国際武器移転史　第 20 号 2025 年 7 月

＜目　次＞

History of Global Arms Transfer, 20 (2025), pp. 1-24

What Made the Strategy Achievable? The Case of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Campaign against Japan during World War II

By SATOSHI FUJITA*

This article demonstrates the strong interrelationship between the formulation and implementation of the U.S. strategic bombing campaign against Japan and its economic policies during World War II. Section 1 summarizes previous studies on strategic bombing and wartime economy, presenting the main arguments of this paper. Section 2 explores the connection between the formulation of the U.S. military's air war plan and wartime economic policies. Section 3 clarifies the role of the War Production Board, which was responsible for planning and implementing national production policies. The Board contributed, both directly and indirectly, to the execution of military strategy by helping make production plans more realistic. It adjusted military proposals that were initially seen as unfeasible and worked to ensure they could be implemented effectively. Section 4 illustrates how the situation surrounding B-29 production dictated the planning and initiation of Operation MATTERHORN, an earlier strategic bombing campaign against Japan. While the political and diplomatic considerations accelerated the schedule of MATTERHORN, the economic reality, that is the delay of mass-production of the B-29s, determined the actual day of starting the operation. The discussion emphasizes the necessity of incorporating various factors—economic, scientific, and technological—that enabled strategic bombing operations into the overall narrative.

Introduction

This article illustrates the strong interrelationship between the formulation and implementation of the U.S. strategic bombing campaign against Japan and its economic policies during World War II. It examines how the war strategy defined wartime economic policies and how the wartime economy, particularly the production of essential weapons, influenced the execution of the strategy in terms of timing and methodology.

From the perspective of military history and strategic studies, previous analyses of U.S. (and Allied) strategic bombing have focused on the formulation and execution of the strategy, assessing its success or failure, its impact on the war's outcome, and its moral

*Author's Affiliation: Satoshi Fujita, Associate Professor, Department of International Communication, Gifu City Women's College

implications. However, most of these studies have overlooked the economic aspects that made bombing the Japanese homeland possible. The planning, feasibility, and implementation of certain strategies or tactics during the war depended on the production situation of the weapons and equipment necessary for their execution. Therefore, to provide a complete picture of U.S. strategic bombing campaigns, it is essential to incorporate the wartime economic system that underpinned them. Although the literature on U.S. wartime economic history details how policies were formulated and executed and how the U.S. business and public sectors achieved overwhelming mass production of munitions, it tends to assume that material superiority contributed to the Allies' victory, thus neglecting how the production situation of certain weapons impacted the execution of the strategy, leading to its success or failure. Thus, this article will focus on the War Production Board (WPB), a governmental agency responsible for the formulation and execution of economic policies, and clarify the importance of it in establishing the mass production system of aircraft and therefore making strategic bombing campaign effective.

This article will consider Operation MATTERHORN to illustrate how the U.S. wartime economy influenced the timing and implementation of the operation. Operation MATTERHORN was the strategic bombing campaign through which the 20th Bomber Command of the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) bombed Japan, East Asia, and Southeast Asia from June 1944 to January 1945. While the missions conducted by the 21st Bomber Command, based in the Mariana Islands, were more extensive and well-known, overshadowing MATTERHORN in military history and strategic studies, MATTERHORN was significant as the first operation using B-29s, the latest bombers of the time. Thus, the timing and scale of MATTERHORN depended on the production situation of the B-29s, making it an ideal case for analyzing the influence of the wartime economy on operational planning and execution.

1. Previous Studies and the Main Arguments of This Paper

Historian Paul Kennedy, known for *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, focuses on "problem solving and problem solver." He argues that there is often a significant gap between the formulation of strategies and tactics and their implementation, suggesting that attention should be paid to the "problem solver" who made these strategies possible but are often overlooked by scholars. Kennedy emphasizes that "there was then, a truly daunting list of difficulties to be overcome by the Grand Alliance…" during the war, but engineers were able to surmount these difficulties and "the tide turned in the greatest conflict known to history[1]." He poses an important hypothetical question:

> What if the legendary "turnaround" weapons such as the long-range fighter and miniaturized radar—whose arrival on the battlefields in 1943-44 most historians seem to take as a given—had not come into play at the time they did, or had not been developed at all?[2]

For the U.S. strategic bombing of the Japanese homeland, we can similarly ask what if the

[1] Kennedy [2013] pp. xxiii-xxiv.
[2] Kennedy [2013] p. xxiv.

B-29 had not emerged when it did, or had not been developed at all?[3]

Indeed, without the B-29s, which were tested shortly after the U.S. entered World War II, the AAF could not have conducted the campaign at that timing and scale. The AAF faced numerous obstacles that needed to be overcome. First, manufacturers had to produce enough B-29s to make operations possible and effective, as by mid-1944, the B-29 was the only bomber with a combat radius that could reach the Japanese homeland from the bases available to the AAF. Therefore, the production situation of the B-29 directly determined the schedule and scale of the bombing campaign against Japan.

The strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese homeland spanned from June 15, 1944, to August 14, 1945, when the Japanese government decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Operation MATTERHORN, conducted by the 20th Bomber Command, engaged in 49 missions, of which 10 targeted the Japanese homeland. In contrast, the missions conducted by the 21st Bomber Command based in the Mariana Islands totaled 332, including training missions, dropping approximately 160,000 tons of bombs on the Japanese homeland. By May 1945, the number of daily sorties regularly exceeded 500[4]. Ultimately, over 60 cities were devastated, Japanese aircraft industry was nearly destroyed, and numerous mines were scattered in the waters surrounding Japan. Although accurately counting the number of victims is challenging, estimates suggest that more than 100,000 people died in Tokyo alone, with over 200,000 casualties for the entire bombing campaign[5]. There are varying opinions on how the bombing campaign influenced the war's outcome, specifically whether it accelerated the war's end. Nevertheless, given the significant sacrifices made and the continuation of similar military activities after the war, it is vital to question why such contentious military operations were conducted and what enabled their realization, thus providing a clearer overall picture of strategic bombing.

In military history and strategic studies, authors examining the U.S. strategic bombing campaign during World War II often overlook—or assume as a given—the factors that enabled the implementation of strategic bombing. They focus on issues such as the establishment of precision bombing as the U.S. bombing doctrine during the interwar years, the overall unsuccessful attempts at precision bombing against both Germany and Japan, and the resulting inclination of the U.S. military toward area bombing campaigns targeting cities[6]. Some researchers have addressed the ethical implications of area bombing due to its indiscriminateness[7], while others have assessed the extent to which the strategic bombing campaign affected the war's outcome[8]. However, the critical factor of building a system for

[3] Regarding the strategic bombing against Germany by the U.S., Kennedy emphasizes that the development and mass production of the long-range escort fighter, the P-51 Mustang, were critically important to its success, specifically focusing on the development of the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine used in P-51. Although he discusses the strategic bombing of Japan only briefly, he notes the development and technological improvement of the B-29 bomber and its R-3350 engine. Kennedy [2013] pp. 99-135; 323-328.

[4] Fujita [2020] pp. 69-70, 76.

[5] See the following websites: The Center of the Tokyo Raids and War Damage (https://tokyo-sensai.net/; March 24, 2025); Air Raids 1945 (Kūshū 1945) by *Asahi Shinbun* (https://www.asahi.com/special/kushu1945/; March 24, 2025). The victims of the atomic bombings are excluded from the latter figure.

[6] Schaffer [1985]; Biddle [2002]; Crane [2016].

[7] Schaffer [1985]; Grayling [2006]; Dower [2010] pp. 162-196.

[8] Shortly after the war, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) conducted official research on the effects of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. The USSBS emphasized the effectiveness of strategic bombing in accelerating the end of the war and even argued that, without the atomic bombings, the war against Japan could possibly have ended by November 1, 1944, the scheduled start date of Operation OLYMPIC, the planned invasion of Japan. Records of the USSBS are available in the digital collection of the National Diet Library of Japan (see the research navigation: https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/rnavi/occupation/USB; accessed March 24, 2025). From a moral perspective, some authors did not acknowledge the usefulness of strategic bombing. Gian P. Gentile, a former professor at West Point, argues that the USSBS's conclusions lacked objectivity because

increasing aircraft and bomber production within the wartime economy has either been ignored or considered a given in discussions of large-scale bombing campaign[9].

However, the production situation of the B-29 has not been entirely overlooked. In historical studies and narratives about the bombing of Japan or the development of the B-29, the well-known "Battle of Kansas" is almost invariably referenced. This story centers on Boeing's Wichita (Kansas) B-29 plant, where Henry H. Arnold, a commanding general of the AAF, visited in March 1944 and expressed disappointment with the production situation. Arnold then strongly encouraged managers and employees to work harder. As noted in an essay about MATTERHORN, the commander of the 20th Bomber Command had about 150 B-29s ready by May 1944, thanks to the dedicated efforts of the personnel in Wichita[10]. However, these discussions often remain anecdotal and tend to overlook the policy discussions surrounding the U.S. wartime economy that underpinned the "Battle of Kansas[11]." (In fact, as shown in Table 4 below, the B-29 production numbers at the Wichita plant in March and April 1944 were not significantly different from those in January and February.)

In the fields of economic history and the history of the aircraft industry, the essential focus has been on how successfully the United States achieved "the miracle of production." However, these studies generally overlook that military policy guided wartime economic policy and dismiss how the success or failure of wartime economic policy affected the planning and execution of individual strategies. Economist Raymond Goldsmith noted as early as 1946 that "what won the war for them [the Allies] in the end, was their ability—and particularly that of the United States—to produce more, and vastly more, munitions than the Axis[12]." Several points have been discussed, including what contributed to achieving this "miracle," the impact of the wartime economy on the postwar economy[13], and how the wartime economy expanded the aircraft industry.

Regarding the first point, there is a narrative that emphasizes the role of business and industrial leaders or the industry as a whole in achieving the "miracle[14]." In contrast, several studies have emphasized economic policy and the role of the public sector. For instance, economic historian Kawamura Tetsuji details the development of the wartime economic system in which the United States emerged from the Great Depression and achieved significant economic expansion[15]. Mark Wilson credits "the role of public sector, including the work of the men and women who staffed powerful military and civilian governmental agencies" for the success of U.S. industrial mobilization, rather than attributing it solely to business leaders. He also emphasizes the friction between

its members were motivated by a desire to make the Army Air Forces (then one of the three branches of the Army) independent. According to Gentile [2001], this intent influenced them to present the results of the strategic bombing campaign in a more favorable light. From a strategic perspective, Robert A. Pape emphasizes the overall critical role of air power but argues that "no strategic bombing campaign has ever yielded decisive results." Pape [1996] p. 316. Regardless of whether strategic bombing was or is considered decisive, many authors have recognized that it contributed to reducing the capacity of Japan (and Germany) to continue the war. See also Overy [1997:1995] pp. 101-133; Frank [2001:1999] pp. 350, 354; Biddle [2019] p. 31.

9 Responding to this trend, Fujita [2021] notes that the establishment of a mass production system for the B-29 around late 1944 was a determining factor in the shift from a precision bombing policy to area bombing.

10 Correll [2009].

11 Berger [1970] pp 22-35, 48-59; LeMay and Yenne [2007:1988] pp. 58-77.

12 Goldsmith [1946] p. 69.

13 Some studies argue that the wartime economic system laid the foundation for the military–industrial complex that emerged during the Cold War era. Fujita [2019] reviews this research line.

14 As a typical example, see Herman [2012].

15 As the U.S. wartime economy was driven and supported by enormous military demand and massive government spending to meet that demand, Kawamura [1995] argues that this system became the foundation for postwar "sustained growth." He also highlights the importance of the economic policies implemented before the U.S. entered the war, a period he terms the "Defense Period." Kawamura [1998].

government and business rather than their cooperation[16]. In discussing the aircraft industry, John B. Rae portrays its growth while assuming its public nature. In her book, Nishikawa Junko credits the establishment of a subcontracting system for the expansion of aircraft production and details the role of government civilian agencies in introducing the system[17]. In response to these research trends, this paper focuses on a government agency, the War Production Board (WPB), shedding light on the influence the WPB exerted—both directly and indirectly—on aircraft production policies and therefore the military strategy.

Focusing on the government does not diminish the importance of the industrial sector. In terms of mass aircraft production, the automobile industry played a crucial role. Represented by "Fordism," this industry established an assembly-line operation system in the early 20th century, paving the way for mass production and consumption in the United States. In contrast, the aircraft industry had not adapted to mass production and relied heavily on skilled labor before World War II[18], which hindered its ability to meet the high demand for aircraft, especially bombers, on its own. Consequently, U.S. government agencies responsible for industrial mobilization arranged for automobile firms to operate factories for airframes and engines. Among these, the most notable was the Willow Run factory in Michigan, operated by Ford Motor[19].

Moreover, the war compelled the aircraft industry to transform itself, leading it to adopt mass production methods. This development occurred in two ways. First, as Nishikawa asserts, the aircraft industry introduced a subcontracting system during wartime. This system involved various industries, including automobile manufacturers, primarily producing parts and engaging in sub-assembly, while aircraft firms handled the final assembly. Additionally, small-scale factories known as "feeder plants" were effectively utilized, especially on the West Coast, to manufacture various parts and supply them to airplane companies. Importantly, the subcontracting system persisted after World War II, supporting the industry's prosperity[20]. Second, aircraft companies began adopting mass production techniques similar to those of the automobile industry. They simplified and segmented their manufacturing processes, standardizing parts and finished products so that unskilled labor, including women, could play a significant role[21]. Given the importance of quantity for executing strategic bombing campaigns effectively [22], the earlier establishment of mass production in the automobile industry and its collaboration with the aircraft industry to meet high demand for airplanes were critical for these campaigns. Thus, the large-scale strategic bombing campaign during World War II can be contextualized within

16 Wilson [2016], p. 3. Alexader J. Field agrees with Wilson on this point. Field argues that the levels of wartime production (what he calls "sheer quantity production") were achieved through government or public sector efforts rather than private business. He challenges the narrative that World War II had a great and positive impact on the U.S. economy and that productivity (as opposed to output) grew during the war and had a lasting positive effect on the U.S. economy after the war. He concludes that "The economy's postwar capabilities are almost entirely attributable to conditions already in place in 1941." Field [2022] p. 372. Paul Koistinen similarly argues that "when placed in the proper context, the American production record does not appear exceptional." He criticizes the close wartime relationship between the military and industry, arguing that it hindered effective war mobilization. Koistinen [2004] p. 498.

17 Rae [1968] pp. 119-172; Nishikawa [2008], pp. 49-102.

18 Sato [2003] pp. 88-91.

19 Willow Run was engaged in the production of the B-24, a long-range bomber that served as one of the main weapons in the bombing campaign in Europe. In summary, the U.S. military accepted 18,190 B-24s, of which 6,792 were manufactured at the Willow Run factory. Office of Statistical Control [1945], *Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II*, pp. 115, 118.

20 Nishikawa [2000].

21 Sato [2003].

22 In early 1945, the AAF shifted the emphasis of its strategic bombing campaign from precision bombing to area bombing. Fujita [2021] argues that this shift was made possible by the increased number of B-29s deployed.

the U.S. history of mass production and consumption.

Indeed, strategy and economy were interrelated. For example, during the interwar period, U.S. Army leadership generally dismissed the idea of strategic bombing, while proponents formulated "precision bombing" as the doctrine of the U.S. Army Air Corps (AAC), constrained by tight economic limits; in other words, bombers—especially long-range bombers—were too expensive to acquire in large numbers[23]. However, as will be discussed, the military freed itself from these constraints with an enormous budget after entering the war, leading to the formulation of air war plans focused on strategic bombing. Consequently, aircraft production was prioritized in America's munitions policy, reflecting the wartime strategies using it, particularly long-range bombers.

More comprehensive discussions integrate military history with economic history. In his extensive work, *Why the Allies Won*, Richard Overy examines several factors that contributed to the Allies' victory. He identifies strategic bombing as one of these factors, alongside the overwhelming superiority of the Allies' mass production capabilities and technological competence[24]. However, due to the book's broad scope, it does not delve deeply into the individual cases of the factors that made strategic bombing feasible. Meanwhile, military historian Kenneth P. Werrell published one of the most detailed studies on strategic bombing against Japan, analyzing the development and production of the B-29 and other equipment such as engines and radar, which facilitated bombing missions and diversified bombing methods. However, as his focus was primarily on technological feasibility, his analysis lacked an economic perspective[25]. As for strategic bombing against Japan, an economic viewpoint is crucial since the number of bombers often dictated the nature of the campaign. Nevertheless, these studies explore what made strategies possible, even if that is not the core question of each study, and attempt to provide some answers.

This paper is situated within the context of this series of studies and examines how the planning and implementation of military strategy interacted with the formulation and execution of economic policy. It argues that the production situation of specific weapons necessary for executing particular strategies critically impacted their implementation. First, this article demonstrates the interactions between the U.S. air war strategy and the formulation of production targets for aircraft before and during the early stages of the war. Next, it explores how the WPB influenced the military strategy by intervening in munitions programs. It shows that the WPB directly or indirectly facilitated strategic bombing campaigns by successfully urging the military to downsize its munitions program based on feasibility, thereby establishing an effective production situation. The final section focuses on Operation MATTERHORN, an early strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese homeland, asserting that the production situation of the B-29 significantly affected how and when the operation was executed. This paper references primary sources, including minutes from WPB regular meetings, monthly reports on the production situation from the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, and records from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Microfilm, Meiji University).

---

23 Morris [2017] pp. 135-190.

24 Overy [1997:1995] pp. 101-133, 180-244. Still, Overy concludes that "The Allies won the Second World War because they turned their economic strength into effective fighting power, and turned the moral energies of their people into an effective will to win." He places greater importance on "will" and "courage," although he concedes that these qualities are "difficult for historians to use as instruments of cold analysis." Overy [1997:1995] pp. 324-325.

25 Werrell [1996] pp. 55-83. Conrad Crane also devotes one chapter each to the development of radar and sights, as well as better bombs. Crane [2016] pp. 101-132.

2. Formulation of Air War Planning and the Establishment of a Mass Production System for Aircraft

Throughout World War II, the U.S. aircraft industry expanded significantly. In 1939, the year war erupted in Europe, this industry produced approximately 5,000 airplanes, most of which were small and private. However, when the situation in Europe shifted in mid-1940, the United States began to establish the foundation for national defense, resulting in a production record of approximately 3,800 military planes that year. By the end of the war, the aircraft industry had manufactured an enormous total of 300,000 planes, with a peak production year of less than 100,000 in 1944. Approximately 98,000 of the 300,000 produced were bombers, with 35,000 being long-range (LR) or very long-range (VLR) bombers, such as the B-17, B-24, B-29, and B-32, each with four engines. Comparing production in 1940 to that in 1944, the number of manufactured planes increased by 25 times, while airframe weight increased by 81 times. During the same period, floor space increased by 12 times, the workforce grew by 16 times, and sales rose by 30 times[26]. These results indicate that the U.S. aircraft industry achieved remarkable success during the war and played a crucial role in securing victory.

A significant portion of aircraft production consisted of LR and VLR bombers (12% by number but 35% by airframe weight), which were primarily used for strategic bombing, although they served other purposes as well[27]. This underscored their importance during World War II. However, during the interwar period, the U.S. Army, which controlled the AAF and its predecessor (the AAC), did not regard strategic bombing as valuable. This was evidenced by the fact that the AAC had only 13 B-17s in the autumn of 1938, the latest bomber at the time[28]. Even advocates of strategic bombing justified the procurement of bombers primarily for hemispheric defense due to budgetary constraints. With the onset of World War II, long-range bombing became the only means to directly attack Nazi Germany and Italy on the European continent, especially after Nazi forces launched westward offensives and defeated France in mid-1940. In this context, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) strongly promoted the expansion of aircraft production, particularly for LR and VLR bombers.

The initial production target was 50,000 aircraft, announced by FDR in May 1940[29]. This was a lofty objective, considering that the production record in 1939 was only 5,000. By September 1940, the 8-A schedule[30] was developed based on FDR's target, requiring the production of 47,495 airplanes, including spares, from August 1940 to July 1942. This target was revised on October 23 to demand 41,341 aircraft in the same period. These reports were more moderate than FDR's target, as they were based on economic feasibility assessments by experts. However, further demands from military services and the British necessitated upward revisions to the schedule. The 8-C schedule (March 1941) requested the manufacture of 78,961 aircraft by June 1943, including VLR bombers such as the B-29 and B-32. The latest version before Pearl Harbor, the 8-G schedule, presented targets similar to 8-C (75,637 by June 1943). Prior to that, the 8-E schedule (May 5, 1941) included a goal of

26 Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] p. 331.
27 Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] pp. 352-353.
28 Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] pp. 202-204; Rae [1968] p. 96.
29 Holley [1989:1964] pp. 226-228.
30 Report no. 8 series referred to aircraft production schedules designated by the aircraft section or branch in advisory agencies involved in the munitions program, such as the National Defense Advisory Committee, the Office of Production Management, and the War Production Board.

producing 500 long-range bombers per month by June 1943[31].

These production figures also accounted for supplies intended for Allied nations, primarily Britain. Even before the war broke out, there were foreign orders for aircraft from Britain and France due to the threat posed by Nazi Germany. However, when the war began in September 1939, the U.S. Congress debated whether to invoke the Neutrality Act, which negatively impacted aircraft production[32]. The Act was revised in November 1939, allowing U.S. firms to export munitions to belligerent nations on a "cash-and-carry" basis, leading to increased foreign orders and facility expansions[33]. Subsequently, the supply of aircraft to Britain and France (and after France's surrender, exclusively to Britain) grew, especially after the Lend-Lease Act was passed in March 1941. While the 8-A schedule (September 1940) called for the production of 47,495 aircraft, 13,694 were planned for delivery to Britain[34]. The 8-C schedule, drawn up just before the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, planned to deliver about 25,000 airplanes to Britain (approximately 20,000 of the total 50,000 for tactical purposes)[35]. In summary, foreign orders and aid to Britain under the Lend-Lease Act helped spur facility expansions, as noted in the official history of the AAF, which stated, "The adoption of lend-lease in March and the President's acceptance in May of a program for the production of 500 four-engine bombers per month removed the question of a further expansion of plant from the area of debate[36]."

