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Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere

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This paper analyzes the historical genealogy of the Anglosphere concept in order to examine the nature of interstate cooperation in the post-global era. Specifically, it examines the following historical backgrounds: the Greater Britain Initiative in the late 19th century, Joseph Chamberlain's tariff reform movement and the Round Table movement in the early 20th century, Winston Churchill's international order concept after World War I, Anglobalization after the end of the Cold War, the writings of Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett, and Brexit and the Global Britain Initiative. In order for the Anglosphere to strengthen the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States and to build good relations with Asian and African democracies in the Indo-Pacific region in the future, the core countries of the Anglosphere, consisting of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America, should cooperate with "like-minded countries" such as Japan and must overcome the racist origins of the Anglosphere concept and the negative legacy of imperialism.

Introduction

Since the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union ("Brexit"), based on a referendum on June 23, 2016, the concept of the Anglosphere has gained international attention. The Anglosphere is widely understood to consist of five countries: the CANZUK countries, consisting of the United Kingdom and the former Dominion countries of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and the United States, which currently has an intelligence and security alliance with the CANZUK countries called Five Eyes. However, the boundaries of the Anglosphere are geographically elastic and ambiguous, which is one of its political attractions, and more recently it has been expanded to include India, Singapore, and Hong Kong, which were once part of the British Empire. In addition, English-speaking countries in Africa and the West Indies and Ireland are also included in the Anglosphere, although this is controversial (Bennett, 2016; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 1; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 2, 5; Vucetic, 2011, p. 3).

In this paper, the five core countries of the Anglosphere are the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. It is crucial to determine the character and characteristics of these core Anglosphere countries from a historical perspective to predict future relations with non-white countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, this paper examines the historical genealogy of the Anglosphere concept to investigate the nature of inter-state cooperation in the post-global era, seeking to clarify future issues from the perspective of Japan. In Chapter 2, the nature and characteristics of the Anglosphere are

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discussed. Chapter 3 presents the historical origins of the Anglosphere concept, including the Greater Britain concept of the late 19th century, the tariff reform movement and Round Table movement of the early 20th century, and Winston Churchill's concept of an international order after World War I. Chapter 4 examines Anglobalization after the end of the Cold War, the writings of Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett, and Brexit and the Global Britain concept to understand the present state of the Anglosphere concept.

1. What is the Anglosphere?

First, it is important to understand the character and characteristics of the Anglosphere.

Anglosphere is a relatively newly coined term first used by science fiction author Neal Stephenson in his 1995 novel *The Diamond Age* (Stephenson, 1995). However, over the past 28 years, it has also come to represent a political discourse that refers to English-speaking countries that share certain characteristics, such as liberal market economies, common law, representative democracies, and a history of Protestantism (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 2). While Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative" emphasizes ensuring a rules-based international order that includes freedom, democracy, rule of law, and respect for fundamental human rights (Cannon and Hakata, 2022), the concept of the Anglosphere is a broad. It is sometimes used to refer to a broad but ill-defined group of English-speaking countries that support the idea of freedom and the post-World War II rule-based international order. However, the Anglosphere has also been criticized and resisted at times because of the imperialistic, Anglo-Saxon racial lineage of its core countries (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 1).

Proponents of the Anglosphere often praise the development of representative democracy in England and the United States, citing the Magna Carta of 1215 as a common historical origin. However, there is little scholarly evidence to trace the origins of the Anglosphere back to 13th century England. Rather, its origins are more appropriately sought in the rise and fall of the British Empire (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 5-7). For example, Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce examined the liberal, democratic, free-market, Protestant, English-speaking political culture of the Anglosphere in relation to past Anglo-American imperial discourses (Kenny and Pearce, 2018).

Particularly since Brexit, at least in political circles, these Anglo blocs have come to be seen as a better political, economic, and cultural fit for the United Kingdom than the European Union (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 2). This cordon is known as the "global bloc". Moreover, these ties are emphasized as a precondition, so to speak, in the new post-Brexit British foreign policy of "Global Britain" (Akimoto, 2021, pp. 84-90), which has been criticized as a return to imperialism, that is, "Empire 2.0" (Utsugi, 2021).

This criticism is rooted in a wariness of the Anglosphere's imperialist past, especially its racist origins. As international relations expert Srdjan Vucetic pointed out, the legacy of empire still haunts the Anglosphere, and it continues to be defined by its racist origins (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 8). In this sense, it reflects nostalgic notions about imperialism, as post-colonial critics, led by Edward Said, have criticized (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 4-5). Vucetic defined "race" as a "racialized identity," a social kind that exists only because people believe in its existence, or an "imagined community," which is not real in the biological sense (Anderson, 1983). The Anglosphere's origins were racist, and the friendship between the expanding United States and the declining United Kingdom

was driven by an identity discourse that implied the blood-borne unity and moral superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. As the Cold War dragged on and then faded away, the Anglosphere was positioned as the supreme symbol of "liberal internationalism" and the "human rights revolution." First centered in London and then later in Washington, D.C., the Anglosphere has dominated world international politics for the past 200 years or more. Its agents, imperialist states, companies, and peoples have colonized and industrialized large parts of the globe, displacing millions of people by force. As a result, the world is now globalized, or *An*globalized, by the Anglo-Saxon peoples. The Anglo-American special relationship, which began with the violent secession of the United States from Great Britain through the American Revolution in the 18th century, has been all but forgotten and replaced by a remarkably enduring alliance and close friendship. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have gradually established special relationships with the United States as they have acquired more sovereignty from Great Britain. Through these special relationships, the "core" of what is now called the Anglosphere, the imperial and civilized presence in global society, has been formed. Since the early 20th century, leaders of the old and new Anglo empires have jointly proclaimed moral superiority in the international community. The Anglosphere is a product of its racist past, a past that may not go away in the future (Vucetic, 2011, pp. 2, 3-4, 7).

The Anglosphere is similar to the concept of the British world in a broad sense, or the Anglo-world or English-speaking world, as James Belich and Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson argued. Indeed, the two concepts are similar.

Belich emphasized the identity of the Anglo-world, or English-speaking world, consisting of the United Kingdom, the former Dominion countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.), and the United States of America, and described the process by which the Anglo-world was formed. He stated that there was a parallel migration from "Old Britain," the British homeland, to the "British West," the Dominion countries, and from "Old America", the Atlantic coastal region of the United States, to the "American West," the western United States. Belich noted that, unlike immigration from other imperialist countries, "the Anglo diaspora began earlier, was more permanent, and its migrants went to reproductions of their own society" (Belich, 2009, p. 126). Not only famine and deprivation, but also land grants, assisted passage, charitable endeavor and government campaigns played a role in promoting immigration. In the 19th century, the Anglo-world experienced explosive population growth, more so than any other region of the world. Between 1790 and 1930, the number of English-speaking people increased nearly sixteen-fold, from 12 million to 200 million, and this rapid growth was supported by mass migration from Great Britain to the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The United States was particularly popular with Irish immigrants, attracting two-thirds of all immigrants from Britain. Australia, like New Zealand in the 1880s, became a favorite destination for British immigrants after the discovery of gold in the 1850s and 1860s. Canada, on the other hand, became the main destination for British immigrants in the early 20th century, who were drawn by the rapid economic growth of prairie towns. Migration to South Africa remained limited despite the discovery of gold and mineral resources in the late 19th century (Takeuchi, 2019, p. 4; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 14-15).

Such large-scale migration was made possible by the transportation and communication revolution that took place during the Victorian era. The increased power and speed of steamships dramatically reduced the time and financial costs of long-distance travel. Merchant shipping was monopolized by Britain, which by the end of the 19th century was

responsible for half of the world's shipping. The construction of the railroad network in Great Britain began in the 1830s and was the most developed in the Anglo-world. The top five countries in terms of per capita mileage traveled by rail in 1875 were the United States, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Great Britain, opening their vast land areas to immigration and trade. Meanwhile, the invention of the telegraph shortened time and spatial distances, and telegraph cables laid over land and on the ocean floor enabled almost instantaneous communication in the Anglo-world (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 15).

Once established, settler societies became embedded in complex transportation and communication networks to and from these homelands. Money, people, goods, and services all moved along these networks, creating strong political, economic, and cultural bonds, with distinctive patterns of Scottish, Welsh, Irish, and English immigration. Magee and Thompson emphasized the importance of British migration to the United States and the Dominion countries and the economic networks they formed, as well as the impact of the cultural identity of Britishness on the economic integration of the Anglo-world, using the concept of a "cultural economy." They argued that globalization progressed most in this Anglo-world. Mass consumption expanded in the English-speaking world after 1850, and British tastes developed in the colonial markets, facilitating trade with Britain. A shared sense of Britishness, although exclusionary and white-preferential, not only created trust and interdependence between mother country and settler societies but also helped shape consumption preferences. Strong personal ties and attachments increased the consumption of British products in settler societies. White intra-imperial trade was supported by a common currency, a common language, and preferential agreements, and cultural ties generated economic growth in the Anglo-world. It was also a time of deep integration between the Anglo-American economies. Capital investment flowed freely across the Atlantic from the City of London, providing funds for expansion and growth. Between 1865 and 1914, over 800 million pounds of British capital was exported to the United States, representing one-fifth of the world's capital exports. In return, United States agriculture enriched the British market, and grain, meat, and cheese were exported in large quantities to Britain, with a quarter of British meat imported from the United States in 1890 and 70% of British grain imported from the United States by 1900. The economic vitality of the United States was now undeniable, and massive capital investment, rapid development of science, technology, and infrastructure, and a growing urban population fueled the country's economic growth. Between 1860 and 1900, manufacturing grew dramatically in the industrial Northeast, its output quadrupled, and the United States showed the world a new model of capitalism (Takeuchi, 2019, p. 4; Magee and Thompson, 2010, p. 173; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 15-16, 20).

