrius Church) and mosque (the Great Omari Mosque) in Gaza were reduced to rubble. The bombing resulted in a massive amount of civilian victims. In early December, the UN aid chief described the civilian casualties of IDF operations thus: “More than 17,000 Palestinians have reportedly been killed since the start of Israel’s military operations, including over 4,000 women and 7,000 children. Tens of thousands are reported to have been injured, and many are missing, presumably under the rubble” (UN 2023f). To make things worse, the IDF targeted many shelters for the displaced people. By December 5, 2023, at least 222 IDPs sheltering in UNRWA camps had been killed (UN OCHA 2023b). These acts have been condemned as intentional killing of civilians. For instance, Human Rights Watch denounced IAF for having used white phosphorus against civilian targets (HRW 2023). Amnesty International claimed to have enough documentation attesting to the IDF’s intentional massacre of civilians (AI 2023). Even US President Joe Biden conceded that Israel had been carrying out “indiscriminate bombing” (AP 2023). Also, an IDF official, after killing 68 people in the Maghazi camp, admitted that the type of munition did not match the nature of the attack, causing extensive collateral damage that could have been avoided (TI 2023g).

The IDF started a large-scale ground operation on October 28. As the troops advanced into dense, urban neighborhoods, the civilian casualties rose rapidly. The IDF had divided the Strip into two by November 5 and encircled its northern half with a total communications outage (Aljazeera 2023b). Pressured by the US and international appeals for a brief pause to get aid to desperate civilians, Israel accepted a temporary ceasefire. The IDF withdrew from Gaza City without achieving any of its initial objectives on November 24. During this short interlude, the humanitarian situation in Gaza did not improve at all. The second ground operation started on December 1. The IDF announced that it would

expand ground operations into all of Gaza, including the southern enclaves that had previously been designated as “safe zones.” During the land operation, Israeli soldiers committed a variety of atrocities, including storming several hospitals, arresting many medical staff, and randomly shooting at and killing many civilians, who were apparently noncombatants. For example, a sniper massacred a Christian mother and daughter sheltering at the Holy Family Catholic Church (TI 2023h). The IDF even executed three of their own soldiers who had taken hostages. The hostages somehow escaped and were approaching for help, half naked and with a white flag, on December 15. Two were killed on the spot, and the third took shelter in a nearby building. A soldier chased this third man and shot him dead (TI 2023i). The IDF said that this was a mistake, but the suspicion of willful killing increased when the IDF disclosed that 18 troops were dead due to “mistaken identification” (TI 2024b). There are also suspicions of random roundups of civilians and hostage-taking. For instance, the IDF announced that they had taken captive more than 1,000 “ Hamas members ” on December 17. Their allegation was rebutted by Euro-Med Monitor, who accused the Israeli army of severe human rights abuse against the detained Palestinian civilians (EMHRM 2023). Despite these accusations, the IDF expanded its scope of operation, making the daily death toll well exceed the level of 250 deaths toward the end of 2023.

The Israeli operation has also brought about large-scale displacement. On October 13, the IDF warned Palestinians to leave northern Gaza within 24 hours on the pretext that the area would be a battlefield. By October 20, about 1.4 million people had been internally displaced, and more than 544,000 had taken shelter in a total of 147 UNRWA improvised facilities (UN OCHA 2023a). As the second land operation started, the number of IDPs grew. On December 3, the UN human rights chief said the following: “As a result of Israel’s conduct of hostilities and its orders for people to leave the north and parts of the south, hundreds of thousands are being confined into ever smaller areas in southern Gaza without proper sanitation, access to sufficient food, water and health supplies, even as bombs rain down around them. There is no safe place in Gaza” (UN 2023e). UNRWA confirmed that 85% of the population had been displaced by December 8.

Many experts have expressed their deep concern that these atrocities by the Israeli army amount to war crimes. As for the siege and blockade of the Strip, the UN human rights chief expressed “grave concerns around willful killing of civilians, firing of indiscriminate rockets, indiscriminate attacks using explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas, forms of collective punishment, obstruction of humanitarian aid, and – all forbidden under international law” (UN 2023e). Oxfam’s Regional Middle East Director accused Israel of using starvation as a weapon of war (Oxfam 2023). As for the massive displacement, Antonio Guterres mentioned that people in Gaza were “being told to move like human pinballs – ricocheting between ever-smaller slivers of the south, without any of the basics for survival” and denounced the increasing pressure for mass displacement across the border into Egypt (UN 2023f). Egyptian authorities shared the same concern and warned Israel not to push Palestinians into its territory. The Palestine Permanent Observer described these pressures as ethnic cleansing. He even claimed that “wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians, destruction of life-sustaining infrastructure, intentional starvation, and displacement of Palestinians from their land with no prospect of returning” attested to “Israel’s overt intention to destroy the Palestinian people” (UN 2023c). South Africa, for its part, filed a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on December 29, 2023, accusing Israel of committing an act of genocide (ICJ 2023). Subsequently, the ICJ’s

preliminary ruling confirmed that “the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide [of Israel]” is “plausible” (ICJ 2024:19).

Discourses of Israeli Leadership

Since the hostilities broke out, the Israeli leadership has made clear their war aims: “The first goal is the elimination of Hamas. The second goal is returning all of our hostages. The third goal is to ensure that after Hamas is eliminated, the Gaza Strip does not go back to being a threat to the State of Israel, to any part of the State of Israel” (GI 2023i). However, they insist that these aims are necessary for national security and are therefore defensive measures. They repeatedly underscored the defensive nature of their military operations. Netanyahu took the October 7 attacks not only as a provocation but also as an undeclared war by Hamas, saying that “Hamas invaded Israeli territory and murdered innocent citizens, including children and the elderly. Hamas has started a brutal and evil war.” For him, the military actions of the IDF were not reprisals but self-defense: “We defend the right of Israel existing, of defending itself [and its] security for its people” (GI 2023e). For Netanyahu, the grand operation was a part of the defensive measures, “our second war of independence” (GI 2023f), and “They [the IDF soldiers] are defending our home” (GI 2023h).

The Israeli leadership, however, has articulated that their “defensive” measures have no limit. On October 7, Netanyahu made it clear that he would destroy the Gaza Strip and ordered its entire population to “evacuate.” He also said that “All of the places which Hamas is deployed, hiding and operating in, that wicked city, we will turn them into rubble. I say to the residents of Gaza: Leave now because we will operate forcefully everywhere” (GI 2023a). Two days later, Yoav Gallant announced, “We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly” (TI 2023d), and the next day, he reiterated that “Gaza will never return to what it was” (TI 2023b). The same day, Ghassan Alian, the head of Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), uploaded a video statement in which he said as follows: “The residents of Gaza are celebrating [Hamas]. Human animals must be treated as such [...] You wanted hell, you will get hell” (TI 2023c). Those remarks suggest that the Israeli leadership had conceived the idea to impose inhumane conditions for the entire population in Gaza. If so, this can amount to a collective punishment, prohibited by Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 4 of the Additional Protocol II. This suspicion grew when Israeli President Isaac Herzog made it clear that Israel was not distinguishing between militants and civilians in Gaza by saying, “It’s an entire nation out there that is responsible. It’s not true: this rhetoric about civilians not aware not involved. It’s absolutely not true.” (ITV 2023). Israeli Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu echoed Herzog by saying, “There is no such thing as uninvolved civilians in Gaza” (TI 2023e).

Subsequently, Netanyahu changed his tone slightly and called civilians “to go south to safe zones” (GI 2023c). However, when the IDF started bombing southern Gaza in December, the “safe zone” effectively disappeared. This action suggests that the Israeli leadership intends to eliminate all of the Palestinians from Gaza. There are many remarks that support this assumption. For instance, on November 5, Eliyahu was reported as saying that “They [the Palestinians] can go to Ireland or deserts, [but] the monsters in Gaza should find a solution by themselves” (TI 2023e). Two Knesset members, Danny Danon, former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, and Ram Ben-Barak, former deputy director of the intelligence agency Mossad, published an article in *The Wall Street Journal* on

November 13, 2023 in which they called for “countries around the world to accept limited numbers of Gazan families who have expressed a desire to relocate” (WSJ 2023). The next day, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich posted on Facebook, “I welcome the initiative of members of Knesset Ram Ben-Barak and Danny Danon on the voluntary immigration of Gaza Arabs to the countries of the world. This is the right humanitarian solution for the residents of Gaza and the entire region” (Aljazeera 2023c). Likud Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel supported the plan by saying that “The international community should promote the voluntary resettlement of Palestinians in Gaza, for humanitarian reasons” (TI 2023f). Subsequently, the “voluntary resettlement” of the Palestinians has become a key agenda of the Netanyahu government. The Israeli prime minister discussed the “voluntary migration” during a Likud party meeting on December 25, 2023 and was reported as saying, “Our problem is the countries that are willing to absorb [the Palestinians], and we are working on it” (Aljazeera 2023a). The National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Smotrich proposed the deportation of Palestinians as a prerequisite for securing stability during the respective party faction meetings on January 1, 2024. Gvir told members of his far-right Otzma Yehudit party that the war had presented an “opportunity to concentrate on encouraging the migration of the residents of Gaza” and called such a policy “a correct, just, moral and humane solution.” Smotrich, on his part, told members of his Religious Zionism party that the “correct solution” to the conflict was “to encourage the voluntary migration of Gaza’s residents to countries that will agree to take in the refugees” (TI 2024a). On January 3, 2024, *The Times of Israel* reported that the government had secretly contacted Congolese authorities to this end (TI 2024c). In light of the ongoing Israeli wanton destruction of civilian targets, there are ample grounds to believe that the Israeli authorities are mulling over ethnic cleansing of Gazans.

No matter whether the IDF operations are a part of an Israeli plan for ethnic cleansing or not, it is undeniable that there has been an immense number of Palestine civilian casualties. However, Netanyahu rebuffs Israeli responsibility and puts the blame on Hamas by saying, “This will be a different kind of war ... Every day, they [Hamas] perpetrate a double war crime: targeting our civilians while hiding behind their civilians, embedding themselves in the civilian population and using them as human shields ... As Israel legitimately targets terrorists, civilians are unfortunately harmed. Hamas is responsible and should be held accountable for all civilian casualties” (GI 2023d). Netanyahu attempts to justify such a sophism by employing moral infusing discourses. From time to time, he describes Hamas as an “absolute evil.” When he met the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, he said that “Hamas is the savagery that we only remember from the Nazi crimes from the Holocaust. Hamas are the new Nazis. Hamas is ISIS, and in some instances, worse than ISIS ... This is a part of an axis of evil: of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas ... We must take action to defeat Hamas to ensure that this doesn’t happen again. But this is ... the battle of civilization against barbarism. And if it’s not stopped here, this savagery will reach you very soon and reach the entire world” (GI 2023c). Yet even after international society fully realized the immense civilian casualties in Gaza and the pressure for a ceasefire rose high, Netanyahu stated that “Calls for a ceasefire are calls for Israel to surrender to Hamas, to surrender to terrorism, to surrender to barbarism. That will not happen” (GI 2023g). By the same token, he vindicated the IDF war crime charges by saying that “They [the IDF soldiers] are committed to eradicating this evil from the world ... Whoever dares to accuse our soldiers of war crimes are hypocritical liars ... Israel is fighting ... the war of humanity against

barbarism” (GI 2023f).

These moralistic remarks can entail serious consequences, with Netanyahu choosing to recite sinister phrases from the Tanakh. On October 12, 2023, in a speech at the Knesset, he mentioned that “The ancient command ‘Remember what Amalek did to you’ [is] ringing in our ears” (GI 2023b). On October 28, when Israeli forces were preparing for their land invasion of Gaza, Netanyahu told the soldiers, “You must remember what Amalek has done to you” (AA 2023a). He repeated the same phrase in a letter addressed to the Israeli soldiers and officers on November 3 (AA 2023c). The legend of the Amalekites in Tanakh can be considered an ancient case of genocide. The English translation of the phrase goes as follows: “So said the Lord of Hosts, ‘I remember that which Amalek did to Israel ... you shall smite Amalek, and you shall utterly destroy all that is his, and you shall not have pity on him: and you shall slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass ... Saul completely destroyed all the people with the edge of the sword” (Tanakh). As sociologist Michael Freeman put it, the moral theories of just war that are deeply rooted in Judeo-Christian values can also justify genocide (Freeman 1994: 280). In this regard, Netanyahu’s insistence on the “just war against evil,” coupled with the ominous Biblical legend, can incite some extreme forms of brutality.

III. Three Cases of “Genocide”

Now we compare these Israeli actions with past incidents that are recognized as genocides. We will take three cases as examples: the German colonial massacre of the Herero and Nama people (1904–05), the Armenian deportation (1915–16), and the Bosnian civil war (1992–95). The three incidents took place in different times and contexts, with different methods, and on varying scales. The target populations differed as well: an indigenous population in a European colony, a religious minority in a Muslim state, and fellow citizens in a former socialist country. For all these differences, they are all recognized as cases of genocide by international institutions in general and the Western nations in particular. The Namibian case is classified by the UN Report on Genocide (1985) as one of the earliest cases of genocide in the 20th century (UN 1985). In March, 2021, Germany acknowledged that their colonial army had committed an act of genocide “from today’s perspective” (Joint Declaration 2021). The same UN report also classified the Armenian case as genocide. The US officially recognized the “Armenian Genocide” on May 28, 1951. The Reagan administration proclaimed the Armenian Genocide as such on April 22, 1981, and the US Parliament adopted the resolution of official recognition for three times (1975, 1984, and 2019) (USHR 2019). The European Parliament declared in 1987 that “the tragic events in 1915–1917 involving the Armenians living in the territory of the Ottoman Empire constitute genocide” (European Parliament 1987). The Bosnian case was officially judged as a crime of genocide by the ICTY and its successor organ, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). Now, let us take a brief look at each case to find general common features.

The massacre of the Herero and the Nama

The massacre of the Herero and the Nama peoples took place in the context of colonialism. Germany formally colonized the territory of today’s Republic of Namibia in 1884, began to deprive the native people of their land and properties, and subsequently used the people as slave labor. This was a part of the well-defined policy to turn Namibia into German land,

and several thousands of German settlers were brought in to do so. The Germans seized the huge swaths of land and a large number of cattle possessed by the Herero, the largest ethnic group in the colony. The dispossession led to pauperization, and many Hereros were forced to work either in German farms or in construction plants as cheap laborers under systematic surveillance and discrimination. As a result, more than 8,000 Hereros stood in arms against German colonial rule in January 1904 (Drechsler 1980: 181–3). Unprepared for such a massive attack, the German colonial force could not fight off the Herero, and more than 100 German settlers and soldiers were killed (Bridgman 1981: 74). The reinforcements, led by Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha, arrived in June and started a counteroffensive, destroying the Herero settlements to stamp out the resistance. Faced with the brutal tactics of the Germans, many Herero fighters, together with their wives and children, escaped into the desert area. Von Trotha escalated the violence and ordered the extermination of all Herero people on October 2, 1904. His soldiers ruthlessly pursued the Herero by shooting and killing thousands of men, women, and children. The Germans blocked the rest of the Herero into the desert, expecting them to perish from thirst and starvation (Sarkin 2011: 114–6). The next year, the Nama, the second largest ethnic group, stood up to fight against the Germans. Von Trotha issued the second order on April 22, 1905, threatening the Nama with a similar fate to that of the Herero unless they surrendered. His soldiers then executed the order in cold blood. Thousands of Nama, regardless of age and gender, were brutally massacred, and their properties were destroyed (Zimmerer 2008: 52–3). The Herero–Nama uprising ended in 1907, but the German policy of extermination did not end then. The remaining Herero and Nama were incarcerated in concentration camps and subjected to harsh treatment—poor hygiene, little food, forced labor, and medical experiments. The camps were closed in 1908. By this time, however, roughly half of the incarcerated population had perished. It is generally accepted that, in the course of the genocide, 50,000–65,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama were murdered. The number corresponded to 80% of the Herero and 50% of the Nama population, respectively, before the war. The surviving Herero and Nama faced radical changes in their living conditions. Their properties, including land, cattle, and other assets, were expropriated under imperial regulations in 1905 and 1906, and possession of land and cattle was prohibited in 1907. The policy resulted in the deprivation of the peoples’ means of economic reproduction, and many of their descendants have been condemned to perpetual and institutionalized poverty (UN 2023a).

Armenian Deportation

The Armenian case is even more controversial and not easy to summarize. First of all, there are different views on how to define the incident. The Armenian government calls it the atrocities committed against the Ottoman Armenians by the government of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) during WWI (Armenia). The Armenian Genocide Museum–Institute (AGM), on its part, defines the incident as the extermination of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the surrounding regions during 1915–1923 (AGM 2007). The US Parliament adopted this view. But such broad definitions make it difficult to grasp the nature of the incident, as there were several different phases, especially the reprisal killing of Muslims by the Armenian paramilitaries in Cilicia and the subsequent eviction of the latter. Therefore, it is better and more suitable for the purpose of this article to adopt the view of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), which is that “the Armenian genocide refers to the physical annihilation of Armenian Christian people living in the

Ottoman Empire from spring 1915 through autumn 1916” (USHMM 2019).

The number of casualties is another focal point. The UN Report on Genocide of 1985 estimated the casualties as being “at least 1 million,” but other institutions assert larger numbers. Both the European Parliament and the US Parliament assert the number of casualties as being 1.5 million. The Armenian government and AGM adopted the following view: “There were an estimated two million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire on the eve of WWI. Approximately one and a half million Armenians perished between 1915 and 1923. Another million found shelter abroad or Islamized.” This means that the Armenians produced half a million children in the middle of persecution, which sounds implausible. Instead, USHMM adopts the following view: “There were approximately 1.5 million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire in 1915. At least 664,000 and possibly as many as 1.2 million died during the genocide.” On the other hand, the Turkish government, who denies genocide, claims that “Prior to World War I, fewer than 1.5 million Armenians lived in the entire Ottoman Empire [of which] slightly less than 600,000 Anatolian Armenians died during the war period of 1912–22” (Türkiye 2022). The fact that the minimum number put forward by the US semi-official guardian of the records of human atrocities coincides with that of Turkey merits attention, as it shows that, albeit a gap in the estimated victims, Turkey recognizes that a mass killing did indeed take place.

The disputing parties, moreover, share very similar views on the causes of the massive fatalities. USHMM describes the course of events as follows:

In spring 1915 the Ottoman government began the deportation of the Armenian population from its northeastern border regions. In the months that followed, the Ottomans expanded deportations from almost all provinces regardless of distance from combat zones. The victims of the Armenian genocide include people killed in local massacres that began in spring 1915; others who died during deportations, under conditions of starvation, dehydration, exposure, and disease; and Armenians who died in or en route to the desert regions of the southern Empire. (USHMM)

The Armenian government and AGM posit a similar picture. According to them, the genocide started on April 24, 1915, when several hundred Armenian elites were arrested in Istanbul, only to be subsequently eliminated. Shortly thereafter, some 60,000 conscripted Armenian military personnel were disarmed and killed. The third phase was the deportations of women, children, and elderly people into the Syrian deserts. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed during the deportation. Others died of famine, epidemic diseases, and exposure to the elements. The Turkish version of events is not so different. It admits that the mass deportation of Armenians in eastern Anatolia took place by the order of the Ottoman government. It also agrees that a large number of people were dead in the course of and after the deportation. The people were killed by attacks, robberies, disease, famine, and many other of war’s privations.

So far, it can be said that the Turkish and the Armenian views are not very different from each other, except for the estimated number of victims. This means that what matters most is not the cognizance of the crime constituting facts but their interpretation. For example, the Turkish and Armenian views on the murderers of the deported people differ in the following way. The AGM relates that hundreds of thousands of people were murdered by “Turkish soldiers, police officers, [and] Kurdish bandits” (AGM 2007). In contrast, the Turkish government asserts that they were murdered “mainly by local Muslims” (Türkiye 2022). According to the former’s view, the mass murder was a military operation, but the latter denies this on the grounds that none of the instructions commanding the relocation

ordered killings. There were many incidents, however, in which the Armenian deportees were killed by the bandits in full view of the soldiers or by the soldiers themselves. The Armenian side interprets this as proof of the well-organized killing operation. In contrast, the Turkish side asserts these acts as derelictions or were due to out of capacity. The most contested focus of the dispute, however, is whether the CUP had a specific intent of genocide. The Armenian side claims that the CUP, who had long dreamed of a Great Turkish state, saw the Armenians as the main obstacle to their plan. Thus, the CUP had secretly developed a well-coordinated plan to eliminate Armenians by the eve of WWI, and the war came as a suitable opportunity for its implementation (Akçam 2006; Hovvansian 2007). On the other hand, the Turkish government, while admitting that the CUP had caused a mass murder by ordering “relocation,” denies it was an act of genocide, as they did not have such a will, and put forward that the “relocation” was a preventive measure to ward off the general uprising of Armenians in cooperation with the Entente powers. In other words, the Armenians assert an unprovoked, one-sided massacre, while the Turks argue due response to nationalist intrigues. Avoiding being trapped by the partisan disputes, Donald Bloxham, a historian, proposes a synthesist approach and puts forward a theory of cumulative radicalization. He admits that the feared prospect of Armenians joining with Entente forces was not ungrounded and that the fear led the CUP to the partial deportation. Those local measures gradually enlarged the CUP’s sphere, leading to the decision to remove the entire Armenian population from eastern Anatolia once and for all. At the same time, Bloxham refutes the Turkish assertions by saying, “Any claim that the murder of the Armenians when it unfolded was not a genocide, simply because there might not be unequivocal evidence of genocidal intent prior to May 1915, is as absurd as the suggestion that the Nazi ‘final solution’ was not a genocide because it was not inscribed before the invasion of Poland or the USSR that every Jew was to be murdered.” The idea of destruction of the Armenian community, he argues, “developed and was augmented over time around broad principles of discrimination and xenophobia, progressing from notions of removal by dilution and/or forced assimilation to physical removal by deportation and/or murder.” Borrowing a term from the Austro-Hungarian ambassador during WWI, Bloxham concludes that the Armenian deportation was “a means of creating a national state through the annihilation of foreign elements” (Bloxham 2005: 94). Namely, the Armenian deportation was an example of extraordinary large-scale ethnic cleansing that eventually took the form of genocide.

The Bosnian Civil War

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) was one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According to the census of 1991, its population was 44% Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim), 31% Serb, 17% Croat, and 8% others. They were defined as equal shareholders of the sovereignty of the republic. In March 1992, the Bosnian government declared its independence from Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serbs opposed this, and created their own state, later called Republika Srpska (RS). As Bosnian Croats followed suit, a triangular civil war broke out. During the war that lasted until 1995, an estimated 102,622 people were killed, and 2.2 million were displaced. In the early phase of the war, Serbs seized two-thirds of Bosnia and committed atrocities against Bosniaks and Croats in the areas under their control. Bosnian Croats had their own strongholds in the western part of the country and committed similar atrocities. In 1993, for example, the Croat forces destroyed Bosniak homes, mosques, and cultural monuments and raped and murdered civilians in Ahmici and

Stupni Do. As a result, the Bosniaks suffered the most. It is often claimed that 80% of the civilians killed or displaced during the war were Bosniaks. However, this sounds a little exaggerated. According to the estimate of the ICTY, 16,700 (30%) of Serb civilians were killed out of a total 55,261.² Out of the total of 47,360 soldiers killed, an estimated 28,000 (59%) were Bosniaks, 6,000 (13%) were Croats, and 14,000 (29%) were Serbs (Bartrop 2016 xxxviii). Thus, the Bosniaks were not one-sided victims of the atrocities. Rather, their forces, albeit on a smaller scale, committed similar crimes against Serb and Croat civilians in the territory under their control (USHMM 2013).

When the three parties systematically expelled the civilians based on their ethnicity, they employed identical methods. They were “carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property” (UN 1992). Such practices, locally called “etničko čišćenje,” led to the term “ethnic cleansing” getting international circulation and subsequently being recognized as a particular form of crime against humanity. The notion is defined as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas. To a large extent, it is carried out in the name of misguided nationalism, historic grievances and a powerful driving sense of revenge” (UN 1992).

During the war, and its aftermath, there was a broad public debate about whether ethnic cleansing was a euphemism for genocide, as there were several suspected cases of ethnic cleansing on a genocidal scale. The Siege of Sarajevo is one of these cases. From April 1992 to February 1996, the city was encircled by the RS army (VRS). The civilians endured incessant shelling for nearly four years, with their living quarters being burnt down, and many cultural monuments, public spaces, and religious institutions were destroyed. As a result, more than 10,000 people were killed (HMDT). Another, but not the last, contested case was the north-western Bosnian municipality of Prijedor. In 1992, the Prijedor town and surrounding villages were occupied by Serb forces. After neutralizing the Bosniak resistance, the Serbs started sending non-Serbs into concentration camps, where the inmates endured various forms of maltreatment—torture, malnutrition, random killings, and explosions. Their properties were confiscated or subjected to wanton destruction. The international courts, however, classified the two cases as ethnic cleansing, not genocide. This is clear in the judgement against Ratko Mladić, the supreme commander of VRS during the war. Mladić was indicted for the following counts: “The killing of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats” in Biljani, Foča, Prijedor, and Vlasenica, “the detention of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in detention facilities in living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction” in the camps in Banja Luka, Prijedor, Foča and Bijeljina, and “the killing of over 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys of Srebrenica” (ICTY Mladić). Mladić was acquitted of the charge of genocide in the abovementioned municipalities except for Srebrenica on the grounds that although the physical perpetrators in several municipalities intended to destroy the Bosnian Muslims, “the people targeted in each municipality formed a relatively small part and were not in other ways a substantial part of the protected group.” The same logic was applied to the

² The rest were Bosniaks and Croats. The ICTY does not separate the number of Bosniak noncombatant victims from those of Croats.

case of Radovan Karadžić, the president of RS during the war. On March 24, 2016, Karadžić was found guilty of genocide in the area of Srebrenica in 1995 but was acquitted in other municipalities on the grounds that they were classified as crimes against humanity (ICTY Karadžić). Those judgements have clarified that ethnic cleansing and genocide are different categories of crime. The view is supported by many researchers. One of them, Marie-Janine Calic, succinctly summarized the point: “Whereas in some cases, ‘ethnic cleansing’ was aimed at the physical destruction of an ethnic community, there are other cases [in which] the objective was limited to the conquest of a strategically or economically important region through expulsion of the unwanted population, but without a clear intent to exterminate that community in whole or in part. In conclusion, ‘ethnic cleansing’ should not per se be identified with genocide” (Calic 2007: 106).