After the United States joined the United Nations, production targets soared, largely driven by FDR. In January 1942, he set the aircraft production target at 60,000 for 1942 and 125,000 for 1943. These figures were so ambitious that they could not be met, at least not in sheer numbers. FDR's commitment to expanding aircraft production strongly constrained discussions between the military and the WPB, which was responsible for the wartime economy; the military insisted on maintaining these targets, while the WPB sought to revise them downward. As mentioned earlier, the 8 series prepared by economic experts tended to present more realistic targets than those set by FDR and the military. For instance, the 8-I schedule, announced at the end of January 1942, set "ultimate" objectives at 56,810 for that year and 105,133 for the following year[37]. As we will see, the WPB attempt-

---

31 Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] p. 289; J. Carlyle Sitterson [1946] "Aircraft Production Policies under the National Defense Advisory Commission and Office of Production Management, May 1940 to December 1941," *Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board*, no. 21, p. 97.

32 Holley [1989:1964] p. 201.

33 Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] p. 191. I. B. Holley Jr. points out that "the greatest contribution of the foreign orders lay in their psychological value to the aircraft industry. The prospects of a sharply rising curve of export sales seem to have put manufacturers in a mood to take bigger risks, to sink more capital in plant expansions…" Holley [1989:1964] p. 200. For discussions on the importance of exports to the aircraft industry, see also Nishikawa [1993] pp. 14-18.

34 Sitterson, "Aircraft Production Policies," p. 50.

35 In September 1940, it was authorized that British procurement officials would join the joint committee of the U.S. Army and Navy to discuss the aircraft production program. Nishikawa [2008] pp. 50-53.

36 Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] pp. 311-314, quotation from p. 313. It must be noted that the U.S. aid to Great Britain was not a one-way street. For its sub-contracting system, the U.S. aircraft industry referred the British aircraft industry, which had already established a system of "wholesale sub-contracting" (see Nishikawa [2000] p. 59). In addition, the exchange of scientific and technological information, including in the field of nuclear science, greatly contributed to the research and development efforts of both nations. For aircraft production, the British Rolls-Royce Merlin engine (denoted as V-1650 in the U.S.) played a significant role. Paul Kennedy argues that the U.S. fighter plane P-51, when equipped with the Merlin engine, helped overcome the obstacle faced by the Eighth Air Force in conducting its strategic bombing campaign against Germany. Kennedy [2013] pp. 116-126. U.S. firms, including the Packard Motor Car Company, manufactured the Merlin engine. Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] pp. 309-310; Sitterson, "Aircraft Production Policies," pp. 65-66. Packard produced 54,714 Merlin engines during the war. Holley [1989:1963] p. 581.

37 The "ultimate" (and "initial") objectives were applied in the 8-I schedule (and continued through 8-J and 8-K) to reflect the President's declared objectives. Although many concerned people considered the objective un-

ed to further decrease these still ambitious figures.

Why were such unrealistic numbers established as targets? The military services often grossly overestimated munitions requirements, though their estimates were not without basis. In July 1941, FDR ordered the secretaries of War and the Navy to prepare "the over-all production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies[38]." The newly established Air War Plans Division (AWPD) of the AAF completed a comprehensive air offensive plan, AWPD-1, on August 12. The ultimate goal was the defeat of the Axis powers rather than merely hemispheric defense, and it estimated the forces necessary to achieve that end. AWPD-1 focused on strategic bombing targeting the German economy, identifying 154 critical targets, including the electrical power system, oil, and aircraft industries.

To completely defeat the Axis, planners estimated that the ultimate forces required for bombers included 98 groups: 10 medium bomber groups (1,062 airplanes), 20 long-range groups (1,700 airplanes), and 68 very long-range groups (5,740 airplanes). Due to the limited availability of airfields in the United Kingdom and the Middle East, only 54 of the 98 groups could be based there. Consequently, the planners determined that 44 groups of bombers, capable of operating from bases in Newfoundland, Greenland, etc., with a 4,000-mile (6,400 km, significantly longer than the B-29) operating radius, were necessary. The monthly replacement numbers for bombers totaled 1,334. Additionally, 25 long-range bomber groups (2,125 airplanes and 81 monthly replacements) were required to defend U.S. possessions and the Western Hemisphere, along with two groups (170 airplanes and 34 replacements) for strategic defense in Asia (Table 1). These calculations were incorporated into the "Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements," issued on September 11 by the Joint Army-Navy Board.The grand total amounted to 63,467, comprising 239 groups and 108 separate squadrons by 1945[39]. Despite the high demand for VLR bombers, military historian Robert F. Futrell notes that this figure "was remarkably similar to the 269 tactical groups that the Army Air Forces would possess at its maximum strength during World War II[40]," reflecting the presidential objective of those higher numbers[41]. The presidential objective reflected those higher numbers.

---

realistic, the military viewed it as imperative. Therefore, the initial objective was set a more practicable target, "assigned to manufacturers" and used as "the basis for planning immediate plant expansion and allocation of materials and equipment." As Craven and Cate explains, "the production scheduled under the ultimate objective was never attained," indicating that the "ultimate" objective was to demonstrate for planners to work toward the goal the President had declared. Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] pp. 289-290. The figures from the 8-I schedule are quoted from the Planning Committee, meetings, nos. 13 and 14, held on March 23 and 25, 1942, Box 1, Minutes and Transcripts of Proceedings of Meetings, WPB Planning Committee, RG 179 (Records of the War Production Board), NARA.

38 Futrell [1989] p. 109.

39 Futrell [1989] pp. 108-112; Craven and Cate [1983a] pp. 131-132.

40 Futrell [1989] p. 113.

41 AWPD-4 presented on December 15, 1941, enlarged the requirement: 13 medium bomber groups, 64 long-range bomber groups, 32 very long-range bomber (B-29 and B-32) groups, and 59 4,000-mile bomber groups. The total aircrafts were 90,000, which demanded a production rate of 3,000 aircrafts a month. Furthermore, the plan recommended "NATIONAL FIRST PRIORITY TO THE PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT," though not accepted. Futrell [1989] pp. 127-128; Craven and Cate [1983a:1948] p. 236.

Table 1: Requirement of AAF in AWPD-1

Missions	Type	Groups	Airplanes	Replacement/ month
Air Offensive against Germany	M Bomber	10	1,062	143
	LR Bomber	20	1,700	228
	VLR Bomber	24	2,040	273
	4,000-mile Bomber	44	3,740	501
	Day Pursuit	21	2,756	334
	Night Pursuit	--	656	80
Defend U.S. possessions and Hemisphere	LR Bomber	25	2,125	81
	Day Pursuit	32	4,200	90
	Night Pursuit	--	1,000	27
Strategic Defensive in Asia	LR Bomber	2	170	34
	Day Pursuit	1	132	17
	Night Pursuit	--	31	4
Air Support for Ground Forces	Light bomber	13	946	42
	Dive bomber	13	1,255	56
	Observation	108 Squadrons	1,901	98
	Photo	2	142	23
	Transport	19	1,520	77
	Gliders	--	(3,000)*	(153)*
Maintenance	Transport	13	1,040	25
Training	All Types	--	37,051	--
Grand Total		239 108 Squadrons	63,467	2,133

Source: Haun [2019] pp. 237-238.

* Not included in totals.

3. War Production Board's engagement with the miliary services

For the WPB[42], responsible for planning and implementing production policy, the military's requirements and FDR's objectives were entirely unrealistic. The WPB believed that an unfeasible objective hindered actual production, and since it could not directly intervene in military procurement, it struggled with the military to reduce targets to a realistic level. From early 1942 to 1943, a "feasibility controversy" emerged between the WPB and the

[42] The WPB was established by Executive Order 9024 in January 1942 as the successor to the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board and the Office of Production Management . The WPB members were a chairman appointed by the President, the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and several of directors or administrators of civilian agencies. Executive Order 9024, in *The War Production Board and Management of the Wartime Economy*, vol. 31 of *Documentary History of Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency*, McJimsey, George T. [2012:2006] ed., Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, Reprint edition, pp. 7-9.For a detailed history, see United States Civilian Production Administration (USCPA) [1969:1947] *Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940-1945*, vol. 1, *Program and Administration*, New York: Greenwood Press. See also Koistinen [2004] pp. 195-217.

military, particularly the Army Service Forces (ASF), which was responsible for nearly all Army procurement [43]. For example, at a meeting on March 31, 1942, the WPB estimated a realistic military expenditure of $40 billion in 1942 and $60 billion in 1943, in contrast to the $60 billion and $110 billion projected by the military services for the same years[44].

In this situation, the WPB decided that Chairman Donald Nelson would consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the top policymaking body of the military, to revise the target numbers downward. As early as March 1942, Nelson informed Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox that the military's estimate (60 billion in 1942 and 110 billion in 1943) "must be carefully reviewed in the light of available resources—raw materials, manpower, and industrial facilities[45]." While the military services revised their estimate downward to 92.9 billion, the WPB set its estimate at 75 billion, reflecting the growing U.S. production capacity[46], despite the significant gap between their estimates. Consequently, in a memorandum to the JCS dated October 19, Nelson urged the JCS to reduce its objectives[47]. As a result, the JCS decided to lower the objectives to 80 billion dollars. "Although this figure exceeds the War Production Board's estimate of the productive capacity of the nation by approximately $5.0 billion," the JCS concluded, "the program is considered to be within the productive capacity of the nation[48]."

The reduction in overall military spending for the munitions program led to a revision of priorities, particularly regarding aircraft production. In discussions about the issue, the WPB exerted influence to maintain a priority on aircraft production. Along with revising the overall production objectives, the priorities for military production were also considered by the JCS. JCS 146/1, a document titled "Priorities in Production of Munitions Based on Strategic Considerations" dated November 1942, outlined that "five parts of the U.S. Military program are of equal importance[49]": The Army Supply Program (including the aircraft program); The Navy War Program; The Marine Corps Supply Program; The Maritime Commission Program; and The International Aid Program. Effectively, this policy lowered the priority assigned to aircraft production. Until then, under President Roosevelt's instructions, aircraft production had been given a higher priority. For example, during the 11th meeting of the WPB, it was noted that "the War and Navy Departments have been requested to let no contracts for new facilities, other than those essential to attainment of the aircraft objectives[50]."

---

43 In the United States, the military services were almost exclusively responsible for estimating requirements, procuring munitions, and contracting with firms, unlike the United Kingdom, which established the Ministry of Supply. For discussions on the disputes over the authority for overall wartime production and procurement, see Ohl [1994] pp. 72-97; Eiler [1997] pp. 326-368.

44 The minutes of regular meetings of WPB and the Monthly Reports to the War Production Board are stored in the following collection: Office of the Undersecretary of War, Administrative Office, Subject-Numerical, 1941–1945, Boxes 735–747, Record Group 107 (Records of the Office of the Secretary of War), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Hereafter, references to these documents will include only the box numbers, as in the following examples: WPB meeting, No. 11, March 31, 1942, Box 737.

45 Donald Nelson to Frank Knox, March 16, 1942, attached to J.C.S. 134, U.S. War Production Objectives, 1943, October 19, 1942, Reel 1 (R1), Strategic Issues (SI), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, part 1: 1942-1945 (RJCS pt. 1), microfilm, Meiji University.

46 WPB meeting, no. 35, October 13, 1942, Box 739.

47 War Production Objectives for 1943, October 15, 1942, and Nelson to JCS, October 19, attached to J.C.S. 134.

48 J.C.S. 134/2, U.S. War Production Objectives, 1943, November 23, 1942, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1. The actual figure for war production totaled to approximately 70 billion dollars. Monthly Report to the War Production Board, December 1943, 1, Box 744.

49 J.C.S. 146/ 1 (J.C.S. 146 series title is "Priorities in Production of Munitions Based Strategic Considerations), November 17, 1942, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

50 WPB meeting, no. 11, March 31, 1942.

Henry Arnold, the commanding general of the AAF, objected to that policy. Initially, he had agreed to it because he was informed that the priorities of each sector "could be parallel each other but there would be no interference with the production of the 107,000 airplanes as laid out for 1943." However, he later learned that the new arrangement would lower the priority of aircraft production, leading him to withdraw his concurrence[51]. Furthermore, Donald Nelson also opposed the priorities outlined by the JCS, stating,

> I have in mind the President's recent instructions that the aircraft program be carried out regardless of its effect on other programs. I have received somewhat similar instructions from him with respect to escort vessels and merchant shipping. I cannot reconcile these instructions from the President with the suggested priorities set forth on Tab "A[52]."

Taking Nelson's opinion and the president's instruction into account, William Leahy, a Navy admiral and chairman of the JCS, established the highest priority group as "No. 1 Group," which separated the aircraft production program from the entire Army supply program. The JCS then presented four sectors in No. 1 Group, including 107,000 airplanes, other Army munitions and supplies, Navy warships and equipment, and vessels constructed by the Maritime Commission[53]. Nelson, however, argued that it would be difficult to complete the production of 107,000 aircraft based on the plan Leahy proposed[54]. In contrast, Navy members criticized Nelson and Arnold, insisting on maintaining JCS 146/1 [55]. Arnold argued that the highest priority should be given to the aircraft production program, citing Nelson's perspective[56]. In February 1943, the chairman of WPB requested that the JCS clarify what constituted the "must program[57]." After these discussions, the JCS divided the entire munitions program into four sectors (Army and Navy aircraft, Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission) and then segmented each sector into Groups 1 to 3. In this framework, Group 1 of each sector was defined as the "must program," with each item in Group 1 given equal preference[58]. Through these correspondences between WPB and JCS, the priorities for the munitions program were refined based on considerations of economic feasibility in WPB. By doing so, WPB contributed to greater efficiency in military production.

WPB prompted a reduction in the overall munitions program and addressed the prioritization issue. At the same time, it sought to decrease the scale of the aircraft production program, as WPB economists considered the production of 125,000 aircraft, as proposed by

---

51 J.C.S. 146/2, November 24, 1942, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

52 Donald Nelson to William D. Leahy, November 18, 1942, attached to J.C.S. 146/4, November 24, 1942, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

53 William D. Leahy to Donald Nelson, November 26, 1942, attached to J.C..S. 146/5, November 30, 1942, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

54 Donald Nelson to William D. Leahy, December 3, 1942, attached to JCS 146/ 6, December 5, 1942, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

55 Memorandum for Admiral [Earnest J.] King, December 7, 1942, attached to J.C.S. 146/8, December 7, 1942, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

56 J.C.S. 146/7, December 7, 1942, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

57 Donald Nelson to William D. Leahy, February 11, 1943, attached to J.C.S. 146/10 (revised), February 27, 1943.

58 J.C.S. 146/12, March 15, 1943, and William D. Leahy to Donald Nelson, March 16, 1943, attached to J.C.S. 146/13, March 18, 1943, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

Table 2: Aircraft production estimates and record for June to December 1942.

type	June	July	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
All	52,235	53,551	51,485	50,835	49,412	47,510	47,694
Combat	29,050	28,950	27,589	27,058	26,169	24,933	24,918
Bomber	15,458	15,165	14,519	14,121	13,531	12,767	12,679
LR	2,879	2,901	2,645	2,631	2,610	2,540	2,579

Source: Monthly Reports to the War Production Board.

FDR, was deemed too ambitious and unrealistic. It was believed that setting such exceedingly high objectives for the program, categorized as one of the "must programs," would disrupt other equally important initiatives and negatively impact the overall economy[59]. Consequently, Donald Nelson recommended that William Leahy reduce the aircraft production target for 1943 from 107,000 to a maximum of 95,000. Ultimately, the actual number manufactured in 1943 was around 85,000, indicating that even 95,000 was an overestimation[60].

Indeed, the WPB continued to revise the aircraft production objectives downward. This is evident from the "Monthly Reports to the War Production Board," which the Office of Progress Report compiled each month during the war. Table 2 illustrates the aircraft production estimates or objectives for 1942 at the end of each month (with December reflecting the actual production record). By June, it was clear that the President's objective for 1942—60,000 aircraft, of which 45,000 were tactical and the remainder trainers[61])—was unattainable. Comparing the figures from June to December, the achievement rate for all types was 91%, while the rate for combat types was only 85%. This indicates that, to approach the target, greater emphasis was placed on producing trainers, which were relatively easier to manufacture. The Planning Committee, "an advisory body to the Chairman of the War Production Board" established by General Administrative Order No. 22 on March 3, 1942, proposed this approach. The committee believed that the target of 60,000 aircraft (45,000 tactical planes and 15,000 trainers) was "unfeasible" but felt that a "public announcement of a revision of objectives downward is undesirable[62]." Thus, the committee recommended that 60,000 "be retained as a goal, but that there be a redistribution of types so as to provide a greater number of trainers and a lesser number of tactical planes…[63]" Indeed, the 8-I schedule (at the end of January 1942) set its initial and ultimate objectives at 17,287 trainers instead of 15,000[64].

In 1943, the gap between objectives and actual production widened compared to 1942. As noted earlier, after the aircraft production goal for 1943 was set at 107,000 in late 1942,

59 For example, at the 55th meeting of WPB, it was pointed out that the current schedule was "over-optimistic," and this "led to the dissipation of productive resources." WPB meeting, no. 55, April 27, 1943, Box 741. Donald Nelson to William D. Leahy, April 14, 1943, attached to J.C.S. 146/14, April 14, 1943, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

60 Nelson to Leahy, April 14, 1943.

61 Military aircraft were classified into "tactical" types and trainers. Tactical types included "combat" aircraft, such as bombers, fighters, and naval reconnaissance, as well as other types such as transport and communications aircraft.

62 The WPB Planning Committee, meeting, no. 14, March 25, 1942, Box 1, Minutes and Transcripts of Proceedings of Meetings, WPB Planning Committee, RG 179, NARA.

63 "Report of Planning Committee for the Period from February 20 to April 4," Robert R. Nathan (Chairman of Planning Committee, WPB) to Donald M. Nelson, April 7, 1942, Box 737, Office, Undersecretary of War, Administrative Office, Subject-numerical, 1941-1945, RG 107.

64 For the 8-I schedule, see note 37. The actual production of trainer aircraft in 1942 was 17,599. Progress Report to WPB, January 1943, p. 4, Box 740.

Table 3: Aircraft Production Estimates and Record for 1943.

type	Jan.	Feb.	April	May	July	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
All	112,038	111,000	101,266	95,212	93,472	90,154	86,288	85,993	85,420
Combat	74,032	72,719	64,412	62,336	60,701	57,684	59,751	54,607	54,091
Bomber	41,040	40,699	34,652	34,615	33,309	31,836	29,650	29,552	29,362
LR	11,384	11,431	10,610	10,511	10,178	9,723	9,326	9,325	9,292
VLR	-	-	-	-	146	140	121	104	92

Source: Monthly Reports to the War Production Board.

Donald Nelson argued that it should be reduced to a maximum of 95,000. As shown in Table 3, the target was adjusted to approximately 95,000 in May 1943, but the actual production in 1943 was only 76% of the January estimate for the year. Although it might seem that performance in 1943 was worse than in 1942, the number of aircraft produced should not be viewed in isolation. Nelson informed William Leahy in May 1943 that "it would appear to be much more practicable for future consideration to standardize on the use of weight of planes rather than numbers." At this point, the quality of aircraft became more critical than quantity, particularly regarding heavy bombers[65]. The production of heavy bombers remained relatively steady.

Nevertheless, the WPB was always concerned about the disparity between goals and objectives. The reasons for poor aircraft production varied over different periods: a shortage of machine tools in the first half of 1942[66] and a lack of critical materials, including aluminum and copper, as well as an inadequate distribution system in the latter half of the year[67]. To address the distribution issue, the WPB developed the Production Requirement Plan, but it did not solve the problem. Subsequently, in November 1942, the WPB announced the Controlled Material Plan, which was fully implemented by July[68]. This plan contributed to the efficient allocation of critical materials, leading to a reduced focus on material shortages in WPB discussions. Instead, from the latter part of the year onward, the WPB identified the primary factor for the shortfall as a lack of manpower in the aircraft industry[69].

The problem of labor shortages was prevalent in newly operating factories, including those related to the B-29. The B-29 was one of the latest weapons, with development beginning in 1940. Boeing, its designer, started constructing a second plant in Wichita specifically for B-29 manufacturing in June 1941. Other factories producing B-29s included Renton (Washington, operated by Boeing), Omaha (Nebraska, operated by Martin), and Marietta (Georgia, operated by Bell). These plants began operations relatively late. For example, construction of the Marietta plant started at the end of March, but it was not completed until July 1943 due to the shortages of steel and labor. According to Jacob Meulen,

65 Nelson to Leahy, May 4, 1943, attached to J.C.S. 146/ 16, May 6, 1943, R1, SI, RJCS pt. 1.

66 WPB meeting, no. 5, February 17, 1942, Box 736; WPB meeting, no. 14, April 21, 1942, Box 737.

67 Kawamura [1998] pp. 160-162, 239-243; Wiltse, Charles M. [1946] "Aluminum Policies of the War Production Board and the Predecessor Agencies, May 1940 to November 1945," no. 22 of *Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board*, p. 142.

68 The official history of the WPB concluded that "The success of CMP by the end of the year [1943] meant the achievement of a highly ambitious and difficult approach to distribution…manufacturers had found CMP workable, and had achieved the highest production level the Nation had ever known." USCPA, *Industrial Mobilization for War*, vol. 1, pp. 485-501, 663-682, quotation from p. 682.

69 The problem of labor shortage was not fully overcome until 1944. In the aeronautical industry, employment peaked at 1,326,000 in November 1943. AAF Historical Office [1946] "Expansion of Industrial Facilities under Army Air Forces Auspices, 1940-1945", no. 40 of *Army Air Forces Historical Studies*, pp. 171-172.

"Many unemployed people lived in the area when planners selected Marietta. But by the time the plant was ready to put large numbers of people to work, most had already found jobs." As a result, the Bell plant relied on women, who made up "nearly 60 percent of the workforce[70]." World War II and the U.S. entry into it abruptly absorbed the unemployed labor pool. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S. unemployment rate in 1940 was 14.6%, but it gradually improved. By 1943, the unemployment rate dropped to 1.9%, making it difficult for any new plant at that time to secure a labor force[71]. Overall, 1943 was a transition period for establishing a mass production system for aircraft[72].