However, it is appropriate to consider such an Anglo-world as related to, but clearly distinct from, the global political and economic system centered on the United Kingdom, collectively called the British world-system, or the British world in the broadest sense, as John Darwin argued. Darwin saw the Dominion countries as the bridgeheads of the British world and further emphasized the existence of the British world-system, including the dependencies of the British Empire (India and Asian and African colonies) and the "informal empires" (China and Argentina). However, unlike the Anglo-world, it excluded the United States (Takeuchi, 2019, pp. 4-5; Darwin, 2009; Kenny and Pearce 2018, p. 14).

In the next chapter, we will examine how the Anglosphere concept, based on the "racialized identity" of the Anglo-Saxon nation revealed above, has been shaped in British political discourse since the 1860s.

2. Origins of the Anglosphere Initiative: From the Greater Britain Initiative to Churchill

(1) The Greater Britain Initiative – Charles Dilke and John Seeley

A small number of specialized studies have sought to understand the intellectual origins of the Anglosphere concept in Victorian Britain. Duncan Bell, in particular, presented a sophisticated discussion of the various imperial federal movements. According to Bell, the origins of the modern Anglosphere concept, which did not include the United States, can be traced back to discussions on the imperial federation under the Greater Britain initiative after the late 1860s (Bell, 2007; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 4, 17; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 7). The leading exponents of this theory were the British Liberal politician Charles Dilke and the Cambridge University historian John Seeley.

Charles Dilke popularized the concept of Greater Britain in 1868 with the publication of his travel book entitled *Greater Britain*. He traveled not only to the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand but also to India and the Pacific Islands, each of which he argued was a territory of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, although each country had different national characteristics based on differences in geography and social conditions. He wrote the following in the preface to *Greater Britain*:

> In 1866 and 1867, I followed England round the world: everywhere I was in English-speaking, or in English-governed lands. If I remarked that climate, soil, manners of life, that mixture with other peoples had modified the blood, I saw, too, that in essentials the race was always one.
>
> The idea which in all the length of my travels has been at once my fellow and my guide – a key wherewith to unlock the hidden things of strange new lands – is a conception, however imperfect, of the grandeur of our race, already girdling the earth, which it is destined, perhaps, eventually to overspread (Dilke, 2009a, p. vii).

Late Victorian thinkers like Dilke were influenced by a virulent type of "scientific racism" focused on social evolution that tended to justify the violent oppression of non-white indigenous peoples, as highlighted in recent studies on settler colonialism (Veracini, 2010; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 19). Hence, in *Greater Britain*, Dilke initially used the concept of Greater Britain as a synonym for the entire British Empire, but in the latter part of his book, he argued that the concept of Greater Britain should be limited to "English-speaking, white-inhabited, and self-governed lands" (Dilke, 2009b, p. 149). Dilke then argued that "that which raises us above the provincialism of citizenship of little England is our citizenship of the greater Saxondom which includes all that is best and wisest in the world" (Dilke, 2009b, pp. 155-156).

On the other hand, historian John Seeley published *The Expansion of England* in 1883, in which he used the concept of Greater Britain. Seeley also defined the concept very broadly, including four large groups of territories outside of England that were settled primarily by Englishmen and subject to the Queen's sovereignty [that is, (1) Canada, (2) the West Indies, (3) South Africa, and (4) Australia and New Zealand] and India (also subject to the Queen's sovereignty and governed by Englishmen, but entirely settled by different peoples) (Seeley, 2005, p. 10). Like Dilke, however, Seeley's definition of Greater Britain underwent several changes in the same book. At one point, he argued that Greater Britain was racially homogeneous (with a few exceptions) and thus could not incorporate India, but later he

argued that there were actually two Greater Britains, one the colonial empire settled primarily by Englishmen, as mentioned above, and the other India, which he called the dependency. He argued that in important respects they were opposites. Nevertheless, throughout his book, Seeley was keen to emphasize the fundamental differences between the colonial empire and India and to emphasize the importance of the former (Bell, 2007, p. 8). In fact, Seely stated the following:

> Our [British] colonial Empire stands on quite a different footing; it has some of the fundamental conditions of stability. There are in general three ties by which states are held together, community of race, community of religion, community of interest. By the first two our colonies [referring to the colonial empire] are evidently bound to us, and this fact by itself makes the connexion strong. It will grow indissolubly firm if we come to recognise also that interest bids us maintain the connexion, and this conviction seems to gain ground. When we inquire then into the Greater Britain of the future we ought to think much more of our Colonial than of our Indian Empire (Seeley, 2005, p. 11).

Further, Seeley considered the colonial empire as Greater Britain and emphasized the strength of its ties:

> Greater Britain [.....] is united by blood and religion, and though circumstances may be imagined in which these ties might snap, yet they are strong ties, and will only give way before some violent dissolving force (Seeley, 2005, pp. 50-51).

As one of the standard bearers of the Imperial Federation League (1884–1893), Seeley envisioned the establishment of a Greater Britain federal government that would unite England and the colonial empires (Baji, 2019, p. 210). This was because, already in the early 1870s, the German Empire was rising in Europe and Russia in Asia, and in order to compete with these countries, England felt the need to federate with its colonial empires, following the example of the federalization of the United States of America. Seeley stated that there were two options for the way forward for Greater Britain: One option is for each of the colonial empires to become independent. In this case, one would have to consider whether Canada and the West Indies would be better off as U.S. possessions, but in any case, English name and institutions would prevail, and the mother country would always continue to be regarded with friendly sentiment, even if secession were to be declared. Another option would be for England to bring together her very separate colonial empires into a federal state, as the United States had so easily accomplished. In that case, England would be a first-class country in terms of both population and area, on par with the United States and Russia, and would surpass the continental powers. Of course, size is not necessarily the same as greatness, and mere material size may be sacrificed if it is morally and intellectually possible to maintain first-class status. However, it is advisable to make a decision on federalization after due consideration (Seeley, 2005, pp. 15-16).

Seeley's drive for such a federal state was motivated by the belief that science and technology (steam engines and the telegraph) had shortened time and spatial distance, just as modern-day enthusiasts of the Anglosphere concept point to Internet technology as an example:

> In the last century [the 18th century] there could be no Greater Britain in the true

> sense of the word, because of the distance between the mother-country and its colonies and between the colonies themselves. This impediment exists no longer. Science has given to the political organism a new circulation, which is steam, and a new nervous system, which is electricity (Seeley, 2005, pp. 73-74).

Seeley emphasized "liberty" and "democracy" as the political ideology of a Greater Britain united by such science and technology (Seeley, 2005, p. 7). In this, too, Seeley is similar to contemporary Anglosphere enthusiasts.

However, in contrast to Greater Britain, which consisted of colonial empires, Seeley, in the latter part of *The Expansion of England*, referred to India as an entity that could not be assimilated into Greater Britain:

> England's connexion with India seems at first sight at least to be in the highest degree unnatural. There is no natural tie whatever between the two countries. No community of blood; no community of religion, for we come as Christians into a population divided between Brahminism and Mohammedanism (Seeley, 2005, p. 185).
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> The English State is powerful there [India], but the English nation is but an imperceptible drop in the ocean of an Asiatic population. And when a nation extends itself into other territories the chances are that it will there meet with other nationalities which it cannot destroy or completely drive out, even if it succeeds in conquering them. When this happens, it has a great and permanent difficulty to contend with. The subject or rival nationalities cannot be perfectly assimilated, and remain as a permanent cause of weakness and danger (Seeley, 2005, p. 46).

Seeley argued that such dangers could have been avoided in the colonial empires of Greater Britain. Like Dilke, he justified the violent oppression of non-white indigenous people, believing that England had occupied "parts of the globe which were so empty".

> There was land for every emigrant who chose to come, and the native races were not in a condition sufficiently advanced to withstand even the peaceful competition, much less the power, of the immigrants (Seeley, 2005, p. 46).

Hence, Seeley made a clear distinction between Greater Britain, which consisted of the colonial empires, and India, arguing that possession of India would surely increase the danger to England and make it a serious liability (Seeley, 2005, p. 11). In this sense, Seeley could be said to have anticipated the late 19th century perspective that emphasized the "global colour line" separating the white and non-white worlds (Lake and Reynolds, 2011).

(2) Joseph Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Movement and the Round Table Movement

Seeley's *The Expansion of England* strongly influenced Joseph Chamberlain, who promoted the tariff reform movement between 1903 and 1906. Chamberlain was obsessed with Seeley's Imperial Federalist movement and not only enrolled his eldest son, Austen Chamberlain, at Cambridge University, where Seeley was a professor, but also shared Seeley's admiration for the United States (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 26-27). The tariff reform movement was initiated by Joseph Chamberlain, beginning with his Birmingham speech on May 15, 1903. However, his imperial preferential tariff concept did not apply to Indians and other alien imperial subjects, but only to "our own kinsfolk" or the "white

population that constitutes the majority in all the great self-governing Colonies of the [British] Empire." In response to criticism that free trade with other countries was outpacing trade within the British Empire, he responded that trade with the colonies was growing faster and was more valuable to Britain. This answer was repeated in modern times by Eurosceptic advocates who emphasized trade with the Anglosphere to counter trade with the European Union (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 27-28).

Joseph Chamberlain's campaign for tariff reform was ultimately frustrated by the hostility of the free traders, who dominated the British political economy, and the working class. The commercial, financial, and shipping interests centered in the City of London, along with the cotton, coal, and shipbuilding businesses, opposed the tariff reform movement, as did the working class, because they believed that such reform would increase food prices (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 28).