There still remains, however, the question of how one can distinguish genocide from large-scale ethnic cleansing. The ICTY has already given us the answer when the court, for the first time, found Radislav Krstić guilty of genocide on August 2, 2001, for the case of Srebrenica. Krstić was a former Commander of the Drina Corps that took part in the capture of Srebrenica in July 1995. Srebrenica was a small Muslim stronghold located in eastern Bosnia. When hostilities broke out, many Bosniaks were expelled in the region and took shelter in Srebrenica. Cut off from the other Muslim-controlled areas, Srebrenica became an enclave in the middle of the Serb-dominated territory. From the spring of 1992 to the early summer of 1995, VRS besieged the town and strictly controlled the movement of people and goods in and out of the enclave. As a result, the prevailing conditions for the inhabitants became dire (ICTY Krstić). In March 1995, Karadžić issued a directive to VRS: “By planned and well-thought-out combat operations,” VRS was directed to “create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica.” VRS started restricting the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclave, making the humanitarian situation deteriorate to a catastrophic level. On March 31, General Mladić ordered the Drina Corps to conduct active combat operations around the enclave, and they captured UNPROFOR observation posts. Subsequently, the commander of the Drina Corps initiated the plan to reduce the enclave to its urban core, with the aim to plunge the Bosnian Muslim population into a humanitarian crisis and, ultimately, eliminate them. VRS began its final attacks against Srebrenica on July 6. At the meeting with UNPROFOR, Mladić made it clear that the Bosnian Muslims could survive only by leaving Srebrenica and that their survival was conditional upon a military surrender of the town’s men (ICTY 2017). By July 11, VRS had entered the town. As a result, approximately 20,000 to 25,000 Bosnian Muslims— mostly women, children, and the elderly—fled to seek shelter in Potočari, a compound used by the UN Protection Force. Conditions were dire: food and water were scarce, and there was a shortage of medical supplies. In the meantime, on the eve of the fall of Srebrenica, the vast majority of the able-bodied men, between 10,000 and 15,000, fled the enclave on foot in an attempt to reach the Muslim-controlled area. A large number of them were subsequently captured by VRS. On July 12, VRS soldiers systematically separated Muslim men of military age who had taken shelter in Potočari from the rest of the population. Together with others captured from the column fleeing on foot, the men were bussed to various execution sites and systematically murdered. The vast majority of them were executed over just a few days from 12 July until 17 July. The court estimated that the total number of executed men was within the range of 7,000 and 8,000 (ICTY Krstić).

The ICTY found Krstić guilty on the grounds that by killing all the men of fighting age,

VRS made it impossible for the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica to survive for the next generation. The court also made an important decision: that it is not necessary for a plan of genocide to exist prior to perpetrators committing concrete genocidal actions. In the case of Srebrenica, the court confirmed that the initial plan had been an ethnic cleansing. No plan to commit genocide existed before or even right after the city fell. However, for unknown reasons, the decision was then taken to kill all the men of fighting age. The result would inevitably bring about the destruction of the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica. The murderers did it with full awareness of the consequences. Thus, they had the clear intention of genocide while conducting the mass murder (ICTY 2001). This ruling defined two important criteria. First, it is not necessary for clear evidence that attests to the will of genocide prior to committing the crime. Second, ethnic cleansing changes into genocide at a certain point.

IV. Comparison of the four cases

Having viewed the general characteristics of the four cases in question, now we can juxtapose each phase of these incidents with others in accordance with the following five key aspects: background, provocation, civilian targeting, displacement, and forced starvation. These aspects are the most pertinent to apprehend the nature of ongoing violence.

Background

As UN Secretary general Antonio Guterres put it, “the attacks by Hamas did not happen in a vacuum.” Before October 7, 2023, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip had to endure a series of dispossessions, eviction from their ancestral homes, and enclosure in a small, overpopulated area with incessant threats of bombardment by the IDF forces. They also suffered from systematic human rights abuses under the Israeli occupation regime. The situation is comparable to that of the Herero and the Nama before the uprising. Due to the steppe climate, the central plateau of Namibia was an area of extensive animal husbandry, and both the Herero and Nama subsisted as nomadic pastoralists. The systematic colonization of white settlers that began in 1894 brought about rapid dispossession of the land and livestock of the native population. As the best grazing land had belonged to the Herero, they saw much of their land and a good portion of their cattle pass into the hands of the white man. By 1903, the white population of the colony had risen to 4,640, and more than 25% of all Herero land had already passed out of native hands (Bridgman 1981: 50). As a result, many Hereros were forced to sell their labor to the colonists at an extremely low price (Kuss 2017: 38) The German settlers not only exploited the Herero; they also systematically mistreated them. They displayed a blatant racist attitude, describing the Africans as baboons, and treated them as such. The German judges either dismissed the charges against the settlers by the Africans or imposed very light sentences. Moreover, the Germans ignored their promise they had made in Article 3 of the treaty of protection with the Herero that they would respect the latter’s habits and customs. Deprived of all their rights, the Herero felt like slaves in their own country (Drechsler 1980: 133). The sense of injustice and well-grounded fear of loss of tribal identities were the principal motives that made them take up arms in January 1904. The same was true for the Nama uprising. It was also motivated by the perception of a threat to their own existence (Kuss 2017: 42).

Provocation

The Israeli government has justified their military operations in Gaza as an act of self-defense, claiming that the October 7 attacks were the worst atrocities against the Jewish people since the Nazis; therefore, the elimination of Hamas is necessary for national security. The Western countries are upholding the claim and support the IDF's operations both militarily and financially. But is it permissible to carry out such a disproportional reprisal against the Palestinians on the grounds that they had provoked first?

In the case of the Namibian genocide, the German operation started as a reaction to the armed rebellion of the Herero and the Nama. On January 12, 1904, the Herero launched their first attacks. "During the next ten days, almost every farm, village, and fort in Hereroland was attacked or at least threatened by the marauding hands of natives. The majority of the German farms were destroyed during those hectic days. [...] All farmers who fled lost everything: their livestock had been stolen; their possessions looted; and their buildings burned" (Bridgman 1981: 73) In all, more than 100 German settlers and soldiers were killed. The Germans were overpowered at first, as a total of some 2,000 men had to face more than 8,000 Herero warriors. Though not more than half of them were armed with rifles, they were militarily sophisticated. Due to their tribal discipline and warlike traditions, the Herero fighters proved to be "man for man equivalent to the German soldiers" (Bridgman 1981: 68). Initially, both sides suffered an even rate of casualties: German losses amounted to 210, while that of the Herero was 250. The Germans saw the deaths of a large number of officers in a series of battles. In the same vein, the Nama started their rebellion as random destructions of German farms in September 1904. Employing clever hit-and-run tactics, carefully avoiding open battles, they successfully waged an attritional guerilla warfare. Organized into smaller units, the Nama bands targeted smaller German formations such as patrols and transport columns. A testimony revealed that "Marching and resting troops, columns, stations and posts were exposed to constant danger from small groups of the enemy that would suddenly appear [from nowhere]. The situation was best described by the phrase 'enemy present everywhere'" (Kuss 2017: 43). As a result, the Germans suffered substantial losses. Moreover, the ultimate objective of the revolt was not restricted to the protest against the colonial system but to drive the Germans out of South West Africa, as both the Herero and Nama had felt the existential threat (Bridgman 1981: 66).

The Bosniaks of Srebrenica were not always subjected to the one-sided violence of the Serbs. They had their own forces. In early 1992, the Srebrenica Bosniaks began a counteroffensive against the Serbs, forcing thousands of Serb peasants to flee from the area. Since then, the Bosniaks regularly attacked the Serb villages near the enclave, committing wanton destruction, pillage, torture, imprisonment, and murder of civilian targets (Bartrop 2016: 169). The raids did not stop even after the UN designated the town as a "safe area." Heavy weapons were handed over, but Srebrenica was never disarmed. Using the UNPROFOR as a shield, the Muslim forces continued to intrude into the Serb-controlled area, searching for food to steal and killing civilians as a reprisal for the siege (Rohde 2017). In the meantime, Bosniak military police persecuted Serb citizens inside Srebrenica. They were detained in several facilities and subjected to physical abuse, serious suffering, and injuries to their bodies and health. In some cases, prisoners were beaten to death (ICTY 2008).

To sum up, not all the past genocides were unprovoked, and both Namibians and Bosniaks had committed atrocities against civilians, including willful targeting of non-

combatants and wanton destruction of their properties, some of which may have amounted to crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the Germans and the Serbs were not acquitted from their crimes of genocide. Thus, provocations cannot justify disproportionate reprisals.

Civilian massacre

The Israelis have so far killed more than 26,000 Palestinians, more than 70% of which were women and children, but the Netanyahu government vindicates this as collateral damage, claiming that Hamas are using the civilian population as human shields. When he met the ICRC chief on December 14, 2023, for example, Netanyahu was reported as saying that “There’s a difference between the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of civilians, which is what terrorism is, and the unintended consequences, unintended casualties that accompany any warfare” (GI 2023j). It is highly doubtful that Netanyahu’s soldiers are doing their best to avoid civilian casualties. An independent media study has confirmed that the AI-based systems used by the IDF to automatically generate targets were inflicting civilian casualties at an astonishing rate and that the fact was well known among the Israeli leaders. An anonymous source was cited as saying, “Everything is intentional. We know exactly how much collateral damage there is in every home.” It has also been confirmed that Israeli officials approved an attack they knew would kill up to hundreds of civilians in a bid to assassinate a single Hamas military commander. The report concludes that the ongoing Israeli military operations “more resembled the indiscriminate bombing of World War II than the modern era of codified civilian protection under international humanitarian law” (Wilkins 2023).

The German colonial troops employed a similar method when they pursued the counter-insurgency operations against the Herero and the Nama. Having destroyed the major Herero forces at the Battle of Waterberg in August 1904, the Germans continued the war of extermination of all Herero fighters, pursuing them into the Omaheke desert and indiscriminately killing every man, woman, and child whom they spotted (Kuss 2017: 42). When the Germans broke into the Herero camps in search of the guerrillas, they showed no mercy for women and children. A testimony reported that “The Germans spared no one. They killed thousands and thousands. I saw this slaughter for day after day” (Bridgman 1981: 126). The Germans adopted the same tactics against the Nama. One of the former’s military commanders wrote that “We must not allow the Hottentotts to escape, rather we must encircle and destroy them before they do so” (Kuss 2017: 45).

In the case of the Ottomans, it is highly dubious if they paid the slightest attention to protecting Armenian non-combatants when fighting against the rebels in such places as Van, Bitlis, Erzurum, and Zeytun in the spring 1915. Moreover, there are ample records of the Ottoman agents who committed random killings of civilians during the deportation (Lewy 2005: 224–6). It is also well-known that the Bosnian Serbs subjected the Srebrenica town and its surrounding villages to daily shelling from all directions and sporadic incursions of paramilitaries between April 1992 and March 1993, inflicting a great number of civilian casualties (Bartrop 2016: 169).

Those examples clearly show that the military operations that entailed immense loss of civilian life constituted a part of actions that would eventually amount to genocide. Contemporary American and European leaders seem to understand this well. For instance, EC President Ursula von der Leyen said that “Targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure with the clear aim to cut off men, women, children of water, electricity and heating with the winter coming, these are acts of pure terror” (Reuters 2022). The German Chancellor

Olaf Scholz asserted that drone attacks on civilians in the cities constituted “war crimes” (DW 2022). In addition, US Vice-President Kamala Harris denounced the wanton destruction of cities where enemy units were entrenched as “barbaric and inhumane” atrocities against civilians and classified them as “crimes against humanity” (BBC 2023). US President Joe Biden was more eloquent in saying that such actions would amount to a genocide (BBC 2022). These leaders have applied these criteria against the Russian actions in Ukraine, but, for unknown reasons, they still hesitate to apply the same judgment to the case of Israel.

Displacement

The Israeli military ordered the Gazans who lived in the northern part of the Strip to immediately “evacuate” from their homes on October 13, 2023. The measures were announced as though for their safety, and Netanyahu designated the southern Gaza areas as “safe zones.” However, the IDF subsequently enlarged their sphere of operation into the wide swaths of southern Gaza in December, and the “safe zones” effectively disappeared. To make things worse, the IDF demolished most of the residential buildings and destroyed social infrastructures, making it impossible for those who were “evacuated” to return to their homes and to resume their previous way of life. This fact leads us to the suspicion that the “evacuation order” was designed to serve the Israeli military aims and not the good of the Palestinians. If so, it was not a temporary safe measure but forced displacement.

Forced displacement itself does not always constitute an act of genocide. The Tsarist deportations of Germans, Jews, Poles, and Latvians during WWI were no doubt atrocities but a bit short of genocide. This was also the case for the Austro-Hungarian eviction of the Bosnian Serbs. The Stalinist deportation of the Chechens, the Ingush, and the Crimean Tatars can be considered examples of ethnic cleansing but are not unanimously accepted as genocide. Furthermore, the Greco-Turkish population exchange in 1924, though it caused enduring suffering to 1.5 million Orthodox Anatolian Greeks and half a million Hellenic Muslims, was internationally recognized as legitimate policies of nation states. On the other end of the spectrum, however, there are many examples of deportation with genocidal dimensions. The Ottoman Armenian case is the best known. In this case, the deportation was the central piece of genocide. Donald Bloxham explains the reason as follows:

The very nature of the deportations is sufficient evidence of genocide[e] [...]. Where the first anti-Armenian measures did not distinguish innocent individuals from ‘guilty,’ the new ones did not differentiate between communities with revolutionary traditions or the great majority without, nor between border regions and the interior. Unlike the first Zeytun deportees, the Armenians were not to be sent to places where settlement was possible, if difficult; they were sent, defenseless and without provision or the means of subsistence, to desert regions where natural attrition could take its deadly toll. (Bloxham 2005: 86)

In a similar vein, the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica saw the following two stages of forced displacement prior to the genocide. Although bordering with the Serbian proper, eastern Bosnia used to be a Muslim majority region. With the objective to ethnically purify the territory, the Serb nationalist forces launched well-organized eradicating operations against the Bosniak population in early 1992. They engaged in looting homes, burning villages, and slaughtering the civilian population in the neighboring municipalities of Srebrenica. Even after the completion of military conquest, the Serbs systematically evicted the Bosniak citizens who were found in their territory to Srebrenica, which had remained

under Muslim control. According to a 1991 census, the Srebrenica municipality had a population of 36,000 (25,000 Bosniaks and 8,500 Serbs). Due to the influx of refugees from the surrounding municipalities, the population of the enclave swelled to over 50,000 people by mid-May, creating a humanitarian crisis, with a serious shortage of shelters, food, and medical services (Srebrenica Memorial). The plight lasted for more than three years. The Serbs then embarked on the second stage of displacement in May 1995. VRS began attacking the outposts of the enclave, gradually tightened a ring, and finally entered the town on July 11. During the attacks, the Serbs systematically burned Muslim houses and evicted the inhabitants with the aim to force them to concentrate in the Srebrenica town and then to escape to Potočari. By July 12, most of the noncombatant civilians of Srebrenica had gathered in and around the compound. Conditions there were dire, with almost no food, water, or shelter. VRS frightened the people, either by shelling near the compound or by abducting some of them. General Mladić insisted on the total “evacuation” of the civilians, and subsequently, women, children, and the elderly were transported to the Muslim-controlled areas. In the meantime, the military-aged men, together with those who had previously been captured by the Serbs, were all executed (ICTY 2017). In this regard, the “evacuation” of the Srebrenica population was a part and parcel of ethnic cleansing and a prelude to genocide.

The Israeli policy of forced “evacuation” of the Palestinians in Gaza shares many common features with the two cases. Just like the Armenians, the Gazans are indiscriminately displaced, based on Israeli President Herzog’s axiom that “an entire nation out there [...] is responsible.” As the Ottomans forced the Armenians to move from one place to another in accordance with the notorious 10% limit, the Gazans were being told to move like “human pinballs.” The Srebrenica Muslims, on their part, were first driven into the enclave, then concentrated into a much smaller space, and finally evicted once and for all. Just like the Ottoman Armenians who were randomly killed during the “relocation,” the northern Gazan refugees were bombed while moving to the southern “safe zones.” The Armenians were executed while staying in their encampments in Syria, and the Gazans are left defenseless against the air strikes, random shelling, and sniping of the IDF in the middle of the “safe zones.” The Serbs did the same to the Bosniaks hiding in the “safe area.” Although Israel has not yet destroyed a large portion of the population, nor rounded up and executed the majority of the male population, the deportation of the Gazans has already gone well beyond the scale of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and reached the level of the Armenian case.

Siege and Forced Starvation

Since October 7, 2023, the Israeli forces have put Gaza under a complete siege, prohibiting free movement in and out of the Strip and strictly restricting the import of any kind of goods, including humanitarian aid. Moreover, the Israelis are not providing the refugees with any kind of shelter and have systematically destroyed residences, schools, warehouses, and religious institutions. This policy has brought about a general malnutrition in the population, who suffer from starvation and exhaustion by exposure. These conditions are extremely unhygienic, and many people are dying of diseases accordingly. In light of Netanyahu’s remark on December 5, 2023, that “We know that if there would be a collapse — diseases, pandemics, and groundwater infections — it will stop the fighting [of Hamas]” (CNN 2023), it is plausible that the creation of these insanitary conditions for the refugees is a part and parcel of the Israeli strategy.

The Serbs adopted similar measures during the siege of Srebrenica. At that time, the enclave was totally besieged by VRS and cut off from the rest of the Bosniak-controlled territories. The situation worsened progressively, with the refugees and townsfolk running out of food and water. As pre-war food supplies were rapidly depleted, people began to eat anything they could find. From the spring of 1993 onward, Srebrenica was completely dependent on the humanitarian aid provided by the UNPROFOR. The aid, however, was often blocked by VRS (Bartrop 2016: 214). As a result, the Srebrenica enclave became the worst-affected case from food shortages in the Bosnian civil war. Contrary to the pretext that the blockage was a measure to prevent the Bosniak fighters from attacking the Serb territories, those who suffered most were those vulnerable elements such as pregnant and lactating women, as well as small children (Conley & de Waal 2019: 722; Slavková 2020: 78–9). The forced starvation was a well-planned policy aimed at a voluntary evacuation of the Bosniaks. In July 1994, for example, the commander of the Bratunac Brigade instructed his soldiers as follows: “The enemy’s life has to be made unbearable and their temporary stay in the enclave impossible so that they leave the enclave en masse as soon as possible” (ICTY 2003).

Forced starvation was also an integral part of the annihilation of the Ottoman Armenians. Most of the deaths were due to hunger and thirst (Suny 2015). Considering the cumulative radicalization of the deportation, the CUP did not have a wholesale plan of massive starvation laid out, but the ad hoc nature of the policy resulted in many more victims. As the local governments had to comply with the hectic “relocation” orders, they gave the Armenians only a few days to prepare for the journey. As a result, most of them could not carry enough food. To make things worse, it was almost impossible to find something to eat on the way, because the government had no plan (or will) for logistical support for those who were deported. It is estimated that of the first deportees from the eastern provinces who were ordered to move in May and June 1915, only 10 to 20% percent reached Syria alive. Later, the situation improved a little. Namely, of those from western Anatolia who were expelled in August and September 1915, some 80 to 90% could reach Syria. George Shirinian postulates that this was because a structure for the deportations had been established by the summer of 1915 (Shirinian 2017: 13). This fact by no means serves as a sign that the CUP cared for the adequate provision of the deported Armenians. It was true that the government provided food and water. However, these things were rather exceptional and far from adequate. A German consular official who traveled from Baghdad to Aleppo recalled that “The way stations with water were about forty miles apart, and many of the deportees did not have enough food or water to last even the three days of walking that it took to get from one station to the next. At some stations no food was available at all” (cited by Lewy 2005: 222). In contrast, the Syrian Armenians and foreign missionaries organized relief committees and actively supported the displaced people. They sent aid and dispatched missions even to the remotest provinces. They were the primary, and often the only, means of subsistence for the deportees. For some time, those foreign and domestic philanthropists received tacit approval and even support from the local authorities. But this was only because the CUP paid little attention to the deportees who managed to arrive in Syria. Their attitude changed in the autumn of 1915. Thereafter, the central government exerted strong pressure on the humanitarian response to the survivors of deportation. Namely, local Muslims who tried to give the Armenians food and water were strictly reproached by the gendarmes (Shirinian 2017: 22). Furthermore, the Armenian activists who supported the refugees were either arrested or persecuted. The CUP even

thwarted the international aid programs. The US ambassador who attempted to distribute the relief funds that had been collected by the US Armenian Relief Committee was prevented from doing so by the Ottoman government (Mouradian 2019: 252–5).

Even those who could reach Syria alive had to endure the daily threat of death by attrition. A large number of deportees who were destined for resettlement in Der-el Zor—one of the major “relocation” sites—were detained in encampments along the Euphrates. Many of them were put in an impossible position to acquire food and gradually died of hunger. The camp at Meskene was one of these detention centers. In early February 1916, the place hosted more than 2,000 tents and about 10,000 persons. Since the government did not distribute any food, most of the detainees had to live by begging. Those who did not manage to obtain any bread cooked and ate grass. Moreover, there was no latrine, and all around the camp was covered with a wide belt of excrements and garbage (Lewy 2005: 223). The deterioration of hygiene conditions inevitably resulted in epidemics of diseases, which took their heavy toll on the Armenian population.

The German colonial army adopted a similar tactic. On August 11, 1904, when the Germans gained the decisive victory over the Herero at the Waterberg, a large number of men, women, and children escaped from the encircling forces and fled into the Omaheke desert. As the Germans knew what kind of human catastrophe would be played out there, they expected the desert would complete “the task begun by German weapons.” Von Trotha ordered his soldiers to occupy all the known water holes around the edge of the desert and to block all Herero returning from the Omaheke. That was the moment when “the actual genocidal phase began” (Zimmerer 2008: 47). Trapped in the desert, the Herero frantically searched for water, only to hasten their death by exhaustion. An eyewitness said that the trails through the desert were littered with hundreds of carcasses. It is estimated that out of 50,000 and 60,000 Herero who had escaped into the desert, barely 3,000 could survive the death trap. (Bridgman 1981: 131). The Germans responded to the Nama uprising with the same strategy of extermination. Their troops systematically occupied watering places, destroying roughly half of the Nama population by starvation (Zimmerer 2008: 51).

According to Conley and de Waal (2019), who have studied historical cases of artificial famine, examples of the deployment of mass starvation on the scale of mass extermination are rare. The Namibian massacre and the Armenian deportation were among those few unambiguous cases (Conley & de Waal 2019: 705–6). Other examples are the ghettos during the Holocaust, the Ukrainian Holodomor (1932–1933), and the Nazi Hungerplan (1941–1945). The ongoing Israeli policy of forced starvation of the Palestinians has seemingly not yet reached the same level as these cases. The policy shares more commonalities with the Bosnian case. If one takes into consideration the remarks of Israeli policymakers on “voluntary” ethnic cleansing, it sounds appropriate to say that, at this stage, the Israeli siege of Gaza has fallen into the category of the use of starvation for gaining territorial control. But in light of the fact that in contrast to Srebrenica, where most of the besieged people could still stay under a roof, a large number of Palestinians have to bivouac under rubble or flimsy tents, so the situation in Gaza has already gone beyond the first stage of the siege of Srebrenica and is rapidly approaching the plight of the Armenians in the concentration camps. The Gazan hygienic crisis also bears resemblance to the Armenian case.

V. Conclusions

The comparison of the ongoing Israeli war with the Namibian, Ottoman, and Bosnian cases leads us to the following findings. First, the prewar conditions of the Palestinians in Gaza shared many of the colonialist characteristics with the German rule in Namibia. Second, the provocation of Hamas does not vindicate the scale of Israeli military actions in Gaza. The Namibian and the Bosnian cases show that not all the victims of genocide were unprovoked and that the disproportionate reprisals were the basic features of those two genocide cases. Third, the Israeli allegation of “collateral damage” does not make sense. It is not only because the wanton destruction of civilian objects is, as the Western leaders admit, a war crime, but also because they are carried out with the explicit aim of collective punishment. In this regard, the Israeli action shows a marked resemblance with those of the colonialist Germans, the CUP, and the Bosnian Serb leadership. Fourth, the massive displacement of the Gazans displays the same indiscriminate nature as the Armenian deportation and the Bosnian ethnic cleansing. In both cases, the “evacuations” were carried out with the clear aim of eliminating the unwanted elements from certain territories. The Israeli pretext of “safety measures” is almost identical with that of the Ottomans, who took no substantial measure to protect the deportees and carried out the “evacuations” for purely strategic purposes. The Bosnian Serbs employed the same hypocrisy. For them, the term “evacuation” is nothing but a euphemism for ethnic cleansing. Fifth, the Israeli siege, blockades of humanitarian aid, and exposure of the Gazans to helpless situations are intentionally creating the conditions of forced starvation, characteristics in common with the past three cases. The Germans imposed impossible living conditions on the Africans either by expelling them into deserts or by blocking their access to food and water. The Ottomans put the Armenians into starving conditions by sabotaging their logistic support, detaining them in places with no or insufficient access to nutrition, and preventing international aid. By doing so, they created extremely unhygienic conditions that resulted in immense human loss. This has a strong resemblance to the contemporary situation in Gaza. The Bosnian Serbs imposed a similar type of forced starvation on the people in Srebrenica. They shut the Bosniaks into a small and overpopulated area with an inadequate food supply and restricted the international aid to the minimal level before finally eliminating them.