The role of women in the aircraft industry is noteworthy. Symbolized by "Rosie the Riveter," many women worked in manufacturing factories. For unskilled female laborers to play an active role in factories, the manufacturing process needed to be simplified and segmented. Traditionally, the mass production system was not suited for aircraft production, which relied heavily on skilled labor. The military also doubted that the mass production system could meet specifications and requests for various changes. However, achieving production targets would be impossible without this system. As mentioned in Section 1, industrial policy authorities arranged for automobile firms, such as Ford, to produce airframes and engines, while aircraft companies collectively introduced a line-assembling system. For example, the Willow Run factory operated by Ford produced 6,792 B-24 Liberators (designed by Consolidated), and Ford's Dearborn plant in Michigan manufactured 57,178 R-2800 engines (designed by Pratt & Whitney). Although automobile firms did not participate in producing airframes for the B-29, Dodge, a division of Chrysler, produced 18,349 R-3350 engines (designed by Wright Aeronautical)[73].

As the military feared, the introduction of the mass production system into the aircraft industry caused issues: mass-produced and standardized airplanes required repeated modifications to adjust to different battlefields or tactics. When the AAF faced the choice between quality and quantity, it opted for both: the AAF established modification centers across the United States, where standardized aircraft were sent to be modified for specific battlefields and tactics. According to the official history of the AAF, the U.S. government spent $100 million to create 21 modification centers, 19 of which were constructed by the AAF at a cost of $75 million. Although the centers required many skilled workers, maintenance staff from civil airliners were hired to meet the demand[74]. This approach was particularly useful for aircraft with numerous technical issues, such as the B-29. Thus, cross-industrial cooperation arranged by government economic agencies and innovative strategies for meeting demands for quality and quantity laid the groundwork for women's contributions in manufacturing factories[75].

Although the gap between actual aircraft production and objectives widened from 1942 to 1943, the production situation for LR bombers, the primary weapon for strategic bombing—including the B-17 and B-24—was relatively better than for other types. As stated in Section 2, the AAF emphasized strategic bombing against Germany, developed air war

---

70 Meulen [1995] pp. 76-81, quotation from pp. 78, 81.

71 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment status of the civilian population, 1940 to date." (https://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2009/cpsaat1.pdf; March 24, 2025)

72 Another factor is the increasing share of sub-contracting. Nishikawa [2000] pp. 63-64.

73 Holley [1989:1963] pp. 577, 580.

74 Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] pp. 316, 336.

75 According to Chitose Sato, the number of workers in the aircraft industry at its peak was 1,326,345, of which 486,037 (36.7%) were women. She argues that in the process of incorporating women into the workforce, various tasks were "discovered" and created as jobs suited for women, in other words, the work was "gendered." Sato [2003] pp. 85-173.

plans such as the AWPD series, and estimated munitions requirements accordingly. The relatively favorable situation for LR production reflected these military policies. Indeed, from the summer of 1943, AAF in Europe began massive-scale operations, including attacks on Regensburg and Schweinfurt, despite unacceptable losses. Starting with the Münster bombing in October, the AAF also targeted cities[76]. Meanwhile, to classify aircraft produced in the Monthly Report to the WPB, the Top Preference and Lower Preference categories were established in October 1943, with LR bombers, including the B-29, placed in the former category[77]. This suggests a shift in emphasis from quantity to quality in aircraft production at that time. The focus on manufacturing LR bombers interacted with the development of the bombing campaign in Europe, which will be discussed in another paper.

In the overall U.S. munitions program, aircraft production, particularly of long-range bombers, was prioritized based on U.S. military policies emphasizing strategic bombing. However, the requirements set by the military and the objectives outlined by the President were unfeasible from the economic standpoint of the WPB. Consequently, the WPB influenced munitions programs as much as possible, insisted on scaling down the production goals, and made necessary adjustments. Simultaneously, the WPB contributed to stabilizing aircraft production, including LR bombers, by addressing priority issues and creating an efficient distribution system for critical materials. The prioritization of LR bombers was particularly aligned with the expansion and diversification of bombing operations in Europe. However, it is important to note that the B-29 production, at least in its early phases, cannot be placed within the context of the relatively better situation for LR bomber production. The mass production of the B-29 was delayed, which also postponed the start of the bombing campaign against the Japanese mainland, known as MATTERHORN. Further details will be discussed in the next section.

4. Delay of the Production of the B-29 and Operation MATTERHORN

Beginning in June 1944, Operation MATTERHORN was a bombing campaign against Japanese-occupied East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Japanese homeland. The 20th Bomber Command, the primary force conducting MATTERHORN, established its headquarters in Kharagpur, India, and its attacking unit's outpost in Chengdu, China. While the straight-line distance from Chengdu to Fukuoka, Kyushu, is about 2,500 km (5,000 km round trip), the B-17's range was approximately 3,000 km and the B-24's approximately 4,500 km, making a round trip to Kyushu nearly impossible. In contrast, the B-29 had a range of 6,000 km, making it the only weapon capable of conducting bombing operations against Japanese homeland[78]. In other words, the development and mass production of the B-29 was the requisite for bombing Japanese homeland (whether the B-29s flew from Chengdu or the Mariana Islands).

However, it was not initially assumed that the B-29 would be used solely for bombing Japan. On the contrary, at the outset, VLR bombers such as the B-29 were expected to be deployed in the European theater, but the production situation did not permit their use

76 Until then, the AAF had officially conducted precision bombings, principally targeting military and industrial sites. By contrast, the Royal Air Force (British Air Force) conducted nighttime bombing operations against cities, that is, indiscriminate bombing. Schaffer [1985].

77 Monthly Report to the War Production Board, October 1943, Box 744.

78 For specifications of the bombers, see the website of the National Museum of the United States Air Force (https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/WWII-Gallery/; March 24, 2025).

Table 4: Delivery Numbers of B-29 for Each Factory

	Renton (Boeing)	Wichita (Boeing)	Marietta (Bell)	Omaha (Martin)	Sum for month
July, 1943	—	7	—	—	7
August	—	4	—	—	4
September	—	15	—	—	15
October	—	13	—	—	13
November	—	17	1	—	18
December	—	31	3	1	35
January, 1944	—	46	4	2	52
February	—	47	6	2	55
March	4	51	5	0	60
April	3	36	12	0	51
May	3	65	19	1	88
June	5	64	10	3	82
July	8	64	1	2	75
August	15	61	11	7	94
September	20	63	29	10	122
October	12	70	27	16	125
November	30	75	34	24	163
December	35	80	43	32	190
January, 1945	50	86	45	40	221
February	60	100	50	50	260
March	80	100	56	55	291
April	100	105	62	55	322
May	140	95	60	55	350
June	150	100	65	55	370
July	160	100	60	55	375
August	119	100	50	50	319
Sum	994	1,595	653	515	3,757

Source: Meulen [1995] p. 54.

against Germany. Development of a bomber superior "in all respects to the B-17B and B-24" began in November 1939. The VLR production goal was ambitious both before the U.S. entry into the war and during its early phases. As mentioned earlier, AWPD-1 envisioned 24 B-29 or B-32 (VLR) bombardment groups (BGs) and 44 BGs with a 4,000-mile radius to be ready (at that time, it was assumed that one VLR BG would consist of 28 VLR bombers; in fact, one VLR BG was authorized to have 45). This totaled 5,780 aircraft. The total B-29 production reached 3,757 actually. In November 1941, the production schedule aimed to establish a target of 1,000 LR and VLR aircraft per month, with 285 allocated for VLR (150 B-29s, 25 B-32s, and 110 B-33s) [79]. A year later, the 8-K schedule, effective November 1942, set a target of 700 B-29s for 1943. The 8-L schedule revised the B-29 production target downward to 361 B-29s[80]. In contrast, only 92 B-29s were produced in 1943,

[79] Sitterson, "Aircraft Production Policies," p. 100. Only the B-29 was actually mass-produced.
[80] Monthly Report to the War Production Board, December 1942, p. 30.

and it was not until November 1944 that the production of 150 B-29s per month was finally achieved (see Table 4).

The delay in VLR mass production critically impacted its deployment. The AWPD series outlined a strategy for the air war against Germany that planned to deploy most VLR units to the European theater. However, even in the latter half of 1943, when the AAF intensified the bombing campaign against Germany, B-29 production was lagging, with only an estimated 146 units produced by July 1943. As mass production of LR bombers succeeded, the use of scarce B-29s in Europe became less critical. In 1944, it was decided to focus B-29 operations exclusively against Japan, culminating in the launch of Operation MATTERHORN in June. How did the production situation influence the planning of the bombing campaign against Japan?

Beginning in March 1943, the U.S. military seriously considered a bombing strategy against Japan for the summer [81]. On August 20, AAF planners presented a memorandum titled "Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan" to the JCS, which was circulated to the British and U.S. Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) [82]. This plan proposed continuous bombing of industrial facilities on the Japanese homeland from bases in Mainland China. It assumed that 10 BGs (28 B-29s per group) would be operational by October 1944, with 20 groups by May 1945. While this assumption was more ambitious than reality, it was not as unrealistic as the AWPD series. The plan anticipated that 4 BGs (one bombardment wing, BW) would be ready by June 1944, aligning more closely with the actual production schedule.

Notably, C.C.S. 323 stated that a "minimum striking force of 100 B-29 airplanes is desirable to conduct effective strategic operations against Japanese mainland objectives[83]." This recognition indicated that meaningful results from strategic bombing could not be achieved without a sufficient number of B-29s. Therefore, mass production of the newly developed VLR bombers was essential for launching a strategic bombing campaign. Importantly, "sustained" bombing operations—emphasized by the title of the Joint Staff Planners' paper—were necessary, rather than isolated missions such as the Doolittle raid in August 1942.

In late 1943, JCS began developing more concrete plans for the strategic bombing of Japan. After discussions within the AAF, it was decided that forward bases in China would be located in Chengdu[84]. On November 9, Joint Staff Planners drafted a plan titled "Early Sustained Bombing of Japan," ultimately codenamed MATTERHORN. This plan anticipated the deployment of 150 B-29s (4 BGs) to Calcutta, from which operational forces would be transported to forward bases in Chengdu, China, by March 1944, with an additional 150 B-29s by September. The plan aimed to initiate the first attack "no later than April 1944 to be followed by a minimum of one mission per month of 100 aircraft each until September 1944[85]." However, there was not unanimous agreement on utilizing forward bases in China. In January 1944, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) presented a paper titled "Optimum Use, Timing, and Deployment of V.L.R. Bombers in the War against Japan," which deemed a campaign against oil industries in Southeastern Asia from bases in Darwin or Broome, Australia, as the most desirable option. The second preference was attacks against Truk (now Chuuk Lagoon) or Palau from Port Moresby, followed by operations from Chengdu.

81 Craven and Cate [1983b:1953] p. 17.

82 C.C.S. 323, Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan, August 20, 1943, Reel 1 (R1), the Pacific Theater (PT), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, part 1: 1942-1945 (RJCS pt. 1), microfilm, Meiji University.

83 C.C.S. 323, p. 5.

84 Craven and Cate [1983b:1953] pp. 17-22.

85 J.P.S. 320, Early Sustained Bombing of Japan, November 9, 1943, R1, PT, RJCS pt. 1.

In this document, JIC did not prioritize bombing the Japanese homeland, although it identified the Mariana Islands as the best forward bases when they became available[86].

Subsequently, Joint Staff Planners authored a paper of the same title (authorized as J.C.S. 742), suggesting that the Mariana Islands were the most suitable bases for bombing operations, though unavailable at the time. Given availability, potential operations included bombing the Kuril Islands from the Aleutians, targeting the Netherland East Indies (now Indonesia) from northwestern Australia or Ceylon, and conducting operations against the Korean Peninsula, Manchuria, and southern Japan, specifically Kyushu. The conclusion was as follows:

> A balancing of the factors of base availability, target nature, and B-29 capabilities indicates that the best initial use for this weapon is
> a. Against iron and steel in the form of coke ovens and shipping in congested harbors from available bases in China, and
> b. Against the petroleum refineries in the N.E.I., primarily those at Palembang, from bases in Australia or Ceylon.

J.C.S. 742 anticipated that the first 4 groups would be deployed by April 1944 and 10 groups by October. It assumed that the first phase of the campaign would involve four groups and that operations with fewer than four groups would adversely affect long-term effectiveness. It was affirmed that the "8-group MATTERHORN project has been assigned first priority on the highest level; hence, the first 8 groups must be allocated to MATTERHORN[87]."

As shown in Table 5, the Joint Staff Planners accelerated the schedule for the deployment of the first four B-29 groups, indicating that J.C.S. 742 was more ambitious than C.C.S. 323. C.C.S. 323, made in August 1943, projected that four groups would be available by June 1944, implying that operations would begin at that time. In contrast, J.C.S. 742 set the deployment date for the same forces to April 1944. Two factors likely influenced the Joint Staff Planners' decisions.

First, the production situation of the B-29s was a significant concern. As noted earlier, B-29 production was lagging, particularly in 1943 (see Tables 3 and 6), leading to the decision that B-29s would be deployed only in the Pacific theater. The cautious estimates in C.C.S. 323 likely reflected this challenging production environment. However, by early 1944, the WPB revised its VLR production estimates upward due to performance improvements in many factories. Specifically regarding VLR, a monthly report to the WPB noted that with the Seattle plant (that is Renton in Table 4) making good progress in B-17 production, "the switch-over to SUPERFORTRESS [B-29] production will be quickened and that schedule has been increased beginning late in 1944[88]." Notably, the Renton factory delivered the first 3 B-29s in March 1944, and the commencement of B-29 production at the Marietta and Omaha factories in late 1943 contributed to a more optimistic outlook.

The second factor appears to be more critical: President Roosevelt pressed the military to initiate MATTERHORN early. In the Pacific theater, there was an urgent need to support

---

[86] J.I.C. 152/2, Optimum Use, Timing, and Deployment of V.L.R. Bombers in the War Against Japan," January 18, 1944, R1, PT, RJCS pt. 1.

[87] J.C.S. 742, Optimum Use, Timing and Deployment of V.L.R. Bombers in the War against Japan," March 2, 1944, R1, PT, RJCS pt. 1.

[88] The Monthly Report to WPB, March 1944, p. 12, Box 744.

Table 5: Schedule of the Deployment Numbers and Actual Number of the B-29 Groups

	C.C.S. 323 (Aug. 1943)	J.C.S. 742 (March 1944)	Actual Groups Deployed
April 1944	-	4	-
May	-	4	4
June	4	4	4
July	6	4	4
August	7	6	4
September	8	8	4
October	10	10	8
November	11	12	8
December	13	14	10
January 1945	15	16	12
February	16	18	14
March	18	20	16
April	19	22	16
May	20	24	18

Source: Reel 1, Pacific Theater, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, part 1: 1942-1945; Office of Statistical Control, *Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II*,1945, p. 11.

Table 6: Aircraft Production Estimates and Record for a part of 1944.

Type	January	February	April	May	December
All	107,000	107,813	106,426	10,3899	95,272
Combat		83,255	82,039	79,699	60,701
Bomber		40,721	38,996	38,342	35,008
LR		16,096	16,204	16,171	15,173
VLR	1,333	1,482	1,437	1,443	1,161

Source: Monthly Reports to the War Production Board.; Office of Statistical Control, *Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II*, p. 112.

the Chinese to prevent their morale from deteriorating and to keep them engaged in the war against Japan. “So it was that the B-29s came to figure prominently in discussions both of long-term Pacific strategy and of immediate aid to China[89].” In this context, AAF planners scheduled operations to begin by June 1944. After consultations within the AAF, Henry Arnold asked Brigadier General Kenneth B. Wolfe, who “had earlier been responsible for the B-29 production program[90],” to review existing plans and prepare an operational plan. Wolfe established a timeline that set the first mission for June 1, 1944, in accordance with C.C.S. 323. However, this timeline was deemed too late to motivate the Chinese and thus “to comply with the President’s desire for an immediate show of force in China[91].” As a result, Wolfe moved D-Day to April 1, 1944, and Arnold even expedited the schedule by a month when he informed FDR about the plan in October 1943[92]. In this context, as men-

89 Craven and Cate [1983b:1953] p. 14.
90 Craven and Cate [1983b:1953] p. 20.
91 Craven and Cate [1983b:1953] p. 20.
92 Craven and Cate [1983b:1953] p. 21. FDR did not satisfy even with the accelerated schedule, suggesting the use of bombers other than B-29s, probably without fully considering the feasibility of operations.

tioned earlier, Joint Staff Planners developed the plan (J.P.S. 320) to commence operations "no later than April 1944," without regard for the B-29 production situation[93]. At that time, strategic planning was primarily influenced by political considerations rather than economic and strategic feasibility. J.C.S. 742, designated by the Joint Staff Planners, indicated that four VLR groups would be ready by April 1944, slightly more moderate than J.P.S. 320 but more ambitious than C.C.S. 323.

In this manner, political and diplomatic considerations dictated the "planning" of when and how VLR was used, rather than economic feasibility or strategic importance. However, it was the B-29 production situation that ultimately determined when and how the plan would be executed. It was not until June 1944 that the 20th Bomber Command could commence operations with a "minimum striking force of 100 B-29 airplanes." The first mission of the 20th Bomber Command was launched on June 5, 1944, targeting Bangkok with 112 B-29s (14 of which were aborted), followed by the first raid on the Japanese homeland on June 15 against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata on Kyushu. In that latter mission, 68 B-29s took off, but only 47 reached the target, resulting in "only one direct hit on the iron and steel works[94]." The B-29s involved fell significantly short of the standard for a "minimum striking force." Although the number of attacking bombers was not the sole factor, the results of the June 15 attack were considered insignificant.

Subsequently, B-29 production stabilized and expanded from late 1944, although the initial objectives of that year were not achieved. By then, the aircraft industry had established mass production systems by creating an effective distribution network for raw materials and implementing efficient labor utilization policies. Furthermore, in the summer of 1944, production of LR was scaled down, and various resources were redirected to manufacturing the B-29[95]. These changes contributed to the mass production of the B-29, the newest weapon in the U.S. arsenal. Although the buildup of B-29 forces did not reach the levels anticipated in J.C.S. 742, by early 1945, with more groups deployed in the Mariana Islands, the AAF was able to conduct area bombing operations targeting cities, including the Tokyo air raid on March 9-10, 1945[96]. The subsequent buildup of VLR bomber forces allowed for diversified operations, including mining operations in Japanese waters, tactical support for the invasion of Okinawa, ongoing precision bombing of the Japanese aircraft industry, and nighttime precision bombing of the oil industry using newly developed radar equipment[97]. Overall, wartime economic conditions dictated how the United States conducted World War II.

Conclusion

This article examined the interaction between wartime economy and the planning and execution of military strategies in the United States during World War II, demonstrating that the production status of B-29 bombers, essential for strategic bombing operations against the Japanese mainland, significantly influenced the timing and methods of such

93 See note 85.
94 Craven and Cate [1983b:1953] pp. 95-96, 100-101; Correll [2009] p. 63.
95 Wilson [2016] p. 157.
96 Fujita [2021]; Fujita [2024].
97 Ultimately, the 21st Bomber Command comprised 23 bombardment groups, totaling over 1,000 B-29s.
Thanks to the new AN/APQ-7 radar system, the 21st Bomber Command was able to conduct nighttime precision bombing operations against oil-related targets in Japan. See Fujita [2024].

operations.

Initially, prior to the U.S. entry into the war, strategic bombing operations targeting Germany (and Japan) using LR bombers, as exemplified by AWPD, were prioritized. These strategic objectives informed military calculations regarding necessary resources, leading to production plans and President FDR's aircraft production targets. However, these plans were deemed unrealistic from an economic perspective by the WPB. Within its authority, the WPB worked to make these unattainable plans as feasible as possible, exerting influence to prioritize aircraft production and ensure effective allocation of critical resources, thereby establishing a functional aircraft production system. While a detailed examination is warranted, the WPB may have directly and indirectly contributed to the relatively stable production of LR bombers amidst overall delays in aircraft production.

Conversely, the establishment of a mass production system for the new B-29 bomber faced delays, which had decisive impacts on the operational timing and scale of MATTERHORN, a strategic bombing campaign against Japan. This delay, combined with the solid production of B-17 and B-24 bombers, led to the decision to deploy the B-29 exclusively against Japan. During the early planning stages for bombing campaigns against Japan, the operation's start date, reflecting delays in B-29 production, was set for June 1944—a timeline that aligned with reality. However, political and diplomatic considerations from FDR necessitated visible support for China in the Pacific theater, prompting the advancement of D-Day during the winter of 1943–1944. Military planners understood that sustained bombing operations required a sufficient number of bombers for effectiveness. Ultimately, MATTERHORN commenced on June 5, 1944.

This discussion underscores the importance of incorporating various factors (economic, scientific, and technological) that enabled strategic bombing operations into the overall narrative. Such factors are not exclusive to U.S. operations during World War II. Strategic bombing continues to be conducted after the war, as military historian Tami D. Biddle noted,

> Through more than eighty years and the experiences of World War II, Korean, and Vietnam, the underlying philosophy and central implementing ideas of strategic bombing have changed remarkably little. The *tools* of air warfare have changed dramatically…but it is striking just how little the basic ideas behind the *use* of those tools have changed[98]. (emphasis original)

Why have military actions defined as strategic bombings been adapted despite much criticism against them? To answer this question, one method is to elucidate the factors enabling their execution. The cheaper and technologically easier it becomes to implement strategic bombing, the more likely it is to be carried out. This point will be discussed in another paper.

[This work was supported by JSPS Kaken Grant Number 21K13131. I appreciate anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.]

98 Biddle [2002] p. 300.

References

Berger, Carl [1970] *B29: The Superfortress*, New York: Ballentine Books Inc.

Biddle, Tami Davis [2002] *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Biddle, Tami Davis [2019] *Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History*, Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press.

Correll, John C. [2009] "The Matterhorn Missions," *AIR FORCE* Magazine 92, no. 3.

Crane, Conrad C. [2016] *American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate [1983a:1948] eds. *Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942*, vol. 1 of *The Army Air Force in World War II*, Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate [1983b:1953] eds. *The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944-August 1945*, vol 5 of *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate [1983c:1955] eds. *Men and Planes*, vol 6 of *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History.

Dower, John W. [2010] *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor / Hiroshima / 9-11 / Iraq*, New York: W. W. Norton.

Eiler, Keith E. [1997] *Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort, 1940-1945*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Field, Alexander J. [2022] *The Economic Consequences of U.S. Mobilization for the Second World War*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Frank, Richard B. [2001:1999] *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*, London: Penguin Publishing Group.

Fujita, Satoshi [2019] "Strategic Bombing of the U.S. Air Force and Military-Industrial Complex," *Sundai Historical Review* (*Sundai Shigaku*), no. 167.