However, Imperial Federalist movement was later succeeded by Alfred Milner, Joseph Chamberlain's ally and commissioner to South Africa, and Milner's kindergarten, consisting of young men from Oxford University whom Milner had recruited. Milner's kindergarten was a tight-knit political society organized to serve Milner and his successor, Lord Selborne, and included Lionel Curtis, a writer and fellow at All Souls College, Oxford; Leo Amery, the Conservative MP and future colonial secretary; and Philip Kerr, the future Lord Lothian, who later served as Lloyd George's private secretary, under-secretary of state to India and British ambassador to Washington (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 29-30).

Led by Lionel Curtis, the Millner kindergarten drafted the Selbourne Memorandum of 1907, which proposed uniting South Africa under a new federation, but also advocated for unification through federation of the entire British Empire. The Round Table movement was launched as a means to realize these ambitions. Curtis organized a network of Round Table societies in the Dominions, and Philip Kerr edited the *Round Table* journals. The first product of the Round Table movement was the Green memorandum, drafted by Curtis and published in 1910. In it, he argued, like the imperial federalists before him, that the British Empire was now in a struggle for survival. It was particularly vulnerable to German naval expansion and could only be secured by joint investment in imperial defense and security, especially sea power. He stated that Greater Britain must "federate or disintegrate". Like his predecessors, however, his plan was criticized as pessimistic, hasty, and unrealistic. The Dominion states were not ready for federation, for it was believed that the British Parliament would not cede its sovereignty to a higher political body. The exclusion of India and the other dependencies from the federalization concept also annoyed and divided Curtis's readers (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 30-32).

The period between the end of the 19th century and the two World Wars was a time of intensified racial discrimination, as Dominion countries took measures to tighten restrictions on non-white immigrants. The British government maintained the principle of "imperial citizenship," or the equal treatment of British subjects throughout the British Empire, but it also recognized the right of the self-governing colonies to enforce their own immigration laws. In particular, Indians were still deprived of their self-governing status and faced racial discrimination in the Dominion countries. At the Imperial Conferences of 1921 and 1923, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were persuaded to rescind their racist laws against Indians (South Africa refused and became isolated), but the tension between imperial citizenship and the autonomy of the Dominion countries was too great to be contained any longer (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 33-34).

It was also during this period that the path to Dominion countries' exercising the right to self-determination became clear. The Imperial Conference of 1926 issued the Balfour Declaration, defining the status of Dominion countries as "autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, through united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations". This carefully crafted principle was codified in the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which established the independence of the legislatures of the Dominion countries, including the Irish Free State. Paradoxically, the independence of the Dominion countries led to a brief revival of the tariff reform movement. By the 1930s, the economic depression, the collapse of the gold standard, and the rise of protectionism strengthened the political argument for an imperial preferential tariff, and when Britain left the gold standard in 1931, the Dominion countries also devalued with it and created a sterling area. At the Ottawa Conference of 1932, Neville Chamberlain, son of Joseph Chamberlain, negotiated an agreement with the empire countries to grant preferential tariffs on each other's products, and although Britain gained relatively little form this agreement, an imperial preferential tariff system was established. Between 1929 and 1938, British imports from Australia and Canada more than doubled, while imports from Argentina fell by almost half (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 34-35).

Although the imperial federalists could not create a single political organization that would unite the "imagined community" of Greater Britain, the political, economic, and cultural ties between Britain and the Dominion countries nevertheless remained real and strong.

(3) Winston Churchill's vision of international order

Historian Andrew Roberts, who wrote *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900* (2006), a sequel to Winston Churchill's *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples* (1956-58), points to the origins of the Anglosphere concept, including the United States, in World War I, particularly Winston Churchill's inaugural speech of the English-Speaking Union on July 4, 1917 (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 6; Churchill, 2015; Roberts, 2008). However, it was not until the decisive decline of the British Empire after World War II that the Anglo-American core of the Anglosphere, "Anglo-America," was clearly formed. When World War II began, the Dominion countries sent troops to support Britain, but the heavy defeats from 1940 to 1942 dispelled any notion that the mother country could guarantee the security of the Dominion countries. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand came to rely on the United States as the guarantor of their security, Ireland became a republic, and India gained its independence (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 14, 36).

While Churchill did not use the concept of the Anglosphere in his *History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, he praised the political and cultural achievements of the English-speaking Anglo-Saxon peoples. He noted that the Anglo-Saxon peoples constantly won wars, expanded trade, and promoted freedom, security, and welfare, all because of their liberal political culture and institutions. He held to Victorian beliefs about racial hierarchies and believed in the cultural superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, but he also held a liberal belief in the obligation to act humanely toward other peoples. Hence, he was sharply critical of Nazi Germany's racial exploitation and violence and declared that Britain and the British Empire would fight to the end against Hitler (Churchill, 2015; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 39, 40-41; Legrand, 2019, p. 64; Vucetic, 2011, p. 2).

When World War II broke out, Churchill, as British Prime Minister, persuaded the United States to join the European front, and the financial support provided by the United States to Britain after 1941, mainly through the Lend-Lease scheme, was considered necessary to support the British war effort. It was also considered necessary to promote the formation of a liberal international order and to make the European imperialist powers, especially Britain, respect the principle of self-determination as expressed in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. Churchill, under considerable pressure by the United States to abandon Britain's imperialist ambitions, repeatedly made rhetorical references to the common history and future unity of English-speaking peoples to resolve such Anglo-American differences of opinion. For Churchill, the deep historical relationship between Britain and the United States was the basis for shaping a new international order that would protect the interests of the British Empire while respecting the ambitions of the United States, safeguarding the security and prosperity of Western nations, and helping to build a new era of liberal civilization (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 46-47, 49-50).

Churchill's first public statement regarding the special relationship between Britain and the United States was the "Iron Curtain" speech that he delivered at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. In his speech, Churchill used grand rhetoric, stating that Britain and the United States were bound together by an English tradition of governance, a common heritage of representative democracy and freedom that had evolved over the centuries and had been carried far by previous generations of immigrants (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 50-51; Vucetic, 2011, p. 2):

> Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States. [.....] The United States has already a Permanent Defence Agreement with the Dominion of Canada, which is so devotedly attached to the British Commonwealth and Empire. This Agreement is more effective than many of those which have often been made under formal alliances. This principle should be extended to all British Commonwealths with full reciprocity. Thus, whatever happens, and thus only, shall we be secure ourselves and able to work together for the high and simple causes that are dear to us and bode no ill to any. Eventually there may come - I feel eventually there will come-the principle of common citizenship (Churchill, 1946).
>
> [.....] we must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence (Churchill, 1946).

Churchill's theory of history still has many adherents, many of whom believe that Churchill was right. In fact, it seems Churchill was right because although decolonization destroyed the British Empire, it left behind a distinct but loosely knit community deeply committed to freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and English as the lingua franca. The "Iron Curtain" speech was delivered precisely as the English-speaking peoples were triumphing over the fascist axis of Nazi Germany and as they embarked on another war against Soviet communism (Vucetic, 2011, pp. 2-3). He spoke gravely about these events:

> A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organisation intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytising tendencies. [.....] From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. [.....] The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy. [.....] Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation. These are sombre facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy (Churchill, 1946).

Since the beginning of the Cold War, the core countries of the Anglosphere have moved forward in close cooperation, and their partnership has been shaped by agreements on defense and intelligence. While on its face this was a matter of collective security against the Soviet Union, which was building up its armed forces (Legrand, 2019, p. 56), the sense of ethnic community it evoked was undoubtedly rooted in the racial thinking about the state that Churchill had acquired in his youth (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 53).

At a meeting of the British Conservative Party in 1948, Churchill pointed out that the United Kingdom was located at the intersection of "three majestic circles" in international relations. The first circle was the British Commonwealth and Empire, the second was the English-speaking world in which the Dominion countries and the United States played an important role, and the third was United Europe, which he argued Britain was at the intersection of. For Churchill, however, involvement in United Europe was secondary to his concern for British security and the Anglo-American alliance. This was an issue he became particularly interested in during the 1940s because of growing concerns about whether the United States would continue to provide defensive assistance to Western Europe in the face of a possible Soviet invasion. By the 1960s, Commonwealth markets was no longer economically profitable for Britain, and there was a growing desire for Britain to start over as part of European Communities. The imperialist lineage that Churchill had so strongly supported appeared to have become obsolete. However, as we will examine in the next chapter, the Anglosphere concept would not disappear and would in fact be revived after the end of the Cold War (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 55-58; Dilley, 2018).

3. The Anglosphere Initiative Today

(1) Anglobalization

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the Anglosphere was resurrected and became a potent way of imagining Britain's future as a globally deregulated and privatized economy outside the European Union. This understanding of the international order, combined with a political discourse predicting the triumph of "Anglobalization" in the 21st century, came to be seen by the Anglosphere advocates as a celebration of neoconservative liberal imperialism and economic neoliberalism (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 4, 140; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 9).

Understood as having special ties, the five core Anglosphere countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) share a common international language (English) and a common law-based legal system, maintain strong civil societies born of liberal democratic traditions, promote free trade principles, and have cooperative military and intelligence services (Legrand, 2019, pp. 56-57; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 9). In this post-Cold War era of "Anglobalization," new threats to U.S. hegemony have also emerged. China began its remarkable rise in Asia, and new conflicts erupted in the Middle East, including the Gulf War. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States led to a war on terrorism, with fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 132).