These findings constitute reasonable grounds for the conclusion that the ongoing war has already shown several key symptoms of genocide. The Israeli military operations have gone well beyond the initial stages of the Namibian case (confinement in an unsustainable environment), the Armenian case (mass displacement, mass killings, forced starvation, and unhygienic conditions), and the Bosnian case (enclosure and siege in a small place, incessant bombing, and the cutting off of outside aid). If the Israeli campaign goes on unchecked, it is plausible to believe that it will develop into a full-fledged genocide. However, as to the question of whether the contemporary stage has already reached such levels, the answer is skeptical. The proportion of death is, so far, much lower than the previous cases. Moreover, whether the Netanyahu government is pursuing the policy with genocidal intention or not is not crystal clear. In light of the consistent remarks of the Israeli leadership on the mass migration of the Gazans, their intentions seem to remain at the level of ethnic cleansing. At the same time, however, compared with the ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian war, the ongoing Israeli war is much larger in scale and akin to the Armenian case. It is true that the scale of mass starvation in Gaza is gradually approaching those of the previous three cases. Regarding these developments, it seems

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prudent to call the Israeli war on Gaza an extraordinary immense ethnic cleansing that is on the threshold of genocide.

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Post-World War II Japan's Defense Buildup Plan and the Function of Industry Associations in Rebuilding the Military Industry : The Trend of "Domestic Production" of Defense Equipment from the 1950s to the 1970s

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We will examine not only what kind of Japan–U.S. relationship was built through the strengthening of the defense capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces from the end of World War II to the 1970s but also how Japanese industry groups responded to it during that period. The rearmament of Japan by the Self-Defense Forces was carried out under the strong control of the United States, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. In addition, the beginning of the Cold War and the Korean War caused a major shift in the U.S. occupation policy. The United States initially provided many arms for free for the creation of the Self-Defense Forces and for the enhancement of defense equipment, but to restrain the outflow of money, it switched from a policy of free to paid armament. In response to this policy shift towards strengthening self-defense capabilities, Keizaidantai Rengokai(Keidanren) and Nihon Heiki Kogyokai tried to achieve economic growth and acquire more advanced technology by taking advantage of the special demand and the business opportunity of building up the defense capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces. The “Domestic Production” of arms was important for these groups. However, even though it is called “domestic production”, advanced technologies used in fighter planes and other equipment were mainly licensed, including important parts like black boxes. Therefore, Japan was a long way off from technological independence.

Introduction

Under the Abe cabinet, which has been in power since 2012, Japan's security posture has undergone a series of rapid changes, including the establishment of the National Security Bureau in 2014, the Cabinet Decision on the “Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer,” which significantly changed the “Three Principles on Arms Exports”, the Cabinet Decision to change the existing interpretation of the Constitution to allow the exercise of the right to collective defense, the revision of the Japan-U.S. Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 2015, and the passage of the several Security Laws (Security regime). In 2015, Japan's security posture began to undergo a major transformation. In particular, the changes regarding the right to collective self-defense marked a milestone in

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that they explicitly advanced the so-called alliance between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I would like to clarify how the shift in the 2010s can be positioned by examining how the Japan–U.S. relationship was constructed from the post-World War II period to the 1970s and how Japanese industry responded to this relationship with regard to the increase in the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces.

Japan’s postwar reconstruction can be divided into two main processes: one is the process of reconstruction by the U.S. occupation policy, and following the conclusion of the 1951 Peace Treaty and its entry into force the following year, the other is the process of reconstruction by the Japanese government after the restoration of independence. The Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, which was concluded and came into effect at the same time as the peace treaty, allowed reconstruction to proceed consistently under the strong control of the United States. To elucidate this point, we will first review the process of change in U.S. occupation policy towards Japan and the development of Japan’s rearmament from 1945 until the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in 1960. The dismantling and rebuilding of Japan’s military power and the establishment of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty are important milestones in this process. Next, we will examine what kind of vision the industrial world had for the process of dismantling and rebuilding Japan’s military power, how it lobbied the Japanese and U.S. governments, and how the defense industry (mainly the arms industry in this paper) actually developed its business, based on the business development of some companies.

1. Rearmament and defense force development, as evidenced by the shift in occupation policy towards Japan and the birth of the Self-Defense Forces.

In September 1945, General Order No. 1 of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers (hereinafter referred to as GHQ) ordered the suspension of munitions production. The “Initial Policy toward Japan” also stipulated the demilitarization of Japan and the elimination of militarism. Furthermore, the E. W. Pauley Reparations Committee delegation that visited Japan in November of the same year proposed a reparations plan that would hand over a substantial portion of munitions factories and basic heavy industrial facilities to neighboring Asian countries and keep Japan’s productive capacity at a level that would not exceed the standard of living of Asian countries. However, the Truman Doctrine of January 1947 called for the prevention (i.e., containment) of the expansion of Soviet-controlled territory, and Secretary of War K.C. Royall’s speech of January 1948 set forth the direction of promoting Japan’s economic recovery and making it “a deterrent against the threat of totalitarian war”.¹ At this point, the U.S. incorporated Japan into its campaign against socialism and communism centered on the Soviet Union and changed its course from a policy of holding economic reconstruction to that of neighboring Asian countries to that of promoting higher productivity and rearmament. In October 1948, the U.S. National Security Council reflected this change in its “Recommendations for U.S. Policy toward Japan”, which were sent to the Japanese government as the “Nine Principles of Economic Stability” and shifted the focus from demilitarization to economic reconstruction. The reparations were to be lifted in full by the statement from F.R. McCoy, the U.S. representative to the Far Eastern Commission.²

¹ See <https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19480106.S1E.html>.

² Kihara [1994], p. 55.

of the Japanese side presenting its First Defense Force Buildup Plan under consideration and explaining its goals of 180,000 troops on land, 124,000 tons at sea, and 1,300 aircraft.⁶

Thus, Japan's rearmament efforts rapidly progressed in response to U.S. demands and assistance in the wake of the Korean War. In 1952, the year the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty came into effect, the Police Reserve Corps was renamed the National Guard Corps, and its ground forces were increased to a capacity of 110,000 and equipped with tanks and howitzers. In maritime defense, frigates and landing support boats were borrowed from the U.S. military and used to form a defense force for guards. It was not until the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces under the Defense Agency in July 1954 that the SDF became a three-military organization consisting of land, sea, and air forces. At the time of its establishment, the SDF seemed to have 139,000 personnel on land, 16,000 personnel and 58,000 tons of naval vessels at sea, and 6,738 personnel and 148 aircraft in the air. It can be said that the SDF strengthened its self-defense capabilities in line with the Japan-U.S. MSA.⁷

The government will consider a draft five-year defense force Buildup plan for the Self-Defense Forces, but in 1956, the National Defense Council was established as an advisory body for the prime Minister, and the following year, the “Basic Policy for National Defense” was decided there. The National Defense Council formulated the basic policy for national defense and the National Defense Program Outline. This council committee consisted of the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, the ministers of foreign affairs and finance, and the directors-general of the Defense Agency and the Economic Planning Agency, among others.⁸

It states that “the defense force shall be developed gradually and efficiently to the extent necessary for self-defense, in accordance with national strength and conditions”. Based on this, in 1957, the Council of National Defense and the cabinet meeting determined the “Defense Force Buildup Plan” (primary Defense Buildup Plan) for the 1958-1960⁹. Table 1 shows the objectives set in the Defense Buildup Plan (hereinafter abbreviated as DBP) implemented over the four plans periods. It shows the target figures and their actual results. In the Ground Self-Defense Force (hereinafter abbreviated as GSDF), the target of 180,000 active Self-Defense Force personnel has been consistently and the goal of the Tertiary DBP was almost achieved. The Guided Missile Unit has been newly established since the Secondary DBP. Guided Missile Unit (GMU) has remained on target, although it has been added as a new piece of equipment. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) was on target in the initial and fourth rounds of DBP. In particular, the target for the fourth DBP had to be changed midway due to major economic fluctuations¹⁰. In the Air SDF (ASDF), the focus is still on aircraft buildup. In the case of primary DBP, although the number of

⁶ Kondo and Osanai [1978], p. 238.

⁷ The size of the SDF at the time of opening is according to the official website of the Air Self-Defense Force (<https://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/about/organization/>).

⁸ In 1972, the Minister of International Trade and Industry, the Director General of the Science and Technology Agency, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary were added to the council.

⁹ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964], p. 165.

¹⁰ At the National Defense Council and Cabinet meetings in December 1975, it became clear that it would be difficult to achieve the targets for major equipment, and it was decided to postpone the following reductions: 31 Type 74 tanks from the originally planned 280 to 249; 60 Type 73 armored vehicles from 136 to 76; 17 naval ships from 54 to 37; and 42 support fighter aircraft from 211 to 169. The Defense Agency [1976], p. 159).

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Table1 Objectives and Achievements of the 1-4th Defense Buildup Plans

	Ground Self-Defense Force						Maritime Self-Defense Force				Air Self-Defense Force			
	Self-defense personnel (mn)		Reserve Officers (mn)		Guided missile unit (squad)		Naval vessels (ten thousand tons)		Aircraft		Aircraft		Guided missile unit (squad)	
	target	track record	target	track record	target	track record	target	track record	target	track record	target	track record	target	track record
primary DBP 1958-60	180,000	170,000	15,000	15,000			12.4	11.2	222	218	1,342	1,133		
secondary DBP 1962-66	180,000	171,500	30,000	24,000	2	2	14.4	14.0	235	239	1,036	1,095	2	2
tertiary DBP 1967-71	180,000	179,000	39,000	36,000	4	4	14.2	14.4	220	250	880	940	4	4
quaternary DBP 1972-76	180,000	*154,805			8	8	21.4	19.8	210	200	770	840	6	5

* The number of Ground Self-Defense Force officers in the Quaternary Defense Plan is the figure from the Defense Agency[1977],p.177.

- In March 1977, the Air Self-Defense Force had 881 Aircrafts(see Defense Agency[1977],p.184.
- Source: Figures from Asagumo Shimbun [2022] (viewed) were used for the primary through quaternary plans. However, the target for the quaternary plan was lowered in December 1975 due to rapid changes in the economic environment.

aircraft scheduled to enter service did not reach the target number due to the short three-year period, it is clear that the target number of aircraft is rapidly being met, supported by the U.S.government's cost sharing and other factors.

Table 2 Total Procurement Results by Defense Agency Item(Central Procurement)

Defense Buildup Plan	period(fy)	total amount (100 million yen)	main product lineup
primary DBP	1958-60	2,301.7	aircrafts54% telecommunications12% vessels12% weapons10%
secondary DBP	1962-66	4,757.7	aircrafts24% telecommunications14% vessels11% weapons12% prototype2.3%=10.9billion yen
tertiary DBP	1967-71	10,864.1	aircrafts35% telecommunications14% vessels8% weapons8% guided weapons7% prototype1.7%=25.5billion yen
quaternary DBP	1972-76	17,557.0	aircrafts39% telecommunications13% vessels10% weapons5% guided weapons 6% prototype2.4%=41.3billion yen

- Guided weapons prior to 1967 are included in weapons.
- Prototypes prior to 1962 are included in each of the applicable items.
- Source: Figures for total value and major commodities are from Kihara [1994], pp.92-93.

Table 2 shows the budget amount and main item composition for the procurement of defense equipment for central procurement in each DBP. Let us examine what kind of equipment was strengthened at each stage, referring to this table. The period of the primary DBP coincided with the revision of the security treaty by the Kishi cabinet, which was a period of “political season”. The contents of the primary DBP, which called for the buildup of a minimum necessary self-defense force (“core defense force”), included 180,000 GSDF personnel, 124,000 tons of MSDF vessels, and 1,300 ASDF aircraft at a total cost of 404.1 billion yen, with “a significant portion of the equipment” to be provided by the United

States.¹¹ Prime Minister Kishi travelled to the U.S. with this DBP to gain the approval of the U.S. side and reached an agreement to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Japan and to make adjustments towards the revision of the security treaty. In August 1957, the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Japan, and the withdrawal was completed in February of the following year. Although aircraft were prominent in the item mix, the U.S. grant of aircraft was significant.

The new Japan–U.S. Security Treaty concluded in January 1960 stipulated in Article II the promotion of economic cooperation, Article III the strengthening of Japan’s defense capability, and Article V the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, as well as the obligation of Japan to defend itself and U.S. forces within Japan in the event of an armed attack. It also stipulated that the treaty could be terminated by either party upon notice of termination 10 years after its entry into force.¹²

In July 1961, the Secondary DBP, which had been postponed due to growing opposition to the revision of the Security Treaty, was decided at the National Defense Council and cabinet meetings. The Secondary DBP was to cover the five-year period from 1962 to 1966, coinciding with the start of the Ikeda cabinet’s income-doubling policy, the start of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, and the Vietnam War in full swing. The basic policy was to “focus primarily on qualitative enhancement of defense capabilities,” including the modernization of equipment, enhancement of mobility, improvement and enhancement of logistical support systems, stockpiling of ammunition and ammunition for combat, introduction of anti-aircraft equipment, and promotion of technological research and development. The goals for Secondary DBP included 180,000 GSDF (13 divisions) and 30,000 reserve SDF officers, 143,000 tons of MSDF vessels, approximately 1,000 ASDF aircraft, four surface-to-air guided missile battalions (two each of Nike and Hawk), an average annual increase in Defense Agency expenses of 20.5 billion yen, and the achievement of the Secondary DBP. The total maintenance cost required was 313.5 billion yen, the total defense budget was 1.16 trillion yen, and research and development and domestic production of new equipment was considered important for achieving this DBP.¹³ During this period, the U.S. switched from grant aid for equipment to paid aid under the Kennedy administration, due to the worsening balance of payments that became a reality from 1962 onward.¹⁴

The U.S. intervention in Vietnam escalated with the start of the bombing of North Vietnam, and U.S. military bases in Japan and Okinawa became more important as sortie bases. In November 1966, the National Defense Council and the cabinet decided on the outline of the Tertiary DBP (1967-71), and in March of the following year, the main items and budget scale for the Tertiary DBP were decided. This was the latter half of the period of rapid economic growth and the period when Prime Minister Sato’s negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, which was to be “nuclear-free and comparable to that of mainland Japan,” were in full swing. As in the case of the Secondary DBP phase, the general policy called for the enhancement and reinforcement of the SDF’s ability to respond to invasions of local or sub-local scale with conventional weapons and the

¹¹ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964] pp. 165,166, Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983] p. 8.

¹² See https://www.archives.go.jp/ayumi/kobetsu/s35_1960_01.html.

¹³ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964] pp. 160, 257, 267-270; Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983] p. 11.

¹⁴ About 45% of the equipment procurement value in FY1950-61 was provided by U.S. grant aid, but the grant aid ended in FY1969. Domestic procurement has accounted for more than 80% since the mid-1960s, and almost 90% in the 1970s (Tomiyama [1979], p. 39).

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construction of elite units. It also called for the promotion of technological research and development, equipment modernization, the improvement of domestic technological standards, and the appropriate domestic production of equipment. In the maritime sector, to strengthen defense capabilities in the surrounding seas, the MSDF was to build 14 destroyers, including those carrying ship-to-air guided missiles and helicopters, and 56 naval vessels, including five submarines, totalling 48,000 tons, as well as 60 fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft, 33 anti-submarine helicopters, etc. In the airspace, two squadrons each of surface-to-air guided missile, Hawk, and Nike Hercules equipped units were to be formed, and preparations were also made to form one squadron each. In addition, to improve the air defense strike capability, the selection of new fighter aircraft models and their maintenance were initiated. The plan also called for the development of 55 aircraft, 4 naval vessels, and supersonic advanced training aircraft in Japan to improve the education and training system and rescue system. Total defense-related expenditures were projected at about 2.34 trillion yen.¹⁵ Overall, the plan emphasized anti-submarine and air defense capabilities and was in line with the intentions of the United States.

In April 1971, the Defense Agency, under the leadership of Defense Minister Nakasone, announced the Quaternary DBP(1972-76). This was a period of dramatic changes, including the 1970 Security Treaty, the shift to a floating exchange rate system, the restoration of diplomatic relations with China, the return of Okinawa to Japan, the oil crisis, the end of Japan's rapid economic growth, and the end of the Vietnam War. Again, the goal was to establish a defense system capable of dealing with an invasion by conventional weapons in a localized warfare situation, and the budget was expected to be more than twice the amount of the 3rd DBP, 5.2 trillion yen, with an emphasis on the modernization of ground equipment, domestic production of equipment, and research and development. However, due to the collision between an SDF aircraft and an All Nippon Airways plane in July of the same year and the impact of the dollar crisis, the total cost was lowered to 4.63 trillion yen in the Fourth DBP outline decided the following year. The main equipment items were as follows: (1) GSDF: 280 tanks, 170 armoured vehicles, 90 self-propelled guns, 159 operational aircraft including 154 helicopters, and 3 surface-to-air guided missile hawks; (2) MSDF: 13 escort ships including 2 helicopter-carrying destroyers and 1 ship-to-air missile escort ship, In addition, 5 submarines, 1 supply ship, and various other vessels for a total of 54 ships; approx. 69,000 tons; (3) ASDF: 3 units equipped with Nike J surface-to-air guided missiles, 46 fighter aircraft with improved warning capability and modernization, 68 support fighters, and 24 transport aircraft.¹⁶ In the same year, Okinawa returned to the mainland, Japan-China diplomatic relations were restored, and Minister of International Trade and Industry Tanaka announced his "Theory of Remodeling the Japanese Islands." In 1973, the oil crisis occurred, and the defense industry was hit by the frenzy of prices¹⁷. The result of the emphasis on R&D can be seen in the increase in expenditures on prototypes in Table 2. At any rate, the quaternary DBP, which faced major economic changes, differed from the conventional maintenance plan, as described above, and was forced to be drastically scaled back at a defense conference and cabinet meeting held at the end of 1975.

With Japan's rapid economic growth, defense equipment was steadily upgraded from the primary DBP through the tertiary DBP, even though "exclusive defense" was the basic policy. In fact, the actual total amount of procurement by item for the Defense Agency was

¹⁵ See https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/taikou/4_3jibou.pdf.

¹⁶ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], pp. 18,19

¹⁷ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 19.

230.17 billion yen for the primary DBP (FY 1958-60), 475.77 billion yen for the secondary DBP (FY 1962-66), and 1.09 trillion yen for the tertiary DBP (FY 1967-71), The quaternary DBP (FY1972-76) was 1.75 trillion yen. The total amount raised in each period was more than twice that of the immediately preceding DBP up to the tertiary DBP, but in the case of the quaternary DBP, it was only 1.6 times that of the tertiary DBP. Nevertheless, Japan's SDF had reached a level of strength that was quite impressive in the world¹⁸.

In April 1967, at a meeting of the House of Representatives Accounts Committee, Prime Minister Sato, in his answer to a question regarding the export of the Pencil Rocket developed at the University of Tokyo, stated that exports of weapons and other items were not allowed to the Communist bloc, countries prohibited by UN resolutions, parties to international conflicts, and other countries under the Operational Guidelines for Export Trade Control Orders and other regulations. This later came to be known as "the Three Principles on Arms Exports", which reminded the arms industry that overseas markets were severely restricted.

2. Keidanren¹⁹ and Japan Association of Arms Industry's efforts to rebuild the defense industry

In this section, we will elucidate the role of the Japanese industry in the reconstruction of the defense industry. Although the defense industry encompasses industries involved in the production and distribution of a wide range of goods and services supplied for military use, this section will limit its examination to industries involved in weapons production. In addition, we will focus on the roles of the Keidanren Committee on Defense Production (hereinafter abbreviated as CODP) and the Japan Association of Arms Industry (hereinafter abbreviated as JAAI) as the industry's response.

After the defeat of the war, the U.S. forces moved into Japan, and the occupation policy developed under the indirect rule of GHQ. In December, the interim report of the E. W. Pauley reparations mission stated that the Japanese economy should be maintained at a minimum level. Japan will be liable for the compensation for the removal of machinery and equipment unique to the munitions industry. The policy for handling compensation was to transfer the assets to the country that Japan was responsible for the compensation and to make effective use of the assets. The Far Eastern Commission's statement in May was the starting point, and the properties subject to compensation in each industrial sector were placed under the control of GHQ by order of the Far Eastern Commission. The results of this process were a series of decisions on the facilities to be compensated for in 11 sectors. As a result, military arsenals and aircraft factories, civilian arms factories and basic heavy industrial facilities were planned to be removed one after another as designated reparations factories. In January 1947, the Far Eastern Commission set the standard of living of the Japanese people at the level of 1930-34, and therefore, the economic revival of Japan after the removal of the designated factories for reparations was expected to have a very difficult time recovering. Not only the Japanese government but also the U.S. viewed such removal

¹⁸ Kihara [1994] pp. 92, 93.

¹⁹ Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) was formed in August 1946 as an organization representing the business community, with national and industry-specific economic organizations as regular members and individual companies as supporting members. The Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, which was formed in 1922, was dissolved and joined Keidanren in order to unify economic organizations and negotiate with GHQ.

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as undesirable. In the end, with the Truman Doctrine and the Royall Secretary of War's speech, as already mentioned, the U.S. occupation policy shifted. Shifting its focus from the designation and removal of factories for compensation to Japan's economic recovery, in May 1949, F.R. McCoy, the representative to the Far East Commission U.S. announced the suspension of collections under the interim compensation plan.²⁰

On the other hand, Japanese companies that had focused on munitions production during the war were unable to continue their operations due to the order to cease munitions production and were forced to rebuild their businesses through civilian production. However, the loss of overseas assets and the GHQ's policy of terminating wartime compensation (imposition of a special wartime compensation tax) caused many related companies to face business crises, and the Japanese government was forced to take relief measures through the Corporate Accounting Emergency Measures Act and the Corporate Restructuring and Improvement Act.²¹ In this process, the change in U.S. occupation policy and the outbreak of the Korean War brought about a turning point, which triggered the peace issue and the movement of Japanese economic organizations in response to the special procurement boom. Although munitions production had been halted following the defeat in the war and was subject to demolition and dismantling, the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War brought about a major change in occupation policy, and munitions production and even weapons production were suddenly resumed. Table 3 shows that CODP, JAAI, and other organizations lobbied GHQ and the government. The following section examines the relationship between the requests submitted by these organizations to GHQ and the Japanese government and the subsequent defense industry.

Table 3 List of Requests and Recommendations of KEIDANREN CODP and JAAI

year	month	matters
1951	1	Keidanren announced "Basic Requests Regarding the Peace Treaty"
	1	(Japan-U.S. Economic Alliance Roundtable established as a special Keidanren organization → reorganized as the Economic Cooperation Roundtable in 52.8; Defense Production Committee and other committees established)
	3	Keidanren's Opinion on Japan-U.S. Economic Cooperation Readiness
	3	Keidanren's 8th General Meeting resolution, "Our resolve on the occasion of our return to the international community"
	10	(Japan Technology Production Cooperation Association established → 52.7 Weapons Production Cooperation Association → 53.10 JWIA → 88.9 Japan Defense Equipment Industries Association)
1952	2	Keidanren requests opinions on administrative agreements
	3	Keidanren announced "Opinion on Measures to be Taken by the Government for Japan-U.S. Economic Cooperation"
	6	Keidanren announced "Opinion on various issues related to U.S. military procurement"
	10	CODP announced Opinion on Urgent Requests Concerning the Utilization of State-Owned Military Industrial and Other Facilities

²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs [2017] pp. 1432-1439.

²¹ In November 1945, GHQ ordered the termination of wartime compensation to companies on the grounds that "it should be known that war is not profitable from an economic standpoint" and the Japanese government was eventually forced to accept the order in July of the following year (SCAPIN337ESS/FI, "Removal of War Profits and Fiscal Reconstruction" (Financial History Office, Ministry of Finance [1981] pp. 517-519)). The number of special accounting companies that were required to submit development plans under the Corporate Reconstruction and Development Law for approval was 5114 as of November 1948 (Fiscal History Office, Ministry of Finance [1983] pp. 753,814).