Fujita, Satoshi [2020] "The Strategic Bombing Campaign and Wartime Economy System of the U.S. during World War II," *History of Global Arms Transfer* (*Kokusai Buki Iten-shi*), no. 11.

Fujita, Satoshi [2021] "The Interaction Between Wartime Economy and Military Strategy: The Shift to Area Bombing in the Strategic Bombing Campaign against Japanese Homeland," *The Journal of American Economic History* (*Amerika Keizaishi Kenkyu*), no. 20.

Fujita, Satoshi [2024] "In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II: Its Historical Significance and Future Tasks," *History of Global Arms Transfer* (*Kokusai Buki Iten-shi*), no. 18.

Futrell, Robert F. [1989] *Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1960*, vol. 1 of *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine*, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press.

Gentile, Gian P. [2001] *How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo*, New York: New York University Press.

Goldsmith, Raymond W. [1946] "The Power of Victory: Munitions Output in World War II," *Military Affairs* 10, no. 1.

Grayling, A. C. [2006] *Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in WWII a Necessity or a Crime?* London: Bloomsbury.

Haun, Phil [2019] ed., *Lectures of the Air Corps Tactical School and American Strategic Bombing in World War II*, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Herman, Arthur [2012] *Freedom's Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II*, New York: Random House.

Holley, Irving Brinton, Jr. [1989:1964] *Buying Aircraft: Matériel Procurement for the Army Air Forces*, Special Studies of *United States Army in World War II*, Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army.

Kawamura, Tetsuji [1995] *The Establishment of Pax Americana: An Analysis of "the Wartime Economy System" of the U.S.* (Pakkus Amerikana no Keisei: America "Senzi Keizai Taisei" no Bunseki), Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha.

Kawamura, Tetusji [1998] *A Study of the U.S. Wartime Economy during World War II: The Establishment of "the Wartime Economy System" and the Process of an Exit from the Great Depression* (*Dainizi Sekaitaisen-ki America Senzi Keizai no Kenkyu: "Senzi Keizai Shisutemu" no Keisei to Daifukyo karano Dakkyaku Katei*), Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo.

Kennedy, Paul [2013] *Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second*

World War, New York: Random House.
Koistinen, Paul A. C. [2004] *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945,* Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
LeMay, General Curtis, and Bill Yenne [2007:1988] *Superfortress: The Boeing B-29 and American Airpower in World War II*, Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing.
Meulen, Jacob Vander [1995] *Building the B-29*, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Morris, Craig F. [2017] *The Origins of American Strategic Bombing Theory*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
Nishikawa, Junko [1993] "Early Phase of the U.S. Aircraft Industry: 1903-1939," *History of Land System* (*Tochi Seido Shigaku*), vol. 35, no. 2.
Nishikawa, Junko [2000] "Establishment of Mass Production System and Sub-contract Production in the U.S. Aircraft Industry," *Dokkyo University Studies of Economics* (*Dokkyo Keizai*), no. 72.
Nishikawa, Junko [2008] *The U.S. Aerospace Industry: History and Present* (*Amerika Kouku-Utyu Sangyo: Rekishi to Genzai*), Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha.
Ohl, John Kennedy [1994] *Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WW II*, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.
Overy [1997:1995] *Why the Allies Won*, New York: W. W. Norton.
Pape, Robert A. [1996] *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Rae, John B. [1968] *Climb to Greatness: The American Aircraft Industry, 1920–1960*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968.
Sato, Chitose [2003] *Defense Industry and Woman's Labor: A Comparative Study between the United States and Japan during World War II* (*Gunju Sangyo to Josei Roudou: Dainizi Sekaitaisen-ka no Nichi-Bei Hikaku*), Tokyo: Sairyu-sya.
Schaffer, Ronald [1985] *Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II*, New York: Oxford University Press.
Werrell, Kenneth P. [1996] *Blankets of Fire: US Bombers over Japan during World War II*, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Wilson, Mark R. [2016] *Destructive Creation: American Business and the Winning of World War II*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

History of Global Arms Transfer, 20 (2025), pp. 25-42

Japan's Security Policy at a Turning Point: Prospects for the "Three Security Documents" and Non-Armed and Non-Aligned Theory

By ATSUSHI KOKETSU*

Japan's defense policy is currently facing its greatest turning point since World War II. This paper highlights the salient points in the *Anpo Sanbunsho* [Three Security Documents], which comprise Japan's *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, and *Defense Buildup Program*; collectively, these documents declare a change in Japan's defense policy. The *Anpo Sanbunsho* identifies China as a de facto virtual enemy and verifies the reinforcement of the Japan–United States alliance while announcing a significant increase in defense spending and the maintenance of counterstrike capabilities. Also investigated in this paper is whether the theory of deterrence capability, which the Japanese government repeatedly advocates, is, indeed, a rational choice. While the United States is actively pushing for Japan to become a military superpower, this paper points out the dangers of the United States' China "siege" strategy. In response, Japan has effectively abandoned its exclusively defense-oriented policy. On this basis, I propose that Japan's future security policy should be based on a non-aligned diplomacy policy of demilitarization that is consistent with the Japanese Constitution, and I question whether Asia's current security environment has really changed. Thus, I conclude that Japan should adopt a security policy that strives for peacebuilding and does not rely on military force while implementing a non-armed, non-aligned policy.

Introduction

Japan's security policy is approaching a major turning point, triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This paper presents a discussion on the so-called "Three Security Documents," which indicate a change in Japan's defense policy: the defense theory unites defense and diplomacy as one category as indicated by the name "defense diplomacy." Moreover, the "demilitarization and non-alignment" theory was reconsidered as the antithesis of such a defense policy to discuss security theory and its policy in the broad sense.

In addition, a very important and significant issue is the fact that the industry has long been banned or strictly regulated since the end of World War II.

The possibility that the transfer of weapons, which are referred to as defense equipment,

* Researcher, Emeritus Professor, Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer, Meiji University

and the leveraging of the defense industry, which has been the main source of foreign investment in Japan, may become occur active in the future should be closely watched, but I limited the coverage in this essay to a brief discussion.

1 .How to read the "Three Security Documents"

(1) Following U.S. military strategy

On December 16, 2022, the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, and the *Medium-Term Defense Force Development Plan* were approved by the Cabinet of the Japanese government. Hereafter, these are collectively referred to as the "Three Security Documents." This section begins with the key points of Japan's *National Security Strategy*, which lays out the basic policy of the "Three Security Documents."

The *National Security Strategy* is literally the core of the *National Security Strategy*. Of particular note is section IV (Security Environment Surrounding Our Country and Our Security Challenges), subsection 2 (Security Environment and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region), item 2 (China Security Trends). It clearly states that "China's current external posture, military trends, etc. are of serious and unprecedented concern to our country and the international community... and [represent] the greatest strategic challenge ever faced in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law."[1] China is described as a "strategic challenger," which is the same as positioning it as a virtual enemy. In effect, the document identifies China as Japan's biggest virtual enemy.

As discussed later in the paper, during the prewar-World WarII period, Japan had clearly designated separate virtual enemy nations for its army and navy, adopted measures to deal with war from peacetime, and enhanced training and equipment. The postwar constitutional system did not envision a state of war in the first place, so preparation for dealing with a virtual enemy state was never specified for clearly stated in official documents, at least not at the level of official national documents. Therefore, the immediate interpretation of "strategically challenging countries" as war partners may seem hasty. However, considering the recent escalation in United States–China tensions, a confrontation that has become acute on various fronts, and the souring of Japan–China relations due to the increased unity of the Japan–US alliance, this expression is equivalent to and reflects the same quality as a fellow country. This issue is important also because the *National Security Strategy* is Japan's independent and self-reliant defense diplomacy policy. The content of *Japanese New Strategy* is largely defined by *American National Security Strategy* (hereinafter referred to as the *New American Strategy*), rather than being derived from the *National Security Strategy* of the United States. The *New U.S. Strategy*, 48 pages long, was published in English on October 12, 2022.[2] The document is not limited to the military domain but refers to the multiple domains that make up the nation, covering a wide range of areas, such as the economy, education, technology, nature, and food.

The totality of national power is reflected in the *New American Strategy*, which is considered to be Japan's Security Policy the issue. Notably, the United States has secured overwhelming superiority in the world in terms of military power and will not hesitate to

[1] December 16, 2022, National Security Council Decision, Cabinet Decision, *National Security Strategy*, p. 9.

[2] For the *New Strategy*, see U.S. White House, "*National Security Strategy*," Oct. 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

use its power to protect its national interests.[3]

Amidst a variety of options, The strategy indicates that the United States prepared to resort to launching war when the fear exists that China and/or. Russia may violate U.S. national interests. Although the document contains very few statements regarding Japan as a whole, in order to fulfill the Indo-Pacific alliance, "The strategy reaffirms the ironclad relationship with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand," noting "we will continue the alliance," followed by a strong message.

To focus on the military domain, it is the further continuation of the U.S. military superiority through a thoroughgoing multilateral military alliance. The strategy document also positions the Japan–United States relationship as constituting "iron-clad commitments." The goal was not only to strengthen the Japan–United States alliance but also to prevent any gaps from arising in multiple areas, including in military, economic, and political affairs. Japan's security strategy is faithfully based on the *New American Strategy* as described. The content can be regarded as a Japanese version.

(2) Hostility toward China and Entry into the Military Bloc

While Japan has a mountain of universal issues, such as human rights and extreme weather problems, the confrontation and competition with China in the political and military spheres, which are based on maritime expansion, military expansion, and differences in values, raises the question as to whether Japan's diplomatic stance is rational. Is it correct to judge that China's response has created an unbridgeable gap between the so-called Western Bloc? Is it correct to assume that coexistence is impossible and that we must move from rivalry to confrontation? In recent years, while reconciliation has been difficult, the effort to create a path of coexistence without reconciliation has been on the chopping block.

How persuasive is the rationale for calculating China's very existence and strategic policy as a threat? Is it possible to explain? Few would argue that the United States must be in direct confrontation with China, rather than China looking over the shoulder of the United States. In other words, "negotiations through proximity" become a permanent reality.

The United States, which holded the largest share of the world market FY2024 (October 2023/September 2024), saw total defense spending of 8,864 million yen.

[3] Ibid., "*National Security Strategy*," p. 20.

*Number of U.S. Troops Stationed Overseas (Unit: Personnel)

Order	September 2011		March 2021	
	Country/Region	Number of people	Country/Region	Number of people
1	Afghanistan	82,177	Japan	55,297
2	Japan	48,235	Germany	35,124
3	Germany	43,393	Korea	24,870
4	Iraq	28,675	Italy	12,455
5	Korea	28,271	United Kingdom	9,402
6	Kuwait	16,811	Guam	6,125
7	Qatar	11,812	Bahrain	3,898
8	Italy	10,451	Spain	2,868
9	Kyrgyzstan	10,194	Kuwait	2,191
10	United Kingdom	8,673	Türkiye	1,683
	Overseas Total	336,645	Overseas Total	172,003

*From Department of Defense DMDC [Defense Manpower Data Center]data (Asahi Shimbun, July 27, 2021).

The total expenditure was estimated to be $6,883 billion. This is about 13% of total expenditures. The amount of the defense budget in China in 2024 was equivalent to about 30 trillion yen. On the other hand, China announced at the last All People's Congress that it would spend about 32 trillion yen on defense. Although the absolute amount is large, it is less than 30% of the U.S. budget, at 27% of the United States–China ratio. The disparity is stark.

The United States has more than 700 military bases and facilities around the world, as well as powerful allies under the US–Japan Security Treaty and the US–Korea Security Treaty, and in addition to bilateral military blocs, it has concluded multilateral military alliances, such as the NATO(North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and today QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and AUKUS(Australia, United Kingdom, United States). The United States also has U.S. military personnel deployed around the world, numbering approximately 170,000 as of March 2021; this number has been significantly reduced since September 2011 (see table *).

The United States is increasingly relying on its military power in bilateral and even multilateral military alliances to maintain and secure its position as a hegemonic power, replacing its relatively declining economic power by its literal military power. On the other hand, China is now the world's second most populous country, although it has been overtaken by India in terms of population, and above all, in terms of economic power and gross national product indicators, it is far ahead of the United States and is working hard to maintain its status.

China is now a super economic power that has surpassed the United States by a head.[4]

[4] World Economic and Financial Surveys ("IMF - World Economic Outlook Databases" Oct. 2022) is that the economic gap between the United States and China is becoming apparent. In other words, if we show the ranking of the GNP (gross national product) on the basis of purchasing power parity, which is considered to be a measure of a nation's real economic power, China ranks first at $27.296 trillion, the United States second at $22.996

Therefore, China is oriented toward the formation of an international order through economic power, such as "One Belt, One Road,[5]" and although it adopts a pseudo-military response to individual events, it has become a state that gives top priority to economic stability. In other words, China does not adopt a strategy of leading the international order by pushing military power to the forefront. Therefore, numerous preconditions are required for China to be considered a threat.

The A 2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) strategy, which is regarded as the basis of China's military strategy, should be understood as a defensive strategy for China. In contrast, the U.S. strategy to encircle China is an offensive strategy. A nation that adopts a defensive strategy can only be wary of constant provocations and threats, but it is unlikely that it will itself engage in acts of aggression. The possibility that the United States, which adopts an offensive strategy, might enter a local war of encirclement against China is far greater. In this sense, it is reasonable to conclude that China cannot be assumed to be an aggressor, at least for Japan, even if it is considered a threat.

(3) Is the theory of deterrence against China rational?

Another point of contention is that the goals of the "Three Security Documents" are inconsistent with Japan's Constitution. In particular, the deterrence theory against China, expressed in the *National Security Strategy* as "together with our allies, the United States and other like-minded countries, we will deter the occurrence of contingencies and unilateral attempts to change the status quo in Japan and its surrounding areas,"[6] can be considered one interpretation of the theory of hostility toward China. The specifics of the change in the status quo in the seas surrounding Japan as the reason for such are vague.

Certainly, China's response to universal issues common to all humankind, such as human rights and extreme weather problems, as well as to differences in values, has created a gap between the so-called West that is difficult to fill. However, do we really have a relationship with China in which it is impossible to coexist? In other words, is China a military threat, as the government and the media are so fond of claiming?

The United States, the world's superpower, revealed that its defense budget for FY2024, which begins later this year, exceeds 120 trillion yen. The United States forms military power through multilateral military alliances by concluding nearly 800 military bases and facilities around the world and military alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other countries, as well as multilateral paramilitary alliances such as QUAD and AUKUS. With this as a backdrop, the United States is trying to carry out its hegemony and, by doing so, is trying to form an American-led international order. The United States, in other words, believes that international events can be resolved by military power. On the other hand, the country is beginning to show signs of permanent sustainability due to the stagnation and decline of its economic power.

Japan is oriented toward the formation of an international order through economic power.

---

trillion, India third at $10,1935 trillion, and Japan fourth at $5.0 trillion. $6,760.5 billion, Japan $5,606,5 billion, Germany $4,888,3 billion, and Russia $4,494,2 billion. Furthermore, Indonesia is in seventh place, Brazil is in eighth place, the United Kingdom is in ninth place, is France in tenth place. In other words, the economic gap between China and the United States is already 5 trillion dollars (about 550 trillion Japanese yen,) or almost the same amount as the GNP of Japan. In addition, the *World Factbook* (official name: *The World Factbook. Travel the Globe with CIA's World Factbook*) site already noted two years ago that the U.S. GNP was $19,846 trillion and China's was $23.19 trillion.

5 A generic term for the conception, planning, and promotion of a broad economic zone between China and Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa.

6 "Three Security Documents" (*Anpo Sanbunsho*), p. 10.

For example, although it may adopt a pseudo military response to individual events, Japan is a nation that places the highest priority on economic stability, and it has not adopted a strategy of leading the international order by pushing military power to the forefront. Therefore, numerous doubts exist about China posing a threat.

Of course, from a phenomenal viewpoint, China's military expansion and maritime advancement seem anything but benign. On the Fiery Cross Reef in the Nansha Islands, which China effectively controls, sits a de facto military base called Yongheat Island in Chinese, where a 3,160 m runway and port facilities capable of berthing up to 4,000 tons have been constructed. Of course, China is not alone in this maritime expansion. Taiwan has secured Taiping Island in the Nansha Islands under the name of Taiwan and is constructing an airstrip there as well. Japan also has reclaimed reefs and taken effective control of Minamitori Island. The Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Japan Meteorological Agency, and the Kanto Regional Development Bureau personnel are stationed there, and the island has been turned into a military base, off limits to the general public. China, Taiwan, and Japan each has its own intentions. The reality of their maritime expansion, so to speak, must be examined.

In November 2022, Chancellor Schulz of Germany and President Marcos of the Philippines visited Beijing, and they held a summit with President Xi Jinping in January 2023. While the Philippines has been very supportive of China's maritime expansion, the country was seeking flexible measures to deal with this expansion. These examples reflect policy decisions that demonstrate an awareness of the danger of responding immediately with military force, even if a threat exists. Compared to this, Japan's response to these situations is very rigid compared to the Philippines and other countries.urthermore, Japan's *National Security Strategy* states, "Together with our allies, the United States and other like-minded countries, we will deter the occurrence of contingencies and unilateral attempts to change the status quo in our country and its surrounding areas."[7] By declaring China's action to be an attempt to unilaterally change the status quo, this statement lumps Japan–China relations into the category of confrontation. The text goes on to explain that China should be dealt with jointly with allies such as the United States and that, for that purpose, the Self-Defense Forces' (SDFs') equipment should be expanded and improved.

Even if it is necessary to prove objectively that China's action constitutes a unilateral attempt to change the status quo, trying to deal with China in a manner that would force it to protrude its military with a military bloc behind it would be premature. Before clarifying such a course of action, Japan must do its utmost to practice and implement the philosophy of the Peace Constitution without abandoning its proactive and independent position by concluding an alliance, whether with the United States or China. Calculating China and Korea as threat countries and setting them up as de facto virtual enemy countries dares to create a threat theory and encourages anti-Chinese sentiment. Calculating China and Korea as threat countries and setting them as de facto virtual enemy countries set up a security system in the United States would, on the contrary, put oneself in an environment that is dangerous from a security perspective.

(4) Orientation toward a national mobilization system

The message that seems to run through Japan's entire *National Security Strategy* is that it is based on the construction of a national mobilization system. While the document presents a discussion on ensuring security through various methods, it ultimately adopts a military

[7] Ibid., p. 100.

theory of security, as indicated by its call for "the drastic reinforcement of defense capability which is the ultimate guarantee of national security."[8] In addition, section VI, subsection 4 notes that "efforts to seamlessly protect our nation in all directions strengthened" is a military.

In view of the current blurring of the boundaries between military and nonmilitary affairs, and between emergency and peacetime, the current situation is such that "peacetime militarization, military peacetime" is the target of this project. This is clearly in line with the national mobilization system as a system and the national total war as a political system.

In other words, it is a problem of mixing peacetime and wartime, a quasi-wartime regime becoming routine. The way to strengthen defense capabilities in peacetime is not limited to the military aspect but also includes the political, economic, educational, technological, and other aspects of the nation and its people.

They say that they will strengthen the defense force with all their might. This is the prewar equivalent of adopting the national mobilization law system. In preparation for war, it is intended to construct a political system through which not only the military but also the consciousness and thoughts of the people who support the military are centrally controlled in the name of strengthening deterrence. The result is a military state. The structure and nature of such a state follows the same path as the prewar Japanese state, which was strengthened with each war experience.

Another characteristic of the "Three Security Documents" in terms of the prewar national constitution, national strategy, and it is the similarity between the "Three Security Documents" and the prewar Japanese *Imperial National Defense Policy*.

The *Imperial National Defense Policy* describes national goals and strategies, guiding objectives and policies for national defense, hypothetical adversaries, and military requirements; it corresponds to the *National Security Strategy*. The "Military Strength for National Defense" section defines the required military strength, i.e., the number of divisions, warships, and numerical targets as specific goals of military policy. It currently corresponds to "National Defense Strategy." The *Imperial Army Military Strategy* describes the Japanese military doctrine and presents individual operational plans against hypothetical emies. It currently corresponds to the Maintenance Plan After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan became aware of the possibility of another war with Russia and aimed at further military expansion and the militarization of the nation itself with the goal of building a war system during peacetime. In order to construct a strategy suitable for a warlike nation, Japan entered an era of furious military expansion. In the course of this process, in 1907, the *Imperial National Defense Policy*, *Military Forces for National Defense*, and *Imperial Military, Military Guidelines* were formulated as classified military documents that laid out the basic strategy for national defense (hereinafter referred to as the "Three Documents for National Defense"). Exactly the same as the present. The documents remain as they were originally written.

The three documents correspond to the "Three Documents of the Security Treaty."

In other words ,Japan's *National Security Strategy* corresponds to the *Imperial Defense Policy*, the *National Defense Strategy* to the *National Defense-Related Forces*, and the *Defense Force Development Plan* to the *Imperial Military Service Guidelines*. Of these, the *Imperial National Defense Policy* was revised many times, but the last version from the prewar period (revised on June 8, 1936) contains the following text at the beginning:

[8] Ibid., p. 17.

1. the true purpose of the Imperial Defense is, based on the Emperor's rule since the foundation of the country, to always and more and more promote national prestige on the basis of a great cause, and to ensure the promotion of national interests and the welfare of the people.

2. The policy of the Imperial Defense is, in accordance with the principle of Imperial Defence, to build up national strength, especially armaments, to become a stable power in East Asia both in name and in reality, and at the same time to adapt diplomacy to this, thereby ensuring national development, and in the event of a morning emergency, to take the initiative and quickly achieve the objective of war.[9]

In particular, preparing the armed forces and conducting diplomacy in a manner that will ensure the development of the nation and provide opportunities in the event of a crisis is crucial. First, quickly determine the objective of the war. Characteristically, which clearly calls for the adoption of the theory of preemptive attack in the event of a contingency prompt.