In the war on terror, several core Anglosphere countries responded to the military call of the United States, but political conflicts also arose, especially in the war in Iraq. Australian Prime Minister John Howard (term 1996–2007), a monarchist who ardently supported the British legacy, immediately invoked the ANZUS Treaty after the terrorist attacks in the United States and sent Australian troops first to the war in Afghanistan and later to the war in Iraq. However, Australian military involvement in the Iraq War was limited. Canada refused to contribute supplies to the war in Iraq, and New Zealand decided not to invade Iraq because of the lack of United Nations authorization for the use of military force. The Labour government of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, which came to power in 1997, invaded Iraq but attempted to get the United States to obtain multilateral support and UN authorization for the invasion, while using the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States to bridge the gap between the United States and the European Union and seeking to revitalize the Middle East peace process. Unfortunately, all of these efforts failed.

However, the Eurosceptic enthusiasts who supported the Iraq war gained vitality from the divisions it created. The alliance between the United Kingdom and the United States and the refusal of major governments in the European Union, led by France and Germany, to join the Iraq war were seen as confirmation of the fundamental unity of the United Kingdom and the United States and of the irreconcilable differences between the United Kingdom and the European Union. In particular, Canadian Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper (term 2006–2015) shared many of John Howard's ideological leanings, was skeptical of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, and reoriented Canadian foreign policy toward a neoconservative position. He also promoted policies that symbolized Canada's loyalty to the Crown, such as restoring royal titles to the Canadian Air Force and Navy and ordering Queen Elizabeth II's portrait to be displayed in diplomatic missions abroad. Early in his premiership, Harper delivered a Churchillian speech, declaring that the "little island [Britain]" and the "great Dominion [Canada]" were forever

linked by language, culture, economy, and values (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 5, 133-136, 141-142).

(2) Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett

The Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank in the United States, held conferences on the Anglosphere in Washington, D.C., and Berkshire in 1999 and 2000. Its leading participants included Margaret Thatcher, David Davis, Conrad Black, Francis Fukuyama, James C. Bennett, John O'Sullivan, Robert Conquest, Owen Harries, and Kenneth Minogue (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 5). Here, we focus on the writings of Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett, two of the most influential advocates of the Anglosphere.

In his *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* (2000), Conquest, an authoritative scholar of Soviet Union history, concluded that the political system in the West was flawed and argued that the European Union had not been the element of strength that some had hoped for. He called instead for a more fruitful union of the core countries of the Anglosphere. Conquest himself believed that Britain should remain in the European Union and join the new association of nations, the Anglosphere, and become a bridge between the two. It was far more attractive for Britain to maintain historical relations with the core nations of the Anglosphere, built on cultural ties, a common history, and similar political institutions, than to fight to preserve its own sovereignty within the bureaucratic and heterogeneous model of the European Union. In *Dragons of Expectation* (2005), Conquest described how an alliance of the core countries of the Anglosphere would be organized, claiming that the presidents of this alliance would be the President of the United States and the Queen of England. This idea gained support from many intellectuals and politicians. Margaret Thatcher supported Conquest's idea of contrasting the Anglosphere with the European Union, saying that an alliance of the core countries of the Anglosphere would redefine the political landscape. This attracted the attention of conservative politicians and commentators, including Lord Howell, who served as Minister of State for International Energy Policy at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Conquest, 2001, pp. 267-288; Conquest, 2006, pp. 229-230; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 125-128; Howell, 2014).

Meanwhile, James C. Bennett, a technology entrepreneur, wrote *The Anglosphere Challenge* (2004), arguing that in the 21st century, the core Anglosphere countries, which are English-speaking countries, would be likely to cooperate and dominate international relations. This is because, as a result of the rapid development of global network due to the advent of Internet technology, English, the lingua franca, has become even more important, and a common English-derived culture characterized by freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and basic human rights has become important as a basis for economic cooperation and political and military allegiance within the Anglosphere. At the core of that common culture was the English tradition of individualism. Bennett noted that advances in digital and other technologies were breaking down geographic barriers and creating new opportunities for trade with remote areas, and that increased economic cooperation among the core countries of the Anglosphere foreshadowed the emergence of a loose coalition with other "like-minded countries." He also praised the existence of "English-speaking networks" that unite English-speaking countries and the intelligence-sharing mechanism known as Five Eyes. Bennett cautioned against the pursuit of multiculturalism in the core Anglosphere countries and the loss of the "national cohesion" that had enabled the reproduction of such values, but he stressed that the organic cooperation that characterized the Anglosphere was far superior to the bureaucratic and artificial projects of the European

Union (Bennett, 2004; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 128-130; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 6).

(3) Brexit, Global Britain, and the Indo-Pacific

Influenced by these writings emphasizing the importance of the Anglosphere, the Eurosceptics in the British Conservative Party and the think tanks, political magazines, lobbying groups, and intellectuals surrounding it began to seriously consider the possibility of an Anglosphere outside the European Union. This trend was further reinforced when the 2010 British general election ended the long reign of the Labour Party and a coalition government of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats was formed (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 144-145).

This increased political interest in the Anglosphere was also motivated by the growing support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which won large numbers of votes in the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections, and the prospect of a British exit from the European Union became increasingly real. When Poland and other Eastern European countries joined the European Union in 2004 and the number of Eastern European immigrants to the United Kingdom increased, Nigel Farage, the leader of the UKIP, said that remaining in the European Union would make it impossible for the United Kingdom to control the flow of immigrants. He stoked the fears of the British public about immigration and established the UKIP as a radical right-wing populist party. In the 2014 European Parliament elections, the UKIP came out on top, winning more than a quarter of the vote. The party's breakthrough was one of the most important factors behind Prime Minister David Cameron's pledge to hold a referendum on Britain's exit from the European Union during the 2015 British general election campaign (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 145, 154).

The UKIP's manifesto during this period emphasized the history and ties between the UK and the Commonwealth, arguing that they had been betrayed and ignored by previous governments. In the 2010 general election, the UKIP positioned itself as the "party of the Commonwealth" and argued for a Commonwealth Free Trade Area. In the 2015 general election, it made explicit reference to an Anglosphere. The United Kingdom is not just another European country but part of the Anglosphere, a global community. Beyond the European Union and the Commonwealth, there is a network of Anglosphere countries that share English as the lingua franca, common law, the democratic tradition, and the benefits of global trade. The UKIP stated that it wanted to foster close ties with these Anglosphere countries, from India to the United States and from New Zealand to the Caribbean. In addition, after the 2010 general election in the United Kingdom, William Hague, Boris Johnson, David Davis, Michael Gove, and Daniel Hannan, all major figures in the British Conservative Party, began to publicly declare the Anglosphere's potential as a counterweight to the European Union. They sought closer ties with conservative governments in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and increased engagement with the Commonwealth and Anglosphere countries. David Davis said, "We share history, culture and language. We have family ties. We even share similar legal systems. The usual barriers to trade are largely absent" (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 145; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 10, 15).

The decision to leave the European Union, formalized in a referendum on June 23, 2016, led the British government to officially declare its Global Britain initiative based on the Anglosphere. Boris Johnson, a politician strongly influenced by Churchill's achievements, as Foreign Secretary in Theresa May's cabinet revived the idea of a British military

presence east of Suez, an idea that had been abandoned since the late 1960s. In a speech in Bahrain in December 2016, Johnson stated that the UK would open a naval support facility there, create a resident force in Oman, and establish new defense staff centers in Dubai and Singapore. Also in March 2018, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office submitted a memorandum titled "The Government's Vision of Global Britain and the Role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Supporting and Enabling Government Departments to Deliver This Vision" to the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee. While placing top priority on the alliance with the United States, the memorandum declared that the United Kingdom would place emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region, which would become the center of global economic growth. On September 4, 2021, after Johnson became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, a fleet including Britain's new aircraft carrier, the HMS *Queen Elizabeth*, arrived in Yokosuka, Japan. It was a symbolic event that signaled Britain's increasing focus on the Indo-Pacific region in cooperation with Anglosphere countries (Johnson, 2014; Akimoto, 2021, pp. 84-90; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 146, 160; Akimoto, 2022, pp. 312-315).

Conclusion

This paper has traced the historical genealogy of the Anglosphere concept from the Greater Britain concept of the late 19th century to the Global Britain concept after Brexit. In concluding this paper, I must emphasize the racist origins of the Anglosphere concept. The legacy of empire still looms over the Anglosphere, and some have criticized its racist origins, calling it "Empire 2.0." Its central theme is that defenders of the Anglosphere everywhere seem to take an overly positive and uncritical view of the legacy of the British imperial past and express nostalgia for the empire.

The Anglosphere concept appears to be dominated by ideology rather than by economic interests. Indeed, in the Indo-Pacific region, there are free trade agreements that involve the core countries of the Anglosphere (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In addition, the United States President Joe Biden has called for an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). However, the argument presented as the basis for the claim that the Anglosphere countries are potentially important trading partners for the UK—that UK exports to the Commonwealth countries have increased much faster than those to the European Union over the past decade—is questionable. This is because, in aggregate terms, the Commonwealth countries have accounted for a relatively small share of UK exports (6–8%) over the past two decades, whereas the European Union has accounted for almost half of all UK exports. The relative decline of the European Union as a trading partner is the result of the rise of China rather than the growing importance of the Commonwealth. Although Britain hopes to revitalize the Commonwealth through the development of trade with India, there is still no agreement on the status of countries outside the core Anglosphere, especially English-speaking countries like India, Singapore, South Africa, and Ireland. It appears to be difficult to actualize the Anglosphere beyond cooperation in the security field, such as Five Eyes, the Trilateral Security Partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS), and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia and India (QUAD) (Kenny and

Pearce, 2018, p. 160; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 17-18).

Moreover, the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States has not always been rock solid. In fact, successive political leaders of the United States have understood British membership in the European Union as a solution to the decline and dismantling of the British Empire. In fact, President Obama opposed Brexit from this perspective, inviting considerable criticism from those in favor of Britain leaving the European Union. The Trump presidency also exposed the fragility of the Anglo-American unity and its special relationship (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 10, 12).