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1953	<p>2 CODP announced "Opinion on Requests Concerning Domestic Production of Aircraft Ordered by the National Security Agency, Opinion on Requests Concerning the Service Life of Aircraft, Weapons, and Other Manufacturing Equipment"</p> <p>2 CODP announced "A Proposal on Defense Force Buildup" and "Research Material on Defense Production"</p> <p>2 JAAI submitted "Requests to U.S. government agencies in Japan regarding special procurement"</p> <p>4 CODP announced "Requests to the government regarding requests to the U.S. Air Force, etc."</p> <p>5 CODP announced "Requests and Opinions regarding special procurement contract conditions, etc."</p> <p>7 CODP announced "General Requests Regarding the Acceptance of MSACODP"</p> <p>10 CODP announced "Memorandum of Understanding on Securing Working Capital for Special Demands Weapons"</p> <p>12 CODP announced "Requests Concerning the Establishment of Machine Tool Foundations" and "Securing Funds for Equipment Related to Defense Production"</p>
1954	<p>1 CODP announced "Opinion on the Development of the Aircraft Industry"</p> <p>3 CODP announced "Opinions on the development of the defense production system" →55.1 CODP published "Analysis of the Current Status of Japan's Defense Production Sector"</p> <p>3 JAAI submitted "Opinions on fostering the arms industry" to MITI and the Economic Deliberation Agency"</p> <p>4 (JAAI and MITI jointly organized a two-month tour and survey of U.S. firearms and ammunition production facilities by engineers from member companies)</p> <p>7 (An arrangement between U.S. and Japanese contractors for the domestic production of jet aircraft was established. CODP worked hard to achieve this based on an informal proposal from the U.S. Far East Air Forces Command.)</p> <p>8 CODP distributed "The Necessity of Self-Defense Forces and the Role of Defense Production". JAAI submitted its opinion on the establishment of a defense production system to the U.S. and Japanese governments</p> <p>9 GM (Guided Missile) Roundtable Meeting by CODP, JWIA, Japan Aviation Industry Association, etc. submitted opinions on GM research policy</p> <p>10 JAAI submitted "Opinion on Current Issues in the Arms Industry" to the Minister of International Trade and Industry</p>
1955	<p>2 KEIDANREN Vice President Kogoro Uemura submitted "Problems in the Industrial Structure of Japan and the Defense Industry" (KEIDANREN Monthly Report)</p> <p>3 JAAI submitted "Urgent Request for Continued Production of Ammunition"</p> <p>4 JAAI submitted "Request for the Establishment of Defense Industry" to the Minister of International Trade and Industry, the Economic Deliberation Agency, and the ruling party.</p> <p>8 CODP submitted the "Draft Guideline for Maintenance of Ammunition Manufacturing Facilities" to the government and announced the necessity of maintaining self-defense forces and the role of defense production.</p> <p>9 JAAI submitted "Opinion on the Handling of Industrial Property Rights for Weapons Research and Prototype Commissioning Ordered by the Defense Agency" to the Defense Agency.</p>
1956	<p>2 "JAAI established a new Technical Advisory Board and a Radar Research Group (research on domestic production of equipment)."</p> <p>3 JAAI petitioned the U.S. Far East Command and the U.S. Embassy to continue ordering additional arms and ammunition, and petitioned the Defense Agency in June to increase ammunition procurement</p> <p>3 (KEIDANREN dispatched an economic cooperation goodwill civilian mission to Southeast Asia. It was also intended to study the export market for equipment.)</p>

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1957	8	CODP submitted a "Request for the Establishment of Basic Policies for the Development of the Aircraft Industry".
	11	JAAI was commissioned by the National Defense Council to conduct "research and study of various problems related to the procurement of equipment" (report submitted in 1958.5).
	12	CODP issued an opinion paper on the early determination of the next fighter aircraft model.
1958	1	CODP requested that a bill for the promotion of the aircraft industry be submitted to the current Diet session→Aircraft Industry Promotion Law was promulgated in 1958.5.
	6	CODP proposed the establishment of a Defense Industry Study Group. This study group was formed by CODP, JWIA, Aircraft Industries Association, and GM Council.
	8	CODP submitted ""Request for Continuation of Measures to Maintain Firearms and Ammunition Manufacturing Facilities".
1959	6	(The Economic Cooperation Roundtable was dissolved.) (Japan Aircraft Manufacturing Co. was established.)
	7	(A Market Measures Committee consisting of 10 leading trading companies and the Japan Machinery Export Association was established within the CODP.)
1960	3	(A survey team of the rocket industry under the jurisdiction of MITI was dispatched to Europe and the U.S., which included members of the CODP Council Office.)
	11	CODP and JWIA jointly proposed a "Request for a long-term lump-sum contract system for arms".
1961	5	(The Advisory Council for the Domestic Production of Defense Equipment was established, and this advisory council submitted eight opinions in September.)
1962	2	The Advisory Council on Domestic Production of Defense Equipment, consisting of the Keidanren, the Liberal Democratic Party, and related government agencies, issued "Opinions on the Basic Policy for Domestic Production of Defense Equipment."
	7	CODP submitted "Opinion on Arms Export".
	10	(In order to transform JAAI from a defense business guidance and development organization to a business-centered economic organization, a representative of a main member company was appointed chairman.)
1963	5	CODP issued "Opinion on Continued Production of F-104 Fighter Aircraft". (The GM Council was reorganized as the Rocket Development Council.)
1964	2	JAAI submitted "Opinion on the Suspension of Grant Aid to Japan" to the Director General of the Defense Agency.
	7	JAAI Operations Committee released "Opinion on Domestic Production of Equipment and Development of Defense Industry".
1965	8	JAAI submitted "Request for the Connection Production between Secondary DBP and Tertiary DBP and the Contents of the Next DBP" to the Director-General of the Defense Agency.
	12	JAAI submitted "Request for Tertiary DBP" to the Director General of the Defense Agency.
1967	6	JAAI submitted "Request for Long-Term Lump-Sum Contracts for Equipment" to the Defense Agency
	12	JAAI submitted "Request for Dollar Defense" to the Defense Agency.
1969	5	JAAI submitted "Request for Cost Accounting of Equipment Procurement" to the Defense Agency
	9	JAAI cooperated with CODP and organizations related to defense production to conduct a survey after the start of TertiaryDBP.

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1970	6	JAAI submitted "Request for Quaternary DBP" to the Director General of the Defense Agency.
	8	CODP released "Opinion on the Next DBP".
	10	JAAI submitted "Opinion on the Revision of Laws and Regulations Related to the Arms Manufacturing Law".
	11	JAAI submitted "Opinion on the Defense Agency's Three Policies on the Production and Development of Equipment".

- KEIDANREN (Japanese Business Federation) Committee on Defense Production is abbreviated as CODP and Japan Association of Arms Industry is abbreviated as JAAI.
- Defense Buildup Plan is abbreviated as DBP.
- The items are mainly based on CODP [1964] and JAAI [1983], but not all requests, etc. are filled in.

(1) Establishment of the Keidanren's Committee of Defense Production (CODP)

In August 1950, the U.S. Far East Command established a Logistics Command in Japan and began placing orders for fuel tanks, napalm tanks, and other equipment. In January 1951, when Special Envoy Dulles came to Japan to conclude a peace treaty, Keidanren requested not only emergency procurement for the Korean War but also economic assistance and development of economic cooperation after peace.²² To this end, in February, Keidanren, in consultation with GHQ, established the Japan–U.S. Economic Alliance Roundtable to “formulate a private-sector approach to the basic principles of Japan–U.S. economic cooperation. In March 1952, GHQ lifted the ban on the manufacture of weapons in Japan, allowed the repair and manufacture of aircraft and weapons, and lifted the compensation designation of former military arsenals and civilian weapons factories, among others, so that the U.S. military could procure finished weapons (from May 1952). The organization was expanded and strengthened from a forum for general economic cooperation to one that dealt with comprehensive and realistic issues, such as armaments, defense policy, and Asian reconstruction and development, and its name was changed to the Council for Economic Cooperation.²³ According to the organization’s establishment outline, the purpose is “to cooperate in strengthening defense production in the Far East region in partnership with the United States and other countries, and to cooperate in the reconstruction and development of Southeast Asia with Japan’s industrial capabilities and technology, etc.” The organization will work in constant collaboration with Japanese and U.S. government agencies and related private organizations to discuss private sector opinions and basic policies for cooperation and to formulate and implement the research and implementation of specific measures. The organization was to cooperate in the formulation of basic policies for private sector input and cooperation and in the study and implementation of specific measures.²⁴ The council had three subcommittees: general policy, Asian reconstruction and development, and defense production, whose members consisted of more than 30 executives from leading Japanese companies at the time. When

²² March 1951, Japan–U.S. Economic Partnership Roundtable, “Opinions on the Cooperative Posture of the Japanese and U.S. Economies” (Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964], p. 7).

²³ Although this was before the establishment of Keidanren Committee on Defense Production, the Roundtable presented the “Requested Opinions on Administrative Agreements” to the U.S. side in February 1952 and obtained an understanding that the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee, which serves as an operational coordinating body for the administrative agreements associated with the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, would discuss coordination, dispute settlement, contract methods and compensation for losses in the extraterritorial procurement of U.S. forces (Kondo and Osanai [1978], p. 225).

²⁴ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964], pp. 44-47.

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the U.S. began calling for the conclusion of an MSA between Japan and the U.S. to build a mutually defensive Japan–U.S. relationship based on the Mutual Security Act and to strengthen Japan's self-defense capabilities, this organization actively advocated for the conclusion of such an agreement.

CODP formed within Keidanren's Council for Economic Cooperation, is a central organization in the development of Keidanren's line. As mentioned above, it was established in August 1952 when the council was reorganized, and it became an important body for disseminating Keidanren's proposals on the defense industry and defense issues. Initially, CODP was chaired by Kiyoshi Goko (former president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. and advisor to the Japan Industrial Council), and permanent members included representatives of leading companies, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Komatsu, Nippon Kayaku, and Hitachi, Ltd. The committee then established specialized committees on weapons, ships, aircraft, explosives, electricity, fuel, machinery, funds, and service life, each chaired by a representative of a leading company in the industry, such as Taizo Ishizaka, president of Tokyo Shibaura Electric Co. In addition, a deliberation room was set up in CODP, with Kogoro Uemura, advisor to Keidanren, as head of the office, and former military officers familiar with equipment, including Zenshiro Hoshina, former lieutenant general of the navy and director general of the Ordnance Bureau of the Ministry of the Navy, Sadanori Harada, former lieutenant general of the army and director general of the Air Weapons Directorate I, Ministry of Munitions, and Masao Yoshizumi, former lieutenant general of the army and director general of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry, as members, as well as assistants including a former military officer of the rank of colonel and a former military officer of the rank of engineer. In addition, a general-level former military officer was selected as a technical advisor, and Haruji Kan, a former lieutenant general and director of the Army Ordnance Administration Headquarters and vice president of the Weapons Production Cooperation Association (see below), was added as a technical advisor.²⁵ Such a lineup would appear to indicate that CODP was attempting to create a full-fledged roadmap for getting weapons production off the ground in Japan and developing the defense industry.

After the Peace Treaty came into effect, the U.S. began to strongly urge Japan to strengthen its self-defense capabilities and switch from grant aid to paid aid, with a view to concluding an MSA as a way of providing assistance to Japan. Korean special procurement had restarted Japan's military production, but the extent of its potential and the extent to which the Japanese government and industry were willing to enhance Japan's self-defense capabilities had not yet been confirmed. The Yoshida cabinet of the time expected as much U.S. assistance as possible for economic reconstruction while allowing U.S. forces to remain in Japan, and when the armistice talks began in July 1951, industry also expected new assistance (new special procurement) to replace the Korean special procurement.²⁶ CODP decided to compile the gradual increase in defense force required in line with the security treaty into a proposal with detailed specific numerical targets and present it to the government and U.S. branch office as reference material to help plan the ordering of special procurement. The "Draft Proposal on Defense Force Development" and the

²⁵ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production[1964], pp. 42-48; Kondo and Osanai [1978], pp. 216, 218-220.

²⁶ Regarding the special demand for Korea, Nakamura Takafusa and Yoshio Asai indicate \$592 million and \$740 million, respectively, for the period from the start of fighting in June 1950 to the end of large-scale fighting with the start of armistice talks in July of the following year. In any case, the impact of the special demand paid in dollar amounts must have been large when exports in 1950 and 1951 were \$800 million and \$1.4 billion per year, respectively (see Nakamura [2012], p. 569 and Yoshio Asai [2003]).

underlying “Survey Data on Defense Force Production” submitted in February 1953.²⁷

According to the “Draft” and the “Survey Data,” the scale of the defense force targeted to be achieved five years later, in FY1958, would be 300,000 troops in 15 divisions, with equipment equivalent to 30 divisions for the ground forces, 70,000 troops in 290,000 tons of naval vessels for the sea forces, 130,000 troops in 3,750 aircraft for the air forces, and an annual average cost of 480 billion yen. The total cost would be 2.9 trillion yen. However, such defense expenditures “cannot be borne in their entirety by our national economy” (annual defense expenditures/projected national income = 7.3–10.2%), and the corresponding “production capacity of Japan’s defense industry cannot be developed in a given period. The report concluded that Japan’s defense expenditure, which it could financially bear, would be about 56% of the target, or 1.6 trillion yen (3.8 to 4.9% of projected national income), and that the remaining 44%, or 1.3 trillion yen (\$3.5 billion), would have to be provided by the United States. The \$3.5 billion in U.S. dependence consists of 559 billion yen (\$1.5 billion: naval vessels, aircraft, and other specific weapons = tanks, anti-aircraft guns, some underwater weapons, etc.) in kind and 710 billion yen (\$2 billion) in financial assistance. For all equipment (tanks and firearms) for the ground forces, Japan depended on the U.S. It also did for more than 80% of the construction cost of naval vessels for the maritime forces, including in-kind donations, and for half of the aircraft in the air forces, including in-kind donations. So the initial stage was envisioned to be overwhelmingly dependent on the U.S.²⁸

This “tentative plan” was prepared by the above-mentioned deliberation room, and since experts from the army and navy who were in charge of logistics during the war joined the committee, it was a very elaborate draft plan and was also large enough to aim at the creation of a self-defense force that could stand on its own.²⁹ However, it was unrealistic at the time to assume such an injection of funds and grant aid on the part of the United States. Even within CODP, which prepared the “draft”, there were some who questioned the plan, but it was nevertheless published without any reduction. It can be said that the plan reflected the unity of interest between the ex-servicemen and industry, despite the differences in perception between the two. In other words, ex-servicemen who had experienced wartime control and mobilization envisioned a military force capable of defending itself, while the industrial world aspired to economic development and a stable expansion of the defense industry through the continuation of special procurement demand and were eager for new business opportunities through U.S. grant aid for Japan’s self-defense buildup and increased aid to the Southeast Asian region. It is believed that both sides had a common interest in drawing more U.S. assistance.

In preparation for the conclusion of the four MSA-related agreements, the Japanese and U.S. governments also worked out a plan to enhance Japan’s defense capabilities and the nature of U.S. assistance. Prior to the Ikeda-Robertson talks mentioned above, CODP proposed the “General Opinion on Acceptance of MSA” in July 1953, emphasizing that Japan had a natural responsibility to improve its self-defense capability on its own initiative and that MSA assistance should be used to systematically introduce special demand as a transitional measure until Japan achieved economic independence. The committee also expressed its support for the conclusion of the MSA by the industry, arguing that not only

²⁷ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964], pp. 93-105. As for the position of this “Tentative Plan,” Ishii [2003] also sees it as a “rearmament plan” for the acceptance of MSA assistance.

²⁸ Defense Production Board [1964], pp. 91-105.

²⁹ Senga Tetsuya, then secretary general of the Defense Production Board, later recalled that the “Tentative Plan” was “a very brave idea to cooperate with the U.S. on an equal footing” (Kondo and Osanai [1978], p. 229).

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U.S. arms assistance but also extraterritorial procurement would promote the development of the defense industry and be useful not only for national defense but also for supplying arms to the Southeast Asian region.

After the four MSA-related agreements were signed in March 1954, CODP proposed “Requests and Opinions Concerning the Development of the Defense Production System,” which requested that defense production should be planned, that the goals of defense industry development should take into consideration not only the SDF but also the renewal of equipment and the replenishment of supplies for free nations in the Far East region, and that subsidies for research and development costs should be provided. The committee also requested subsidies for research and development expenses, special tax measures, financial facilities, and subsidies for long-term contracts, etc.³⁰ As already mentioned, when the Defense Agency was established in the same year and became the controlling organization for the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as a self-defense force, it further continued its building activities, calling for a longer-term and systematic “defense buildup plan” emphasizing “defense production as the base of self-defense” and support measures for such a defense industry.

With the conclusion of the MSA and the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, the domestic defense industry intensified its activities towards the domestic production of defense equipment. The resumption of equipment production was facilitated by the Korean Special Demands, and the April 1952 revision of the Joint Ministerial Ordinance of the four ministries regarding restrictions on the production of weapons, aircraft, and other items made it possible to produce and repair weapons, aircraft, and other items subject to GHQ approval. In May, the first complete weapon (4.2-inch mortar) was ordered from the U.S. Military Procurement Department in Japan in an extraterritorial procurement. In June 1954, the Aircraft Manufacturing Business Act was enacted, replacing the Aircraft Manufacturing Act, whose main purpose was to deal with the actual situation in response to special procurement demands, and which had little regulatory power and did not consider measures to foster the development of the industry. The Act functioned as a “coordination” law that prevented the proliferation of weakly based companies and enabled the selection of factories with a strong financial basis and technical capabilities. CODP received an informal proposal from the Far Eastern Air Force Headquarters to produce jet fighters and trainers for the Air Self-Defense Force in Japan on a Japan–U.S. joint sharing basis. The government hesitated, fearing an increase in defense costs due to the shift from grant aid to payment, but CODP persuaded the government by insisting on “defense production as the base of self-defense”, as emphasized in the “Request for the Improvement of Defense Production Systems” submitted in March 1954. In June 1955, the government agreed to the joint domestic production of jet aircraft (F-86-F fighters and T-33-A trainers) in Japan.³¹ The main contractor for the production of 300 fighter jets was Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, while Kawasaki Aircraft Industries was the main contractor for 210 trainer jets, which were to be manufactured during the 1956-1958 fiscal years.

In August 1955, the Council Office of CODP issued an interesting opinion. It examined “Theoretical Issues Concerning Defense Production” and published a document entitled “The Necessity of Maintaining Self-Defense Forces and the Role of Defense Production,” in which it listed five points as the contribution of defense production to the national economy. In the document, defense production is considered to contribute to the national

³⁰ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964], p. 72.

³¹ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964] 14, pp. 125-127.

economy in five ways: (1) some defense production can become an export industry, (2) it can increase employment and national income, (3) it can promote the sophistication of the industrial structure, (4) it can contribute to the advancement of industrial technology, and (5) it can promote the export of general commodities. In this connection, Keidanren Vice President Kogoro Uemura discussed the “Problems of Japan’s Industrial Structure and the Defense Industry” in the “Keidanren Monthly Report” of February 1955. Criticizing the argument that the defense industry is unnecessary, Uemura emphasizes that “the establishment of the defense industry is closely related to the improvement of the technological level of general industry because the recent defense requires the highest level of technology in aircraft, electronic weapons, etc.” and that “from the viewpoint of general industrial technology, the defense industry is in a very important position”.³² Since the defense industry requires the highest level of technology, the argument goes, this will lead to advances in industrial technology. However, in the case of the application of military technology to civilian products, this view would be accompanied by a number of important reservations, since in practice there are various barriers such as secrecy, mass production techniques, and production cost reductions.³³

(2) Establishment of the Japan Association of Arms Industry (JAAI)

According to “*The Thirty-Year History of the Japan Association of Arms Industry*,” the predecessor of this organization, the Japan Technical Production Cooperation Association, was established in 1951. The GHQ, which was in dire straits for weapons and other supplies during the Korean War, requested the cooperation of Lieutenant General Haruji Kan, former Director General of the Army Ordnance Administration Headquarters, with a view to procuring such items in Japan. The company’s advisors included Kiyoshi Goko, former president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Keizo Shibusawa, former minister of finance, and Ryozo Asano, former president of NKK. However, because it was a group of people who had been expelled from public office, it could only be organized as a joint-stock company.³⁴ The company was capitalized at 3 million yen, and its purpose was to “gather together dilapidated weapons manufacturing facilities and dispersed engineers to stand between the U.S. military, the Japanese government authorities, and private companies to cooperate in the manufacture, repair, and supply of U.S. military weapons. In 1952, this organization was reorganized into the Weapons Production Cooperative Association, a voluntary association of member organizations, and the following year into JAAI. It had Goko as chairman, companies related to weapons production as regular members, civilian and former military engineers as technical members, and a mandate to deal with Korean special demand and weapons orders from the National Security Agency and Defense Agency and to maintain relations between the Japanese defense industry. The organization maintains relations with the Japanese government and the U.S. military by handling Korean special procurement and weapons orders from the National Safety Agency and the Defense Agency. At the time of its establishment, the organization was not engaged in profit-making activities but was engaged in the investigation and collection of information on dilapidated weapons production facilities and scattered military technology,

³² Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964], pp. 112-117.

³³ Fujita [2018] takes a negative view of the Keidanren’s perspective, which encourages the development of “dual-use technologies” today, citing transistors, electronics technology, and NC machine tools as examples of successful “civilianization of military technology”.

³⁴ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 2. In 1988, the association was transformed into the Japan Defense Equipment Industry, and in 2012, it was transformed into the Japan Association of Defense Industry (JADI), a general incorporated association, to continue its operations.

liaison, and coordination among dispersed engineers and in “consulting work” in response to inquiries from the U.S. military and foreign countries concerning weapons technology. In 1952, when the organization was reorganized as the Weapons Production Cooperative Association, a constitution was established, and the organization’s activities included introducing the status of weapons orders, providing guidance and assistance regarding ordered items and their production methods, researching and introducing professional engineers, planning weapons production facilities, submitting research materials, cooperating with receipt inspections, responding to inquiries from military and government officials who placed orders, and introducing the industry’s actual situation and offering opinions. The objectives of the Society, which was renamed the Japan Association of Arms Industry in October 1953, were to contribute to the promotion and development of the arms industry and the improvement of related technologies, as well as to promote friendship among members. The association initially supported the supply of U.S. forces during the Korean War, but with the establishment of the National Safety Forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, interest in equipment research and supply increased. Around 1954, a Tank Committee, Underwater Weapons Subcommittee, Fire Control System (FCS) committee, Rights of Industrial Property Committee, Radar Study Group, Pistol Study Group, Rocket Study Group, Electronics Committee, and Ammunition Domestic Production Study Group, etc. were established. These were also in preparation for the domestic production of defense equipment in response to the request of the Defense Agency.³⁵

In 1953, the Arms Production Council was established with respect to the Law on the Production of Arms, etc. In February 1954, when the Minister of International Trade and Industry asked for advice on subsidies for the arms industry, Mr. Goko, president of JAAI, was appointed chairman of this council, and many of the association’s technical experts became members of the technical subcommittee established within the council. They were involved in the drafting of the report, which included the early establishment of a defense plan, ensuring economical production, maintaining production on an appropriate scale, giving consideration to the export industry, and maintaining the firearms and ammunition industry.³⁶

In 1955 and 1956, JAAI was involved in the protection of corporate interests in industrial property rights and ammunition procurement, as shown in Table 3. In response to a decline in the number of orders, JAAI submitted a letter of opinion requesting the maintenance of related companies by placing additional orders, thereby encouraging the development of the defense industry. In the 1957-1959 fiscal year, about 140 million yen was granted as a subsidy for the maintenance of defense industrial facilities. This was probably the result of these opinion letters.

In addition, from 1956 to 1961, JAAI was commissioned by the Defense Agency and other government agencies to prepare drafts of standards for equipment and other products. In this respect, it can be seen that JAAI was building a close relationship with government agencies and was taking on the task of responding to technological advances in weaponry and other products.

(3) Domestic defense production after primary DBP and the functions of CODP and JAAI

It will be only after the Japanese government begins to decide on the DBP that the National

³⁵ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 6.

³⁶ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 7.

Defense Council and the Cabinet meeting will be able to consider and decide on defense force development in a somewhat systematic manner. In order to stably provide defense equipment indispensable for self-defense reinforcement on its own, the Japanese government was required to spend a large amount of money from the national budget. 4 DBPs were formulated from 1958 to the 1970s. Defense equipment procurement trends were as shown in Table 4. The equipment in the founding period of the SDF was heavily dependent on U.S. grant aid.³⁷

Table 4 Procurement Trends by Fiscal Year, Long-Term Plan, and Procurement Method

classification fiscal year	Domestic Procurements(A)			General Import(B)			FMS(C)			subtotal (D=A+B+C)	Grants-in-Aid(E)		total (F=D+E)
	amount of money	propotion (%)		amount of money	propotion (%)		amount of money	propotion (%)			amount of money	propotion (%)	
		A/D	A/F		B/D	B/F		C/D	C/F	E/F			
1950-57	241,519	95.3	39.6	9,477	3.7	1.6	2,499	1.0	0.4	253,495	356,863	58.5	610,358
1st DBP(1958-60)	278,913	91.0	62.4	10,860	3.5	2.4	16,848	5.5	3.8	306,621	140,494	31.4	447,115
1961	70,249	85.1	64.7	6,311	7.6	5.8	5,972	7.2	5.5	82,532	26,080	24.0	108,612
2nd DBP(1962-66)	578,135	87.8	81.6	42,397	6.4	6.0	38,203	5.8	5.4	658,735	49,710	7.0	708,445
3rd DBP(1967-71)	1,282,897	91.8	91.6	66,202	4.7	4.7	47,833	3.4	3.4	1,396,932	3,275	0.2	1,400,207
4th DBP(1972-76)	2,158,818	93.0	93.0	100,123	4.3	4.3	61,656	2.7	2.7	2,320,597	0	0.0	2,320,597
Total	4,610,531	91.9	82.4	235,370	4.7	4.2	173,011	3.4	3.1	5,018,912	576,422	10.3	5,595,334

- The amount of the grant aid was recorded based on the amount received.
- FMS : Foreign Military Sales. The grant aid includes the loan of vessels. Receipt of the grant ended in FY1969.
- Source: FY1975 financial results (House of Councillors Accounts Committee Research Office).
- Source: Reproduced from figures in Nagamatsu [1979], pp. 62, 63.

U.S. aid is shifting from grant aid to paid aid, but in terms of amount, it does not account for a large proportion of the total. The percentage of domestic procurement has expanded dramatically. In primary DBP, U.S. grant aid has been greatly reduced, and as a result, domestic procurement now accounts for more than 60% of the procurement value, with U.S. grant aid ratio accounting for only 31% of the total. In the case of secondary DBP, domestic procurement now accounts for more than 80% of total procurement, indicating that domestic defense production has begun to take off in earnest. However, the scale of domestic procurement does not imply independence in terms of weapons and military technology, as Japan is heavily dependent on the U.S. for advanced technology and fighter aircraft.³⁸ In addition, even if there is a price increase, taking into account the fact that domestic procurement amounts for primary to quaternary DBP have each more than doubled or increased significantly over the previous period, it is thought that there has been a remarkable development of the domestic defense industry in the background. We will discuss this point later and examine the role of CODP and JAAI in each period.

³⁷According to Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964], p. 169, the U.S. arms aid (grant aid) to Japan amounted to 345.5 billion yen during the period 1951-1957, of which 108.7 billion yen was for equipment, 95.2 billion yen for the Ground Self-Defense Force, of which 62.7 billion yen was for 170 ships and 13.4 billion yen for 163 aircraft, and 54.3 billion yen for the Air Self-Defense Force. This indicates that equipment during this period was heavily dependent on this grant aid. Note that the amounts differ slightly from the grant aid amounts in Table 3.

³⁸In the case of domestic procurement and production, since it includes licensed domestic production of products developed in foreign countries in addition to products based on proprietary technologies, the technological dependence cannot be determined by the amount of procurement alone.

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① Primary DBP period: 1958-60

Primary DBP began in 1958 after the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces in Japan was completed. As shown in Table 2, the first emphasis during this period was on air defense in terms of equipment, and CODP also submitted a draft proposal, "Request for the Establishment of Basic Policies for the Development of the Aircraft Industry" in 1957, and in 1958, CODP also submitted a proposal to the Diet, "Requesting the Submission of an Aircraft Industry Promotion Bill to the Diet" (Table3). The former called for the establishment of a long-term plan, the establishment of measures for the export of aircraft, and special measures for their development in the areas of finance, taxation, subsidies for testing and research, proper cost accounting, and the introduction of technology, while the latter also called for the development of a law to promote the aviation industry for the domestic production of aircraft, which led to the promulgation of the law in May of the same year. CODP actually promoted domestic production of medium-sized aircraft, and the results became evident during the 2DBP period.