The war aims to achieve its objectives quickly by seizing the first opportunity. The policy of seizing the opportunity to win the war by preemptively attacking without waiting for war to break out was clearly stated. This policy was proven effective in later preemptive attacks during the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937), the landing on the Malay Peninsula (December 8, 1941), and the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor (December 8, 1941). Japan was strongly oriented toward a short-term battle, as a long-term war would be disadvantageous given Japan's national and military strength. In order to implement this short-term decisive war, it was imperative to develop military power and secure a large number of soldiers even in peacetime, and it was also necessary for the political system to constantly develop laws and mobilize ideology and spirit to facilitate the transition to a wartime system. In particular, the shift to total warfare in the modern warfare system, where the capital power of a nation such as Japan or Germany was weak compared to that of the United States, Britain, or France, required a short-term decisive military and a domestic system.[10]

(5) Concept of Establishing a Joint Command Post

The establishment of the Joint Commanders and Joint Headquarters, which is scheduled to be completed after the next fiscal year, is also essential for the SDFs to carry out operational planning overseas. The postwar version of the General Staff, or *Daihonei* (Imperial Headquarters), will be established within the SDF organization under the name "Joint Operations Command."

In addition, National Defense Strategy, section V (The Future of the Self-Defense Forces), subsection 2 (Approach to the development of the Self-Defense Forces' system.) clearly states that, in order to strengthen the execution of the joint operations, a permanent Joint Command Center that can command the entire Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces will be created through a review of existing organizations. The strategy also notes that Japan "will also proceed with a study of an equipment system that

[9] Akira Yamada (ed.), *Diplomatic Materials: Modern Japan Expansion and Aggression,* Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 1997, p. 249.

[10] For more information on the total war system, see KOKETSU, *Sōryokusentaisei kenkyū Nihon rikugunno kokkasōdōin kouso* [Study on the Total War System: Japanese Army's National Mobilization Concept] (Sanichi Shobō, 1981). The same book was reprinted twice by Shakai Hyūronsha in 2010 and 2017.

contributes to integrated operations."[11] This is a surprising plan for reorganization of the SDF.

The Joint Command (Joint Commander) position to oversee and operate the three SDFs in a unified manner will be established. This is, I dare say, equivalent to the revival of the General Staff. In terms of the prewar Japanese military organization, the General Staff Headquarters and the Chief of Staff can be said to have been restored. The General Staff was tasked with providing operational guidance and planning for the army organization. During the Asia-Pacific War, the Imperial General Headquarters organization straddled the army and navy, and in effect, the Joint Headquarters became an organization similar to the Imperial General Headquarters when wartime was assumed.

The SDF currently has a Joint Chief of Staff that spans the three SDFs, but perhaps that role will be specialized as a liaison between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. The Joint Command function will be secured to ensure thorough coordination with the U.S. military, and the Joint Commander will be tasked with providing operational guidance in unison with the U.S. field commanders. This would be a clear division of roles. If we follow the prewar example in the sense that the Joint Commander would concentrate on military affairs and the Joint Chief of staff would coordinate with politics, the Joint Commander would be the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the Navy General Staff, and the Joint Chief of Staff would be the Minister of the Army and the Minister of the Navy combined.

In the prewar period, the military and politics were thus separated, with the General Staff and military commanders eliminating political involvement and, conversely, intervening in politics with the backdrop of military force. The military rationale that attacking an opponent is the best defense was strongly emphasized, and propaganda was repeated directly and indirectlyinfluence to public opinion and the media.

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a strange disaster, public opinion and most of the media have been moving in the direction of accepting the militaristic assertion of "military for military's sake". At the same time, the threats posed by China and Korea are being voiced in an extremely inflammatory manner, and while taking this as a tailwind, the whole country is in danger of turning into a military mode, so to speak.

2. The Realities of United States–Japan Defense Cooperation and the Emergence of Defense Diplomacy

(1) U.S. Strategy Defines the "Three Security Documents"

When analyzing the "Three Security Documents," the *New U.S. Strategy* must be examined because it served as the basis for the three documents.

First, the *New U.S. Strategy*, released on December 18, 2017, is a strategy to ensure America's the military superiority that has been maintained to date. While acknowledging degradation, he wrote that the priority in the future is not the prolonged Middle East war but the competition with China and Russia. In other words, we are moving from the conventional war on terror to the era of competition among major powers.

It clearly indicated its judgment. It sounds like he was predicting the war between Russia and Ukraine. The first and most important issue that Japan should consider before responding to the war, was how the United States would be involved in the war between

[11] Ibid., "Three Security Documents" (*Anpo Sanbunsho*), p. 23.

Russia and Ukraine.

At the same time, bearing in mind the growing importance of the strategy of encirclement against China, the New U.S. Strategy further clarified the United States policy of strengthening its alliance with Japan and South Korea in order to complement the deterioration of its military superiority. This is the so-called multilateral security regime framework. These are QUAD and AUKUS. The participating countries in these two frameworks are the five countries of Japan, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and India. As a counterpart, the Shanghai Organization (SCO), led by China, has been established, and its member countries total nine: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, and Iran.

As a military and economic bloc centered on these Asian countries is being formed, it remains unclear which camp Vietnam, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, and other countries will fall into to whether they will remain neutral. Therefore, both China and the United States are working hard to bring them onto their side. At the G20 forum held in Indonesia the month and year, these non-member countries were actively pursued by the United States, Japan, and China.

The three documents, especially Japan's *National Security Strategy*, are based on the scenario that Japan's policy is to ensure the nation's security by not resigning itself to military confrontation with states, regions, and organizations that obstruct the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy," as it is called in the United States-led multilateral military alliance. Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy is the key concept of the three documents. The three documents state that any obstacle to free and open Indo-Pacific must be contained and eliminated by military force. It is inevitable, then, that Japan's *National Security Strategy* will set up a scenario in which Japan's national security is ensured through containment and exclusion, even if not in direct terms.

In order for the document to be elaborated in such a direction, the statements of the SDF uniformed personnel should be emphasized. The National Security Council and the Cabinet make the final decision on the document, but in accordance with Article 8 of the Law for Establishment of the Council, the opinions of the uniformed personnel of the SDF are sought, as necessary. In fact, the SDF uniformed personnel practically seized the initiative in the preparation of the document, without even bringing up the procedure. In other words, the fact that the SDF uniformed personnel are in the process of deciding Japan's national security strategy in accordance with the *New American Strategy* document, without going through the deliberation process should be considered the most important issue of all.

The fact that almost no one in the media has pointed out the lack of civilian control over the creation of the three documents, and the fact that the opinions of the Japanese voters are completely left out of the equation, should also be a problem.

The overall characteristics of the three documents can be summarized in one phrase to a considerable extent, the U.S. strategy of encirclement against China.[12]

The number of such attacks is very high. In addition, the enemy base attack theory includes a discussion on destroying the other side's command center function. This argument is clearly based on the premise of launching a war, and although it is not explicitly stated to that extent in the three documents, the fact is that such a war mode is floating around on the government side, which is extremely dangerous.

[12] Asahi Shimbun, "Expert Proposal: Time, Time, Time," November 23, 2022.

(2) The issue of possessing an enemy base attack capability and increasing defense expenditure

In the three documents, which was reworded as a counterattack capability, and news of the purchase of 400 Tomahawks around the same time had a major impact on public opinion. During the Iraq War, on March 20, 2003, Tomahawks were launched around the city of Baghdad, Iraq. The type of Tomahawk that the SDF plans to purchase has not been disclosed, but the B-type (RGM／UGM-109C, DTLAM-C／D) is equipped with a 454 kg conventional warhead and has a range of 1650 km. The U.S. military used a large number of these missiles during the invasion of Iraq to destroy the Iraqi forces and achieved war results as a representative presence.

The three documents stipulate increasing defense expenditures in order to expand the equipment of the SDFs. The increase in defense spending, which is also supported by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, is expected to result in the world's third largest military spending power, exceeding 10 trillion yen at one stroke. The rationale for this is explained in the three documents. The focus is on the size of the absolute amount and what it will be used for and how equipment will be maintained. The amount of more than 10 trillion yen means that the defense budget (i.e., military budget) has been increasing steadily every year since the second Abe administration, followed by the Kishida administration after the Democratic Party of Japan's administration of Naoto Kan. Moreover.Three Security Documents includes more than 100 items for which the total budget amount is not specified. The reason certain items are not specified is that the process for the selection of equipment and materials has taken a backseat to the overall concept of the equipment and materials. This is a result of the budget being secured first, but even if the above conditions are met, there is still a great deal of uncertainty.

As if to pre-empt the move to increase defense, the *East Asian Strategic Review 2022*, published by the Japanese Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense in March 2022, states, "Considering the current ratio and the future growth of China's defense spending, there is a possibility that the level of defense spending to maintain the trillion yen level will be in the 10 trillion yen range."[13] It is problematic that a public research institute, which should be in a neutral position, makes statements that encourage the bloating of the defense budget in the midst of various debates.

(3) Possibility of defense diplomacy theory emerging

I have, for many years, been paying attention to the policy of demilitarized neutrality and non-alignment, which should be the goal of Japan's defense policy and defense strategy, and I have noticed that the term "defense diplomacy" has been mentioned recently in connection with this.[14] This term does not appear in the *White Paper on Defense*, nor in the previous "Three Documents on Security and Diplomacy." It is, so to speak, a term that is only used by some researchers related to the Ministry of Defense. It can be said to mean something close to "defense exchange," a term that frequently appears in the *Boei Hakusho* (Defense White Paper). A more familiar term is "defense cooperation."

The reason I have tried to touch upon the meaning of the term "defense diplomacy" here

13 The National Institute for Defense Studies ed. *Higashi Azia Senryaku Gaikan 2022 (East Asian Strategic Review 2022),* Interbooks, 2022, p. 241.

14 The book on defense diplomacy, written before the invasion of Russia and Ukraine, is *Defense Diplomacy: What is Defense Diplomacy?* By discussing the effective use of defense and military power in wartime and peacetime, where wartime = combat and peacetime = defense diplomacy, the publication discusses the issue of actively grasping the role of military power with reference to not only the United States but also Britain and France.

is that, beginning with this term, the terms "defense engagement" and "military diplomacy" are likely to be actively used in the near future. These terms have also been explained in detail by defense diplomacy theorists. The terms presuppose that the military plays an important role among state institutions, not limited to that of a mere military professional group but, instead, getting deeply involved in the political sphere. They are terms that derive from a process in which minimal tension exists between politics and the military, but in the end, they coexist as an integrated organization as the relationship between the two is optimized.

The military organization positions of the military superpowers, such as the United States, China, and Russia, are each established following its own organizational principles. What they all have in common is that, regardless of their internal reality, their organizations are secured by being subject to extremely powerful presidential authority or, in China's case, control by the Communist Party of China. In other words, they share the same point of being subordinated to politics. At the same time, as the physical foundation of a political organization, they possess very important powers.

Even though the roles of politics, diplomacy, and the military are clear, so the claim that the military power supports political power, including diplomacy, can be denied, the fact is that military organizations are actively utilized in the political field based on the state of the military and military forces. Therefore, the most utilized theory is the idea of military power as a complement to diplomatic power.th Even today, the number one reason for supporting the SDF is disaster relief.[15]

This reality has no doubt contributed to the latent desire among Ministry of Defense officials, as well as among politicians and their supporters who are busy expanding defense capabilities, to substantiate the terms "defense diplomacy" and "military diplomacy."

Although defense diplomacy and military diplomacy may theoretically be the subjects of study and discussion, is it really permissible to address these matters in the realm of Japanese politics? I put the issue of the pacifism of the Japanese Constitution aside for a moment here. In this case, the security that the so-called defense force is intended to ensure needs to be addressed.

(4) From Political and Military Relations

There are two major problems with defense diplomacy. In the first, as understood in the case of the United Kingdom, a country advanced in defense diplomacy, in order to secure a fixed amount or an increase in the military budget in peacetime, the bloated military should be assigned to missions other than combat missions. The role expectations arise from facing the challenge of funding. As a measure to achieve this, the orientation to develop business in the diplomatic sphere was born. In other words, as a means of maintaining and expanding the organization in peacetime, we try to secure entry into the diplomatic sphere. This is a passive entry. However, the problem is the possibility that this advance may objectively result in intervention by a group of military experts' involvement in diplomacy. This is what is properly called "defense involvement." In the second, if intervention becomes a permanent phenomenon from the problem described, it will lead to "defense inter-

[15] According to the "Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues" released by the Government Public Relations Office of the Cabinet Office at a press conference on March 6, 2023, the most common reason for being interested in the SDF was "response to various situations such as large-scale disasters" (53.1%), followed by "Japan." The result was significantly higher for "Because it is an organization that protects peace and independence" (28.9%). Adding "Because it works for peace and security of the international community" (10.3%) to the previous percentage (28.9%), and the total percentage of respondents was 39.2%.

vention," a term coined by the author himself.[16]

For example, the year prior to the September 19, 2015, vote on the so-called new security legislation in December 2014, on the 17th, Katsutoshi Kouno, then chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited the U.S. Department of Defense and met individually with then Chief of Staff of the Army Odierno, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force Spencer, Deputy Secretary of Defense Work, Chief of Naval Operations Grinert, Chief of Staff of Naval Operations Swift, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey, Marine Corps. He has met separately with the commandant and others and has returned home with a promise that the new Japan's security legislation will be enacted into law as soon as possible.[17]

As the examples provided illustrate, specific involvement or intervention in defense policy by the SDF uniformed forces has not only already begun to a considerable extent but also has played an extremely important role in the realization of the policy. The problem is that we are now faced with the reality of having to decide whether such defense intervention is or not. Of course, the SDFs are constitutionally unacceptable, but their existence has been legally permitted. Therefore, the question of whether to intervene is directly related to the question of how to judge the unconstitutional legality of the SDF.

(5) On the Pros and Cons of Defense Diplomacy

The concept of defense diplomacy and its actualization should be distinguished sharply, but here I examine the latter in particular. In other words, it is an issue that must be pointed out from a policy perspective.

First, the Constitution maintains a constitutional position and with respect to the example cited, Article 9 of the Constitution implies that Japan does not allow defense diplomacy or defense intervention and, moreover, does not allow any kind of military, nor does it envision any kind of military-related organization or law. These are judgments that cannot be compromised by a constitutional posture.

Second, if Japan accepts the historical process that produced the Peace Constitution, the country must be prepared to defend it by communicating to the world that Japan will never again be either a perpetrator or a victim, and to regain the trust that was lost in the process. Japan must have the resolve to protect the Peace Constitution, and it is this resolve that it abandons through defense diplomacy and the defense intervention that is derived from that process.

Third, that the defense and military power is indispensable as a guarantee of diplomatic power is clearly a wrong way of thinking. This way of thinking is related to the belief that deterrence is militarily irrational and, moreover, only an illusion. The question is whether

---

16 My main work is *Kindai Nihon seigun kankei kenkyu*, published by Iwanami Shoten (2005), in which I discuss the American-based theory of political–military relations. I address whether politics and military coexistence is possible by considering examples from Japan, the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the former Soviet Union, China, and other countries. In addition, I have written two books on civilian control, *Civilian Control: Where Is the Self-Defense Forces Going* (Iwanami Shoten, 2005) and *Crumbling Civilian Control: Self-Defense Forces Current Stage* (Rokufyu Shuppan, 2019). For many years, I have been studying the *Runaway Self-Defense Forces* (Chikuma Shobo, Chikuma Shinsho, 2016), chapter 5 (Uniformed Group Deviant Acts: History of Self-Defense Forces Incidents). I wrote that the SDF coup attempt plan "Mitsuya Incident" (1963), then Chairman of the Joint Staff Council Hiroomi Kurisu, who was dismissed for his "extrajudicial remarks" (WING, January 1978), "Self-defense and deterrence are difficult concepts to coexist". The issue of the operation of the constitutional revision plan by the Ground Self Defense Forces(GSDF) cadres (December 2004) and the issue of the GSDF Information Security Force, which is responsible for monitoring the people of the Self-Defense Forces, were discussed in detail in the January 1978 issue of WING.

17 So the record of the meeting, "The Summary of the Results of the Revised Draft During the Visit of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Staff to the U.S.," is introduced in detail in my book *Runaway Self-Defense Forces* in chapter 1 (After the Security Law Self-Defense Forces Japan Defense Policy New Stage).

reliance on the theory of deterrence, which only spurs the chain of military expansion and increases the possibility of war, can really lead to security. Everyone knows that nations that have become military powers through deterrence, including Japan in the prewar period and the United States in the postwar period, have been engaged in wars of aggression.

The Soviet Union has been replaced by Soviet Russia as a military power, which is pursuing an invasion of Ukraine because of its military power; domestic military organization expansion and policy interventions have become apparent in defense forces.

Diplomatic power secured by force (armaments), be it military power or otherwise, is not really diplomatic power.[18] The position that stronger diplomatic power is exerted by military power is itself evidence that the thinking has degenerated into a lack of trust in diplomatic power. It is nothing more than a justification for military power. These issues are also deeply related to the security theories that are appearing more and more frequently. The Kishida administration's security theory is guaranteed by military power, as if the word "military" were used as a pillow. It has been taken for granted, and in the overwhelming public opinion and in the debates and policies of various political parties, this military security theory seems to have taken on a life of its own without sufficient discussion.

My view of defense diplomacy may come from the fact that the concept of defense diplomacy is only narrowly defined. However, the idea of defense and diplomacy being integrated or equalized implied in this concept is a very dangerous concept from the viewpoint of civilian control and considering the relationships between politics and military defense (military) and diplomacy are never equal. The military is subordinate to diplomacy, not driven by defense, nor is diplomacy driven by defense. They are neither parallel, and their cues should be different. At the same time, the basic principle of political–military relations is ignored or disregarded.

3. Examining New Security Policy Theories

(1) What is security?

Then we must again ask what exactly is meant by security. The concept of security is very broad, and within it lies the idea of "national defense military security." Because it is a broad concept, national security is a subordinate concept of security. Thus, when thinking about security, the subject, value, and means are grasped in a unified manner in the trinity relationship, and policy is proposed as an extension of that relationship.

In the Cold War era, this trinity relationship was briefly described in a certain sense. For example, the United States (the subject) tried to secure and maintain its position (= hegemony) as the leading country in the world by means of free thought (value) and military power (method), while the former Soviet Union also tried to maintain and spread the value of socialism by military power. We have called this conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union the "Cold War Structure" or the "Cold War System."

Entering the post-Cold War era, a situation of pluralization or proliferation of security concepts will emerge. There, we are confronted with the realities of subject multiplicity, value diversification, and means absolutization and sophistication due to nuclear

[18] In this connection, Hitoshi Tanaka, former vice minister of foreign affairs of Japan, stated "that powerful military power is indispensable for powerful diplomatic power is a violent argument and totally wrong" (a@tanaka.Diplomat, December 26, 2022.) Mr. Tanaka, who has a wealth of experience and many achievements, makes a serious point.

proliferation. The diversification of subjects, values, and methods in the post-Cold War era has become a reality in contemporary international politics.

The fundamental reason for this is the uncertainty and opaqueness of the security concept in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct the concept of security that can respond immediately to a situation in the post-Cold War era.

Security is said to have two meanings. The first is "the condition of being secure," and the second is the "means of being secure". In Japanese, however, "safety" and "security" are often understood separately. The question of what kind of state is called "security" is also a major issue, but conventionally the focus has been on the means of "security." When we speak of security, the emphasis has been on "assurance." The theory of collective security was discussed at the League of Nations,, but the collective security system with the entire United Nations as a single entity was not realized.

(2) Can the Theory of Non-Armed Non-Alignment Be Established?

Several issues are presented next that should be the subject of security theory discussions rom this point forward. Currently, a stream of research and proposals exists from academic societies—including the Japan Peace Association—and established political parties and civic organizations that proposes alternatives to the military security that is being promoted by the government. Several are discussed next in the hope that the discussion will deepen the security theory in the future.

First, we must promote a change in the status quo and thorough pursuit of demilitarization with constitutional pacifism: unilateral demilitarization.

The concept of unilateral disarmament is part of this discussion. To overcome a unilateral initiative, the initiative must be extended to a multilateral structure. The 50s British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) demanded unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain. There is much to learn from that example. Solidarity and joint action with our Asian neighbors are two ways to realize the demilitarization of East Asia and the creation of an Asian nuclear-free zone.

Second, we must advocate for the demilitarization of global society, disabling nuclear forces that physically support the U.S. hegemonic principle and further restraining advanced forces (through base removal, withdrawal of U.S. forces, disarmament, and so on), more specifically, the *Anti-Ballistic Missile System Restriction Treaty* (ABM Treaty: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972–2001), the United States–Soviet treaty on limiting ballistic interceptor missiles. The ABM Treaty and the conclusion of a new *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty* are aimed at eliminating all intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles defined as intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Third, we must thoroughly communicate that the theory of deterrence is an illusion. The U.S. side today claims that Japan should "deter" its enemies by equipping itself with an "enemy base attack capability" and that the Southwest Islands should be the front line for this purpose. To overcome ,the critical situation. Which is to denounce the reality that before the war, Okinawa and the Nansei Islands were "thrown away" for the defense of the mainland, and after the war they were about to be "thrown away" for the defense of the U.S. mainland.

The Japanese government's deterrence is a punitive deterrence that guarantees the ability to counterattack, as clarified in the "Three Documents," and it is counted as a countermeasure offensive force that assumes actual operation and is actually in operation.

It is also called "denial deterrence."[19] However, deterrence eventually leads to a chain of arms proliferation, which literally leads to a security dilemma.

Fourth, whether the construction of a demilitarized and non-aligned Japan was the ultimate objective of the postwar constitutional movement must be confirmed. The principle of American hegemony has been internalized in the Japanese nation. In order to follow the U.S. hegemony that has led the postwar international order and to break away from the imperial Japan inheritance principle, it is essential to thoroughly implement constitutional pacifism. In other words, we must put our feet down on the global ground and start a new effort in a way that considers the positive aspects of anti-war and non-war ideas and movements, such as the Vietnam anti-war movement and the security treaty struggle, and transcends the limitation that these were unilateralist ideas and movements.

Demilitarization and non-alignment here do not merely reflect the absence of armies; the principles of demilitarization and non-violence are also inclusive of gender relations, urban and rural relations, and capital and labor relations to achieve demilitarization in social, ideological, and cultural processes. This leads to a process of change in the direction of reducing and eliminating oppressive power relations. After all, a demilitarization policy transcends national frameworks. Awareness that the people are the agents of change and that they should position themselves as such is essential.

Fifth, we must go beyond the existing nation-state. The first step is to lower the threshold of the nation-state through joint action by the people of Asia and to build an Asian peace community beyond the nation-state. This concept itself is being boldly discussed by the Japan Peace Association and other academic societies, political parties, and civil movements, but it remains unfocused.