The future challenge for the core countries of the Anglosphere will be how to overcome the racist origins of the Anglosphere concept and the negative legacy of imperialism to work with the Asian and African democracies in the Indo-Pacific region while maintaining the Anglo-American special relationship. Japan, as a "like-minded" Asian democracy with similarities to the core countries of the Anglosphere, could play a role in bringing the special Anglo-American relationship closer together and acting as a bridge between the core countries of the Anglosphere and the democracies of Asia and Africa. However, for Japan to fulfill this role, it must, like the core countries of the Anglosphere, reflect on and strive to overcome the negative legacy of past imperialism.

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the "American Lake": Focusing on Militourism in Hawai'i

By KAORI TAKADA*

Hawai'i has stood at the intersection of military strategy and tourism development, serving as a principal home port for the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet while concurrently becoming a sought-after tourist destination since attaining statehood in 1959. This paper delves into the intertwined dynamics of militarization and tourism in Hawai'i, exploring their evolution into an inseparable nexus. Centered on Hawai'i's pivotal role in Pacific militarization and tourism, the paper examines the concurrent escalation of military fortification and nuclear proliferation during the Cold War era. It traces Hawaiian transformation from a strategic military outpost following its annexation by the United States in the 19th century to a focal point of global wartime air networks during World War II. In addition, it analyzes the resurgence of both military and civil aviation sectors during the Korean War and their subsequent impact on Hawai'i's militarization. Attention is directed towards Hawaiian democratization movement following the Korean War, influencing further militarization efforts and shaping the state's path to statehood. It focuses on "militourism" in Hawai'i, the center of the "American Lake," offering valuable insights into the multifaceted relationship between military activities and tourism development in the region.

Introduction

Since the conclusion of World War II, the operational scope of U.S. military activities in Hawai'i, particularly within the confines of Oahu, has steadily expanded. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam has served as the principal headquarter for the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet and the Air Force Pacific Command, and Schofield Barracks as a site for infantry training center during the Korean War[1]. The genesis of mass tourism in militarized Hawai'i can be traced back to 1959, when it became the fiftieth state and Pan American World Airways (Pan Am), a prominent U.S. airline, launched Jet Clipper between Mainland and Hawai'i in the same year. The advent of the jet age, epitomized by the introduction of the Boeing 707, engendered a notable decline in airfares in the 1960s and catalyzed the proliferation of tourism to Hawai'i[2]. How did these incongruous influences of the military and tourism coalesce into an indissoluble nexus? Throughout the Cold War era, Hawai'i functioned as

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1 Kajihiro [2009], pp. 299-328.

2 Mak [2008], p. 16.

the United States' conduit to the Asia-Pacific region; furthermore, it captivated tourists with its alluring cultural portrayal as a quintessential Pacific paradise since the early twentieth century[3]. This paper scrutinizes "militourism" in Hawai'i.

The concept of militourism, as delineated by Theresia Teaiwa, encapsulates the phenomenon in which military or paramilitary forces facilitate the seamless operation of a tourist industry and are concurrently obscured by the veneer of said tourist industry. This paper critically probes the militarization of the Pacific, contextualizing it within the dynamics of intercontinental relations among Europe, the Americas, and Asia, where the imperceptible within this militarized region. The discourse critically interrogates the erasure of Indigenous communities in the Pacific region. In locales such as Guam, Hawai'i, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia, militarism manifests itself in a manner that both sustains military installations and fosters tourism, thereby engendering employment opportunities while simultaneously dispossessing local populations of their land and undermining Indigenous livelihoods. Notably, in Hawai'i, the military apparatus has institutionalized practices such as rest and recuperation (R&R) for servicemembers, and it oversees not only medical facilities but also a hotel such as Hale Koa Hotel operations[4]. Following Teaiwa's analysis, a notable corpus of research, especially militourism researches on countries such as Cuba, the Philippines, Guam, Hawai'i, and Okinawa have accumulated in recent years[5]. However, studies on militourism typically acknowledge but do not delve into aeromobilities, namely international civil aviation, which has been indispensable to global tourism since World War II. This paper endeavors to address this research gap by focusing on the role played by military and civil aviation networks in shaping the postwar international aviation order in World War II era and the subsequent militarization of the Pacific throughout the Cold War period.

The history of international aviation during the Cold War has gained increasing scholarly attention since the 1990s. Commencing with the seminal work of Dobson and Engel, which scrutinized the U.S.–U.K. competition regarding the postwar aircraft industry and the consequent emergence of international civil aviation during World War II and the Cold War[6], scholars have studied various facets of the interplay between nations. This research includes examinations of the dispute over the U.S.–Netherlands aviation agreement, the Soviet Union's withdrawal from participation in the Chicago International Civil Aviation Conference in November 1944, and the civil aviation policies of Yugoslavia, which developed its own air routes amid internal conflicts within the Eastern Block[7]. Peter Svik's insightful analysis, which elucidates the globalization of the Cold War through an examination of civil aviation policies adopted by both Eastern and Western blocs, is notable among these studies[8]. Additionally, research has explored the impact of Cold War military and economic aid packages on decolonization efforts and the establishment of air forces and civil aviation enterprises in regions such as Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. For instance, Katsuhiko Yokoi's examination of the Indian Air Force and civil aviation in India directly addresses the concept of "independence of armes production" in international arms transfers during the Cold War. Similarly, Waqar Zaidi's investigates the creation of a Pakistani air force and Pakistan airlines through the economic and military assistance from

3 Klein [2003], pp. 161-163.
4 Teaiwa [1999], pp. 251-252.
5 See, Gonzalez [2013]; Ginoza [2016]; Lisle [2016]. Also, regarding the linkage between militarism and tourism, See, *Special Issue: Tours of Duty and Tours of Leisure, American Quarterly*, 68-3 (September 2016).
6 Dobson [1991]; Engel [2007].
7 Van Vleck [2013]; Scott-Smith and Snyder [2013]; Gormly [2013]; Tiemeyer, [2015].
8 Svik [2020].

the U.S. His work also underscores the role of inter-allied arms transfers and military and economic aid in shaping the development of civil aviation during the Cold War[9].

While many of these studies have centered on Cold War alliances, the discourse on civil aviation in the Pacific has revolved around the overwhelmingly influential U.S. civil aviation sector. Compared to conventional air transportation studies, analyses of Asia–Pacific civil aviation have focused on contemporary economic evaluations rather than on historical inquiries. Despite this, the genesis of Pacific civil aviation during the Cold War period cannot be divorced from the U.S. occupation of Japan. Transportation activities were further amplified during the Korean War; in addition to the United States, other nations involved in the occupation of Japan operated Pacific routes to facilitate traffic between these regions[10].

Focusing on Hawai'i, which has emerged as a focal point of militarization and tourism in the Pacific, this paper delves into the process of heightened military fortification and nuclear proliferation in the region during the Cold War era. It scrutinizes the trajectory of nuclear weapon development from the onset of militarization through infrastructure construction in the Pacific, the Japan–U.S. rivalry involving Hawai'i, and the establishment of the international aviation order following World War II. This study elucidates the concurrent escalation of military buildup and nuclearization across the Pacific during the Cold War and juxtaposes with the burgeoning development of Hawai'i as a sought-after tourist destination.

Initially, the author explores the United States' ingress into the Pacific during the 19th century and the subsequent annexation of Hawai'i, which precipitated the state's metamorphosis into a pivotal military outpost. Hawai'i's transition as a precedent for the land appropriation and coerced relocation witnessed not only in Okinawa and mainland Japan after World War II, but also across the broader Pacific region. Subsequently, the paper analyzes the international uproar sparked by the establishment of a global wartime air network meticulously maintained and operated by the United States. Within the United States surfaced among federal lawmakers and high-ranking officials within the Department of the Navy, who advocated for the acquisition of strategic overseas bases in foreign territories in the interest of postwar security. Consequently, the U.S. government formulated a policy aimed at securing strategic bases overseas and challenging the airspace sovereignty of the British Empire. This contentious stance precipitated the U.S.–U.K. clash concerning postwar civil aviation, culminating in the establishment of the Chicago/Bermuda system—the foundational framework of postwar international civil aviation. While extensive research has been devoted to studying competition in postwar civil aviation on the Atlantic front, historical analysis of the Pacific dimension, as highlighted earlier, has lagged in terms of scholarly inquiry[11].

Thirdly, accounting for the U.S. occupation of Japan post-World War II and the military presence in Micronesia, this paper aims to elucidate the rapid demobilization of the U.S. military, the challenges encountered in transitioning military aviation activities to meet civilian demands. Fourth, an analysis of the Korean War, which precipitated the resurgence of the struggling military and civil aviation sectors, will be conducted. Additionally, the paper will scrutinize the process of Pacific militarization that ensued alongside the shift to wartime footing. This militarization encompasses not only the establishment of a network of U.S. military bases but also nuclear testing and deployment in the Pacific region.

9 Yokoi [2020], pp. 325-354; Zaidi [2020], pp. 355-381.
10 Takada [2020b], pp. 291-324.
11 Dobson [1991], pp. 151-210.

Attention will be directed toward the militarization of Hawai‘i throughout the Cold War period. This will include an examination of the development of housing, resorts, and recreational amenities tailored to military personnel. Furthermore, this paper will explore the democratization movement in Hawai‘i following the Korean War and its subsequent impact on further militarization efforts in Hawai‘i. Additionally, the process leading to Hawai‘i's attainment of statehood and the onset of mass tourism with the advent of jet aircraft will be analyzed. Through this endeavor, the study seeks to elucidate the several factors that led to the formation of Pacific mass tourism in the jet age, with particular emphasis given to Hawai‘i's militourism within the context of making the Pacific "the American Lake."