Next, in 1958, CODP called for the Defense Industry Study Group to be formed by defense industry-related organizations to promote the domestic production of defense equipment in general in response to U.S. aid to Japan being paid for. This study group aimed to analyze the current status and future prospects for domestic production in each sector of the defense industry, and to contribute to the formulation of the government's annual plan. In addition to CODP, JAAI, the Japan Aviation Industry Association, and the Guided Missile (GM) Research Association participated in this study group, and within this study group, the General Coordination Committee, the Policy Committee, and the Technical Committee were established. The following subcommittees were established under these committees: Aviation(studies on domestic production of P2V anti-submarine patrol aircraft, intermediate jet training aircraft, large helicopters, FX fighters, etc.); Weapons (armouring of the 7th Mixed Group, development of land-based equipment and mass production system, continued development of weapons for maritime forces and study of production system); Missiles (study on research and basic trial production of 28 related companies, which had been almost undeveloped); Electronics (study on research and development system of code analyser, secret communication device and its analyser, radar, navigation aid device, etc.); Naval vessels (study of building submarines, missile-carrying patrol vessels, and helicopter carriers) and Fuel.³⁹ The contents of these studies were submitted as an interim report in 1959, and it is believed that they were referred to in the annual plan of the Defense Agency.

In 1959, the Market Measures Committee was established within CODP, consisting of the presidents of 10 trading companies, including Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui & Co., Marubeni Corporation, Itochu Corporation, and the Machinery Center for Trade and Investment. This Committee considered the development of overseas markets and special export measures to overcome bottlenecks in the weapons and defense equipment industry, such as high-mix low-volume production and rapid obsolescence. Part of the results of the study was submitted as the "Opinion on Weapons Exports" in 1962, and after discussion at the Defense Equipment Domestic Production Roundtable, it was proposed as a reference opinion to the prime minister, relevant ministers, and the LDP's Political Affairs Research Committee.⁴⁰

In addition, members of CODP and the GM Council (see below) accompanied the

³⁹ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production[1964], pp. 148, 172-181; Japan Arms Industry Association [1983], p. 8.

⁴⁰ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production[1964], pp. 198-206.

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) survey team and travelled overseas under the jurisdiction of MITI to investigate the international military situation in 1959 and the rocket industry in 1960. They reported on the current status of international joint R&D and joint production, as well as problems in importing finished products and licenced production.⁴¹

By the way, as already mentioned, JAAI, circa 1956-61, was commissioned by the National Defense Council to survey the procurement of equipment. At the same time, JAAI has been commissioned by the Japan Defense Agency and other government agencies to draft standards for defense equipment and devices. Although JAAI describes itself as “the only industrial organization in charge of domestic arms production in both name and reality,” it can be seen that as the domestic production of defense equipment expands, JAAI is taking on the task of keeping up with technological advances in weapons and other equipment. While it played an important role in following up on the technical aspects of defense equipment, it was also a member of the above-mentioned Defense Industry Study Group, and in 1960, jointly with the CODP, it was involved in demand activities related to the profitability of defense industry management, such as the “Request for a Long-term Lump-sum Contract System for Weapons” (Table 3).⁴²

②Secondary DBP period: 1962-1966

The Kishi cabinet resigned in July 1960 due to the Security Riots. The drafting of DBP came to a standstill due to political instability, but DBP was officially decided in July 1961. We will review four characteristic matters in which the industry was involved in defense industrial policy during this period.

First, as Table 4 shows, the ratio of U.S. grant aid to Japan has declined sharply, the amount of U.S. paid aid has increased sharply, and the ratio and amount of domestic procurement have increased sharply. In response, the industrial sector has been lobbying the U.S. to avoid reductions in extraterritorial procurement and U.S. aid to Japan and has demanded that the government substitute domestic production for foreign procurement. In addition to the opinion submitted by JAAI in 1964, as shown in Table 3, the industry has also lobbied the U.S. government and business community for good measures against the prohibition of the exchange of military vehicles in FY1963 and thereafter, which had been continued since FY1957 in the U.S. fiscal year.⁴³ The exchange of military vehicles is structured as follows: procurement of new Japanese vehicles by the U.S. military → free transfer to the Self-Defense Forces → return of used vehicles by the Self-Defense Forces → refurbishment by the U.S. military and provision to Southeast Asian countries.

Next was the promotion of domestic aircraft production. In 1957, due in part to the high compatibility between military and civilian aircraft, the Japan Transport Aircraft Design and Research Association began research on the design of a medium-size transport aircraft. In 1959, the Japan Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation was established with a capital of 500 million yen as a joint public-private investment. The capital was increased to 4.9 billion yen. Kawasaki Aircraft, Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Shin Maywa, and Fuji Heavy Industries completed the major parts of the aircraft, except for the engine, propeller, and other parts, which had to be imported. This was the first domestically produced

⁴¹ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production [1964] pp. 222, 226, 227, 230-235. Already at this stage, the advantages of international joint development and production and the problems of importing finished products or producing under licence are pointed out, but no mention is made of constitutional restrictions.

⁴² Long-term contracts are realized in the 1962 budget process. Keidanren Committee on Defense Production[1964], pp. 157, 160 and Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], pp. 3, 11.

⁴³ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production[1964], pp. 191-196.

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aircraft, the YS-11, which was purchased and put into practical use by All Nippon Airways and the Defense Agency Secondary DBP.⁴⁴

Furthermore, the introduction of anti-aircraft equipment was considered a new plan for the secondary DBP period, and surface-to-air guided missile (Nike and Hawk) units were deployed at the end of the secondary DBP period. The Guided Missile Committee was established in 1953 within CODP as a specialized committee for weapons, aviation, and electricity, and was followed by research and study by the GM (guided missile) Advisory Council, which included government agencies, JAAI, and the Japan Aerospace Industries Association. After research and study by the GM (guided missile) Advisory Council, formed in 1957 by 41 member companies from the weapons, electronics, and aviation industries under the guidance of the Defense Agency's Equipment Bureau, the equipment was provided by the United States under a grant and cost-sharing licensed production system.⁴⁵ Then, domestic production of Nike and Hawk began in FY1966 through licensed production. The GM Council also took charge of space development, and in 1964, it was renamed the Japan Rocket Development Council. It was dissolved in 1974 on the grounds that it had accomplished its mission. The Japan Aerospace Industries Association took charge of space development, and JAAI took over military missile development.⁴⁶

Finally, it should be noted that JAAI underwent a certain change in its activities during this period, abolishing technical membership and replacing it with associate membership and individual membership in a 1959 revision of the Articles of Incorporation, as the number of weapons-related engineers increased within corporate member companies and JAAI no longer needed to provide technical guidance. In October 1962, the association invited Mr. Kono, president of Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy Industries, Ltd., as its chairman, and in 1964, it established the Operations Committee as an advisory body to the chairman to strengthen cooperation with the Defense Agency, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and other government agencies closely related to the defense industry. In 1964, the company established the Operations Committee as an advisory body for the chairman to strengthen cooperation with the Defense Agency, MITI, and other government agencies closely related to the defense industry. As seen in Table 3, the number of opinion letters submitted to government agencies has increased since then. They have demanded "bridging production" to fill the gap that may occur between secondary and tertiary DBP and to improve subsidy amounts that are less than the actual R&D costs of companies from the survey on the actual status of secondary DBP.⁴⁷

③ Tertiary DBP period:1967-71

The tertiary DBP pointed to the improvement in the domestic technology level, appropriate domestic production of equipment, and emphasis on anti-submarine and air defense capabilities. As shown in Table 4, domestic procurement of equipment has exceeded 90%, and some assess that "we have entered the full-scale phase of 'independent' equipment".⁴⁸ Three points regarding the involvement of industry in defense policy should be reviewed here.

The first point is the policy of increasing anti-submarine and air defense capabilities. As seen in Table 2, the actual amount for procurement from the secondary DBP to the tertiary

⁴⁴ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production[1964] pp. 207-215.

⁴⁵ Keidanren Committee on Defense Production[1964], pp. 136-146; Kondo and Osanai [1978], p. 264.

⁴⁶ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 86.

⁴⁷ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], pp. 11-13.

⁴⁸ Kihara [1994], p. 104.

DBP (central procurement) exceeded 1 trillion yen, an increase of approximately 2.3 times, with an extremely large increase of 3.6 times in aircraft purchase expenditures. Although not shown in the table, the aircraft purchase cost for tertiary DBP was 384.3 billion yen, accounting for 35% of the central procurement cost and far exceeding other items. In the aviation sector, the Maritime Self-Defense Force's PS-1 anti-submarine amphibian (formally introduced in 1970) C-1 jet transport aircraft (under research and development), T-2 advanced jet trainer aircraft (research and development started in 1967), P-2J anti-submarine patrol aircraft (deployed in 1969), and F-4EJ fighter aircraft (next main fighter aircraft; licensed production started in 1969) were all introduced during this period. Research and studies were also being conducted on the PXL anti-submarine patrol aircraft (the next anti-submarine patrol aircraft, yet to be decided).⁴⁹ And in terms of increasing air defense capabilities, the domestic production and deployment of Nike and Hawk missiles, introduced in the final phase of the secondary DBP, became a key issue. As shown in Table 3, JAAI continued to actively request the Defense Agency to secure a budget, place orders based on a long-term plan and long-term lump-sum contracts, develop future-oriented technologies, and secure a budget for such development, while at the same time demanding the promotion of domestic production of Nike and Hawk.⁵⁰ In 1968, partly as a result of these efforts, the Japanese government approved the "Technical Collaboration Agreement for the Design and Manufacture of Nike Hercules Missiles" between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and McDonnell Douglas, and the "Technical Collaboration Agreement for the Manufacture of Hawk Systems" between Mitsubishi Electric and Raytheon Technologies of the U.S., and licensed production was started in Japan. As a result, procurement of guided weapons now accounts for 7% (about 75.5 billion yen) of the major items in the composition of tertiary DBP in Table 2, approaching the composition of ships and weapons.

Second is the issue of R&D and prototype support, as well as the costing of defense equipment. Since the conclusion of the MSA, the industry has advocated "defense production as the base of self-defense capabilities" and has demanded that the government provide adequate support for R&D. However, tertiary DBP required equipment that required advanced technological capabilities, such as aircraft and guided weapons production, and the defense industry was also required to increase its R&D capabilities. In response, in 1969, JAAI and CODP, in cooperation with other defense production-related organizations, conducted a survey of the actual situation after the inauguration of the Tertiary DBP, focusing on the Defense Agency's technological R&D in fiscal 1967 and 1968. As a result, it became clear that the private sector's share of R&D expenditures was extremely high, particularly for weapons, missiles, and vehicles. Considering the fact that the ratio of actual procurement to prototypes in Table 2 has decreased for the Tertiary DBP, and that the increase in the amount is not significantly different from the increase in the total amount, the reality emerges that despite the publicity about the importance of R&D, prototypes and R&D expenditures have not increased. In this regard, JAAI calls for securing a budget that can be allocated to R&D expenses⁵¹ and, as shown in Table 3, for "appropriate contract prices" based on "budgets set in line with actual conditions and cost accounting commensurate with reality" in accounting for defense equipment procurement.⁵² As a reason for this, they pointed out that while rising prices and labour costs are affecting production costs due to inflation during a period of rapidly rising GNP, weapons are special

⁴⁹ Kondo and Osanai [1978] pp. 276, 288, 289.

⁵⁰ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], pp. 13, 14.

⁵¹ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 17.

⁵² Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 15.

products for which companies themselves cannot develop their own markets, and cost reductions through increased production are not expected.

The third is about “the Three Principles on Arms Exports”, as stated by Prime Minister Sato in his 1967 Diet speech. Even after the Korean special procurement, overseas arms transfers peaked at 15 billion yen in the mid-1950s, and exports continued to some extent since 1963, due to extraterritorial procurement and new special procurements. However, the Three Principles on Arms Exports, which may have reflected anti-Vietnam war sentiments, led to the implementation of restrictions on exports. In 1968, since there were no restrictions on plants, the company exported ammunition manufacturing equipment to the Philippines as postwar compensation. On the other hand, a significant portion of weapons manufacturers switched to civilian demand during the process of rapid economic growth, and companies that continued to produce weapons also shifted their focus to producing weapons for the Self-Defense Forces. As a result, they appear to have remained static with regard to these three principles.⁵³ JAAI, which had stipulated in its articles of incorporation “matters related to the promotion of arms exports” as its business, “decided that its basic policy was to follow government policy, effectively abandoning any expectation of arms exports.”⁵⁴ Later, in 1976, the Miki cabinet expanded the scope of the three principles and the areas to which they applied, but at the same time, it gradually hollowed out the arms export regulations by narrowing the category of “arms” and creating exceptions that exempted them from application.

④ Quaternary DBP period: 1972-76

Defense Minister Nakasone, who had been advocating self-defense partly because of the Nixon doctrine and the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in 1970, emphasized “exclusive defense” as a basic policy while modernizing land-based equipment, domestic production of equipment, and emphasizing R&D, with the view that equipment development and production should be “in principle limited to the home industry”. He was perhaps a politician who was favourably disposed to the defense equipment industry. However, in the development of the defense industry, he mentioned the “introduction of appropriate competition principles,” and JAAI immediately issued an order that “the introduction of competition principles should be handled with caution.”⁵⁵ In this section, we will examine the trends in the domestic industry and production of equipment, which were emphasized in the defense policy.

In 1970, when the fourth DBP period was under consideration, JAAI submitted a request, as shown in Table 3. In it, they requested the consideration of an appropriate budget and reasonable contract prices, with emphasis on R&D to promote domestic production, the formulation of a long-term plan to stabilize defense production, and the improvement of an advance payment system to deal with the increasing size and length of procurement.⁵⁶ Although these were matters of concern to the defense industry, it can be said that these requests were made out of consideration for the economic situation at the time, when labour costs and prices were rising, and because of the increase in large-scale projects for aircraft and other equipment. The requests were also because of the increasing number of

⁵³ Tetsuya Senga, who was secretary general of the Defense Production Committee, looks back on those days and states that the focus was on aircraft and weapons production for the SDF and that “enthusiasm for developing export markets had waned” (Kondo and Osanai [1978], p. 256).

⁵⁴ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 32.

⁵⁵ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 15.

⁵⁶ Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 18.

cases in which production continued for several rounds, and the companies that received orders therefore asked to take good measures to continue production. In the fourth DBP period of the war against the dollar, oil shocks, and other challenges, there was a reduction in the amount of equipment ordered, and on behalf of the companies that received orders, the Procurement Implementation Headquarters was often asked to take measures to prevent such reductions.⁵⁷ As shown in Table 2, R&D was emphasized during the fourth DBP period, as indicated by the increase in expenditures for prototypes, but according to a survey conducted during the fourth DBP period by five industry organizations, including CODP and JAAI, the number of direct man-hours for weapons-related manufacturing and repair decreased to 75 in FY1976 on an index of 100 for FY1972, and the number of direct man-hours for missile and rocket fields in particular decreased to 55, and in the pyrotechnics field, 49, a significant decrease. JAAI was aware that the fourth DBP period “clearly fell behind in the second year due to the unforeseen circumstances of the oil crisis” and strongly urged that the Defense Agency’s Basic Defense Capability Concept reflect measures to formulate defense production and R&D capabilities.⁵⁸

Domestic production of aircraft was also underway during this period. The F-4EJ fighter aircraft was produced as planned, but the PXL, the next-generation anti-submarine patrol aircraft, was “returned blank” at the National Defense Conference in October 1972, despite the fact that both industry and the Defense Agency had a policy of domestic production until 1971, and five years later it was officially decided to adopt Lockheed’s P-3C. The P-3C was adopted by the Defense Production Board in 1974. Although the Defense Production Board had requested domestic production in 1974 in such opinion pieces as “Proposal for PXL Development and Production (Memorandum)” and “Security and Equipment Acquisition Methods,” the P-3C ended up being imported. This process has pointed to technical problems and uncertainties that cannot be explained simply as a measure to reduce Japanese dollars in consideration of Japan–U.S. relations.⁵⁹

Summary and Future Issues

The beginning of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War led to a major shift in U.S. occupation policy, moving Japan from demilitarization and restraining economic recovery to promotion of reconstruction and rebuilding of military power. Symbolically, the U.S. withdrew from the policy of designating munitions factories and industrial facilities for compensation and removal, and began to actively utilize the former military arsenals and other facilities by selling them to weapons producers. Then, the U.S.

⁵⁷ At the National Defense Council and Cabinet meetings at the end of 1970, 31 tanks, 60 armored vehicles, and 70 self-propelled guns for the Ground Self-Defense Force, 17 naval vessels for the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and 42 fighter aircraft for the Air Self-Defense Force were excluded from the initial targets (“The Fourth Defense Force Development Plan” (4th Defense), https://www.asagumo-news.com/hbdl/bouei/1_4jibou/4ji-bou.pdf).

⁵⁸ In 1977, CODP published “*Analysis of the Current Status of Japan’s Defense Industry and Future Responses*”, a survey of 67 companies in the industry conducted by Japan Association of Arms Industry, CODP, Japan Aerospace Industries Association, Japan Shipbuilding Industry Association, and Japan Electronic Machinery Manufacturers Association during the fourth defense period, which served as one of the bases for the request (Japan Association of Arms Industry [1983], p. 23).

⁵⁹ Senga questioned the “blank slate” return at the National Defense Council, saying, “It seems as if it was decided by the voice of heaven. Tomiyama [1979] also questioned the selection process. Furthermore, NHK’s “Unsolved Cases” Reporting Team (2018) has approached the core of the matter through interviews with those involved at the time. Similar opaqueness is also pointed out in the selection of the F-104 (Kondo and Osanai [1978], pp. 261, 309).

recognized the restoration of Japanese sovereignty by concluding the Peace Treaty. The Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the MSA Agreement allowed U.S. forces to be stationed in Japan and the U.S. has mandated an increase in self-defense capabilities in line with U.S. desires. The U.S. initially provided many weapons for the creation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the defense equipment buildup.

The U.S. government provided the loans free of charge, but to curb the outflow of dollars, it switched to paying for the loans, Foreign Military Sales and then to exporting them. The Japanese government, on the other hand, steadily enhanced its defense capability from the 1950s to the 1970s, the Primary DBP through the Quaternary DBP.

In response to this policy shift towards increased self-defense capabilities, Keidanren, the center of Japanese industry, responded to this policy shift by taking advantage of the special demand and the business opportunity of upgrading the SDF's defense capabilities to achieve economic recovery and growth through a tie-up with the United States.

Keidanren organized the CODP, which was led by the heavy industry sector closely related to weapons production. CODP actively lobbied GHQ, the U.S. military in Japan, and the Japanese government to provide the JSDF with free provision of arms, to utilize “wheat funds” in accordance with Section 550 of the U.S. MSA Agreement, and to pursue possible arms exports to Southeast Asia. CODP often emphasized “self-defense” and developed a request for the maintenance and expansion of “defense production as the base of self-defense”. Looking at the activities of CODP, as an industry group, it lobbied more actively directly to the U.S. military in Japan and GHQ until the Defense Agency as an administrative structure was better organized in terms of organization and personnel.

JAAI, which was organized by the United States Armed Forces, also provided military technical assistance to supply the U.S. military and served as a research and study organization that provided administrative support to the government. JAAI was also changing its character from a military industry development organization to an organization that represented the military industry's interests, while enhancing defense equipment and stabilizing the defense industry.

By the way, as already pointed out, Keidanren insists on the importance of the defense industry's technological leadership in the civilian demand production sector. As mentioned in Minoru Fujita's criticism of this argument, more careful empirical analysis will be necessary since the technological interdependence between military and civilian demand seems to have deepened since the 1990s, when development in the ICT aspect has become more prominent.

I also mentioned that with regard to arms exports, the Sato cabinet advocated the three export principles in 1967, and export controls were tightened under the Miki cabinet. When these issues were raised in the Diet, Keidanren and JAAI did not express a clear stance against them. This was due to the strength of the anti-Vietnam War movement and to public opinion for peace. This is probably reflected in the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s, the period covered in my paper, public support for the Japanese Constitution, which stipulated the non-preservation of war potential, greatly outweighed opinions calling for its revision.⁶⁰ For the defense industry, the fact that demand is limited to the domestic market means that sales channels are limited, which should be a major constraint on corporate management unless there is a very large domestic demand. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the subsequent process has moved in the direction of lifting the restrictions, and this point must be examined again.

⁶⁰ See Miwa and Sakaiya [2020].

How was the Japan–U.S. relationship regarding the Japan Self-Defense Forces? They were established and DBPs were promoted from the 1950s to the 1970s. As Japan’s military force was rebuilt under the leadership of the U.S., much of the equipment was initially provided free of charge by the U.S., but as Japan’s military buildup plans progressed in line with the MSA agreement, the equipment was switched from grant aid to export, and “domestic production” was promoted, reflecting the interests of domestic industrial groups. However, even with the production of parts and equipment at domestic factories and the increasing rate of domestic production in the price structure, “domesticization” was far from being technologically independent, as fighter aircraft and other equipments with advanced technology were mainly produced under license and important parts were black boxed. In addition, the U.S. government’s consent is basically required for the selection of aircraft models, and Japan’s passive position in defense equipment is clear. The cabinet’s decision in the 2010s to allow the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, mentioned at the beginning of this paper, appears to be an extension of this policy, but further study is needed to verify this.

Furthermore, how did the domestic arms industry develop? During this period, leading companies, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (three heavy industries merged in 1964), Kawasaki Aircraft (Kawasaki Heavy Industries after 1969), Fuji Heavy Industries (Subaru Corporation after 2017), ShinMaywa Industries, Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba Corporation, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, and Komatsu Manufacturing, grew as leaders in the military industry, producing aircraft, naval vessels, special vehicles, and missiles. It is also clear that these companies have steadily improved their aircraft manufacturing technologies, as seen in the completion of the YS-11, a medium-sized transport plane jointly produced by domestic companies, and the XT-2, a supersonic advanced training plane by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Many companies switched from military production to civilian production after the Korean War and subsequent sharp decline in special procurement demand, but these leading companies have continued to produce weapons while expanding civilian production within their companies.⁶¹ The study of the relationship between civilian and military production within their companies is a future issue.

⁶¹ Sawai [2018] mentions examples of continued weapons production at Osaka Metal Industries (renamed Daikin Industries in 1963) and Komatsu Ltd.

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Japan's Defence Industry and Arms Transfers During the Cold War: Between Independence and Alliance

By ATSUSHI KOKETSU*

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the development process of the Japanese defense industry during the Cold War in relation to the issue of arms transfers. After World War II, the U.S. promoted the lending of surplus weapons to Japan, and at the same time, it hoped for the revival of Japan's independent defense industry, albeit with restrictions. In Japanese domestic politics, a conflict emerged between the Shigeru Yoshida Cabinet's vision of light armaments and the rearmament plans of those in the defense industry. Thus, the issue of rearmament became an important political issue in Cold War Japan, and at the same time, also conflict over restrictions on the defense industry and its independence influenced the political situation. The conflicts and confrontations over the revival of the defense industry and demands for arms transfers that occurred during the Cold War have continued to have a strong influence on Japan-U.S. relations and the nature of Japan's national security policy to the present day. This paper analyzes the above issues in light of the controversy over the theory of self-defense and the Japan-U.S. alliance.

1. Introduction: Problem-Setting and Previous Studies

(1) Assignment of tasks

The Korean War, which began on June 25, 1950, forced the United States to change its military strategy during the Cold War. The new strategy was to move away from the 'forward base strategy', which was based on deploying forces in areas close to the Soviet Union, to a new strategy of dispersing forces to surrounding areas at a certain distance from the point of force projection. It would reduce the deployment of forces in areas where conflicts were expected to erupt and, as an alternative, encourage the establishment of a defence community between Japan and South Korea in the Asian region. As a result, the U.S. would counter the Soviet threat, especially to Japan. Moreover, it would force Japan to rearm in accordance with the Mutual Security Act (MSA).

The U.S. lent Japan its surplus weapons after World War II in the hopes that Japan would become self-reliant in its defence, as well as continue and develop defence production through the MSA. It also made Japan's rearmament inevitable. At first, both the Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) and the Cabinet of Shigeru Yoshida were reluctant to rearm Japan. However, proposals

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from the private sector led by businessmen with high hopes for the defence industry were pioneering; public organisations, such as the National Security Agency, the Economic Council and the Ministry of Finance, also submitted proposals for rearmament. In the midst of these developments, there was a heated debate among political parties in Japan over the scale of rearmament and the nature of defence production.

The gap between Japan's intention to extract special economic demands through the MSA agreement and the U.S.' desire to strengthen Japan's self-defence capabilities became apparent. In other words, the Yoshida cabinet's attitude of struggling to respond to the mutually contradictory demands for self-reliance and alliance came to the fore.

This paper will first examine how Japan's defence production during the Cold War responded to the conflicts and contradictions over independence and alliances. Second, it will point out that the supposedly contradictory interrelationship between independence and alliances has been deeply inherent in the foundation of the Japanese defence industry and policy from the end of the Cold War to the present. Third, the reality of such conflicts and contradictions has not been fully recognised or overcome even today. Fourth, these conflicts and contradictions remain unrecognised and unresolved to this day, which is why the defence industry and policy have fallen into a semi-independent state, far from being self-reliant.

(2) Previous studies

Due to paper length limitations, I would like to highlight only two papers. The first is Minoru Sawai's 'From Special Demand Production to Defense Production: The Case of Osaka Prefecture'.¹ In the postwar period, Japan's economy was more inclined towards special demand production (initially called 'separate demand') during the Korean War. However, after determining that it could not expect to expand military production due to the extraterritorial procurement of the U.S. forces under the MSA agreement, the economy did not overly lean towards the defence industry; instead, it focused its efforts on enhancing civilian production. Based on the common theory that the result was high economic growth, Sawai states that 'taking on weapons production in the late 1950s caused great social friction'.² He also underscores that while weapons production was considered taboo in society, the entrepreneurs who sought to produce weapons had a deep interest in and a certain ideology of national defence. The words and actions of these entrepreneurs suggest the existence of a certain ideology and a deep interest in national defence among those entrepreneurs who sought to produce weapons. Although it is undeniable that military demand, i.e. the defence industry, was declining in proportion to the development of civilian demand, we point out that there was strong support from MITI, the Defence Agency and the Keidanren Committee on Defence Production.³

Thus, Sawai does not give credence to the common belief that the Japanese economy as a whole will re-transform from military to civilian production and enter an era of full-fledged

¹ Sawai [2018].