What is generally implied here as a goal is to dismantle the physical basis of state violence military forces, to overcome the theory of national security that defines its existence, and to liberate the state from its monopoly on violence. What should be introduced from there is a policy of unarmed neutrality. The foreign policy of non-aligned neutrality is the ideal security theory.

Sixth, we should consider whether it is possible to construct a "security without enemies" policy.

Is it possible to construct a standing theory of military power that does not pose a threat to its neighbors? Egon Karlheinz Bahr (1922–2015)[20] discussed how to accept the "structural impossibility of attack" as a pressing security issue and how to turn it into policy. Bahr was a well-known politician in the inner circle of Willy Brandt, the German Chancellor. In order to go beyond the theory of deterrence, a "de-deterrence theory" is expected. This "structural impossibility of attack" is the basic principle of Japan's defense strategy, which is based on the premise of maintaining a certain defense capability at the "minimum necessary" level. It is not clear to what extent the meaning of "structural impossibility of attack" is based on the assumption that capability is guaranteed as a coping power.

Therefore, it would be reasonable to interpret this more positive interpretation as not

[19] For more information on the diversity of the security and deterrence concept, see Keitaro Ushirogata, "*Transition of the concept of deterrence: Multilayered and redefined*" (Kaikankousenryakukenkyuu) (Maritime Self-Defense Force Executive Staff College), Volume 5, No. 2 [Volume 10], December 2015).

[20] On Egon Baar, see Forktmeyer, Andreas, translated by Kohei Okada, West German Diplomacy and Egon Baar (Sangensha, 2014). The following is also in Mike Hendrik's discussion of Egon Bahr and the issue of Japan possessing nuclear weapons: Sprotte, Maik Hendrik (2014). "Egon Bahr und sein Japan-Besuch 1969: Japanische Atomwaffen als 'Frage des Willens, nicht des Können's?" *Bochumer Jahrbuch zur Ostasienforschung (BJOAF)*. 6/2012.

possessing any military power in the sense that the premise of demilitarization is a condition for the structural impossibility of attack. This kind of argument may be harsh at a time when bold steps toward militarism, such as deterrence and the ability to counterattack, are being boldly discussed considering the changing international situation. However, it is precisely in such an international situation that it is essential to discuss security from the standpoint of demilitarization and non-alignment.

Conclusion

The process of the transformation of Japan's security policy can only be discussed in a separate article, but a topic that will be very important to consider in the future is the issue of Japan's arms exports. *The Three Principles on Arms Exports* have already been effectively abandoned and replaced by the *Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer*, which effectively permits arms exports, albeit with conditions. On April 5, 2023, Japan announced the "Official Security Assistance" (OSA), which is described in the *National Security Strategy* as a system to provide defense equipment to so-called "like-minded countries" free of charge.

The four countries to which Japan will initially provide defense equipment for the time being are the Philippines, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Fiji, but Japan likely will increase the number of countries it provides defense equipment to depending on future developments. In other words, Japan has literally changed its course from a nonmilitary diplomatic strategy to a full-fledged arms export approach.

The publication of the "Three Documents" summarized in this essay, the theory of defense diplomacy advocated by some academic societies and researchers, and the lifting of the ban on arms exports under the OSA system clearly constitute the exact opposite of the demilitarization and non-alignment policy that the Japanese Constitution aims for. In this turning point of Japan's security policy, more active research needs to be conducted not only on the pros and cons of such a security policy but also on the framework of the concept of a world without war.

References

Seiji, ENDO [2015] *Nihonno Anzen Hosho: Nichibei Anpo to JDF (Japan-US Security Treaty and Self-Defense Forces*), Iwanami Shoten.
Akira, KATO [2016] *Nihonno Anzen Hosho* (*Japan Security*), Chikuma Shinsho.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2004] "Civilian Control: Today's Issues," *Sekai*, No. 734.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2005] "This Is a Coup d'Etat by Law": Executive's Constitutional Revision Drafting Case," *Sekai* (World), No.736..
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2014] *Shuudannteki-jieiken-koushiyounin-no-shinso* (*The Depths of the Approval of the Exercise of the Right to Collective Self-Defens*e), Nihonhyouronnsha.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2014] "Kowamote-no-kokkade-nihonha-ikinorerunoka" (Can Japan Survive in "Strong Face")? *Gendai Shiso* (Contemporary Thought), Vol. 41, No. 17.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2015] "Bunnminntousei-seiritukatei-niokeru-Boueikannryou-noyakuwari" (The Role of the Defense Bureaucracy in the Civilian Control Establishment Process: Technocrats and Democrats), *Gendai Shiso* (Contemporary Thought), Vol. 43, No. 12.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2015] "Jieitaino-unjisakusenkeikaku" (Military Operations Planning of JSDF: What Do the Internal Documents of the Joint Staff Mean?), *Sekai* (World), No. 874.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2016] *Bousousuru Jeitai* (*Self-Defense Forces Run Amok*), Chikuma Shobo.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2018] "Jieitai to Bunminntouse no Gendankai" (Current Stage: of Self Defense Forces and Civilian Control Current Stage: Focusing on the Issue of Revision of Article 12 of the Law for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense)*, Rekishi-Hyouron*, No. 817.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2018] "Kyugunn to Jieitai" (The Old Military and the Self-Defense Forces: From a Civilian Controversy Perspective), *Hou to Minshushugi* (Law and Democracy), No. 530.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2019] *Kuzureyuku Bunmintouse* (*Collapsing Civilian Control: The Current State of the Self-Defense Forces*), Ryokufushuppan.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2019] *Jieitaikakenronntohananika* (*What is the Theory of the Addition of the Self-Defense Forces to the Constitution*?), Nihonkikannshishuppansenter.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2020] *Omoitobiranomukouni* (*Beyond the Heavy Door: The Conflict between Historical Reconciliation and Prewar Regression*), Ryokufushuppan.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2022] *Liberalismhadokoheittaka* (*Where Has Liberalism Gone?*), Ryokufushuppan.
Atsushi, KOKETSU [2022] *RussianoUkraineshinnryakutoNihonnoanzenhoshou* (*Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Japan's Security*), Ryokufushuppan.
Akihiro, SADO [2015] *Jieitaishi* (*The History of the Self-Defense Forces: Seventy Years of Defense Policy*), Chikuma Shobo.
Yasuaki, CHIJIWA [2022] *Sengonihonnoanzenhosho* (*Postwar Japan's Security*), Chuoukouronsha.

∗ This paper is an English translation of a previously published article in Japanese (Atsushi Koketsu, "Japan's Security Policy at a Turning Point : Prospects for the 'Three Security Documents' and Non-Armed and Non-Aligned Theory," *The Journal of Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer*, No. 16, 2023).

リレー座談会：10周年を迎えた研究所の「これまで」と「これから」

＜趣旨説明＞

国際武器移転史研究所の創設10周年を記念して、下斗米秀之氏の司会進行の下、研究所の所員8名に以下のようなテーマで自由に論じてもらった。これは10年の総括であると同時に研究所の目指す第2ステージの方向性を示すものでもある。その点を踏まえ、忌憚のないご意見を賜れれば幸いである。

1. 横井：過去10年の総括（研究プロジェクト、研究活動、研究成果）
2. 須藤：第二期所長職を振り返っての所感（研究セミナー、J-STAGE他）
3. 佐原：現代の国際情勢を見据えた研究所の新たな課題と研究体制について
4. 白戸：日本経済史研究の英語化・海外発信・国際共同研究 －成果と展望－
5. 渡辺：東北学院大学ヨーロッパ文化総合研究所での経験を踏まえて
6. 纐纈：市民運動・学会活動／韓国・中国との国際交流 －成果・課題・展望－
7. 西尾：若手研究者の弁「国際武器移転史研究所と共にあった私の10年」
8. 森元：『国際武器移転史』の編集を担ってきた経験に即して

下斗米：研究所は今年度で早くも10周年を迎え、本研究所の機関誌『国際武器移転史』も20号の発行となります。それを記念してリレー座談会を企画してみました。ここで8人の研究所員に登場頂いて、それぞれ特に専念しておられる課題を中心に、研究所にかける思いのたけを自由に語って頂こうと思います。

研究所のこれまでの10年の歴史を振り返ることで、これからの10年を見据えて、何を課題としつつ、研究所の新たな歴史を刻んでいくのか。あらためて確認していきたいと思っています。司会は、本研究所の立ち上げの際にこちらの研究グループに加えて頂いた明治大学の下斗米が担当させて頂きます。本研究所の支援を受けて実施した史料調査や研究報告が現在の私の研究の柱となっており、改めまして研究所の皆様に感謝申し上げます。それではトップバッターとして、本研究所の立ち上げに尽力され、初代の所長を務められた横井先生から、過去10年間の研究所の活動の総括のようなものからお話頂ければと思います。

横井：わかりました。10年一昔とは言いますが、この10年を一口ではなかなか言い切れないところがありますので、紙幅の許す範囲内で纏めてみたいと思います。

国際武器移転史研究所は10年前の2015年秋に設立されました。そこで掲げられた「総

合的歴史研究を通じて、軍縮と軍備管理を取り巻く近現代世界の本質的構造を解明する」という研究課題自体は、科研費の共同研究（3回の基盤研究A）の中で、さらにその10年以上前から扱ってきていました。そこから数えると明治大学に拠点を置いた研究所の歴史は、実に四半世紀の長きに及ぶことになります。この稀に見る「長寿」は、何よりも研究所に集った面々の弛むことのない研究への熱い情熱の賜物と言えます。しかし、それだけではありません。世界秩序の危機が進む中で、本研究所の担うべき課題がますます大きくなってきているという事情があります。

明大の現在の研究組織は、(1) 特定の研究課題に関わる共同研究を推進する「特定課題研究ユニット」（現在約100件）、(2) 新たな世界的研究拠点を創出することを目的として重点領域プロジェクトを推進する「研究クラスター」（現在5件）、そして (3) 世界的研究を推進する卓越した研究拠点を形成することを目的とした研究・知財戦略機構の付属研究機関である「特別推進研究インスティテュート」（現在5件）から構成されております。残念ながら、右図のように現在までのところ、文系の共同研究でインスティテュートに属しているのは本研究所だけです。

（出典：明治大学HPより）

下斗米：明治大学のような大規模な大学にありながら、文系の共同研究で唯一のインスティテュートというのは学外の方達には意外と受け止められているかもしれませんね。創設から運営にかけて難しい舵取りをされてきたのではないかと思いますが、その辺の苦労話も含めてお話頂けますか。

横井：本研究所は、2013年に研究ユニット、2015年に研究クラスター、そして2018年にインスティテュートに認定され、その5年後の2023年にはさらに設置の5年継続が承認されています。その際もこれまでと同様、研究企画推進本部による1次審査（書面審査）と2次審査（ヒアリング）をパスする必要がありました。自己点検・評価のようなものだと思えばそれなりに意義も感じ、覚悟もできますが、審査を受ける側にとってはやはり中々

の試練でした。研究実績、研究組織の体制、実現可能性、ビジョンと独創性などでは高い評価を賜りましたが、研究の国際性と外部研究資金の獲得については、さらに努力が必要というのが審査員の大方の評価でした。

ここで詳細に成果と課題を報告するのは無理ですので、取り敢えず次のようなデータ・ベースを紹介しておきます。本研究所の活動全般に関しては研究所HP、所員の研究者情報はResearchmap、機関誌『国際武器移転史』情報はJ-STAGE、所員の科研費採択状況はKAKEN、そして文科省の私立大学戦略的研究基盤形成支援事業（大型研究）については明大のHP「研究の企画推進・研究推進状況」からご覧になれます。当然のことながら、データ・ベースにはポジティブな記録だけが収録されています。

下斗米：横井先生を中心として研究所が取り組んできた具体的な活動を順次お話ください。

横井：では研究活動、研究プロジェクト、研究成果の3点に絞って研究所の10年を紹介しようと思います。先ず研究活動についてです。研究プロジェクトについては、本当に暗中模索はたまた一部独走の最初の3年間を経て、2018年初めには総勢28名による4つのプロジェクトが出揃いました。それは、①帝国統治システムの移転に関する実証研究、②軍事・民間航空における武器移転・技術移転の国際連鎖の研究、③途上国の軍事的自立化と経済・軍事援助に関する比較研究、④近現代における軍縮・軍備管理の構想と帰結の総体的解明、以上の4プロジェクトです。一見バラバラなように見える4プロジェクトですが、根底にある問題意識は共通しております。しかし、いずれのプロジェクトも海外研究者との共同研究を、そのまま海外の大学・研究機関との国際連携に発展させるには至っていません。共著出版、共同発表、相互訪問のレベルにとどまっております。いまのところ形式に拘らない、そうした弾力的で実質的な国際連携を追求しています。

4つの研究プロジェクトがそれぞれ活発に動き出した結果、活動領域は多岐に広がってきております。①兵器産業・武器移転史フォーラム（2024年6月16日第81回開催）、②研究セミナー（2024年12月17日第19回開催）、③公開シンポジウム（全11回）、さらには④海外研究者の招聘や⑤学会でのパネル報告などを挙げることができます。もちろん総動員体制で当たってきましたが、研究所の中堅若手層は「研究と校務の両立」という普遍的問題で絶えず悩み、企画・広報担当の所員は「動員の努力と集客結果のギャップ」に落ち込むことも度々ありました。しかし、いずれも地道な努力と経験の蓄積以外に、こうした問題をクリアする都合の良い秘策はなさそうです。

下斗米：本研究所の売りというか、特に注力した活動に公開シンポジウムの開催がありますね。学内外に研究成果や研究所の役割を発信していくための取り組みですが、少し振り返って貰えますか。

横井：これまで通算で11回ほど開催してきました。そのポスターを次に示しておきましたのでご覧願います。

公開シンポジウム（第1回～第11回）のポスターと開催風景写真

第4回シンポジウム

第11回シンポジウム

次に研究所としての研究成果を取り敢えず4点挙げておきます。第1に、研究叢書6冊の刊行があります。横井編『航空機産業と航空戦力の世界的転回』（2016年、日本経済評論社［以下同様］）、榎本珠良編『国際政治史における軍縮と軍備管理』（2017年）、竹内真人編『ブリティッシュ・ワールドー帝国紐帯の諸相ー』（2019年）、榎本編『禁忌の兵器ーパーリア・ウェポンの系譜学ー』（2020年）、高田馨里編『航空の20世紀ー航空熱・世界大戦・冷戦ー』（2020年）、横井編『冷戦期アジアの軍事と援助』（2021年）、以上の6冊です。

『国際武器移転史』、研究叢書、その他研究所員の著書（一部）

これらは先ほどお話しした4プロジェクトの成果です。第2に、機関誌『国際武器移転史』の年2回刊行（本誌で第20号に到達）。『国際武器移転史』は一部所員の尽力に多くを依存してなんとか第20号まで漕ぎ着けましたが、一層の充実のためにはここらで編集方針の確認と査読体制の整備が改めて必要かもしれません。

そして第3に、研究成果の学部教育への還元（全学共通総合講座、2025年度は「アジア国際秩序の軍事再編と武器移転の連鎖」を開講）があります。2019年に始まった全学共通総合講座は、明治大学のすべての学部に開かれた公開講座となっており、和泉や中野はもちろん、生田校舎から理系の学生も受講しています。当初は50名程度だった履修者も、最近では150名に膨れ上がり、すっかり大学の人気講座？として定着しつつあります。第4に、これが最も誇るべき成果かも知れませんが、研究所の若手（9名）の研究職への就職と着任校での活躍を挙げることができます。冒頭に紹介しましたように、特別推進研究インスティテュートの課題は「世界的研究を推進する卓越した研究拠点を形成すること」にありますが、若手研究者の育成による他大学への研究拠点の拡大も重要な課題であると考えております。

下斗米：横井先生、ありがとうございました。10年間の研究所の諸活動を端的に語って頂きました。非常に濃密な成果が生み出されてきたと、改めて痛感しました。

次に横井先生に継いで二代目の所長を担われた須藤先生にお願いします。横井先生の後を継ぐというのは大変な重責だったと思いますが、先生は次々と斬新なアイデアや提案をされ、本研究所を柔らかくかつ確実に前進させられました。いま大役を終えられての感想なども含めお願いします。

須藤：私が研究所のメンバーに参加したのは2015年秋頃、まだ大学での位置付けでは「クラスター」と呼ばれる段階で、大型研究（代表者は横井勝彦先生）の助成金を受けていた頃でした。具体的には、機関誌『国際武器移転史』第1号か第2号（2016年）あたりから編集に関わるようになりました（2022年1月の第13号まで編集委員長）。これは『社会経済史学』（社会経済史学会）や『歴史と経済』（政治経済学・経済史学会）の編集委員の経験も関係していたからでしょうが、立ち上げ間もない時期に投稿原稿を確保する苦労は専ら横井所長が負っていました。

機関誌の発行は研究所の活動の柱の一つであります。国際的な発信に力を入れ、英語論文の掲載は国際シンポジウムやセミナーと連携する形で第3号（2017年1月）から実施していました。しかし、コロナ禍で国際的なシンポジウムなどの開催が困難になったこともあり、掲載論文の国際発信を強化する方策が課題になりました。こうして第17号（2024年1月）より研究所員を中心に、（既掲載論文の英語化を含めて）英語論文の掲載を意識的に強化する取り組みを始めています。

機関誌掲載論文が国内外の読者に広く知れ渡り、研究所の活動が認知されることはとても重要です。掲載記事はすでに研究所のホームページや明治大学学術成果リポジトリを通じて公開されています。これらに加えて研究所は、J-STAGE（科学技術情報発信・流通総合システム）への登載を計画し、創刊号から第19号（2025年1月）までの論説・書評など全てを公開することができました――当初はJ-STAGEの申請手続きや搭載作業も複雑で壁も高かったと記憶していますが、現在は随分と改善されています。

とはいえ、J-STAGEでジャーナルを公開している機関は、明治大学では『社会科学研究所紀要』（2023年：62巻1号～）に次いで2番目になります。発行機関名で検索したところ、早稲田大学では紀要2件、慶應義塾大学では紀要1件を公開しているだけで、大学機関レベルでの利用はあまり進んでいないようです。

下斗米：所長就任の前後でしたか、コロナ禍に襲われて研究所も、研究所が主催する総合講座の運営も大変でしたね。

須藤：確かに、コロナ禍は研究所員の活動にも例外なく大きな影響を及ぼしました。学内外の研究所員との交流はオンラインのみになり、研究所員間の交流は停滞したままでした。こうした状況を打破するため、研究所メンバーを中心とする「研究セミナー」を立ち上げ

ることになりました。在外研究でブラウンバック・ミーティングを経験したことを思い起こし、多忙な教員も参加できる昼休み時間に昼食をとりながら、しかもコロナ禍で普及したオンラインを活用して学外のメンバーも参加できる形にしました。2022年10月に第1回研究セミナー（発表者は白戸伸一先生）を開催し、原則月1回のペースで、2024年末までに計19回を数えることができました。定期試験や入試業務に忙殺される期間などを除くため、第20回目の研究セミナーは新学期の始まる4月に予定しています。

下斗米：先生が提言された定例の研究セミナーは、実に大きな成果を得ていると思います。月に一度皆さんの研究報告をお聞きできるとは幸いなことです。加えて国際シンポジウムや国際間での研究交流協定の締結も大きな出来事でしたね。

須藤：国際シンポジウムなどの活動は国際学術交流協定の締結に結びつきました。とりわけ幅広い活動を続けている纐纈厚先生が実務面の中心となり、2023年12月18日に中国社会科学院日本研究所と学術交流協力協定を取り結ぶことができました。その後も韓国（高麗大学）やイギリス（ウォーリック大学）との学術研究交流などを積極的に進めています。海外の若手研究者との研究交流も重要であり、海外研究者の客員研究員としての受け入れなども検討しています。

下斗米：研究所の移転問題もありました。しかし先生の御配慮のお蔭で、静謐な研究環境の保持に成功しました。

須藤：本年1月、全学的なキャンパス整備計画の暫定的な措置として、研究所はグローバルフロントの16階から17階に移転しました。経緯を示しておけば、2023年11月22日、大六野学長の命を受けた教学企画部から、「中野キャンパスにおいて開設している理工学研究科建築・都市学専攻国際建築都市デザイン系（「I-AUD」）がグローバルフロント16階の国際武器移転史研究インスティテュートのスペースを利用して開設し、当インスティテュートをグローバルフロント17階に移転したいとの要請（電子メール）がありました。

この件にも関連して、「駿河台キャンパス再開発計画（仮称）基本構想に関する意見集約」が全学的に行われていたことから、当インスティテュートは「駿河台キャンパス再開発計画（仮称）基本構想に関する要望書」（2024年6月18日付）を提出し、中別府研究担当副学長との面談（同7月2日）の上、「移転はあくまでも仮移転であること」、「基本構想の策定及び実施にあたっては、本研究所を明確に位置付け」ることを要望しました。スペースが手狭になるなどの不便もありますが、これにめげず研究活動の一層の増進が期待されるところです。

下斗米：先生のお力で本研究所が一段とパワーアップしたと思います。重ねて御礼申します。さて、次は須藤先生の後を引き継ぐ次期所長でいらっしゃいます佐原先生にお願いし

たいと思います。研究所の次の10年を見据えた研究体制について、おもに現代の国際情勢との関連を踏まえてお話して頂けますか。

佐原：兵器の性能と戦闘で用いられる戦術は不可分の関係にあり、こうした軍事技術は戦略を規定します。近代以降の戦争の歴史は兵器の歴史ですから、その意味で、これまで武器移転史研究所が行ってきた兵器産業の国際的ネットワークの歴史的変遷に関する研究は、世界史を認識する上でも重要なものと言えます。本研究所は、これまで主に20世紀の武器移転に関して優れた成果を挙げてきましたが、今後は、戦争そのものの性格や戦術の変遷といった軍事史的側面、および、軍事同盟の再編と「集団的安全保障」の既成事実化といった国際政治的側面との相関性を重視する必要があります。

下斗米：現在もロシア・ウクライナ戦争やイラン・イスラエル戦争など、我々は戦争の時代を生きていますから非常に重要なご指摘かと思います。現在の戦争はどのように特徴づけられるでしょうか。