1. U.S.–Japan Conflict over the Pacific and Hawai‘i

(1) Annexation of Hawai‘i by the United States of America and its establishment as a base of operations

During the late 18th and 19th centuries, the rivalry between the United States and Europe for the Pacific Ocean intensified. Following James Cook's expeditions, British influence extended over territories such as Australia, New Zealand, and other southwestern Pacific regions, while French dominions prevailed in much of eastern Polynesia. Notably, only the Kingdoms of Hawai‘i and Tonga managed to maintain their sovereignty amid this geopolitical contest. During this period, economic activities such as the lucrative fur trade in the North Pacific, whaling ventures across the wider expanse of the Pacific, and the trade of sandalwood flourished in the Pacific region. European traders introduced firearms to Pacific Island communities, thus transforming local dynamics. In response to labor shortages in British-controlled Australia and Fiji, islanders from the Southwest Pacific were coerced into servitude, leading to a drastic decline in Indigenous populations due to diseases introduced by European contact[12].

European influence was instrumental in the consolidation of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1795. British advisors John Young and Isaac Davis played pivotal roles in assisting King Kamehameha I, who unified the islands through military prowess and astute leadership. In recognition of their contributions, Young and Davis were granted land on Oahu. The Kingdom of Hawai‘i emerged as a vital hub, providing essential resources such as water and food to Westerners, and serving as a crucial whaling station for Western ships. Until the demise of Kamehameha I in 1819, European influence remained confined to the vicinity of the Honolulu harbor. King Kamehameha, I initiated a centralized system of governance and exerted control over foreign trade and other economic activities. He monopolized the sandalwood trade, amassing substantial wealth through lucrative trade relations with Europe. Kamehameha I also regulated the conduct of foreigners arriving in Hawai‘i. Despite efforts to curb the deleterious effects of alcohol, including the prohibition of its production and the destruction of several distilleries, the influx of rum and spirits into Hawai‘i exacerbated tensions between foreigners and Hawaiians, contributing to alcoholism developing among ruling elites and commoners. Following Kamehameha I's passing, discontentment with the rule of his successor, Liholiho, mounted, culminating in a rebellion over disputes regarding royal authority and land distribution. While most rebels were quelled, Power in Hawai‘i became more decentralized. Liholiho's ascent to the throne

12 Blackford [2017], pp. 16-17. For more on islanders' kidnapping (blackbirding), see, Takeuchi [2009].

as Kamehameha II marked the abolition of the Kapu system, a religious code that governed Hawaiian society, paving the way for the introduction and spread of Christianity[13].

In 1820, American missionaries arrived in the Hawaiian Kingdom, propelled by the fervor of the Second Awakening, which was sweeping through the United Kingdom and the United States. Hailing mostly from New England, these missionaries gradually integrated into Hawaiian society following the abolition of the Kapu system. Hawai'i soon became a focal point for American missionary endeavors and trade. Hawaiian inhabitants, valuing their associations with the missionaries over the tumultuous presence of violent and inebriated sailors and traders, welcomed the influence of these missionaries, who not only introduced Christianity to Hawai'i but also imparted elements of the United States' legal system. Initially, Hawaiian royalty permitted missionaries to reside on land they had discovered; over time, however these missionaries began to strengthen their position over Hawaiian land and societal affairs. The Hawaiian population experienced a precipitous decline due to interactions with Westerners. At the time of Captain Cook's arrival, Hawai'i boasted an estimated population of 400,000; however, by 1823, this figure had dwindled to 135,000. By 1893, when the United States orchestrated the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the population had plummeted to a mere 40,000[14].

American expansion in Hawai'i unfolded against the backdrop of Manifest Destiny on the mainland. President John Tyler, embroiled in conflict with Congress over domestic policy and renowned for advocating for the annexation of Texas, prioritized trade relations in Asia and the Pacific. He championed the expansion of American influence into the Pacific and extended the Monroe Doctrine to Hawai'i, insisting on British non-interference in the Hawaiian Islands. This policy became known as the Tyler Doctrine. During the subsequent Polk presidency, the annexation of the Republic of Texas led the United States-Mexican War, resulting in the acquisition of vast swathes in the southwestern United States. The Oregon Treaty, concluded with the British government, delineated the border between Canada and the United States. The consolidation of the U.S. West Coast spurred further expansion into the Pacific Ocean[15].

In 1848, the significant alterations were made to the Hawaiian Kingdom's land tenure system. American merchants and missionaries contended that the traditional royal domain system of the Hawaiian Kingdom hindered Hawai'i's development and advocated for the adoption of a Western land system known as the Grand Mahele, which facilitated individual land ownership. Initially, King Kamehameha III and other members of the Hawaiian royal family resisted this proposition. However, they were persuaded by an American lawyer who highlighted the colonization of the continental United States and the Pacific, warning that the United States would annex the Hawaiian Kingdom if the Grand Mahele was not implemented. Consequently, in 1850, Hawaiian land became available for sale, with parcels gradually purchased by white Americans, leading to the land dispossession of Hawaiians and the expansion of sugarcane plantations by white American planters[16].

The white American elite, comprised of missionaries, merchants, and planters, collectively known as haole, wielded significant political and economic influence within the Hawaiian Kingdom. Among them, the most influential were the large landowners who operated sugar plantations that came to be known as the Big Five. In 1873, General John Schofield and Commander Alexander, posing as travelers, assessed the site for a naval base

13 D'Arcy [2018], pp. 206-219.
14 Hixson [2013], pp. 148-150.
15 Kajihiro [2008], p. 171.
16 Hixson [2013], p. 150.

at Pearl Harbor and extolled, "Hawai'i is the jewel of the Pacific." The haole community, welcoming the military presence in terms of their own security and seeking to reinforce their ascendency over Hawaiian politics, staunchly supported the construction of the naval base by the U.S. Navy. Because of their racial and class similarities, haole and military officers forged a partnership over the control of Hawai'i[17].

Upon ascending to the throne as the seventh king of Hawai'i in 1874, David Kalakaua discerned the encroachment upon Hawaiian lands and the imminent threat to the kingdom's independence posed by white Americans. Recognizing the colonial expansion underway in the Asian and Pacific regions under Western dominance, Kalakaua embarked on a diplomatic tour aiming to seek protection for the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom. His objective was to appeal to Emperor Meiji of Japan to forge an Asian federation with Japan at the helm through an alliance between Hawai'i and Japan. Both nations suffered from unequal treaties imposed by Western powers. Kalakaua further proposed matrimonial ties between the Hawaiian royal family and the Japanese imperial family to solidify their relationship. Concurrently, an agreement was brokered between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Japanese government to facilitate the migration of laborers, resulting in the arrival of the first official Japanese immigrants to Hawai'i in 1885. However, Kalakaua's vision of an Asian federation remained unrealized[18].

In 1887, just two years after the Japanese arrived, white militias armed themselves and forced Kalakaua to adopt a new constitution. This was known as the "Bayonet Constitution," Article 20 of which reads:

> The Supreme Power of the Kingdom in its exercise, is divided into the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial; these shall always be preserved distinct, and no Executive or Judicial officer, or any contractor, or employee of the Government, or any person in the receipt of salary or emolument from the Government, shall be eligible to election to the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, or to hold the position of an elective member of the same. And no member of the Legislature shall, during the time for which he is elected, be appointed to any civil office under the Government, except that of a member of the Cabinet[19].

Hence, the Bayonet Constitution effectively stripped power from the king and consolidated it in the hands of white Americans while removing Asians from positions of authority. The enactment of the new constitution coincided with the renewal of the 1875 Treaty of Reciprocity between the U.S. government and Hawai'i. This treaty included a provision granting the U.S. military exclusive use of Pearl Harbor, thereby solidifying the Kingdom of Hawai'i as a pivotal outpost for the U.S. navy in the Pacific[20].

Following the demise of King Kalakaua in 1891, Queen Liliuokalani ascended to the throne with the aspiration of restoring Hawaiian sovereignty. Queen Liliuokalani faced staunch resistance against her efforts to nullify the Bayonet Constitution and institute a new governing framework. Working in concert with the haole elite, U.S. diplomat Stevens facilitated the landing of U.S. marine corps aboard the U.S. battleship *Boston*, effectively quelling the queen's bid for constitutional reform. Bolstered by the support of the U.S. military, the haole faction coerced Queen Liliuokalani into abdicating her throne and

17 Kajihiro [2008], p. 172; Kanuanui [2008], pp. 69,
18 Fujikane [2008], p. 18.
19 The 1887 Constitution [https://hooilina.org/collect/journal/index/assoc/HASH01b8.dir/5.pdf].
20 Lind [1984/ 1985], p. 28; Kajihiro [2008], p. 172.

subsequently proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Hawai'i in 1893. In response, U.S. President Grover Cleveland vehemently condemned military intervention as unlawful. Opposition within the United States to the annexation of Hawai'i resulted in two instances of congressional refusal to ratify the proposed treaty. From the illegal abolition of the Hawaiian Kingdom to the annexation, Hawaiian royalty continued to protest against the Republic of Hawai'i and its moves toward annexation. However, with the election of McKinley as president in 1896 and the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the movement to annex Hawai'i accelerated[21].