² Sawai [2018], p. 58.

³ In this connection, Sawai states, 'Behind the decision not to let go of defense production was not only the judgment of management, which considers defense production as the basis of the nation, but also the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which has jurisdiction over defense production companies and calls for cooperation in strengthening defense capabilities while preventing bleeding orders, the Defense Agency, which is the user of defense equipment, and the Keidanren Defense Production Committee, which has strong It is imagined that there was strong lobbying by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which has jurisdiction over defense production companies, the Defense Agency, which is the user of defense equipment, and the Keidanren Defense Production Committee' (Sawai [2018] p. 59).

rapid economic growth.⁴ He emphasises that attention should be given to the fact that the defence industry will surely take root in the Japanese economy even in the midst of rapid economic growth. Several things cannot be seen from an understanding of the actual state of the economy on a quantitative level, and we agree with this point. The defence industry should be viewed not from a quantitative perspective but from a qualitative one, focusing on its potential and possibilities.

Next, Yoshio Asai's 'Special Demand in the 1950s s'⁵ in the 'IV Japan-U.S. Economic Cooperation Concept' traces in detail the fact that under the name of 'Japan-U.S. Economic Cooperation', strategies were skilfully devised and implemented from around the outbreak of the Korean War to extract Japanese munitions production capacity for the benefit of the U.S. It also argues that there was a clear difference among the various forces in Japan in terms of their response to these strategies. Asai also postulates that there was a clear difference between the various forces in Japan over how to respond to this situation. Asai details the process by which the revival and utilisation of Japan's munitions industry led to prospects for the development of Japan's civilian munitions industry and Japan's role as a bulwark nation for the U.S. in both economic and military terms.

The above paper is in the category of economic history. Thus, it is essential to analyse the 'Japan-U.S. Economic Cooperation' and Japan's 'industrial mobilisation' at the economic level, as presented in the Asai paper, as well as at the military level, that is, to mention the extent to which the security environment surrounding Japan during the Cold War was affected by the U.S. military's actions. It has already become a clear historical fact that Japan's rearmament was forced in response to the U.S.' intentions. In the context of this historical fact, it is necessary to discuss the issue from political and military perspectives because it is no exaggeration to say that in Cold War-era Japan, the military determined the economy.

(3) Definitions of terms: 'self-defence' and 'independent defence'

If self-defence is conditioned on the compatibility of unilateral defence intentions and capabilities, then it seriously lacks validity as a practical matter. This is because, from the standpoint of economic and military rationality, it does not seem to make much sense to fortify the nation with equipment of its own manufacture. Citing Kwon Tae-young's article 'Our Country's Self-Reliance Defence Efforts and the Direction of Advanced National Defence in the 21st Century',⁶ Chung Kyung-aw distinguishes between 'self-reliance' defence, which excludes outside interference, and 'independence' defence, in which the nation does not depend on outside forces but rather on its own capabilities.⁷ However, as military technology continues to evolve, it is now largely impossible for a single country to carry out either self-reliance or independent defence on its own. Therefore, it is highly doubtful how much meaning there is in this distinction.

In South Korea under the Park Chung-hee administration and Taiwan under the Chiang Kai-shek and Ching-kuo administrations, 'self-defence' was repeatedly emphasised in their policies, but only to the extent that they mentioned the rate of domestic production of frontline equipment. It is often possible to emphasise the independence and autonomy of a nation or administration by estimating its dependence on the U.S. at a low level. The terms 'independence' and 'originality' are nothing more than a kind of propaganda. From there,

⁴ Sawai [2018], p.41.

⁵ Asai[2003a]

⁶ Korean Association for International Politics [1997].

⁷ See Zheng[2015],p.70.

the only forceful terminology is eclectic coinage, such as ‘semi-autonomy’, ‘semi-independence’ and ‘semi-dependence’, but even this terminology remains ambiguous. Japan’s security policy has been consistently dependent on the U.S. since the end of World War II, and this excessive dependence is now merely replaced by the terms ‘joint’ and ‘alliance’. I dare say it is dependence and subordination in the name of alliance.

Another distinction between the military and defence industries is the use of the term ‘munitions industry’ in this report, which refers to the prewar and postwar periods as the defence industry.

2. Dismantling the Munitions Industry and Military Spending

(1) Dismantling process of the military industrial industry

After the defeat of Japan, GHQ issued a series of orders to dismantle and convert state-owned and private munitions factories. On 22 September 1945, an order was implemented banning the production of weapons and aircraft (GHQ Directive No. 1), as well as an order for former munitions companies to submit civilian munitions development plans (GHQ Directive No. 2). Furthermore, on 15 October of the same year, military institutions were abolished (General Staff Headquarters, the Army and Navy academies, and others). The dismantling of the military arsenals consisted mainly of a total of 100 plants (50 Army, 46 Navy and the Army and Navy Research Institute) and a total of 46 plants in the eight Army arsenals (Tokyo No. 1, Tokyo No. 2, Sagami, Nagoya, Osaka, Kokura, Incheon and South Manchuria), along with the fuel headquarters, transportation department, clothing depot, medical material depot, veterinary material depot, military stores and various research laboratories. Meanwhile, the Navy dismantled four arsenals. The Navy had four arsenals (Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru), a machine shop, a gunpowder plant, ten air arsenals, six fuel plants (Yokkaichi, Tokuyama, Iwakuni, Yokohama and others), three technical ministries, two medical supply plants and a technical research institute.

The Yokosuka Arsenal was converted into a base facility for the U.S. Navy, and other facilities were developed as private shipyards. For example, Kure Arsenal became Harima Shipbuilding Kure Dockyard, Sasebo Arsenal became the Sasebo Shipbuilding Industry, Maizuru Arsenal became Iino Sangyo Maizuru Plant, and so on. In addition, aircraft manufacturing companies were banned from production and research altogether, and airframe factories were converted from military to civilian production plants for producing passenger cars, freight cars and train bodies. More than 600,000 units of machine tools were used for compensation, reducing the total number owned to 175,000 units; approximately 5 million tons of blast furnaces 3 million tons of electric furnaces, 6 million tons of flat furnaces and 6 million tons of rolling mills were removed.⁸

By August 1948, 16,736 pieces of machine tools from the Army and Navy arsenals in 17 locations throughout Japan had been transferred as compensation in kind. In parallel, all weapons and production materials under the control of the Army were transferred to the Allied Forces. The buildings and various production facilities of the Army arsenal, valued at 1.3 billion yen as fixed assets, were turned over to the Allied Forces. Navy vessels, weapons and production facilities were likewise destroyed. A portion of these will be used for compensation, and a portion will be converted for the peace industry.

The above are examples of the dismantling and destruction of state-run military arsenals,

⁸ Koyama [1972], pp. 334–335. See also, e.g., Toyo Keizai Shinposha [1950] Cohen [1950].

but the civilian munitions facilities that had greatly supported the munitions industry were uprooted in November 1946 with the Final Report on Compensation (commonly known as the Pauley Plan). However, in March 1947, the year after the Pauley Proposal was presented, the Truman Doctrine was announced in the midst of the emerging Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This led to a revision of Japan's prewar policy of dismantling its munitions industry.

During this period, the Tetsu Katayama Cabinet enacted the 'Law for Eliminating Excessive Concentration of Economic Power' (Law No. 207) on 18 December 1947, which resulted in the June 1949 reorganisation of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the top company in the prewar Japanese munitions industry, into East Japan Heavy Industries (later Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy Industries), Central Japan Heavy Industries (later New Mitsubishi Heavy Industries), West Japan Heavy Industries (later Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and then New Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) and West Japan Heavy Industries (later Mitsubishi Shipbuilding). The dismantling of the munitions industry was part of the GHQ-led policy of 'democratisation' of Japan. However, the brakes were applied to this move after the Truman Doctrine.

When the Korean War begins, Japan will assume the role of a U.S. military supply base. This was the start of the postwar defence industry. The postwar defence industry was to be booming, covering a broad range of industries, ranging from those that could be produced with relatively low-cost technology, such as jute bags for sandbags, military uniforms, cement, barbed wire and fuel tanks, to aircraft repair, bomb manufacture and tank and armoured vehicle repair. The U.S. government's extraterritorial procurement, or the so-called 'special procurement', amounted to \$10 billion (360 billion yen) over a three-year period when the government budget was around 1 trillion yen. If domestic consumption by U.S. soldiers in Japan (so-called 'indirect special procurement') is added, the amount is estimated to have reached \$30 billion (about 1 trillion yen).

(2) Commencement of arms lending and MSA agreements

Japan, which was prohibited from manufacturing, importing or exporting weapons, began de facto arms imports in the form of U.S. military assistance in the form of weapons to be deployed in the Police Reserve Corps that was established. On 8 July 1950, GHQ Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur issued a letter ordering the creation of a 75,000-member National Police Reserve Corps and the increase of the Japan Coast Guard from 8,000 personnel.

Following the Police Reserve Corps, Patrol Frigates (PFs) and Landing Support Ships (LSSLs) were provided free of charge to the Coast Guard, which was established in 1952, followed by the signing of the 'Japan-U.S. Vessel Lending Agreement' in November 1952 and the 'Japan-U.S. Naval Vessel Lending Agreement' in May 1954, respectively, in which the former provided 18 PFs and 50 LSSLs and the latter provided 14 destroyers and other large vessels. On 28 April 1952, the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty came into effect, creating the so-called 'path of arms' between the two countries.

Specifically, the MSA law was applied to Japan (and North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries). According to the 'Vandenberg Resolution' (U.S. Senate, June 1948), 'The United States will participate in regional and collective defence agreements affecting its national security'. Such agreements shall be based on the principle of 'continuous and effective self-help and mutual assistance'. The purpose of the MSA Act was to 'strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective self-defence of the free world' and

‘develop the resources of friendly nations for the national interests of the United States, for the security and independence of its friends’. It confirmed Japan’s determination to fulfil its military obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, while the U.S. side confirmed in the text that Japan would ‘contribute to the development of its own defence capabilities and the development and maintenance of the defence capabilities of the free world’ (Article 8 of the MSA Act).⁹ Furthermore, following the start of the grant aid, the Defence Secrets Protection Law was enacted (1954), which established penalties of up to 10 years in prison for those who detected, collected or leaked secrets.

Thus, ‘financial support for Japan’s defence industry was entrusted to the U.S. under the MSA agreement concluded in 1954. Between 1954 and 1967, Japan received military assistance amounting to 576 billion yen. This amount accounted for 27% of total equipment purchases during the same period, and this value reached 58% by 1957 alone’.¹⁰ As pointed out, the MSA agreement at least allowed the Japanese defence industry during the Cold War to develop based on the will and requests of the U.S.

(3) The inside story of the U.S.’ economic and military assistance to Japan

The U.S. envisioned an increase in economic and military aid to prevent the Korean War and the subsequent penetration of communism into Southeast Asia. According to Yoshio Asai, the gist of the ‘Japan-U.S. Economic Cooperation’ was, first, to mobilise Japan’s industrial production capacity to supplement the U.S. military mobilisation system; second, to help Japan gain access to the Southeast Asian market; and third, to support Japan’s economic independence by indirectly procuring reconstruction aid supplies for Korea from Japan. The three points are summarised in the following article.¹¹ In other words, the U.S. was using the special procurement from Korea as leverage to encourage Japan’s economic recovery and self-reliance while simultaneously planning industrial mobilisation and the revitalisation of the defence industry.

This U.S. plan diverged from the stance of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who was also a light-armaments activist. However, Yoshida, who was also a realist, judged that, apart from the ostensible theory of light armaments, accommodating the U.S. intentions would strengthen Japan-U.S. relations, counter communism and ensure economic expansion into Southeast Asia.

The ‘Data on U.S.-Japan Economic Cooperation’ dated 3 April 1951 and prepared by the Economic Stability Headquarters, which was the general manager of economic policy in the Japanese Government, stated, ‘In order to maintain a rational and smooth circulation of the national economy, it is necessary to coordinate domestic and foreign demand, and the following measures should be taken. (1) The Government of Japan should be fully informed of the details of the items, quantity, duration, etc., of the goods expected from Japan. (2) Establish a reasonable mechanism and method of ordering and receiving orders for expected goods from Japan’.¹²

In short, the Japanese government was strongly aware that the Korean War had created special procurement demand for Japan, and that actively responding to the U.S.’ requests would be an effective means of economic recovery. In the end, the U.S. agreed to Dulles’

⁹ Appendix A of the MSA Act states, ‘The development of the defense capabilities of Japan should be significantly facilitated if the United States Government would consider assisting in financing the various industries of defense production in Japan’.

¹⁰ Parler[2010]p.118.

¹¹ Asai[2003b],p.123.

¹² Material on U.S.-Japan Economic Cooperation (Economic Stability Division)” prepared by General Affairs Division, Ministry of Finance (Center for Asian Historical Records, Rec. A19110145600)

demands on Japan.

As Dulles stated on 18 January of the same year, the purpose of his visit to Japan was to incorporate Japan into the U.S. wartime mobilisation system and expect Japan's defence production capabilities to play a complementary role. He said, 'In order to have Japan actively cooperate with the free world, the United States must commit itself militarily and economically to Japan'.¹³ In particular, after the Korean War, Japan's defence production capacity and munitions were given increasingly greater weight in military assistance to Southeast Asia. However, unlike the Yoshida administration and the Japanese business community, which were active in strengthening Japan-U.S. relations, the Ministry of Finance was not necessarily positive about the unconditional Japan-U.S. Economic Cooperation at a stage when sufficient prospects for economic recovery were not yet available.¹⁴

(4) Emergence and consequences of the rearmament proposal

Even before the outbreak of the Korean War, rearmament proposals were initially presented on a civilian basis. In March 1953, in addition to the 'Tentative Proposal on Defence Force Development' by the Keidanren and the Defence Production Committee of the Economic Cooperation Roundtable and the 'Economic Study of Japanese Rearmament' by the National Economic Research Association, three concrete rearmament proposals were proposed: the Security Agency proposal, the Economic Council proposal and the Finance Ministry proposal. The three proposals were suggested as concrete rearmament proposals.¹⁵ The reason for this was the need to set a more reasonable and realistic figure that took into account the size of Japan's economic power and military aid provided by the MSA.

The problem was the economic strength to support the set figures. In other words, no matter which rearmament plan was adopted, the question was how to secure financial resources and how much of a burden it would be on the Japanese economy, which was still in the process of reconstruction. It has been pointed out that the above three proposals 'are said to have been prepared with the aim of covering the annual defence expenditures within the framework of the natural increase in national income each year, with the shortfall expected to be covered by U.S. assistance, so as not to devalue the national lifestyle'.¹⁶

In particular, in all three proposals, the amount of Japanese defence spending and MSA military assistance funds were roughly equal, and Japan's rearmament expenditures were roughly split 50-50 between Japan and the U.S. At the same time, the total amount of military spending as a percentage of national income was kept in the range of 2% to a maximum of 5.5% over the five-year period from 1954 to 1958.¹⁷

Even if U.S. military assistance is provided for the time being under the MAS agreement,

¹³ Igarashi [1995], p. 229.

¹⁴ See, for example, 'Documents on Japan's Economic Cooperation', prepared by the General Affairs Division, Minister's Secretariat of Finance (Economic Stability Headquarters). The same document is in the collection of the Center for Contemporary Asian History (Ref. A1911014550).

¹⁵ There are numerous previous studies on the rearmament issue, but I will cite Masuda [1999] here.

¹⁶ Economic Affairs Department, Financial Division, 'The Economic Burden of Japan's Rearmament', in Reference No. 36, February 1954, p. 34, edited by the Research and Legislative Examination Bureau, National Diet Library.

¹⁷ The three proposed military budgets in 1954 were as follows: the NISA proposal for 118 billion yen for Japanese military spending and 108 billion yen for U.S. MSA aid, for a total of 226 billion yen; the Economic Council proposal for the same, 1038 yen and 80.1 billion yen, for a total of 183.7 billion yen; and the Daisho proposal, 76.4 billion yen and 54 billion yen, for a total of 130.4 billion yen (see *ibid.*, Reference No. 36, Table 2 □, p. 32).

once Japan decides to rearm, capital investment in response to the development of military technology will become indispensable, and growth in defence expenditures will be inevitable. This would inevitably place a burden on the Japanese economy, which was in the process of reconstruction soon after the war. Therefore, it was predicted that Japan would become increasingly dependent on the U.S. to equip its police reserve forces, security forces and even the Self-Defence Forces. Indeed, 'Japan's defence forces would become the "metabolism" of U.S. weapons, and in that sense, a loss of autonomy' (bypass marks are in quotations). The judgment of the Finance Division of the Ministry of Economy¹⁸ was right on the mark.

(5) Conflict over the MSA agreement

The MSA is shifting from support for Europe to support for Asian countries from the viewpoint of military strategy to check and deter the Soviet Union and China. In Japan, there will be a fierce debate between those who want to take advantage of the U.S. strategy of focusing on Asia and find ways to increase defence production and defence capabilities and those who believe that Japan should choose the path of economic development by enhancing trade relations, especially with China, while improving relations with the Soviet Union and China.¹⁹

The fierce debate between Shigeru Yoshida's Cabinet and the Socialist Party over the interpretation of the MSA was a complex issue of security in Japan during the Cold War. As already noted, Prime Minister Yoshida, while accepting the intentions and requests of the U.S., tried to keep the strengthening of defence forces to a minimum and prioritise economic development as much as possible. However, the policy debate was muddled by the expectations of the defence industry, which was eager to use the MSA agreement as leverage to get Japan's defence industry off the ground.

Regarding the MSA agreement, Government Commissioner Ueki Koukoro (Parliamentary Vice Minister of Finance) had a positive outlook: 'I think the first point that MSA assistance will have a positive impact on the Japanese economy is that it will reduce the burden of national expenditures required for the implementation of Japan's defence programmes. Secondly, the cooperation in economic measures will provide us with a gift of \$10 million, which is necessary to contribute to the enhancement of our country's industrial and other economic strengths'.²⁰

Ueki's remarks summed up the Yoshida Cabinet's view of the government's insistence that the MSA was a highly beneficial agreement for Japan, including the reduction of Japan's defence burden through the assistance of the U.S. and other countries, the enhancement to the Japanese economy, the yen purchase of wheat imports and the convenience in the introduction of foreign capital.

However, the aid by the MSA consisted of military assistance and economic and technical assistance (mutual defence financing, defence support assistance, economic and technical assistance, technical assistance and others). 'The U.S. fiscal year 1954 budget was roughly 70% military assistance, defence support assistance (economic assistance to the military

¹⁸ Economic Affairs Department, Financial Division, 'The Economic Burden of Japan's Rearmament', in Reference No. 36, February 1954, p. 34, edited by the Research and Legislative Examination Bureau, National Diet Library.

¹⁹ For more information on the actual state of arms expansion plans in Europe and the issue of MSA aid, see Masao Fujii's 'Western European Military Expansion Plans and U.S. MSA Aid' (Reference No. 31, 1953) and Michizo Yamakoshi's 'West German Rearmament and Financial, Economic, and Human Resources' (Reference No. 53, June 1955)

²⁰ Official Gazette Extra No. 19, Proceedings of the House of Councillors, No. 21, March 19, 1954, p. 299.

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industry), technical assistance and others at 10%'.²¹ As noted, it is fair to say that it was a military aid itself.²²

Opposition parties led by the Socialist Party of Japan increasingly criticised the Yoshida cabinet on the grounds that the MSA agreement would lock in a subordinate relationship with the U.S. and make rearmament inevitable and that the defence industry could grow alongside it. In particular, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (formed in 1950), a labour union supporting the Socialist Party, launched a campaign in various regions against the MSA agreement, claiming that it would spur the militarisation of Japan. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida responded to these movements by stating, 'Regarding the MSA issue, we did not agree to the MSA because of pressure from the United States but as a result of discussions between the United States, which requested and hoped for the MSA, and Japan, which also requested and hoped for the MSA. It was concluded, and it was not concluded under the command and order of the United States government. I believe that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has already explained this to you'.²³

The gap in perception between the U.S. and Japan over the MSA agreement was immense. The U.S. expected Japan to take the initiative in this agreement to expand its defence capabilities and play a pivotal role in the U.S. military strategy against China and the Soviet Union in East Asia. Therefore, in August 1953, when it became evident that the Yoshida Cabinet was not serious about expanding its defence capabilities, U.S. Secretary Dulles and other high-ranking officials were dispatched to Japan to press for the expansion of Japan's defence capabilities. In fact, Secretary Dulles and others 'expressed dissatisfaction with Japan's defence efforts, and as the MSA negotiations progressed, it became increasingly clear that the real heart of the negotiations lay in Japan's defence buildup plan, which should be commensurate with the U.S. military assistance'.²⁴

In light of this situation, it was Japanese Socialist Party member Yoshihachiro Kimura who most sharply attacked the explanations of Prime Minister Yoshida and Yoshida's cabinet ministers. Mr. Kimura argued, 'As for the self-reliance of the Japanese economy, it cannot become truly self-reliant if it continues to depend on special procurement'.²⁵ Kimura insisted that 'Japan's economy cannot truly become self-reliant if it continues to depend on special procurement'. In particular, Kimura recognised that the MSA agreement would lead to an acceptance of Japan's dependency on the U.S. and that the ongoing rearmament would lead to excessive government investment in the defence industry, which would put a brake on Japan's economic independence.

Similarly, in connection with the MSA agreement, Sukeharu Soma of the Japan Socialist Party asked, 'What kind of future subsidies are intended for heavy weapons, aircraft, naval vessels and other such items, not just orders as in the past, to promote these industries? The government itself intends to promote these industries by subsidising heavy weapons, aircraft, naval vessels and others in the future'.²⁶ In response to this question, Minister of Finance Ogasawara Sankuro responded, 'The government itself intends to promote these industries. For example, even if we were to direct the defence industry, since we have the so-called Security Forces in Japan, of course, we would not be able to receive or borrow all

²¹ Ishii [2003], p. 179.

²² In fact, in terms of the economic history of Japan during the period in question, Nakamura [1982] states that 'this was the period in Japan's postwar history of more than 30 years in which the country was most inclined towards rearmament and military production'.

²³ The 19th Budget Committee Minutes of the House of Councillors, No. 26, April 22, 1954, p. 4.

²⁴ *Nihon no Bouei* [Defense of Japan], Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1958, p. 39.

²⁵ The 19th Budget Committee Minutes of the House of Councillors, No. 26, April 22, 1954, p. 11.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 27, April 23, 1954, p. 9.

of these weapons and other items that we use from them. Even if we were to build what we have now, it is likely that there would be a considerable amount of money needed for security forces' other items'.²⁷

While pointing out the possibility that the economic independence stipulated in the MSA agreement will eventually result in overinvestment in the defence industry, he says that this is to be limited to the enhancement of the defence industry, which secures equipment for the security forces, to avoid pressure on other civilian demand industries. This is where the contradiction between the two policies of economic independence and enhancement of the defence industry becomes a point of contention between Yoshida's cabinet and the opposition parties in relation to the MSA agreement. Even though the government steered the economy away from dependence on special procurement for the purpose of economic independence, as long as the MSA agreement existed, the quality of the independent economy and the direction of the defence industry would ultimately have to proceed under the will of the U.S. In short, the opposition parties are unanimous in their view that there is little possibility of resulting in an independent economy. From this, it is clear that both the Yoshida cabinet and the opposition parties were fundamentally aware of the structural difficulty of reconciling the U.S.' military assistance with Japan's self-reliant economy.

The issue of weapon exportation was proposed as a way to resolve this contradiction. From the opposition side, Kimura Yoshihachiro makes the following noteworthy statement on this point: 'In relation to Japan's defence production in the future, you said that you would foster the production of weapons to be supplied to Japan's security forces, but in the current situation in Japan, when fostering weapons production, it is not possible for a business unit to meet the demand of the Japanese security forces alone. The company as a unit cannot be established unless it is based on the premise of the so-called extraterritorial loans and exports of weapons. In this way, an economy dependent on special procurement cannot be allowed to continue. Therefore, the production of weapons is immediately dependent on special procurement demand. This is inconsistent with the independence of the Japanese economy' (quoted in parentheses).²⁸

For economic independence and the expansion of the defence industry to proceed without contradiction, he was proposing an arms export method that would seek orders for weapons production from overseas, outside of the MSA), as a precondition for the defence industry to develop on its own. Councillor Kimura pointed out that the domestic market is not sufficient for the defence industry to be established as a sustainable industry, and the only way is to seek sales channels overseas. This is not an active endorsement of arms exports by Mr. Kimura but rather a judgment that the only way to achieve both economic independence and a defence industry is through arms exports.

The reality of the orientation towards arms exports to ensure the sustainability of the defence industry can be seen in similar examples in the prewar Japanese munitions industry.²⁹ It is inevitable for the expansion of any industry, not only the munitions industry, to seek markets and sales channels not only domestically but also abroad. Similar issues were actively discussed in the Diet during the postwar reconstruction of the Japanese defence industry.

Furthermore, Mr. Kimura disagreed with the government's response to Prime Minister Yoshida and Mr. Kiichi Aichi and went on to make the following statement: 'If we were to finance the arms industry, as the Keidanren has clearly stated, it would be difficult to

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ The 19th Budget Committee Minutes of the House of Councillors, No. 28, April 24, 1954, p. 7.

²⁹ See KOKETSU [2018] and KOKETSU [2019] for such prewar examples.

develop such an arms industry in Japan because the demand from the Japanese Self-Defence Forces alone is too large for an industrial unit. In the end, the larger the economic unit, the more unprofitable it will be, and so the export of weapons to Taiwan, Korea and other areas in Southeast Asia will be a prerequisite'.³⁰ In the end, it will be based on the export of weapons to Taiwan, Korea and other Southeast Asian countries.