佐原：21世紀初頭に提起された「新戦争論」は、国家間戦争に代わって不正規戦争が戦争の支配的形態となり、それに備えた新しい安全保障思想の必要性を唱えるものでした。そこで議論された低強度紛争の増加と戦闘主体のパラミリタリー化が国民国家の構造的変化と相関性を持つという指摘は現在も有効性を失っていません。ウクライナ戦争は一見すると「新戦争論」のアンチテーゼのように映りますが、この戦争で登場したドローン、高性能の携帯式兵器、人口密集地域での都市ゲリラ戦といった現象は、IT技術によって制御された大量破壊兵器を駆使したハイテク戦争という湾岸戦争以来の戦術が時代遅れであることを示したものでした。ウクライナの多くの戦場では塹壕と歩兵による肉弾戦という第一次世界大戦さながらの状況が展開され、従来の「ノーデス・ウォー」に代わって大量の戦闘員を「砲弾の餌食」にする消耗戦となりました。ガザ戦争でも同様の現象が見られ、ハイテク兵器を駆使したイスラエル軍に対して、パレスチナ側のレジスタンスは廃墟となった市街地でのゲリラ戦を展開し、手製の簡素な武器でイスラエル軍に甚大な損害を与えています。2024年に二度行われたイランによるイスラエル本土へのミサイル攻撃も安価なドローンを一度に大量に投入する「空間飽和戦術」によってイスラエル側の防空システムを機能不全に追い込み、甚大な被害を与えました。レバノンのヒズボラも同様の戦術を用いて性能の劣るミサイルによってイスラエルに被害を与えてきました。こうした新たな消耗戦によって、現在のイスラエルは深刻な兵員不足に陥っており、それを補うために「予防介入論」に基づく積極的な戦線拡大を採用していますが、中・長期的に見ると自滅に向かうことになると思います。

下斗米：最新兵器でも対応できない古典的な消耗戦が各地で繰り広げられているのです

ね。今後の各国の軍需産業や安全保障の在り方はどのようにお考えでしょうか。

佐原：戦術と兵器の変化は、今後ますます多くの国の軍需産業に質的な変化をもたらすと思います。それはおそらく、高度な技術を集積したハイテク兵器に代わって、性能は劣っても安価な兵器を大量に生産する能力が重視されるようになり、大量の物資と兵員を消費する大規模な消耗戦を想定した戦術が採用されてゆくようになるでしょう。既にドイツなどの西欧諸国では徴兵制の復活が議論されており、EUは5年間で800億ユーロの大軍拡を進める計画を承認しました。日本でも岸田政権時代に軍事費の倍増が決定され、DICASを通じて日本企業の米軍事産業の下請化が進んでいます。一方的な軍拡は軍事緊張を高め、更なる軍拡をもたらすだけですが、こうした負の連鎖を止めるためにも、現代の戦争に関する包括的な研究を進める必要があります。

下斗米：本研究所が取り組んできた「軍拡の負の連鎖」に関する歴史研究の必要性が、現実世界のほうからもますます要請されていることが良く分かりました。次に白戸先生にお願いします。先生には日本経済史研究の英語化・海外発信・国際共同研究などの成果や今後の展望など含めてお話頂きます。

白戸：本研究所は、武器移転問題を軍事史、国際関係史等とともに経済史の課題として位置づけています。2度の世界大戦が軍事産業や国民経済を総動員して戦われたことを勘案すれば、経済史的アプローチの重要性は明白です。核兵器や弾道ミサイルの開発・配備が直ちに国際的脅威となる現実を直視すれば、日本の立ち位置や武器移転に関する研究成果を英語で発信することや、国を超えた共同研究の推進は今後さらに重要になると思われます。

本研究所も、過去10年間にオンラインを含め主催・共催でシンポジウムを17回（うち外国人講師を含むもの6回）、国際セミナー12回（うち外国人講師を含むもの10回）、国際ワークショップ7回（すべて外国人講師を含む）を開催し、諸外国の研究者と意見交換してきました。それらの成果を機関誌『国際武器移転史』や研究叢書として6冊刊行しています。これらのうち5冊には欧米や南アジア、さらには台湾や韓国等の研究者の論考が収録されています。研究所の機関誌は今号で20号となりますが、論説85本中42本は英語論文であり、近年では日本の歴史展開に関する研究を海外に発信するため、既刊の論説の英訳版もいくつか掲載されています。

下斗米：まさに本研究所が目標として掲げる国際性や多様性を地で行くような諸活動に思います。当然ながらご苦労や困難さが付き纏うのではないかと思いますが。

白戸：確かに容易でないことは、その通りです。そこで心がけているのは、国際的共同研究の進め方としてシンポジウムやセミナー、ワークショップで海外の研究者に参加しても

らい、率直に意見交換することです。しかし議論を深めるためには事前準備も重要であり、たとえば2025年5月開催の国際ワークショップ出席予定者のC.W.Hughes教授（ウォーリック大学）とは2024年11月の来日時に事前打ち合わせをおこない、さらに同月開催の研究所セミナーで同氏の論考‘Japan’s Defence Industry’（K. Hartley and J. Belin eds., *The Economics of the Global Defence Industry*, Routledge, 2019所収）について検討しております。

21世紀も四半世紀を経過したものの、ロシアーウクライナ戦争、ジェノサイドにまで至ったイスラエルとパレスチナ及び周辺アラブ諸国やイランとの対立に見られるように、戦火は治らず武器移転問題はエスカレートしています。その一方で、日本は次期戦闘機の国際共同開発を開始しており、これまた日本の防衛産業のあり方を転換する可能性があります。防衛産業の実態解明には困難が伴いますが、歴史的検討と現段階における軍事面での国際的連携の問題点を解明するためにも、中・韓・東南アジア諸国を含めた海外の研究者との共同研究はますます重要であり、そのためにも英語での発信がさらに強化される必要があるでしょう。

下斗米：内外の研究者が日本語だけでなく、国際語としての英語でも発信する機関誌として充実度を増しているように思います。発信力や発信方法についても、新たな取り組みも始まっていることもあり、凄く充実感がありますね。さて、次にその国際化という点では、長い実績を積んで来られた東北学院大学の渡辺先生にお願いします。

渡辺：国際武器移転史研究所には参加させて貰って以来、一貫して大きな期待感を抱き続けています。それに絡み私の勤務する東北学院大学のヨーロッパ文化研究所での研究活動を紹介しながら、話をさせて頂きます。

東北学院大学のヨーロッパ文化研究所は、2007年度から2011年度までの5年間、私立大学学術研究高度化推進事業「オープンリサーチセンター事業」に応募して、2度目で採択されました。課題は「ヨーロピアン・グローバリゼーションと諸文化圏の変容に関する研究」（研究代表：渡辺昭一）で、本学のヨーロッパ文化研究所の所員が中心となって実施しました。ヨーロッパ文化研究所は、大学院にヨーロッパ文化史専攻とアジア文化史専攻の2分野が設置されて間もなかったため、外部資金を獲得して研究拠点を作ることが大きな課題でした。大学院設置のための予算も採択されましたが、ハード面の整備が中心となり研究活動予算は十分とは言えませんでした。

この事業で特徴的なことは、研究所を拠点として国内外の研究者の協力を得ながら更なる研究拠点を形成することでした。本研究所の教員10名を中心に、各教員の人的研究ネットワークを生かし、毎年公開講演会を5，6回開催し、また研究者育成のために若手研究会を組織し、大学院生やオーバードクターの研究発表の機会を設けました。

ハードの面においてもネットワーク関係の整備としてミニネットワーク網を構築して研究活動の基盤を作り、情報収集や整理の利便性を図りました。1年あたり3000万円ほどの予算をいただきましたので、5年で1億2000万円ほどの経費を使ったことになります。当然のことながら、対費用効果を期待されたわけですが、毎年調査報告として冊子体を発行し記録として残し、また最終的には、事業成果として渡辺昭一編『ヨーロピアン・グローバリゼーションの歴史的位相―「自己」と「他者」の関係史』（勉誠出版社、2013年）を出版しました。

下斗米：潤沢な研究資金を獲得されるまでの努力は並大抵のものではなかったであろうと推察しますが、それにもまして素晴らしい研究成果を発表されたことに敬意を表します。貴学のヨーロッパ文化研究所では、プロジェクト終了後の活動はどのようなものでしたか。

渡辺：5年でプロジェクト事業は終了したわけですが、基盤形成事業として研究拠点をいかにして継続発展させるかが、新たな課題でした。既存のヨーロッパ研究所と別個に新たなセンターを設置する必要があったのですが、維持管理と経費面から大学当局との協議の上、既存のヨーロッパ文化研究所をヨーロッパ文化総合研究所として改組するに至りました。その際、研究活動の場所はそのまま維持され、新たに非常勤職員1名の追加配置を認められ、予算も既存の予算の他にプロジェクト経費としてそれ相応の活動経費を計上していただきました。ただ毎年減額されていますが、今なおプロジェクト経費は継続されています。

現在の事業活動としては、本学のヨーロッパ史専攻の教員を中心に、毎年交代で公開講座を開催し、それを翌年研究所の機関誌『ヨーロッパ文化史研究』の特集号として掲載してきておりますが、若手研究者の育成については、残念ながら本学の後期課程にヨーロッパ史領域の院生が在籍していないため開店休業状態にあります。

下斗米：それで長年にわたりヨーロッパ文化総合研究所を運営されてきたご経験からみて、国際武器移転史研究所への期待や課題などについて、ご提言などありましたらお願いします。

渡辺：「オープンリサーチセンター事業」採択をめぐっての私共の大学の本研究所の歩みですが、本研究所と国際武器移転史研究所は、共に既存の研究所を基盤としながら、補助金をもとに新たな研究活動の基盤を形成したという点で共通しています。

それでご質問を頂きましたから、我々の経験を踏まえて、国際武器移転史研究所への期待を3点ほど述べてみたいと思います。

第一は、研究活動の一層の国際化です。国際武器移転史研究所はメンバーの国際社会に対する関心の強さと人脈の広さが反映されて、すでに研究活動の国際化の方向性が明確

になっています。海外研究者との連携および原稿依頼は、アジアに限定されず欧米への広がりを見せています。また、研究所メンバーは研究成果を外国語論文として積極的に発信しています。その発行件数と内容は、もはや研究所機関誌の枠を超えて国際学会誌レベルに到達しています。この方向性をさらに継続していってほしいものです。

第二は、若手研究者の育成です。現在日本の大学院に共通する問題ですが、研究者を目指す学生が少なくなってきております。軍事問題に関する領域ではこの傾向は特に顕著ではないかと思います。そこで、武器移転の経済史研究という分野に限らず関連分野での研究者への支援（研究報告の機会の提供や研究費の補助など）を拡大する必要があります。この問題は、われわれの研究所にも共通する課題となっています。他大学大学院との関係拡大を一層進めてほしいと考える次第です。

第三は、研究活動の予算の確保です。本学の研究所は、オープンリサーチ事業終了後は何ら外部資金確保の動きはなくなってしまい、予算総額が年々削減されています。外部資金を確保するという建前でその準備資金として予算を計上することも可能なのですが、実際はうまくいかないのが現状です。なかなか総合的な研究企画が出てきません。明確な新企画を作成し他の所員の積極的な参加を促すような動きが見られません。こうした経験を踏まえ、明治大学では、大型の外部資金を果敢に獲得していくために、学内研究所メンバーの拡充が進むことを期待しております。

下斗米：本研究所が目指すべき方向性を一段とクリアにして頂いたご発言と思いました。さて、次に凡そ40年ぶりに明治大学に〝帰還〟されたという纐纈先生にお願いします。先生は確か2018年から明治大学の特任教授に就任されたのですね。定年後も客員研究員として本研究所に残って頂いていると。

纐纈：そうです。母校の明治大学に戻る格好となり、皆さんと一緒に研究活動の仲間に入れて頂いていることに感謝しています。

私の本来の研究は近代日本政治・軍事史ですが、このテーマですと必然的に近隣アジア諸国、とりわけ中国や朝鮮との関係史に踏み込まざるを得ないこともあって、30代の頃から足繁く通い、研究交流も続けてきました。そうした研究歴のなかで培った経験や成果を踏まえて、この研究所もアジア近隣諸国との研究交流が進めばと願っていました。

下斗米：2018年12月には、韓国と台湾から研究者を招聘して国際シンポジウムをコーディネイトされましたね。

纐纈：そうでしたね。2018年の夏に台湾と韓国に出かけ、研究所に相応しい研究者に直接面談をし、入念な問題意識の確認をしたうえで正式に招聘することにしました。私は、このシンポの後に中国の研究者を招聘し、日中安全保障政策の比較検討をテーマに企画

を温めていたのですが、コロナ禍によって頓挫してしまいました。これは本当に残念でした。

日本と中国との関係は近年において国家間でギクシャクしていますね。でも研究者は国家間の関係がどうであれ、普遍的な真理を探究する一点において国境を超え、共同研究や議論は可能です。そんな思いを二つの研究所が共有できたから実現したと思いますね。それに来訪された中堅の研究者は、私が中国での学会などに出席した折、親しくなった人たちでした。同研究所の楊所長などお互い若い時からの友人であったことも助かりました。

今後の課題として、韓国の高麗大学日本研究所との交流を前進させていきたいと思っています。すでに昨年、同研究所の先生に来学頂き、研究報告会を開きました。機関誌にも寄稿して頂けることになっています。

さらには、中国、韓国、日本から研究者を同時に招聘して明治大学で「国際武器移転史の比較研究」（仮題）と言ったテーマでシンポジウムを企画したいと考えています。これにインドやイギリス、アメリカ等諸外国の研究者も一同に会しての企画も皆さんと力を合わせて実現したいなと思っているところです。機関誌にも英語論文が号を重ねる毎に増えていますが、国の内外に向けた発信力のさらなるパワーアップに微力を尽くしたいと思っています。

下斗米：纐纈先生は本研究所以外にも、様々な領域で活動されているとのことですが、その辺を差しさわりのない範囲でお話頂けますか。

纐纈：研究所での業務に専念したいところですが、これまでの研究交流から内外を含めて多様な人たちとの繋がりがあります。学会では現在、植民地文化学会の代表理事をしています。これは台湾、中国、韓国、日本の主に文学や歴史学の研究者の集まりですが、100人以上の会員のうち、三割近くが日本以外の研究者です。アジアからの日本留学生も多いです。主に植民地史や戦前期の海外文学をテーマとする記念講演集会を毎年開催しています。

機関誌『植民地文化研究：資料と分析』（不二出版／定価2000円）を年一回発行していますが、200頁を超える研究誌を編集するのは大変な苦労の連続ですが、もう20年以上続けています。歴史学と政治学の領域に居る私が文学研究者の集まりをコーディネイトするのは楽ではありません。でも考えてみれば私自身明治大学文学部の出身者で、近現代ドイツ史を専攻しておりましたので、純文学の領域にも頗る親近感を抱いています。

本来、アカデミズムとジャーナリズムの狭間で研究や仕事をしてきた関係で、これまで市民運動や評論活動、国会での陳述や歴史に関連する裁判での学者証人として多くの出番を与えられてきました。そうしたなかで、現在、研究会と言って良いかも知れませんが、

「重慶大爆撃を語る会」、「中国の文化財を返還する会」、さらには二ヵ月に一度開催する「共同テーブル」の共同代表や共同発起人も務めています。これは内外の諸問題を熟議するシンポで毎回200名近い市民が参集しています。

本研究所には一層飛躍する使命がありますから、今後も私なりの経験を活かしながら貢献できるよう微力を尽くしたいと思っています。

下斗米：さて、最後は本研究所では最年少の西尾さんです。2022年に明治大学で博士号を取得されたばかりの若き研究者です。そこで若手研究者にとって、本研究所の活動をどのように捉えておられるか、を中心にその思いを自由に語っていただけますか。

西尾：このような場で発言の機会を頂いたことに感謝いたします。私は近代日本の政治・軍事史が専門で、この点で纐纈先生と同様の領域といえます。文系の学術研究というのは、主として、ある研究者が自分の研究テーマに即してさまざまな文献・史料を黙々と読み込み、そこから得られた知見をベースに学会・研究会での報告や論文・研究書の執筆を行うという側面と、その研究者が関連諸分野の他の研究者との人脈を作り広げながら、研究者コミュニティの中で切磋琢磨していくという側面から成り立っています。

後者の側面については、文系の研究については一般的に等閑視されがちですが、特に人文・社会科学系の大学院生や若手研究者の場合、真に研鑽や経験を積むためには、自宅や研究室に引きこもって1人で黙々と研究するだけではなく、いかに関連諸分野の先生方と人的交流を深め、そうした交流からさまざまな知見を得たり仕事をともに行ったりすることができるかという点も非常に重要となってきます。これまで、明治大学国際武器移転史研究所で約10年間活動してきた私も、その重要性を痛感してきました。

下斗米：それでは具体的な研究活動について教えて下さい。今後若手研究者の参加を求めていきたいと考えている研究所にとっても、重要な点に係る問題です。参考となるようなお話をお願いできますか。

西尾：わかりました。私自身の研究所での活動実績を簡潔に紹介することを通じて、私のこれまでの研究の進展が、いかに研究所のプロジェクトや所員の先生方とのつながりによって支えられてきたかを強調したいと思います。

私が国際武器移転史研究所の所員の先生と初めてお会いしたのは、研究所にとっても記念すべき第1回目の研究所設立記念シンポジウム（2015年11月17日）の際でした。当時、私は明治大学大学院文学研究科博士前期課程の2年目で、戦間期から第二次世界大戦期にかけてのドイツから日本への航空技術移転をテーマとした修士論文を執筆中でした。第1回シンポジウム開催のしばらく前に、自分の研究テーマを学部時代の指導教授に報告したところ、同教授が、御自身の知り合いである研究所所長（当時）の横井勝彦先生（現明治

大学名誉教授）と、ワイマール期ドイツ航空機産業史を研究しておられる永岑三千輝先生（現横浜市立大学名誉教授）に私のことをメールで紹介してくれました。そうした先生方のネットワークを通じて、第1回のシンポジウムでは横井先生に、第2回のシンポジウム（2016年1月19日）では永岑先生にそれぞれご挨拶させていただきました。

私は2016年3月に博士前期課程を修了し、翌月に博士後期課程に入学しましたが、その頃永岑先生から、主として研究所所員で構成される政治経済学・経済史学会の兵器産業・武器移転史フォーラムで修士論文の報告を行う機会を設けていただき、その第52回会合（2016年6月18日）で修士論文「日独航空技術交流（1922 ～ 1945年）―日本軍事技術開発における『自立』と『欧米依存』の相克―」の内容を報告しました。この報告が、私が以後国際武器移転史研究所に関わるようになった大きなきっかけとなりました。

下斗本：研究所の活動を通して、沢山の先輩研究者との交流を重ねておられるということですね。研究所の役割の一つに研究者間の交流による自己啓発がありますね。また、学問領域の相違が自らの研究に幅を創る、というのも醍醐味です。

西尾：この報告の後、2016年10月から11月には、私はミュンヘンにあるドイツ博物館文書館での、永岑先生の史料調査にご同行させていただき、1920~30年代におけるドイツ航空機製造企業と日本の陸海軍・航空機製造企業との航空機売買に関する企業文書を収集できました（写真①）。さらに、2017年3月には、ロンドンのイギリス国立公文書館での横井先生の史料調査にもご同行させていただき、戦前・戦中期日本の航空戦力・航空機産業に関するイギリス空軍省資料など貴重な一次史料を収集しました（写真②）。快く海外史料調査への同行を承諾していただいた永岑先生・横井先生には、いくら感謝してもしきれない思いでおります。

写真①：ミュンヘンのドイツ博物館文書館の入口で撮影（2016年10月31日）

写真②：ロンドン郊外のイギリス国立公文書館（2017年3月16日撮影）

こうした海外の一次史料と日本側一次史料を併用して、私は2017~21年にかけて、

研究所機関誌『国際武器移転史』に3本の論文を投稿し、その全てが厳正な査読を経て掲載されました（第4号、第6号、第11号に掲載）。

また、2019年には、研究所の中でも高田馨里先生（現大妻女子大学比較文化学部教授）を代表とする航空史のグループにも加えていただきました。このグループの共同研究の成果として、2020年3月には高田馨里編『航空の二〇世紀―航空熱・世界大戦・冷戦―』（日本経済評論社）が刊行され、私はその第7章「太平洋戦争における日本航空戦力の配備・補給」を執筆しました。1冊の研究書がどのようにして出来上がるのか、その一部始終を執筆陣の一員として直接経験できたことは、大変貴重なことでした。

このようにして蓄積した研究成果をまとめるべく、私は2021年度に博士論文「日独間の航空技術移転と日本航空機産業の自立化（1919~45年）」を明治大学大学院文学研究科に提出し、2022年3月には博士号を取得しました。同年4月からは明治大学文学部兼任講師として授業を担当するようになり、その一方で自身のこれまでの研究の総仕上げとして、2023年8月には、博士論文をベースとした単著『日独航空技術移転史―1919~45年―』を日本経済評論社より刊行しました（写真③）。永岑先生には拙著に関する非常に行き届いた書評を『国際武器移転史』第17号に寄稿していただき、本当に感謝に堪えません。

写真③：拙著の表紙

下斗本：単著出版という形で、これまでの研究所の支援に恩返しができたということですね。これからの展望についてもお聞かせください。

西尾：2024年4月より、私は国際武器移転史研究所の研究推進員として、明治大学の全学共通総合講座「アジア国際秩序の軍事再編と武器移転の連鎖」の講義を担当し、またJ-STAGEの更新や機関誌『国際武器移転史』の発送作業に従事しています。この10年間、極めて恵まれた環境で研究を続けることができたのは、ひとえに同研究所の先生方が研究者としても社会人としても尊敬すべき方々であり、そうした先生方から温かいご支援を賜り続けたからに他なりません。それに対する深い感謝の念を抱きつつ、設立から10年を迎えた研究所の今後のさらなる発展に、微力ながらでも貢献していきたいと考えております。

下斗本：ますますのご活躍を期待しています。それでは、最後に本研究所の研究成果の

屋台骨となっている『国際武器移転史』の編集に長年携わって頂いている森元先生にお話を伺います。20号に到達し、史学雑誌の「回顧と展望」にも度々取り上げられるなど、すっかり定着してきたように思いますが、『国際武器移転史』年2回発行の＜現行体制＞と＜改善が必要な問題＞について教えてください。