It was the Pacific submarine cable that made possible the Spanish-American War, fought over a vast oceanic area. The Legislature of the Republic of Hawai'i, occupied by haole, prepared grants for the laying of the submarine cable between the United States and Hawai'i. However, members of U. S. Congress, opposing to the annexation of the Hawaiian Republic, blocked the Pacific Submarine Cable Act. It was the Spanish-American War that brought the Pacific submarine cable project to fruition. While fighting the Spanish Navy in Cuba, the Navy Department in Washington ordered Brigadier General George Dewey, commanding the state-of-the-art Asiatic Fleet, anchored in Hong Kong, to attack the Spanish Navy in the Philippine archipelago through cable communications. Dewey's fleet headed for Philippine waters and defeated the Spanish Navy, winning the battle. Despite repeated protests by Queen Liliuolaraini, amid the Spanish-American War, Congress passed a resolution to annex Hawai'i in August 1898 [22].

After the annexation of Hawai'i, a concerted effort to seize land and initiate base construction commenced on the island of Oahu. In 1900, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers initiated construction, culminating in the completion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base by 1902. The naval base was to serve as a frontline base for the Philippine-American War that broke out in 1899, when Emilio Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader of Philippine, had declared independence. The U.S. Army's war for control of the Philippines, supported by the U.S. Navy, continued intermittently until 1907. In 1909, reclaiming a fish farm in Waikiki facilitated the establishment of Fort DeRussy, now the largest area in the Waikiki vicinity. In the lead-up to World War I, a series of extensive land seizures occurred on Oahu to create bases such as Fort Shafter, Fort Lugar, and Schofield Barracks, which were nestled in the inland mountains. The haole elite collaborated on the construction of these bases with the military to reinforce white-centric social structures and advance the militarization of Hawai'i and Oahu. From 1911–1914, the U.S. Army Commander in the Pacific delineated plans to encircle Oahu with a "ring of steel[23].

The militarization of Hawai'i traces its roots back to the revelation of its significance as a whaling base by the West. The concept of "Manifest Destiny" embraced by the United States in the 1840s extended to Hawai'i, catalyzing the gradual encroachment of American missionaries and merchants into the Hawaiian Kingdom. As lands within the Hawaiian Kingdom fell into the hands of white Americans, annexation further facilitated the acquisition and confiscation of land by the U.S. Army and Navy for the construction of bases on Oahu, notably the Pearl Harbor Naval Base. Subsequent developments included the establishment of the John Rogers Air Station adjacent to the naval base in 1927 and the Army Air Corps installation on adjoining land in 1934. By 1938, the deployment of B-17

21 Poblete [2021], pp. 698-699; Silva [2004], pp. 145-147.

22 Headrick [1991], pp. 99-101; Hagan and Bickerton [2007], pp. 88-89; Silva [2004], pp. 197-203.

23 Hagan [1991], pp. 226-227; Hagan and Bickerton [2007], pp. 94-101. After the conquest of the Philippines, U.S. naval bases were also constructed in Manila Bay and Subic Bay; Lind [1984/ 1985], pp. 28-29; Kajihiro [2008], p. 172.

bombers solidified Oahu's status as a pivotal combined naval and air force bases in Pearl Harbor to deter the Japanese military forces.[24]

The military officers, lived in haole community created by wealthy white Americans, shared their political views. A common concern of haole and the military officers was the Japanese immigrants in Hawai'i. They had come to fear the political influence of the outnumbered Japanese labor organization movement, and in 1920 the military intelligence stationed in Honolulu reported that the "Japanese problem" was a "racial problem." Japanese influence in the Asia-Pacific region after the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo Japanese War, was one of the factors driving the militarization of Hawai'i[25].

(2) From the Opening Japan to the Pacific War

Around the middle of the 19th century, whaling activities in the Pacific played a significant role in shaping the relationship between Japan and the United States. The waters stretching from the Ogasawara Islands to Japan, commonly referred to as the "Japan Ground," served as a prime location where sperm whales congregated; thus, the area was attractive to whaling vessels from Great Britain and the United States. In response to whaling and American business circles' anticipation of fostering trade opportunities with Asia, the U.S. government dispatched the Black Ship Fleet of the U.S. Navy to pressure the Edo Shogunate to open Japan to the outside world. This strategic move by the United States aimed to secure a foothold in the Pacific region[26].

In 1856, three years after the arrival of the Black Ships, the U.S. Congress enacted the Guano Act, which authorized the claiming the possession of unoccupied Pacific islands and the harvesting of bird droppings (guano), which were known for their utility as agricultural fertilizer. By 1903, the United States had claimed sovereignty over ninety-four uninhabited islands and atolls in the Pacific. Among these territories, Midway Atoll emerged as a strategic site for both a military base for the U.S. Navy and a fertilizer source. Conversely, following Japan's opening to the Western world, Japan claimed the ownership of the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands in 1876. [27].

Following the Meiji Restoration, the influx of Japanese immigrants to Hawai'i and the U.S. West Coast presented a citizenship dilemma for the U.S. government. In 1885, pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement between Japan and the Kingdom of Hawai'i, numerous Japanese laborers migrated to Hawai'i. However, this became a contentious issue when the United States annexed the islands. Criticism of Japan's militarism escalated following its victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo- Japanese wars, fueling a substantial anti-Japanese immigration movement in California during the early 20th century. Tensions reached a peak, resulting in discriminatory practices such as the exclusion of Japanese children from schools in California. This situation was eventually resolved through negotiations between the Japanese and U.S. governments, culminating in the signing of the U.S.–Japan Gentlemen's Agreement in 1907, which was an agreement to refrain from immigration of Japanese male workers.[28].

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[24] "History of Hickam Field, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawai'i," [https://www.15wing.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/376269/history-of-hickam-field-joint-base-pearl-harbor-hickam-Hawai'i/].

[25] Lind [1984/1985], pp. 29-31.

[26] Goto [2017], pp. 39–47.

[27] Poblete [2021], pp. 692–693.

[28] As for Japanese immigrants to Hawai'i and the United States, Azuma [2005], pp. 49-50; After World War I, the Japanese government endeavored to secure a racial equality clause in the Charter of the League of Nations. However, due to the indifference of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, this aspiration remained unrealized. See, Shimizu [1998], pp. 137–162.

Japan capitalized on an opportunity to expand its influence in the Pacific after Germany's defeat in World War I. Prompted by the outbreak of war in Europe, Japan, in alignment with the Anglo-Japanese alliance, declared war on Germany. This led to the deployment of naval forces to the Pacific Island region, resulting in the occupation of Micronesia and the establishment of an archipelago defense force headquarters. Subsequently, Japan asserted its claim over the occupied German territory of Micronesia, a claim recognized by Great Britain, Russia, and France. However, President Wilson opposed Japan's mandate over Micronesia. Despite this opposition, Japanese rule was acknowledged under the League of Nations mandate system, and Japan retained its mandate over Micronesia even after withdrawing from the league. Referring to Micronesia as Nansei Shoto (the South Sea Islands), the Japanese government encouraged immigration and agricultural development in the region. Many of the migrants to Micronesia hailed from Okinawa Prefecture and the Yaeyama Islands. Japanese immigrants on Rota Island reported that, "Guam is within arm's reach of Rota's ranch," and "Guam's residents facing thick American racism[29]."

During the interwar period, the Hawaiian ruling class perceived the sizable Japanese American population to be a challenge. Despite the 1907 U.S.–Japanese Gentlemen's Agreement, which did not prohibit the entry of wives, children, picture brides, parents of Japanese immigrants workers into the archipelago, the number of Japanese immigrants increased. Japanese immigrant workers organized large-scale strikes, supported by Nisei, to demand higher wages for plantation labor. The 1909 strike aimed to abolish the racial wage system, while another significant strike in 1920 involved Japanese American and Filipino workers who sought increased wages. In response to these developments, the local U.S. military suggested placing Japanese American workers under military control. However, a growing number of U.S.-born Japanese Americans held U.S. citizenship, posing a challenge to such proposals. In 1922, the Governor of the Territory of Hawai'i urged U.S. President Harding to address the high percentage of Japanese immigrants in Hawai'i, as they constituted over 40% of Hawai'i's total population of 253,000 in 1920. Efforts were made to promote tourism as a means of attracting white workers or the white middle class to the islands[30].

In the 1920s, Matson Navigation Company and Hawaiian Tourist Bureau, conducted various advertising campaigns to the mainland. Hawaiian Tourist Bureau Association ran an ad about "Honeymoons in the South Seas" in the mainland newspapers and magazines. It showed local Hawaiian women placing flower leis around the necks of white couples. Throughout the 1920s, tourism became the third largest economic sector, after sugar and pineapple production. The image of the wealthy white or middle-class mainland Americans as tourists to Hawai'i became widely popularized through magazines and Hollywood movies. Rather, the presence of Asian residents did not appear there[31].

Utilizing the Royal Hawaiian brand, the haole community spearheaded beach development through the Waikiki Beach Reclamation Project and the construction of a canal between 1921 and 1924. The iconic Royal Hawaiian Hotel opened its doors, followed by the inauguration of the Pink Palace of Royal Hawaiian Hotel in 1927. Despite a temporary setback in tourism caused by the Great Depression of 1929, visitor numbers rebounded by 1935. Notably, Castle and Cook, a prominent member of Hawai'i's Big Five landowners, acquired shares in the Matson Navigation steamship line, which led to the expansion of its liner service. However, this progress came at the expense of the traditional

29 Ogimi [1934], pp. 135–136 [https://dl.ndl.go.jp/pid/1899980/1/114].
30 Skwait [2010], pp. 83, 94–95.
31 Desmond [1999], pp. 79-80.

Waikiki fish farms, which formed a crucial component of the Hawaiian Legislature[32].

In 1929, the haole community established the Hawaiian Inter-Island Airline Company. Subsequently, the Civil Aeronautics Board, established under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, granted the airline a permanent operating certificate in 1939. Originally known as the Island View Airline Company, it was rebranded Hawaiian Airlines in October 1941. The airline practiced a significant racial policy: it was racially discriminatory in that it exclusively served the white population of Hawai‘i. Consequently, Americans on Japanese Ancestors and other people of color, which made up most of the population, were excluded from utilizing the airline's services[33].