One of the reasons given by the opposition party members, including Mr. Kimura, for their criticism of the government was that the defence industry is positioned as an obstacle to economic independence and that the only way to ensure the sustainability of the defence industry is to seek overseas sales channels for the defence industry. This would lead to Japan's participation in the Pacific Alliance Organization (PACO), as Senator Kimura stated, which would undermine the pacifist goals of postwar Japan and force Japan to participate in the U.S.-centred collective self-defence system.

Around the time of the creation of the Self-Defence Forces across the Security Forces, there was suddenly a lively debate, mainly in the Diet, over the state of Japan's defence industry. This debate highlighted that Japan's policy of rearmament through the creation of the Self-Defence Forces was determined through its approach to the MSA agreement, which guarantees U.S. military support. At the same time, the expansion of Japan's defence industry was discussed over the equipment of the Self-Defence Forces.

To ensure the sustainability of the defence industry, there is a prevailing view that entry into the U.S.-centred collective self-defence system is inevitable while also making the expansion of the defence industry conditional on arms exports, in addition to dependence on military assistance from the U.S. The Yoshida cabinet, which seeks the independent development of Japan's economy through the concept of light armaments, scrambles to promote a policy that avoids domestic and international criticism of Japan's military superpower status by placing a certain degree of restraint on the defence industry.

3. Conflicts Between the Theory of Self-Defence and the Theory of the Japan-U.S. Alliance: The Ambiguous Choice Between Independence and Subordination

(1) Inauguration and activities of the Defence Production Committee

In addition to the Diet debates, we would like to review the stance of the defence industry, led by the Defence Production Board, towards new policy developments, such as rearmament, the defence industry and arms exports. This review will confirm the reality of the Japanese government's ambiguous choice between the theory of independent defence, which emerged in the process of Japan's rearmament, and the theory of alliance, which is essentially dependent and subordinate to the U.S.³¹

The Japan-U.S. Economic Partnership Roundtable, which had been established on 13 August 1952 to facilitate U.S.-Japan economic relations, was divided into three committees: the General Policy Committee, the Asian Reconstruction and Development Committee and the Defence Production Committee, which, for the time being, would focus

³⁰ 30) The 19th Budget Committee Meeting of the House of Councillors, No. 26, April 22, 1934, p. 11.

³¹ John Palmer, in his article 'The Future of Japan's Defense Industry' points out four unique characteristics of the Japanese defense industry: 'First, the ambiguity of the public's attitude toward defense; second, the attitude of maximising domestic production (inclination toward domestic production); third, the ban on exports; and finally, the principle of limiting defense spending to 1% of GDP. The third is a ban on exports, and the last is the principle of limiting defense spending to 1% of GDP, a principle with unclear grounds' (Palmer [2020], p. 116).

on the activities of the Defence Production Committee while receiving economic and military support from the U.S.³²

The Defence Production Committee began its activities in the order of preparation for arms production activities centring on special procurement from the U.S. military, the Japanese business community's response to the issue of concluding the MSA agreement and the establishment of a defence production stance in connection with the policy of equipment expansion for the Self-Defence Forces. At the time of its establishment, the 'Urgent Request Opinions on the Utilisation of National Munitions Industry and Other Facilities' (28 October 1952), the 'Request Opinions on the Service Life of Aircraft and Weapons Manufacturing Equipment' (27 February; 5 March; 27 March 1952) and the 'Request Opinions on Securing Working Capital for Special Weapons' (6 October 1953) were successively published.

Earlier, Keidanren had prepared a resolution for its 8th General Meeting entitled 'Our Preparedness for Rejoining the International Community'. The resolution called for Japan-U.S. economic partnership and integration, the U.S.' utilisation of Japan's industrial strength for the security of Far East Asia and U.S.' understanding of Japan's efforts to achieve early economic independence.³³

How did the U.S. position the MSA agreement in the first place? The following is a quote from U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, who played an important role in the agreement made on 6 May 1953 before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.

'Japan's future is closely tied to the future of the United States. Japan is a reliable ally, but its economic situation is extremely unstable. Japan wants to develop trade with Southeast Asia, the breadbasket of Asia, and needs Southeast Asian oil, iron ore and other raw materials. Therefore, if Southeast Asia were to fall under communist rule, Japan's future would be extremely precarious'³⁴.

In short, the MSA was positioned as part of the U.S. anti-communist bulwark-building effort by providing economic and military support to Japan to stop the spread of communism into Southeast Asia. This is nothing new; however, the Yoshida administration was eager to interpret the MSA as a means of extracting economic aid from Japan. Therefore, it did not show any sympathy for the U.S.' military strategy.

Due in part to this attitude of Yoshida's cabinet, the Defence Production Committee positively evaluated the MSA. The committee also developed a variety of activities to extract funds for defence production from the MSA. As a typical example, the Defence Production Committee drafted a 'Statement of Opinion on the Acceptance of MSA Assistance' (5th Defence Production Committee Meeting). Thereafter, the 'General Request Opinion on Acceptance of MSA (Draft) 28, 7, 6 Keidanren Economic Cooperation Roundtable Meeting', dated 6 July 1953, was prepared under the name of the Keidanren Cooperation Roundtable Meeting. A portion of the text there is quoted below.

'We believe that for Japan, as a member of the free world, to truly prepare itself for the future, it is necessary to take measures to increase its self-defence capabilities on its own initiative, within the limits of political and economic conditions, and consider contributing fully to the strengthening of the defence capabilities of the free world through its industrial power. If the application of MSA assistance is based on Japan's current situation and can

³² Committee on Defense Production [1964], p. 7.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³⁴ Planning Division 2, Planning Department, Economic Affairs Council, 'General economy, General Economy, 1953-1954 (7)' (in the collection of the Center for Contemporary Asian Materials, Ref. A18110493200 '1. U.S. Views on MSA Aid to Japan', Image p. 286).

contribute to the realisation and promotion of the right basic issues through such assistance, we believe that Japan should not hesitate to accept it. If the application of MSA assistance is based on Japan's current situation, and if such assistance can contribute to the realisation and promotion of the basic issues mentioned above, we believe that we should not hesitate to accept it at the earliest opportunity'.³⁵ While the gap between the government and opposition over the interpretation of the MSA remained unresolved, the Defence Production Board's position would eventually lead to an eclectic discussion of independence and dependence on the U.S. Independence and dependence were to be marked by the terms 'coexistence' and 'alliance' as Japan-U.S. relations deepened.

(2) Keidanren Defence Production Committee's arms export theory and defence force development proposal

The Defence Production Board is strongly oriented towards arms exports, with a view towards Southeast Asia. During this period, a draft plan for defence force development was submitted in a manner that embodied the intentions of the business community. In particular, the 'One Proposal on Defence Force Improvement' (hereinafter referred to as the Keidanren Proposal) submitted by the Defence Production Board was numerical proof that the business community of the time viewed rearmament and the defence industry as two sides of the same coin.

The Keidanren's proposal for the defence force after the maintenance plan from 1953 to 1958 included 15 divisions on land (300,000 personnel), 292,000 tons at sea (70,000 personnel) and 3,750 aircraft (130,000 personnel).³⁶ Of the total defence expenditure of 2.8943 trillion yen over the six-year period, 1.6252 trillion yen was paid by Japan and 1.2691 trillion yen by the US. On the other hand, the 'Economic Study of Japanese Rearmament', prepared by the National Economic Research Institute, set the defence force after the same six-year plan at seven land divisions (175,000 personnel), 220,000 tons at sea (35,000,000 personnel) and 1,200 aircraft (28,000 personnel), with total defence expenditures of 2.2653 trillion yen (2.5223 trillion yen required, defence contributions of 213 billion yen), defence spending limit of 1.4059 trillion yen and a shortfall equal to the expected U.S. aid of 858.4 billion yen.³⁷

Other rearmament plans, such as the NISA, the Keihin and the Daizo plans, have been submitted at this point; however, Japan's rearmament and defence force development plans will be built based on the above two plans. While it is true that there are differences in the size of the Army and Navy between the two plans, there is no significant difference in the total cost over the six years. The problem is that the two plans relied on military assistance from the U.S. for about half of the total cost. This was because the U.S. expectations for Japan's defence capability and the existence of the MSA agreement were decisive reasons. At the same time, the expectations for the expansion of the defence industry, led by the Japanese Defence Production Board, was positioned as an extremely important industry in the process of Japan's economic recovery.

In this sense, the country's orientation towards economic self-sufficiency led to increased expectations for U.S. military spending support. In other words, economic independence and military support emerged as two sides of the same coin. Self-reliance and subordination

³⁵ Ibid, image pp. 299–300.

³⁶ Economic Affairs Department, Financial Division, 'The Economic Burden of Rearmament in Our Country', Reference No. 36, February 1954, p. 29, edited by the Research and Legislative Review Bureau of the Library of Congress.

³⁷ Ibid.

became one set of factors, and rearmament was initiated, followed by the development of the defence force improvement plan. Although the discomfort between independence and subordination manifested itself in the form of various protests, the military support by the U.S. must have been linked to the development of the U.S. military strategy for East Asia. At the same time, the Japanese business community actively tried to promote the path to economic independence by inviting military support.³⁸

(3) Defence industry putting pressure on the national economy

While expectations for the defence industry were rising, there were also concerns about the opposing pressures on national life. Among them, the National Security Agency's proposal estimated that the ratio of national income to GDP would rise to 3.9% in 1954, 4.2% in 1955, 4.8% in 1956, 5.1% in 1957 and 5.5% in 1958. This was higher than the Keikin proposal, which had corresponding figures of 3.1%, 3.7%, 4.1%, 4.1%, 4.1% and 4.1%, and the Daisho proposal, which had 2.2%, 2.4%, 2.8%, 2.1% and 3.6%.³⁹

As it became clear that the proposed NISA, which would put pressure on the national economy, could undermine Japan's greatest postwar challenge of economic independence, the NISA proposal of 283,000 personnel in total for land, sea and air security forces was not acceptable to the Yoshida Cabinet, which had a vision of light armaments. In this respect, the Defence Production Board's desire to expand the defence industry and the independence of the Japanese economy through the realisation of the light armaments concept became the basic stance of the Yoshida cabinet. However, the Yoshida Cabinet did not hold a stable seat in the Diet. Therefore, it was faced with the difficult task of accepting the views of the Defence Production Board while striving for economic independence at the same time. From this point on, Yoshida's cabinet emphasised the MSA agreement as economic assistance from the U.S. more than it actually was, thus avoiding criticism from the public and opposition forces.

This policy of contradicting the two principles of economic self-reliance and acceptance of military assistance became the basic principle of Japanese conservative politics and the conservative system after the Yoshida administration. This became the reason for the ambiguity of Japan's defence policy.

Criticisms of the limits of economic self-reliance and the expansion of the defence industry resulting from the MSA agreement have been active in the discourse. For example, in an article titled 'MSA Aid Demands a Life of Impoverishment', Seiji Usami, a professor at Hosei University, wrote, 'The MSA is a military aid, unlike the Keidanren and the government, which emphasised the economic aspect of the MSA and propagandised and frightened the public by saying that the MSA was dollar income to replace special demand and that rejecting it would destroy the Japanese economy. Unlike the Keidanren and the government, which have been promoting and trying to scare the public into believing that the MSA is a single-minded military aid package, it has become clear in the course of the negotiations that the MSA is a single-minded military aid package. In other

³⁸ Incidentally, other than the above two proposals, the total defense cost of the NISA proposal (1954–1953) was 1.496 trillion yen (956 billion yen for Japanese military spending and 540 billion yen for U.S. MSA assistance). The total defense cost of the Keishin proposal was 1.2162 trillion yen (809 billion yen for the Japanese portion and 407.2 billion yen for the projected U.S. MSA assistance). The total defense cost of the Daisho proposal was 897 billion yen (627 billion yen for Japanese military spending and 270 billion yen for U.S. MSA assistance). (Economic Affairs Department, Finance Division, 'The Economic Burden of Wagakuni Rearmament', National Diet Library, Research and Legislative Review Bureau, Reference, No. 36, February 1954, p. 32).

³⁹ Ibid.

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words, the MSA is an assistance that the U.S. will send weapons and military advisors to Japan if it strengthens its defence capability (military equipment)'.⁴⁰

Similar to Usami's view, Inihachiro Kimura, who criticised the MSA agreement as a military aid in the Diet, wrote an article entitled, 'The Transformation of Japan through the Progress of Defence Production' in the 'Defence Production' Special Issue of the magazine *Chuokoron*. He pointed out that Japan's 'defence production' is a part of the U.S.' strategy against the Soviet Union, based on the name of collective security through cooperation with the United Nations and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and includes (a) the provision of military supplies to the U.S. Far Eastern Command and the regular repair of its weapons, (b) Japan's own rearmament and (c) the return of Asian countries to the U.S. Japan was assigned the role of the so-called 'arsenal of Asia', supplying the weapons necessary to mobilise the Asian nations for the U.S. policy of turning the tide against the Soviet Union; this role was necessarily subordinate to the U.S. operations against the Soviet Union.⁴¹

The MSA agreement spurred rearmament and the munitions industry and, at the same time, clearly pointed out the possibility of Japan being incorporated into the U.S. military strategy towards the Soviet Union. The Korean War had already demonstrated that Japan had become the 'arsenal of the U.S.', and after the Korean War, Japan was a shoo-in as an arsenal to support the U.S.' strategy against the Soviet Union.

The Japanese industry, which had quickly sensed the intentions of the U.S., took an even stronger interest in munitions production. In particular, Kiyoshi Goko of Mitsubishi and Ichiro Ishikawa of Showa Denko took the lead in deciding that the munitions industry would act in unison. The Special Supplies Trading Companies Advisory Board of the trading companies and the Weapons Production Advisory Board of the manufacturers established close working relationships with the government's Economic Deliberation Agency (formerly the Economic Stability Headquarters, later the Economic Planning Agency) and the U.S. Army Procurement Agency in Japan (JPA). The JPA established a close working relationship with the government's Economic Advisory Agency (formerly the Economic Stability Board, later the Economic Planning Agency) and the JPA. The role of these two groups, among others, was to 'ensure that the most important concern at the moment is to make the government determined to make progress on rearmament and gain visibility into its own weapons production'.⁴² example, in October 1947, after Yoshinari Kawai, who had been active in munitions production and arms exports, was appointed president, Komatsu responded to the JPA's first special arms procurement in June 1952 by bidding for a large quantity of shells (totalling 16 billion yen over the next several rounds). In October 1952, the company made an unofficial offer to sell the Hirakata Works, an Army Arsenal, to Komatsu. In October 1952, the company was offered the disposal of the Hirakata Works of the Army Arsenal. In September 1953, Komatsu received a series of orders for the Kaita area of the former Hirakata Arsenal, and in October 1953, it received orders for the Nakamiya and Nakamiya areas of the (former Army) Arsenal. In October 1953, Komatsu Manufacturing became a typical example of a company that was steadily becoming a munitions company.⁴³

⁴⁰ Usami[1953],p.104.

⁴¹ Kimura[1953],p.91.

⁴² Hirai[1953],p.110.

⁴³ 43) From the chronology in Komatsu Seisakusho [1971]. Yoshinari Kawai, president of Komatsu Ltd., was also keenly interested in arms exports: 'As far as ammunition is concerned, we are able to meet the demands of Southeast Asian countries in addition to satisfying our own defense needs in peacetime. ... We have no regrets about engaging in this business, and we have created a huge export industry for Japan' (Defense Production Committee [1964], p. 83).

These moves were similar to those of other companies involved in heavy industries, literally speaking of Japan's pride as the 'arsenal of Asia' and the leading sector of the Japanese industry as a whole.⁴⁴ However, the percentage of that defence industry to the total Japanese industry in terms of numbers was never significant. For example, 'Japan's defence industry was of low relative importance from an economic standpoint. After the end of the Korean War, the production of defence equipment as a percentage of industrial output declined from 1.2% in 1954 to 1.0% in 1955 to 0.5% in 1965. It has generally remained at that level since then'.⁴⁵ The report also pointed out that 'the rate of return on investment has been declining since then'. Critical discussions of the Keidanren's proposal were not infrequent. For example, economist Ryoza Takahashi, known as the author of 'Introduction to the Theory of Controlled Economy' (Gakurinsha, 1950), criticised the 'Keidanren Draft' in an essay entitled, 'The Whole Picture of the "Defence Production" Plan' by highlighting four points.

The first was to strike a balance among the three forces. Second, it involves enormous capital investment, which puts pressure on the peace industry. Third, only a small fraction of the equipment that has been built with such an unreasonable investment will operate at all. Fourth, subordination to the U.S. and British military capital will become inevitable'.⁴⁶

While implicitly criticising the idea of creating the Self-Defence Forces as a receptacle for the defence industry without a strategic theory by equipping the three Self-Defence Forces, the author expresses his concern that excessive investment in the defence industry will put pressure on civilian demand. He also cites that even excessive capital investment will not be returned as corporate profits and, under the expectation that capital accumulation will not progress, the defence industry will eventually become subordinated to the Anglo-American military capital. In the end, it will continue the defence industry through inflated capital investment.

Takahashi's concerns have since become a real issue, spreading to many economists, politicians and even entrepreneurs. It became not only an issue of Japan's economic independence but also a heated debate over how to build Japan's defence system.⁴⁷

4. The Rise of Self-Defence and the Parallels Between Self-Defence and Light Armaments: Japan's Defence Policy During the Cold War

(1) Conflict over the defence policy

The Yoshida Cabinet's policy was basically to restrict capital investment in the defence industry to prioritise the independence of the Japanese economy and equip the forthcoming Self Defence Forces with as light equipment as possible.⁴⁸ It was also clear to all that

⁴⁴ Indeed, one aspect of Japanese arms exports during the period in question is that 'Japan exported 37mm shells to Thailand in 1953, and other weapons were also exported to Burma, Taiwan, Brazil, South Vietnam, Indonesia, and the United States, but not in large quantities. It has been noted that "the Japanese defense industry concentrated on meeting the demands of the Self-Defense Forces and its growing defense industrial base"' (Palmer [2010], p. 119).

⁴⁵ Sakuragawa[1995],p.125.

⁴⁶ Kimura[1953],p.90.

⁴⁷ Terasawa [1952] introduced Nabayama [1950a]; Nabayama [1950b]; Ashida [1950a]; Ashida [1950b]; Ashida [1951a] Ashida [1951b]; Ito [1951]; Akiyama [1951], etc.

⁴⁸ There are a number of studies that have put forward the viewpoint that the rearmament theory of Shigeru Yoshida, who consistently advocated the concept of light military forces from the rearmament process to the creation of the Self-Defense Forces, is the 'Yoshida Line' and that this is a characteristic of Japan's postwar defense policy.

Japan's defence policy during that period was dictated by the U.S. military strategy.

This issue was also discussed in the Diet debate. For example, Fukuzo Nakayama of the Liberal Party said, 'Assuming that a Pacific defence alliance of liberal nations is formed as a result of the MSA, there was considerable discussion in the House of Representatives recently, and Director General Kimura of the National Security Agency said that he might mobilise some of the troops to take a joint stand, but he would not deploy them to the front lines. However, we will not deploy troops to the front lines but may cooperate internally'. In response to this statement, Prime Minister Yoshida said, 'We have not promised to deploy troops overseas. We have no intention of participating in the Pacific Alliance, nor do we have any such plans at this time'.⁴⁹

What this meant was that he denied that Japan's defence during the Cold War was defined by the U.S. and emphasised Japan's self-defence policy. In Yoshida's judgment, following U.S. regulations would force the Self-Defence Forces to become heavily armed instead of lightly armed, and he developed the theory that excessive capital investment in the defence industry was inevitable.

Prime Minister Yoshida also stated, 'Regarding the MSA issue, we did not agree to the MSA because of pressure from the U.S. but because the U.S. requested and hoped for it, and Japan also requested and hoped for it. As a result of discussions, the MSA was established. I believe that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has explained this fully'. Indeed, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had already explained this to the Socialist Party and others who criticised his policy of subservience to the U.S.⁵⁰

One serious point of contention that cannot be avoided when discussing defence policy is its relationship with Article 9 of Japan's Constitution. The government side has been at pains to explain this point. Although Ogata Taketora, Deputy Prime Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet, argued that 'the MSA arrangement does not add any military obligation and, in that sense, I believe it is not a violation of the Constitution', he was criticised by Soma Sukenji of the Japan Socialist Party for saying that Article 8 clearly 'reaffirms the decision to fulfil military obligations under the Security Treaty. Article 8 clearly states, 'We reaffirm our determination to fulfil our military obligations under the Security Treaty. And by determination, I think this is generally intended to involve action'.⁵¹ This was rejected outright.

From these exchanges, the question of how to explain the consistency between the military and the Constitution, including Prime Minister Yoshida's concept of light armaments, has been a consistent issue in Japan's defence policy since the end of World War II. It is for this reason that Japan's defence policy has lacked consistency and has repeatedly become an ambiguous policy issue for the ruling and opposition parties. This is why Japan's defence policy lacks coherence and has become a recurring point of contention between the ruling and opposition parties as an ambiguous policy issue.

(2) Arms export markets and export performance

Until then, the defence industry had been a wartime depletion compensation for the Korean War. After the armistice of the Korean War in 1955, when the suspension of orders for ammunition, a consumable item, became a reality, the Defence Production Board began the

⁴⁹ The above is the '19th House of Councilors Budget Committee Meeting Minutes', No. 26, April 22, 1954, p. 3.

⁵⁰ The 19th Budget Committee Meeting of the House of Councillors, No. 26, April 22, 1954, p. 4.

⁵¹ The 19th Budget Committee Minutes of the House of Councillors, No. 27, April 23, 1954, p. 11.

process of identifying ammunition and other arms export destinations.⁵² With the rapid increase in U.S. military assistance to Southeast Asian countries, which emerged as a point of contention in international conflicts during the relevant period, the Defence Production Board also embarked on a detailed investigation to explore the possibility of arms exports to the region. It was reported that a total of 219 items were surveyed, including 54 items of facility equipment, military vehicles, tanks and others, 54 weapons and important items, 63 items of communication equipment, 41 items of ammunition, 2 aircraft models and 5 other items.⁵³

The following year, in March 1956, the Japan Federation of Economic Organisations also dispatched an economic goodwill civilian mission to Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma and Pakistan, with economic development cooperation as the main issue. Military assistance, in a broad sense, was also planned, including technical assistance to the Vietnamese naval arsenal. However, it took some time before the dispatch of engineers was realised in the spring of 1958. Thereafter, arms exports did not achieve the initially expected export performance due to political problems and the underdevelopment of the defence production system. Specifically, as of June 1959, the total amount of actual weapons exports was \$16.74 million, of which \$4.91 million was compensation payments.⁵⁴

Despite the enthusiasm of the Defence Production Board, the results were disappointing, and an 'Opinion on Arms Exports' was prepared on 12 July 1962. The report pointed out the reasons for the sluggish exports and concluded that arms exports should be further increased to overcome such problems. The Defence Production Board was trying hard to find ways to increase arms exports as much as possible.

In tracking the actual situation, although about 46% of the weapons procured in 1958, when the First National Defence Force Development Plan was announced, came from grant aid from the U.S. military, the shift to domestic production of equipment steadily progressed. In this sense, the trend towards self-reliance became apparent. In this connection, Masao Kihara stated, 'In 1955, when the Basic Policy for the Defence Program was decided, there was a development from military production based on special procurement to "self-reliant" defence production based on the defence program. In 1958, when the First Defence Force Development Plan was openly launched, more procurement was made by the SDF compared with special procurement, and defence production also became "stable". With a "market", the items of military goods changed and diversified, and the foundation for domestic production of military supplies was established',⁵⁵ noted the report. Furthermore, 'In 1962, the mass production system of military production that enabled the domestic procurement of the SDF became established and autonomous, with monopoly capital at the centre of the system'⁵⁶.

However, it should be noted that Kimura's point about independence in terms of munitions is not necessarily true at the quantitative level. It goes without saying that Japan had no choice but to depend on the U.S. for many of the high-value weapons that required

⁵² In this connection, the Federation of Economic Organizations of Japan (Keidanren) stated, 'At present, Japanese arms production has resumed on the basis of special demand from the United States. Therefore, for this to proceed systematically, it is an indispensable requirement that orders be placed systematically and continuously with a certain outlook, along with the development of Japan's own readiness to receive such orders' (Resumption of Weapons Industry and Future Problems: A Summary Report on the Work of the Defense Production Committee, Keidanren Monthly Report, Vol. 1, No. 3, March 1953, p. 34).

⁵³ Committee on Defense Production [1964], p. 183.

⁵⁴ Defense Production Board [1964], p. 202. By item, \$744,000 for ammunition and explosives, \$4,140,000 for aircraft, \$584,000 for ships, \$1,574,000 for vehicle parts, etc.

⁵⁵ Kihara [1972], p. 7.

⁵⁶ Kihara [1972], p. 8.

advanced technology.

5. Conclusion: Summarising the Three Issues

Finally, we conclude with a summary of the three issues raised in this paper. For the first issue, Japan's defence production and policy during the Cold War period were enacted in the midst of rapid changes in the security environment in the Asian region after the Korean War. In addition, the U.S. continued to request Japan to enhance its defence capabilities from its democratisation policy. Moreover, Japan's independence and alliance framework were certainly defined by trends in the U.S. strategy towards Asia. In other words, the U.S. defence buildup against Japan was a key factor in the U.S. strategy towards the region. The U.S.' request to strengthen Japan's defence against the Soviet Union and China came from a part of the U.S. military strategy against the Soviet Union and China. Japan's economic development was positioned as a means to achieve this goal.

Within this framework, the pace of development of the defence industry during the Cold War period of the 1950s, which began around the time of the Korean War, was regulated. The process of such regulation resulted in economic independence. In this sense, the strengthening and development of the military (defence) and the economy in Japan were inextricably linked. From there, the inherently conflicting and contradictory relationship of independence and alliance became diluted, making the development process of Japan's defence policy very difficult to watch.

It should be a given that a country's defence should be self-sustaining. However, during the Cold War, Japan was forced to identify itself with the superpower, the U.S. Therefore, to sum up this reality in terms of subordination or dependence is an extremely cynical understanding of the situation. The uncertainty in the defence policy of the postwar Japanese nation that has persisted to the present actually stems from this uncertainty during the Cold War period.