森元：ご質問にお答えする前に、私が研究所の活動に参加することになった背景を簡単に紹介させてください。本誌の編集作業に私が携わるようになったのは第2号からです。横井先生からお声を掛けていただきました。というのも、横井先生と私は2000年代半ばに明治大学の別の研究所に参加していたのですが、私はその研究所が発行していた総合雑誌の編集作業を担当していました。そちらの雑誌は学術雑誌ではなく、一般向けの総合雑誌として年4回発行する季刊誌でした。そのため、当時の私は研究所に所属しながらも、雑誌の発行に専念し、結果的に多くの編集経験を積むことになりました。その経験を横井先生が本誌の発行に役立てる機会を提供してくださった形になります。

現在、「国際武器移転史」は1月末と7月末の年2回、発行しています。これは第1号の時から変わっていません。編集作業は主に編集長と研究所長、そして私の3人が担当しています。最初の数年間は、当時研究所の正規研究員として活動されていた榎本先生も、多方面にわたって編集作業を手伝ってくれていました。英文論文の掲載に力を入れるようになってからは、赤津先生にも外部校閲者との連絡などで協力をお願いしています。また、掲載本数が多かったときなどには、西尾さんにも校閲などで協力をお願いすることがありました。

下斗本：多くの所員の皆様のご協力のもとで年2回発行というペースを守られてきたのですね。学務や研究に追われるなかでの編集作業に頭が下がる思いです。雑誌が完成するまでの具体的なプロセスや改善点についてもお話しいただけますか。

森元：編集作業は、まず編集長を中心に投稿論者を選定します。編集委員会から依頼することもありますし、投稿希望をいただくこともありますが、正式な執筆依頼、それから査読者への依頼は編集長が担当しています。私が担当するのは主に原稿入稿後の作業になります。執筆者や査読者との連絡、出版社との原稿のやり取り、それから本誌の執筆要綱に準拠しているか、誤字・脱字、表記の揺れがないかなど、校閲作業も担当しています。今回で第20号になるので基本的な作業工程は固まっていて、大きな改善が必要と思われることはありません。ただ、査読候補者が限られていることもあり、原稿を投稿されている方に同時に査読をお願いしなければならないケースがあります。原稿の専門性が高いこともあり、候補者は限られてくるとは思いますが、査読を担当していただける方を増やす必要はあるように感じています。

下斗本：「国際武器移転史」という専門誌ならではのお悩みかと思います。編集にあたってとくに苦労されることはありますか。

森元：先ほどお話ししたように、編集業務については編集長や研究所長をはじめ、研究所のメンバーが協力してくださっているので、業務量としてはそれほど過重なものではありません。海外の執筆者とのやり取りも、執筆を依頼した研究所のメンバーが担当することになっているので負担はありません。一番気を配るのはスケジュール管理です。理想としては、各号に掲載する原稿を基本的に同じスケジュールで進められれば良いのですが、論説と研究ノート、査読の有無といった原稿の性格やその他諸般の事情で原稿ごとのスケジュール管理が必要になります。授業や学内業務の繁忙期と重なると、編集作業が滞ってしまうことがあります。実際、第18号の編集では下斗米先生にゲラを送るのを失念してしまいました。その節は、ご迷惑をお掛けしてしまい申し訳ありませんでした。幸い下斗米先生のケースは、作業工程の比較的早い段階であったので大きな問題にはならなかったと認識していますが、編集作業が終盤に差し掛かった段階でのミスは影響が大きくなるので、少なからず緊張感があります。

専門誌の編集という点での苦労としては、最初に編集業務に携わった一般向けの総合雑誌と比べ、格段に原稿の専門性が高いということです。一般向けの総合雑誌の場合、読み込むのにそれほど難しさを感じることはなかったのですが、本誌の原稿は専門性が高く、また私の専門とも少しズレがあるので、内容を理解しながら誤字や脱字などを確認するのが難しいです。これまでに一定数の原稿を読ませてもらってきたので、もう少し理解力が高まっていても良さそうなものですが、なかなか難しいです。

下斗本：その高い専門性こそが研究所の「ウリ」でもありますから、とても難しい課題ですね。知られざる編集のプロセスやご苦労を知ることができました。最後にこれからの「国際武器移転史」の展望についてお聞かせください。

森元：国際武器移転史という研究テーマの重要性を広めるうえで、本研究所と本誌は少なからず一定の貢献を果たしてきたと考えています。それゆえ、今後は若い研究者の投稿がさらに増えることを期待しています。19号には明治大学の院生2人が投稿してくれましたが、本誌が国際武器移転史をテーマに研究する若手研究者の活躍の場になるよう取り組んでいきたいと考えています。加えて、国際的な社会情勢が暗転しつつあるなか、今後も海外の研究者や研究機関との協力関係を広げ、本誌が国際社会の平和と安定に寄与する媒体になるよう、微力ながら尽力したいと思います。

下斗本：これからの研究所を担う若手研究者が続々と生まれてきていることは喜ばしい限りですね。今後さらに国際的に注目される機関誌へと成長することを願っています。さて、

ここまで8名の所員の方々に10年間の研究所の活動を振り返ってもらいながら、研究所の進むべき方向性についてお話いただきました。歴代の所長を中心に、多くの方々の支えによってここまで成長してきたことが良く分かりました。私たち研究者は、現在進行形の戦争や紛争の解決に対して直接的に貢献できることは少ないかもしれません。しかしこれまでもそうだったように、これからも一次史料の渉猟をベースとした歴史的な実証研究を地道に積み重ねていくことによって、真偽不明の偽情報に惑わされることなく、問題の真相究明に努めることはできると思います。これから研究所がさらに発展していくことを祈念して、座談会を終わりたいと思います。どうもありがとうございました。

国際武器移転史研究所10年の歩み

2015.3.3	**国際武器移転史研究所が明治大学研究クラスターに選定**
2015.5.30	**学会パネル報告「両大戦間期航空機産業の世界的転回―軍需・民需相互連関の視角から―」（社会経済史学会第84回全国大会、早稲田大学）**
2015.6.18	**文科省の私立大学戦略的研究基盤形成支援事業（大型研究）に採択**  2015年7月1日 MEIJI UNIVERSITY NEWS 明治大学広報 7月号 No.681 文部科学省 2015年度私立大学戦略的研究基盤形成支援事業 研究プロジェクト1件（約1億円）が採択 2015年度大型研究 採択プロジェクト
2015.10.17	**学会パネル報告「イギリス帝国における宗教、政治経済、ブリティッシュ・ワールド」（政治経済学・経済史学会秋季学術大会、福島大学）**
2015.11.17	**明治大学国際武器移転史研究所設立記念第1回シンポジウム「軍備管理と軍事同盟の＜いま＞を問う」開催**  2015年12月1日 MEIJI UNIVERSITY NEWS 明治大学広報 12月号 No.686 国際武器移転史研究所 設立記念シンポジウム 「軍備管理と軍事同盟の〈いま〉を問う」
2016.1.19	**『国際武器移転史』第1号発行**
2016.1.19	**第2回公開シンポ「航空機の軍民転用と国際移転」**開催
2016.3.24	国際シンポジウム「中東難民と欧州連合」開催（北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター他と共催
2016.5.31	**第3回公開シンポ「第二次世界大戦は不可避だったか－軍縮・軍備管理から考える－」**開催

2016.7.2	国際ワークショップ「難民危機と中東・バルカン：紛争の連鎖と武器移転」開催
2016.7.25	『国際武器移転史』第2号発行
2016.11.19	**研究所による海外研究者の招聘企画始まる**（Keith Krause（ジュネーヴ高等国際・開発問題研究所教授）とJoseph A. Maiolo（ロンドン大学教授）招聘 
2016.11.22	**第4回公開シンポ「世界の大学における軍縮研究－ヨーロッパの研究・教育機関を中心に－」**開催
2016.12.12	**研究叢書1：横井勝彦編『航空機産業と航空戦力の世界的転回』**（日本経済評論社）出版
2017.1.20	『国際武器移転史』第3号発行
2017.3.8	国際ワークショップ「イギリスの戦車生産と戦時経済 1937-1945」（Benjamin Coombs）
2017.3.24	**研究叢書２：榎本珠良編『国際政治史における軍縮と軍備管理－19世紀から現代まで－』**（日本経済評論社）出版
2017.3.27	国際ワークショップ「戦間期の軍縮における科学技術の概念化－航空の技術転用と軍事的乱用 1919-1945－」（Waqar H.Zaidi）開催
2017.4.11	国際ワークショップ「ジェントルマン資本主義の省略と回避」（Andrew Dilley）開催
2017.4.13	国際ワークショップ「第二次世界大戦におけるブリティッシュネス報道－ラジオとブリティッシュ・ワールドー」（Simon Potter）開催
2017.6.27	**第５回公開シンポ「冷戦期南アジアにおける軍事援助の展開」**開催
2017.7.25	『国際武器移転史』第4号発行

2017.10.14	**学会パネル報告「武器への道徳的な問いの諸相 －負の問い、「正」の問い、「正ではない」問い－」（政治経済学・経済史学会秋季学術大会、大阪商業大学）**
2017.11.21	**第６回公開シンポ「ブリティッシュ・ワールド研究の新視点－帝国紐帯の政治経済史－」**開催
2018.1.23	『国際武器移転史』第５号発行
2018.3.7	国際セミナー「大量破壊兵器とアメリカの中東外交－パーリア・ウェポンズの系譜学－」（Ido Oren, Michelle Bentley）開催
2018.3.19	国際セミナー「戦間期と第二次世界大戦後：武器移転規制はどう変わった？」（Daniel Stahl）開催
2018.3.28	国際セミナー「武器の入手可能性と暴力との関係性」（Nicholas Marsh他）開催
2018.7.20	国際セミナー「国際法の歴史における軍事技術の制限－パーリア・ウェポンの系譜学－」（Miloš Vec）開催
2018.7.23	『国際武器移転史』第６号発行
2018.8.1	**国際武器移転史研究所が明治大学特別推進研究インスティテュートに選定**
2018.8.18	**第7回シンポ「武器貿易条約（ATT）第4回締約国会議直前　世界の武器移転をめぐる理想と現実」**開催
2018.10.20	**学会パネル報告「『航空熱』とは何だったのか？－戦間期における民間航空事業を中心に－」（政治経済学・経済史学会秋季学術大会、一橋大学）**
2018.11.24	国際セミナー「冷戦期国際航空研究の新動向－脱植民地化とジェンダーの観点から－」（Waqar H. Zaidi、Phil Tiemeyer）開催
2018.12.16	劉復國（台湾国立政治大学教授）、ソン・キョンホ（韓国国防大学教授）招聘
2018.12.18	**第8回公開シンポ「冷戦期における台湾・韓国の安全保障政策－軍事援助と軍事的自立化をめぐって－」**開催
2019.1.9	国際セミナー「係争地域における武器移転と循環メカニズム－バルカンと中東の事例を中心に－」（Andrey Edemskiy, Danilo Manic）開催
2019.1.21	『国際武器移転史』第７号発行
2019.2.28	**研究叢書3：竹内真人編『ブリティッシュ・ワールド－帝国紐帯の諸相－』**（日本経済評論社）出版
2019.4.16	**全学共通総合講座（春学期）開講**（コーディネーター：纐纈厚「アジア諸国の軍事的自立化の現段階－武器移転史の研究から－」）
2019.5.17	国際セミナー「独立前夜インド航空機産業の誕生と国際ネットワーク」（Aparajith Ramnath）開催
2019.7.5	国際セミナー「Japan’s Awakening: Moving Toward an Autonomous Policy」（Lionel Fatton）開催
2019.7.23	『国際武器移転史』第８号発行
2019.9.2-3	研究合宿（霞ヶ浦・土浦、予科練平和記念館ほか）

2019.11.26/28	国際セミナー「ブリティッシュ・ワールドーコモンウェルスの経済を考えるー」（Andrew Dilley, Rachel Bright, Felicity Barnes）開催
2019.12.26-27	研究合宿（東北学院大学サテライト・キャンパス、仙台）
2020.1.21	『国際武器移転史』第9号発行
2020.2.20	**研究叢書4：榎本珠良編『禁忌の兵器－パーリア・ウェポンの系譜学－』**（日本経済評論社）出版
2020.3.6	**研究叢書５：高田馨里編『航空の20世紀－航空熱・世界大戦・冷戦－』**（日本経済評論社）出版
2020.4.16	新型コロナのため春学期対面授業開始が延期となり、オンライン授業に移行
2020.4～	**全学共通総合講座（春学期）開講**（「アジア諸国の軍事的自立化の現段階－武器移転史の研究からー」、コーディネーター：纐纈厚）
2020.7.27	『国際武器移転史』第10号発行
2021.1.21	『国際武器移転史』第11号発行
2021.3.1	**研究叢書6：横井編『冷戦期アジアの軍事と援助』**（日本経済評論社）出版
2021.4～	**全学共通総合講座（春学期）開講**（「アジア国際秩序の軍事再編と武器移転の連鎖」、コーディネーター：横井勝彦）
2021.7.23	『国際武器移転史』第12号発行
2021.9.21	**全学共通総合講座（秋学期）開講**（「ポスト・コロナ時代の軍縮・軍備管理を展望する」、コーディネーター：榎本珠良）
2022.1.21	『国際武器移転史』第13号発行
2022.4.12	**全学共通総合講座（春学期）開講**（「アジア国際秩序の軍事再編と武器移転の連鎖」、コーディネーター：須藤功）
2022.7.26	『国際武器移転史』第14号発行
2022.9.20	**全学共通総合講座（秋学期）開講**（「ポスト・コロナ時代の軍縮・軍備管理を展望する」、コーディネーター：榎本珠良）
2022.10.25	**研究セミナー（第1回**：白戸伸一「1950年代米国主導の航空機国産化プロセス」）
2022.11.15	研究セミナー（第2回：下斗米秀之「冷戦期米国の科学技術を支えた人材育成ー「技術移転」および「頭脳流出」との関連からー」）
2022.12.6	研究セミナー（第3回：千田武志「日本海軍における兵器国産化の進展と武器移転の変容―主力艦の建造期を中心としてー）
2023.1.10	研究セミナー（第4回：纐纈厚「錦州爆撃―忘れられた都市無差別爆撃―」
2023.1.23	『国際武器移転史』第15号発行
2023.3.14	研究セミナー（第5回：永岑三千輝「第一次大戦終了までのユンカースの航空機開発―史料紹介―」）
2023.3.28	研究セミナー（第6回：太田慧「イギリス海軍予算報告書に見る、軍艦価格の上昇と電子装備の増加―1949-1963―」）

2023.4～	**全学共通総合講座（春学期）開講**（「アジア国際秩序の軍事再編と武器移転の連鎖」、コーディネーター：須藤功）
2023.4.25	研究セミナー（第7回：石原明徳「1950年代の魚雷艇輸出について」）
2023.5.16	研究セミナー（第8回：佐原徹哉「欧州難民のバルカン・ルートの現状、違法なプッシュ・バックとその背景」）
2023.6.27	研究セミナー（第9回：里見柚花「19世紀中頃から第一次世界大戦前期における国際情報通信史」）
2023.6.29	中国社会科学院日本研究所研究者の来訪（協定調印の事前打ち合わせ）
2023.8.1	**国際武器移転史研究所が特別推進研究インスティテュートとして継続承認**（5年間）
2023.8.1	研究所所長を須藤現所長が続投（２期目：2025.7.31.迄）
2023.8.31	『国際武器移転史』第16号発行
2023.9.5	研究セミナー（第10回：竹内真人「ブリティッシュ・ワールドを超えて－帝国紐帯をめぐる駆け引きと多文化アイデンティティー」）
2023.10.12	研究セミナー（第11回：高田馨里「冷戦期、アメリカ軍事民間航空政策―戦争とミリツーリズム（militourism）の展開を中心に－」）
2023.10.19	**第９回公開シンポ「日本の防衛産業と安全保障政策－ロシア・ウクライナ戦争から考える－」**開催
2023.11.28	研究セミナー（第12回：福士純「北米防空司令部の設立とカナダにおける「軍器独立」の断念－国産戦闘機アロー開発計画の失敗を中心に－」）
2023.12.18	**中国社会科学院日本研究所との間で学術交流協定を調印** 
2023.12.20	金暎根（高麗大学日本研究所教授）来訪、招聘打ち合せ
2024.1.10	**第10回公開シンポ「分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－」**開催

2024.1.31	『国際武器移転史』第17号発行
2024.4～	**全学共通総合講座（春学期）開講**（「アジア国際秩序の軍事再編と武器移転の連鎖」、コーディネーター：須藤功）
2024.4.16	研究セミナー（第13回：下斗米秀之（政治経済学部）「第二次世界大戦中のアメリカにおける科学者・技術者教育－The Engineering, Science, Management War Training（ESMWT）programの紹介を中心に－」）
2024.4.25	金ヨング教授招聘・研究交流
2024.5.28	研究セミナー（第14回 西尾隆志「日独航空技術移転史の到達点」）
2024.7.11	**第11回公開シンポ「ガザのジェノサイドとリベラリズムの危機」**開催
2024.7.16	研究セミナー（第15回：里見柚花「19世紀後半の電気通信産業とロンドン商工会議所」）
2024.7.25	中国社会科学院日本研究所の来訪（共同研究の打ち合わせ）
2024.7.26	『国際武器移転史』第18号発行
2024.9.24	研究セミナー（第16回：奥山誠「ドイツ労働組合総同盟の雇用創出構想―「積極的な世界経済政策」からWTBプランへ―」）
2024.10.15	研究セミナー（第17回：田嶋信雄「東ドイツ＝中国関係と世界政治の変動：1978－1990」）
2024.11.7	Christopher Hughes（ウォーリック大学教授）と共同研究の打ち合せ
2024.11.19	研究セミナー（第18回：西尾隆志（研究所・研究推進員）「日本の防衛産業に関する研究：Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's defence industry," in Hartley and J. Belin eds., *The Economics of the Global Defence Industry,* Routledge,2019の紹介」）
2024.11.29	国際シンポジウム「Modern War Industry & Science : Focusing on the Perpetual War in the Middle East」開催
2024.12.17	研究セミナー（第19回：太田慧「中国の防衛産業に関する研究：Sarah Kirchberger and Johannes Moh, “China’s defence industry,” in K. Hartley and J. Belin eds., *The Economics of the Global Defence Industry*, Routledge,2019の紹介」）
2025.1.9	研究所がグローバルフロントの16階から17階に移転
2025.1.30	『国際武器移転史』第19号発行
2025.3.5-7	研究合宿（岐阜・愛知：各務原航空宇宙博物館・大江時計台航空史料室） 

2025.4～	**全学共通総合講座（春学期）開講（「アジア国際秩序の軍事再編と武器移転の連鎖」、コーディネーター：須藤功）**
2025.5.19	Christopher Hughes（ウォーリック大学 UK 教授）招聘
2025.5.21	国際ワークショップ「日本の軍需産業と防衛政策」 第１報告：「日本の防衛産業戦略と戦闘機生産–ティアワン・ステータスの獲得とGCAPプロジェクト–」クリストファー・ヒューズ（ウォーリック大学教授） 第２報告：「日米関係の変化と日本の軍事産業–「専守防衛」の軍事産業から「日米同盟」下の軍事産業へ–」白戸 伸一（国際武器移転史研究所・客員研究員） コメンテーター：纐纈 厚（国際武器移転史研究所 客員研究員） 
2025.6.3	研究セミナー（第21回：石原明徳「1980年代に軍事転用された海外移転航空機」）
2025.6.21	「イラン・イスラエル戦争の即時停戦を求める研究集会」開催 報告：「国際武器移転構造から見たイラン・イスラエル戦争」佐原 徹哉（明治大学） リレートーク：「イランの視点から」松永 泰行（東京外国語大学） 「パレスチナ・イスラエルの視点から」鈴木 啓之（東京大学） 「レバノンの視点から」黒木 秀充（東京外国語大学） 「ロシア・ウクライナ戦争の視点から」下斗米 伸夫（神奈川大学） 「極東安全保障の視点から」纐纈 厚（明治大学） 司会：横井 勝彦（明治大学国際武器移転史研究所）
2025.7.25	『国際武器移転史』第20号発行

編　集　後　記

今に始まったことではないが、近ごろ、山火事や地震など天災が頻発している。その一方で、軍事紛争も世界に拡がっている。気候変動などを原因とする天災に対し、人間は人知を絞り、団結して立ち向かう。天災に政治や経済、文化や歴史の差異は無縁だから。

だが、人災とも言うべき軍事紛争には、政治や経済、さらには文化や歴史の差異のためなのか、いまだ解決の方途を見出せないでいる。その一方、差異を認めたうえで、解決のための糸口が、数多提唱されてはいる。「平和共同体の構築」や「和解無き共存」など、新たな平和システムや用語が、次々と議論の俎上に挙げられる昨今だ。

既存の国際秩序の崩壊と混乱、多層化する国際社会。だが、呻吟してばかりはいられない。そこから私たちの研究力が求められてもいる。研究とは、この差異を克服する知恵を紡ぎ出すための実践である。その意味で人間史（人類史ではなく）にとって、取り分け人文社会科学分野の役割期待が、頗る大きくなっているに違いない。

本研究所は、創設以来10周年を迎える。本機関誌も20号の大台に乗った。活動年数と号数は、確かに実績の指標となるが、同時に役割期待にどこまで応え得たかの回答でもある。私たちは、軍事紛争に絡めて流通する武器を追い、その実態を明らかにしようとしてきた。それを「武器移転史研究」と呼ぶ。それによって軍事紛争の根絶する方途を見出すことに、本研究所は尽力してきた。

山火事が天災だとしても、人力によって鎮火できるように、軍事紛争も人知によって、文字通り「鎮火」することは可能なはず。恐らく本研究所の役割、本誌発行の目的も、そこにあろう。そんな思いを滾らせながら、受け継がれてきたのだ。その有様の一端を、本誌では座談会で回顧し、年表で確認している。そこには、次の10年（20周年）、次の20号（通号40号）への決意と覚悟が刻印されている。

（纐纈　厚・こうけつ　あつし）

『国際武器移転史』第 20 号
2025 年 7 月 18 日印刷　　2025 年 7 月 25 日発行

編集・発行　明治大学国際武器移転史研究所
代表者　須藤　功

連絡先住所　〒 101-8301　東京都千代田区神田駿河台 1－1
明治大学グローバルフロント 17 階
明治大学国際武器移転史研究所
Email: rihgat_journal@meiji.ac.jp
URL: http://www.kisc.meiji.ac.jp/~transfer/

印刷・製本　株式会社　サンヨー