The second issue concerns the controversy over the evaluation of the defence policy under the Yoshida administration, which is the subject of this paper. In other words, there is a limit to understanding Prime Minister Yoshida's stance, which responded to the U.S.' demand for increased defence capabilities with a light arms concept to maintain a course of economic priority in terms of independence and self-reliance. Although Yoshida was very careful to ensure that quantitative expansion did not become the sole focus of his policy, he was by no means opposed to the strengthening of defence forces, nor was Hitoshi Ashida negligent in his relations with the U.S.

Therefore, it is said that the expectations and evaluations of Yoshida were higher than those of Hitoshi Ashida, who had aggressively advocated the strengthening of defence capabilities. Even for Ashida, the defence buildup was certainly a defence buildup in the sense of preparing the appearance of Japan as an independent country, and he always had in mind the strengthening of the alliance with the U.S. for this purpose. In this sense, there is a contrast between Yoshida's theory of light armaments and Ashida's theory of heavy armaments; however, in reality, while emphasising Japan's independence in the rearmament process, Ashida, who placed this issue within the context of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, considered 'independence' and 'alliance' to be two sides of the same coin and not concepts that were oriented in different directions. As Ashida pointed out in his essay 'The United

States and Japan',⁵⁷ 'Independence' or 'self-reliance' and 'alliance' were not conceived of as opposing concepts or as opposing policies. From this point of view, the difference between Yoshida's and Ashida's defence policies was not fundamental.

The coexistence of 'self-reliance' and 'alliance' within the same vector was the same in Korea and became a characteristic of Japan's postwar defence policy to a greater degree than in Korea as a homogeneous issue, whether conservative or innovative. As discussed in this paper, the defence industry forced Japan to restart its postwar industry and to revive civilian demand. It was essential to leverage the defence industry, even though the prewar military industry was partially dismantled. This was spurred on by the special procurement demand resulting from the Korean War. The fact that civilian demand was revitalised with the military as the leading sector may be accepted today as an undeniable economic and political reality. The business executives represented by the Defence Production Committee were keenly aware of this fact and insisted on its implementation.

Regarding the third issue, we can learn from the heated debate in the Diet between the ruling and opposition parties over the status of the MSA agreement that it was a dispute over self-defence and the Japan-U.S. alliance rather than a dispute that resulted from differences in interpretation. Certainly, the MSA agreement was an agreement between the U.S. and Japan that should be viewed under the category of military assistance. It is also true that the MSA agreement was filled with intense feelings of rejection. Moreover, the memories of the war had a strong influence on the debate. More than that, it was the fact that Japan had made a fresh start as a peaceful nation under the new Constitution, and the principles of defence policy optimal for a peaceful nation, the enhancement of the defence industry to support it and its support for economic independence while suppressing the rise of new militarism were the main points of the debate.

Among these, the role of the Defence Production Board was particularly noteworthy in this paper. It is known that it was not only oriented towards the expansion of defence production for the purpose of increasing defence capability in a linear fashion but also called for complementary development and enhancement within a certain balance between the so-called civilian and military demands. This was a rational choice that would curb Japan's militaristic political climate and enable the gradual development of an optimal minimum defence force. However, it was also true that amid the fierce disputes between the ruling and opposition parties, the formulation of a stable and definitive defence policy did not proceed smoothly.

Therefore, the U.S. did not necessarily have absolute confidence in the Japanese government, including the administration of Shigeru Yoshida, which is said to have been relatively more credible from the U.S. perspective. It was always aware of the possibility that the Japanese government and people might turn anti-American, and for this reason, it never nakedly called for a coercive buildup of defence capabilities. For the U.S., Japan was an important nation in its strategy towards the Soviet Union and China. At the same time, the U.S. was consistently wary of Japan moving towards a trend of de-U.S. neutrality.

In the context of the overall intent of this paper, defence production in the broad sense, including the issue of defence policy, has been extremely autonomous and has the potential to change in any way depending on international factors. The future of Japan's independence and alliances as an independent nation would ultimately be defined by the pressure of the U.S., and the ambiguity would deepen without end.

As a result, in the absence of a firm and steadfast Japanese defence policy, the

⁵⁷ Nakano [2006], p. 115.

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development of the defence industry has also been influenced by extreme political factors. While defence policy and the defence industry have changed substantially since the end of the Cold War and through Japan's rapid economic growth to the present, the structure of the defence industry, which continues to be tied to the external factor of the U.S., has remained unchanged.

The MSA agreement is divided into two categories: end-item aid and defence support aid. The former is further divided into U.S.-made weapons loans and offshore procurement of weapons. This makes us keenly aware of the need to explain the actual status of the U.S. military and aid from the perspective of the U.S. military strategy through a detailed analysis of the actual status of military aid applied to Japan based on the diversity of U.S. military aid. I would like to leave this as an issue for the future.

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書評

エリン・ブロコビッチ著（旦祐介訳）
『エリン・ブロコビッチ スーパーマンは来ない
米国の水汚染と私たちにできること』
（緑風出版、2023年、417頁）

藤巻 裕之

はじめに

同書はErin Brockovich, “*Superman’s not coming - Our National Water Crisis and What WE THE PEOPLE Can Do About It*”の旦祐介による訳書である。エリン・ブロコビッチ氏はアメリカのみならず、世界的に著名な環境活動家である。2000年にハリウッドで同氏と同名の映画が制作され、監督スティーヴン・ソダーバーグ、主演ジュリア・ロバーツで2001年度アカデミー賞を受賞した。同映画をきっかけとして水質問題がアメリカで注目され始めた。その約10年後、米国のシェールガスの掘削による土壌と水質の汚染に関する報道が世界を駆けめぐった。2018年には米国環境保護庁（EPA）長官がPFAS（有機フッ素化合物）汚染は「国家的な危機」だと宣言する¹⁾。2019年にはロバート・ピロット弁護士の活躍を描いた映画『ダーク・ウォーターズ』が米国で公開され、日本でも2021年12月に上映された。映画の原作本である『毒の水』（旦祐介訳）は2023年4月に翻訳出版されている²⁾。しかし、2000年頃から米国で始まったPFASをめぐる論争を尻目に、日本ではPFASが社会問題として認知されたのはこの数年のことである。

本書は3部12章構成から成る。第1部「恐ろしい真実」（第1章から第5章）では、1980年代以降、4万を超える化学物質を含む産業汚染水が土壌に垂れ流されてきた米国の現実が明らかにされ、その現実に対応できていなかった行政の実態が明らかにされる。第2部「希望に満ちた未来のために」（第6章から第10章）では、汚染が明らかになった地域で市民社会の現状改善への取り組みが描かれている。第3部「最後の呼びかけ」（第11章と第12章）は、気候変動が水に与える影響は単に水の枯渇だけではなく、社会全体の循環性の毀損に及ぶと警告を発する。そして、我々市民がどのように水の危機に対応することができるのかを経験を元に提案をしている。

1) ジョン・ミッチェル（小泉昭夫、島袋夏子、阿部小涼訳）『永遠の化学物質 水のPFAS汚染』岩波ブックレットNo. 1030、3頁、<https://www.iwanami.co.jp/moreinfo/tachiyomi/2710300.pdf> (access : 2023/10/1)。

2) ロバート・ピロット（旦祐介訳）(2023)『毒の水』花伝社。

問題の所存

PFASとは、ペルフルオロアルキル化合物、ポリフルオロアルキル化合物の略であり、およそ15000種類を数える有機フッ素化合物、合成化学物質群の総称である。本書が対象とする米国の水源、水道水を汚染する有害化学物質には、防錆剤の六価クロム、テフロン製造に使うPFOA（ペルフルオロオクタン酸）やスコッチガードの原材料のPFOS（ペルフルオロオクタンスルホン酸）を含むPFAS、ドライクリーニングや冷蔵庫に使うトリクロロエチレン、鉛、フラッキングの化学物質、水道水消毒用のクロラミンなどが含まれる。PFASは、耐熱性、耐油性、耐水性に強い安定性を持つ合成化学物質である。そのため、20世紀に入ると様々な産業、工業製品になくはならない化学物質として使用されてきた。例えば、テフロン加工が施されたフライパンや炊飯器、撥水加工の衣類は普段から我々の日常生活に密着している。一方、軍事基地や空港では航空機火災に使用するPFAS含有の強力な泡消火剤が大量に配備されている。

しかし、このように科学的安定性ゆえに我々一般消費者の生活を便利に変えてきたPFASは、同時に我々の健康を害するという危険性を持つ。なぜならば、人体はおろか、自然界でさえもPFASを分解することは「永久に」できないためである。専門家たちがPFASを「永遠の化学物質（Forever Chemicals）」と呼んだことは象徴的である。PFASが人体に入ることによって生じる健康被害は深刻でありかつ広範に及ぶ。PFOA暴露に伴う疾病だけでも、腎臓がん、睾丸がん、潰瘍性大腸炎、甲状腺疾患、高コレステロール、プリエクランプシア（妊娠高血圧症）などが挙げられる³⁾。

本書の内容

米国において水質汚染に対処する法律は1948年に「連邦水質汚染防止法」として制定された。1972年には大幅な改訂がなされ「きれいな水法（Clean Water Act）」として認知されている。また、1970年に米国環境保護庁が設立され、「きれいな水法」を法的根拠に、下水、生物・放射性廃棄物、産業・農業廃棄物などによる破壊から、小川、河川、湾などの大きな水域を守るために活動してきた。

しかし、現実には1970年代以降、汚染は増加の一途をたどり、法律違反も増加している。2004年から2009年の間に水質浄化法に違反した件数は50万件を超え、企業などの汚染者はほとんど処罰を免れている。PFASの中でも特にPFOAとPFOSは健康への被害が明らかになってきた。これらの化学物質の製造元であるアルケマ、デュポン、3Mなどの企

3) ピロット・ピロット（旦祐介訳）（2023）『毒の水』花伝社、339頁。

業は毒性を知らながら人々への警告を怠ってきたのである（本書、266頁）。

農工業の有害廃棄物による汚染はいたるところにある。現在、出回っている化学物質4万種類以上のうち、規制されているのは数百種類だけだ。何年も前から、産業廃棄物が地面や水源に捨てられている。有害物質を投棄する企業は、それが有害であることを昔から知っていた（本書、8頁）。政府も知っているし、軍も知っていたはずである。

実際、PFASの脅威に晒され、深刻な健康被害を被っているのは、我々一般市民だけではなく、米国内の軍事基地と海外基地で働く軍人、職員、その家族、そして、基地周辺に暮らす人々である。米国は世界一の軍事力と軍事費を誇る一方、プロコビッチに言わせれば、「国防総省こそ世界で有数の汚染者」なのである。米環境保護庁は、少なくとも149の現・旧軍事基地で地下水汚染を確認している。これらの基地の飲料水と土壌は、ジェット燃料、洗浄剤、脱脂溶剤、泡消火剤、爆発物などを使用する軍事活動の結果、廃棄されてきた危険な化学物質で汚染されている。特に、PFOSは1970年以降、世界的に展開する米軍基地において（もちろん日本も含む）航空機火災を消火するために使用された泡消火剤に含まれていた。その後、米環境保護庁と発泡剤を販売する企業との間でPFOSの製造中止が合意されたが、空軍などの多くの軍事施設ではこれらの製品を継続使用してきた（本書、267頁）。

米軍はPFOAとPFOSの水質汚染について、約400ヶ所の調査を行った。その結果、本書によれば2018年3月の下院軍務委員会の報告書では、基地内外126ヶ所が、飲料水または地下水のPFOA/PFOS検査で環境保護庁の基準を上回ったのである。内訳は、陸軍25基地、空軍50基地、海軍・海兵隊49基地、国防物流局2基地である。更に、国防総省は、基地内および基地周辺の地下水井戸2688本を検査し、約61%の井戸で環境保護庁の推奨値を超えていることを明らかにした（本書、269頁）。

国家安全保障と人間の安全保障の狭間で

これまでの国民国家の歴史において、人類は人間の安全保障よりも国家の生存を追求する国家安全保障を優先してきた。国民国家体系を維持するために、国家の安全保障を優先することを我々も無意識のうちに前提としてきたのかもしれない。冷戦構造においては、国家安全保障が更に優先されたことで、イデオロギー対立の下に人権、貧困、環境問題が後回しにされてきたことは周知の通りである。冷戦後は、イデオロギーに代わり民族、文化、宗教上の対立から国内紛争や地域紛争が多発したことで、国家が国民の生命と財産を守るという使命を十分に果たせず、国民の安全が紛争や国内の混乱の犠牲となるケースが多発した。このような「非対称の戦争」を含めた諸問題を体系化させた概念が人間の安

全保障である。更に、人間の安全保障の概念は、人間の保護と人間の能力強化という二つの側面からの政策によって理論に現実性を持たせてきた。本書では、水質汚染という「人間の保護」の深刻な問題に直面した人々が、自らのガバナンスを獲得し、「人間の能力強化」を実現しつつ、問題に立ち向かう姿が生き生きと描かれている。

今後の課題

2018年の13もの米国連邦機関から発出された報告書は、米国が気候変動に対処しなければ経済の10%を失うリスクを警告した（本書、332頁）。しかし、トランプ前大統領は気候変動を中国のデマと断じ、自動車の排気ガス基準を緩めた。更に、2017年には経済成長の促進のため、環境保護庁に対して、「きれいな水法」規制の範囲を狭めてきた。ブロコビッチが指摘するように、ネガティブに働く政治の力は大きい。しかしながら、科学者や政策の専門家たちが舞台裏で働き続けることで我々は気候変動の現実を知り、手遅れになる前に行動することができることも筆者は強調する。

「デイ・ゼロ(すべての始まり)」と題する第3部第11章で筆者は次のように提案する。「投票に意味がある」、「ビジネスリーダーを見る」、「直接行動を起こす」、「フットプリントを減らす」。米国は投票によってトランプ大統領を選び、パリ協定から脱退した。その際、イーロン・マスク氏はホワイトハウスの諮問委員会から退き「気候変動は現実だ」と訴えた。そして、我々にはSNSなどによって世界中の同じ信念を持つ人々と力を合わせて声を上げることができるのである。気候変動は、我々が毎日行っている何百万もの選択の結果であることから、早く行動すれば改善できることを本書は見事に実践し、実証している。待っていても市民を救ってくれる「スーパーマンは来ない」。しかし、市民一人ひとりの行動によって世界を変えることができる。その術は、第12章で我々が行動すべき7つのステップとして具現化されており、大いに参考にすべき視点が明示されている。この数年の間に沖縄をはじめ日本各地で注目され始めたPFASの問題に対する日本の、いやわれわれ一人ひとりの取り組みを、ブロコビッチはどう評価するだろうか。

（東海大学政治経済学部政治学科教授）

書評

西尾隆志『日独航空技術移転史 1919-1945年』
（日本経済評論社、2023年、x + 324頁）

永岑 三千輝

本書の内容に立ち入る前に、本書の組み立てを概観しておきたい。目次は以下のようになっている。

序章 日独航空技術移転史の解明に向けて

- 1 課題設定の理由
- 2 先行研究の整理
- 3 各章の概要

第1章 1920年代の航空技術移転

——「軍縮下の軍拡」としての事例——

はじめに

- 1 第一次世界大戦後におけるドイツ航空機の獲得
- 2 日本海軍による金属機製造技術の導入

おわりに

第2章 1930年代の航空技術移転

——日本海軍とハインケル社の関係を中心に——

はじめに

- 1 日本海軍の航空機国産化政策とハインケル社
- 2 ドイツ再軍備の技術移転
- 3 技術移転の継続
- 4 1930年代の航空機の技術革新と日本航空機産業の自立化

おわりに

第3章 第二次世界大戦期の航空技術移転

——企図と実態の乖離——

はじめに

- 1 日独伊三国同盟と遣独軍事視察団
- 2 封鎖突破船の活動
- 3 技術移転の諸相
- 4 ジェットエンジンの技術移転

おわりに

第4章 アジア太平洋戦争での日本航空戦力の兵站

はじめに

1 アジア太平洋戦争での航空戦と兵站

2 航空機の配備・補給過程

おわりに

終章 全体の総括

1 結論

2 残された課題

参考文献

あとがき

本書はタイトルおよび上記の1～3章から具体的にわかるように、1919～45年の約25年間に行われたドイツから日本への航空技術移転の実証研究である。博士課程において『国際武器移転史』や『駿台史学』、それに国際武器移転史の共同研究の成果・高田馨里編『航空の二〇世紀——航空熱・世界大戦・冷戦——』（日本経済評論社、2020）などに発表した諸論文を基礎に、2021年度明治大学大学院文学研究科に提出した博士論文に加筆修正を施したものである。

こうした蓄積とその間の研鑽を踏まえ、本書は問題意識・論理展開・実証度において極めて高い水準の研究書に仕上がっている。それは、奈倉文二・小野塚知二・横井勝彦が日英の技術移転史で開拓し、明治大学国際武器移転史研究所の共同研究で鍛え上げて来た方法を基礎にしている。その点、「序章 日独航空技術史の解明に向けて」で研究史の動向を紹介しつつ詳しく説明されている。中心的分析概念の「武器移転」は、純技術的要素だけではなく、送り手側と受け手側の軍事的・経済的・政治的文脈に留意する総合的見地であり、個々の技術移転をその意味での全体との関連のなかで追跡している。

検討の中心は航空機の機体・エンジン部門の技術移転である。それを通じて一連の技術移転が日本航空機産業の「自立化」に対して果たした意義と限界を明らかにしている。そのために、わが国ではほとんど全く利用されてこなかった文書館（ミュンヘンのドイツ博物館アルヒーフやイギリス公文書館）の史料などをはじめとする内外の基本的な一次史料を発掘し、研究史に批判的修正を加え、歴史像を豊かにしている。従来学術的な日本航空史発達史が一国史的枠組みの中で叙述されてきたものを克服しようとする課題意識が明確であり、その課題をしかるべき実証度で達成しているといえよう。

本書が直接対象とする日独間の航空技術移転を扱った最近の先行研究もある。しかしそれらは、二次文献だけに依拠し、しかも時期的にもワイマール期に分析が及んでいないものや、通史的で技術移転の詳細に立ち入っていないものである。こうした現在の研究状況を打開するものとして、本書がある。

「第1章 1920年代の航空技術移転——「軍縮下の軍拡としての事例——」は、日本航空機産業の「模倣時代」すなわち、1920年代の技術移転を解明している。ドイツの新興航空機企業は、ヴェルサイユ体制下で敗戦国ドイツに課せられた空軍保有禁止、軍用機製造禁止などの厳しい諸制限のなかで、むしろそれに抗し、制限を逆手にとって——全金属製機による民間航空業・交通革命の推進など——新しい航空機産業を発展させるために奮闘した。日本の陸海軍は先進的技術を開発している主要企業ロールバッハ社、ドルニエ社、ハインケル社、ユンカース社に注目し、積極的にその技術を模倣・導入し、ライセンス生産などに向かった。諸主要企業との関係に即して、この過程を実証し、30年代「自立化時代」の一つの基底的要因を創り出したこと、それは、国際武器移転史研究が提起し実証してきた「軍縮下の軍拡」の典型事例ともいべきものであったことを明らかにしている。

公然たる軍拡期がそれに続く。第2章 1930年代の航空技術移転——日本海軍とハインケル社との関係を中心に——では、1930年代の日本航空機産業の「自立化時代」について、日本海軍とハインケル社との関係を中心に辿っている。日本海軍は、32年から航空機設計・開発技術の自立化・国産化方針を明示した三ヵ年計画を実施し、「早くも35～36年には性能面で世界水準に達した国産機を登場させた」と結論する。他方で、ドイツではナチスが権力掌握と同時に開始した航空機増産・空軍建設の秘密再軍備を35年春には国際的に公然化した。そして新型軍用機開発と航空機産業の大拡張に突進した。こうした新たな国際環境のなかで継続した技術移転を追跡する。

しかし、日本軍機の国産化・高性能化の進展とドイツ航空省による航空機輸出政策とは必ずしも整合的に進まなかった。それぞれの思惑が齟齬することを明らかにし、「技術移転の全体的規模は20年代よりも限定的となった」点を摘出する。同時に、その中で存在感を増すのがドイツ航空機諸企業のなかでは特に「明確な軍需志向・高速機開発志向を有したハインケル社」であった。そこで、30年代に新たに登場した海軍艦上爆撃機の開発において、「一貫した技術的影響」が浮かび上がる。

第3章では、第二次世界大戦期の航空技術移転が、ドイツと日本の軍事的膨張政策とそれに対する米英の対抗的行動のなかで考察される。ドイツの電撃戦勝利の熱狂に巻き込まれて、日本は1940年9月に日独伊三国同盟を締結し、日独は公式の軍事同盟関係に突進す

る。しかしそのことは、航空機技術の移転・導入の点でアメリカとの関係を悪化させる。アメリカからの技術導入が極めて困難化する中で、日本は事実上唯一の軍事技術供給国となったナチス・ドイツへの依存を深めざるを得なくなった。陸海軍は、機体・エンジン・兵装・装備品・工作機械の輸入やライセンス生産、大量生産技術の導入、軍用機開発など、極めて包括的で野心的な技術導入計画を立案するに至る。

しかし、それが実現するのは、ドイツのヨーロッパ全域における覇権が揺るがないかぎりにおいてである。まさにその基本的前提が、ソ連への奇襲攻撃と独ソ戦の泥沼化の中で崩壊していく。日独間の連絡輸送手段は、ソ連経由では途絶し、その他の経路も脆弱化してしまう。ドイツ戦争経済の逼迫、日独間の顕著な工業力・技術力格差などにより、戦略的・軍事的・経済的には緊密化よりもむしろ希薄が進む。したがって、「日本側が獲得した成果は、戦間期に比して極めて乏しかった」ことが明らかにされる。

以上の三つの章が、本書タイトルに即した日独航空技術移転史の内容である。本書が実証した技術移転史を規定する諸要因と時代状況によって転変する実相は、方法と実証において当時の国際的な経済的・軍事的全体状況への具体的な叙述を折り込んでいることから、狭い航空技術史だけではなく、広く日本経済史、ドイツ経済史、ひいては世界経済史への理解を豊かにし深化させているといえよう。しかも、いろいろの箇所指摘されているように、欧米の研究が日本の史料にほとんどかまったくアクセスしていない——語学的文書館等の制約などから——状況を考えれば、本書の英語版を出すことが求められるのではないか。その点では、日独関係史を開拓してきた工藤章・田嶋信雄編著や柳和治の仕事の英文出版が参考になろう。

以上の技術移転史を踏まえながら、第4章「アジア太平洋戦争での日本航空戦力の兵站」では、日独間の航空機技術移転の実証的解明とは次元を異にする問題群が対象となっている。豊富なデータでアジア・太平洋戦争期の航空戦力の実態に迫り、航空機の配備・補給過程の重要性や航空戦力の兵站網を広大なアジア太平洋で構築・維持することの著しい困難性を浮き彫りにし、それを克服できたアメリカと日本の決定的違いが明らかにされている。日独技術移転史という本書表題からは想定し得ない貴重な内容を持っていることを強調しておきたい。本書を手にとって初めて、アジア・太平洋戦争期の航空戦力の重要性、さらにとりわけ兵站の決定的重要性が重要な柱として緻密に検討されていることがわかるからである。日本の兵站網の脆弱性は、大量生産された航空機がそもそも航空戦に投入できないことを意味した。広大な戦域のためにいかに日本の航空力がみじめな状態に陥ったかを日米の航空戦略の違い、航空機損耗統計の日独比較、日本航空戦力の「墓場」と称される壊滅的実体、長期にわたるソロモン・ニューギニア戦線の絶望的状况などから、

これでもかこれでもかと実に詳しく実証している。3章までと違い、この章の主たる史料は、アメリカ戦略爆撃調査団の報告書である。アメリカがいかに綿密に戦略を練り、その戦略を実現するための航空機生産能力を開発していったか、手に取るようにわかる。技術移転史から出発して兵站網の問題群の解明に発展した研究が、今後どのように展開するか期待したい。

(横浜市立大学名誉教授)

編集後記

第17号では、論文5本（うち英語論文3本）と書評2本を掲載することができました。巻頭論文は、巨大鉄道会社ペン・セントラル鉄道に対する連邦政府の救済計画（「大きすぎて潰せない」政策）が、国防生産法を以てしても破綻した事情を多角的に分析した本格的な経済史研究の成果です。航空機産業や軍産複合体などが注目されがちな冷戦期アメリカの「もう一つの産業政策」を学ぶことができます。

第2・第3論文は、反ユダヤ主義と比較ジェノサイド論に注目して（後者は英語で）、イスラエルのガザ侵攻について論じています。イスラエル軍によるガザでの地上侵攻や難民キャンプへの空爆によって、多数のパレスチナ人が死亡し、ガザ地区では人口の40%が飢餓の危機に瀕しています。にもかかわらず、アメリカをはじめとする西側諸国はイスラエルの軍事行動を支持し続けています。こうした現実の問題が縦横に論じられています。

第4・第5論文は、冷戦期日本の防衛産業と防衛政策の動向を英語で論じた成果です。ロシアのウクライナ侵攻を契機として世界の軍事ブロック化と武器供与（武器移転）が拡大し、軍事費も世界的に膨張を遂げつつあります。中国の軍事的台頭とアメリカの敵対的な中国政策を背景として、「専守防衛」を掲げてきた日本も「軍拡の負の連鎖」に巻き込まれようとしています。2014年、日本は防衛装備移転三原則によって武器輸出国に転じましたが、その後の軍需産業支援法の成立や三原則の見直しはどのように捉えるべきでしょうか。2本の論考は、こうした直近の問題を歴史的に考察する上での豊富な素材を提供しています。

書評では2冊の近著を取り上げました。エリン・プロコビッチ著（旦祐介訳）『スーパーマンは来ないー米国の水汚染と私たちにできることー』は、われわれに「行動を起こすことの重要性」を訴える警告の書です。沖縄以外でも米軍基地周辺でPFAS汚染は広がっていますが、評者が示唆しているように、わが国の調査と対策の遅れは深刻です。西尾隆志著『日独航空技術移転史』は、気鋭の若手研究者による最新の研究成果です。各章の紹介のみならず、課題設定までの背景や全編を通じての資料紹介など、さらには研究の一層の進展への期待も込めて、行き届いた書評を寄せていただきました。

（横井 勝彦・よこい かつひこ）

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