In the 1930s, Pan American Airways established a Pacific route connecting Hawai‘i to the U.S. mainland. Pan Am, renowned for its service between Key West and Havana since 1927, swiftly expanded its operations into Latin America and introduced seaplanes to its Pacific routes in 1935. Pan Am's primary Pacific route extended from San Francisco via Hawai‘i to Midway Island, Wake Island, Guam, Manila, and Shanghai. The introduction of air services facilitated an influx of affluent visitors to Hawai‘i. Celebrity visits to the islands were prominently featured in movies and magazines, thus solidifying Hawai‘i's image as a tropical paradise. Additionally, Pan Am inaugurated a South Pacific route from Hawai‘i to New Zealand; however, this route was forced to cease operations following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941[34].

In his address urging a declaration of war, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt branded December 7th as "a day of infamy." The attack inflicted severe damage on the battleships of the Pacific Fleet moored at Pearl Harbor, while Hickam Air Force Base suffered substantial destruction, resulting in the loss of numerous military aircraft, including B-17 bombers. The onslaught claimed the lives of 2,402 military personnel, with 1,178 others sustaining injuries. This brazen attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed the isolationist attitudes of the American populace[35].

Japanese victories in the initial stages of the Pacific War posed logistical challenges for the Allies. However, the Battle of Midway altered the course of the conflict. This engagement witnessed fierce confrontations between Japanese and U.S. aircraft carriers coupled with intense aerial skirmishes over the island's airfields. Japan's early air superiority faltered when their main aircraft carriers were sunk at Midway in June 1942, disrupting the Japanese's ability to safeguard crucial supply routes. Subsequently, upon securing airfields along the islands, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in collaboration with civilian aviation firms like Consolidated Aircraft Company's subsidiary, Conceal, facilitated the transportation of B-17 bombers and other aircraft to Brisbane, Australia. This endeavor, known as operation steppingstone, played a vital role in reestablishing U.S. military air capabilities in the Pacific[36].

The U.S. military placed Hawai‘i under military control to better manage the Japanese American population. Governor Poindexter and General Walter Short swiftly initiated discussions on the proposed military administration and subsequently implemented martial law. This decision garnered support from Robert Shivers, head of the FBI's Honolulu office. Poindexter communicated with President Roosevelt, citing the presence of Japanese Americans as the rationale behind the imposition of a military government. Under this

32 Mak [2008], p. 82.
33 Davies [1972], pp. 316–17; Skwait [2010], p. 165.
34 Blower [2017], p. 456; Davies [1972], pp. 247–256; Konzett [2017], pp. 58–59.
35 Dallek [1979], p. 311.
36 Craven and Cate [1958], pp. 175–177.

regime, habeas corpus was suspended, and the courts ceased operations in Hawai'i. However, unlike the mass internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans on the mainland, encompassing regions such as California, Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Arizona, and other remote areas, individual Americans of Japanese Ancestry in Hawai'i were able to lead normal lives under the authority of the Hawaiian military government. Of the 1,569 individuals deemed disloyal or dangerous, 1,466 were of Japanese ancestry, constituting only 1% of the total Japanese American population[37].

Delos Emmons, succeeding General Walter Short, assumed leadership of the military administration in Hawai'i. Emmons, a graduate of the Army Air Corps Tactical School who was trained in flight, was appointed by President Roosevelt as chief of the General Headquarters Air Force in 1939. Known for advocating the use of bombers to bolster offensive capabilities, Emmons was chosen to head the Hawaiian command at the insistence of Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, following the Pearl Harbor attack. Having previously served as an Army Air Corps officer at Fort Shafter from 1934 to 1936, Emmons possessed intimate knowledge of Hawai'i's demographics, particularly the significant role of Japanese Americans in the local economy. Emmons swiftly instituted a policy of racial tolerance toward ethnic groups, emphasizing the "Americanism" campaign among Nikkei while staunchly opposing discrimination against Japanese Hawaiians. In 1943, Japanese Americans were permitted to volunteer for military service, resulting in 12,000 Nisei Hawaiians of the 33,000 all Nisei soldiers serving and eventually forming the renowned 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Through their unwavering dedication, Japanese Americans demonstrated their powerful sense of patriotism[38].

Meanwhile, the military government continued its acquisition of land in the Hawaiian Islands for use by the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy. By 1944, military-controlled land had reached a total area of 600,000 acres. Among the areas seized was Kahoolawe Island off the coast of Maui. Initially leased to Angus McPhee and Harry Baldwin's Kahoolawe Ranch Company, the southern end of the island was leased to the U.S. military for bombing and artillery training in May 1941. After the Pearl Harbor attack, the military commandeered the entire island. McPhee and Baldwin demanded that the Kahoolawe Island be returned, claiming that its role as a training ground had ceased and seeking reimbursement for their investments. U.S. military authorities rebuffed their requests and retained the island for continued use as a bombing and artillery training area. Consequently, Kahoolawe Island suffered extensive devastation from bombing and shelling operations[39].

Hawai'i emerged as a pivotal hub for military intelligence operations in the conflict against Japan. The commencement of widespread city bombings during World War II necessitated enhanced aerial intelligence capabilities to refine targeting accuracy. While in Europe, the utilization of aerial photography maps, crafted by the British military, facilitated operations, analogous resources for the Pacific theater and Japan were notably deficient. Recognizing this lacuna, the U.S. Army and Navy, traditionally characterized by rivalry, forged a cooperative alliance to develop aerial reconnaissance and bombing target maps directed towards Japan. Following the pivotal victory at the Battle of Midway in June 1942, senior leaders within the U.S. Army and Navy commenced efforts to optimize intelligence operations for greater efficacy.

During World War II, Hawai'i emerged as a hub for military intelligence operation for war with Japan. The intensification of city bombings necessiated accurate aerial

37 Scheiber and Scheiber [2016], pp. 39–41.
38 Scheiber and Scheiber [2016], pp. 42–43.
39 Blackford [2017], pp. 34–35.

intelligence, a capability that was lacking for Pacific and Japan. While the British military had produed aerial photography maps for Europe, similar resources were unavailable for the Pacific theater. Recognizing the need for collaboration, the previously competitive U.S. Army and Navy joined forced to develop aerial reconnaissance and bombing target maps of Japan[40].

As various governmental and military entities had initiated intelligence undertakings, Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations, Ernest King, discerned the decentralized nature of intelligence efforts and advocated for comprehensive reorganization. Consequently, the Joint Army Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were established in late April 1943. The Naval Aviation Photography Unit (NAPU), operating from an aircraft carrier as its primary vessel, assumed the critical task of capturing photographic intelligence over Japanese territories, encompassing the Marianas, the Caroline Islands, the Okinawa Archipelago[41].

In parallel, the Naval Aviation Photography Battalion undertook multifaceted responsibilities encompassing public relations photography and strategic aerial reconnaissance activities. Notably, among the personnel mobilized for this unit was Edward Steichen, a luminary figure renowned for his contributions to major fashion publications and advertising ventures during the 1920s and 1930s. Tasked with military advertising campaigns, Steichen's unit spotlighted leisure and tourism, particularly during wartime. Employing aesthetically pleasing and stylish portrayals of servicemembers engaged in daily routines aboard aircraft carriers, these images served as potent recruitment tools for the Navy. Depictions of soldiers engaged in leisurely activities such as sunbathing conveyed a sense of American military superiority in the Pacific theater to the domestic audience[42]. Furthermore, photographic documentation extended to the environs of Hawai'i, serving as a strategic base of operations. However, these images depicted idyllic scenes of palm-fringed beaches, lush South Seas flora, and captivating sunsets, featuring solely white soldiers and American citizens while conspicuously omitting representations of the Indigenous population. Collectively, these portrayals projected Hawai'i as an exclusive military enclave, underscoring its characterization as a U.S. military "playground.[43]"

During World War II, Hawai'i assumed dual roles as a military base for the Pacific War and a recreational center for service members. Under military governance, Hawai'i's agrarian economy, centered around crops such as sugarcane, underwent a significant transformation into a military-driven economy. The military also wielded control over wartime tourism, reshaping the image of Hawai'i, which had been thought of as an exclusive resort destination frequented by Hollywood celebrities, as depicted in movies and photo magazines of the 1930s. Soldiers stationed in Hawai'i found respite through recreational activities such as Hawaiian music, hula dancing, and surfing[44].

However, the influx of military personnel also exacerbated issues such as prostitution and venereal diseases, leading to the institutionalization and control of prostitution until 1944.

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40 Takada [2020a], p. 89.

41 Kreis [2004], p. 116; Central Intelligence Agency [2009], p. ix; Marchio [1996], pp. 116–119. JANIS reports were digitized by the Constitutional Archives of the National Diet Library as part of the Strategic Bombing Survey Mission materials. About thirty-two volumes were produced for Japan, including volumes on Kamchatka, Sakhalin, Taiwan, the Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands. The collection corresponding to the Japanese mainland was produced from late 1944 to early 1945 due to the difficulty of obtaining photographic intelligence. https://rnavi.ndl.go.jp/kensei/entry/USB-1.php (Accessed: 2019/12/10).

42 Dod [1999], p. 510.

43 Lisle [2016], pp. 102–112.

44 Skwait [2010], pp. 148–149; Connelly [2021], pp. 232–234.

Seaside areas surrounding naval and air bases were developed into beach resorts, further enhancing the perception of Hawai'i as a leisure destination. Haole, in collaboration with the military, aimed to transform soldiers into tourists, and they used organizations like the United Service Organization (USO) promote the slogan "Hawai'i is paradise" to boost morale. In sum, militourism gained traction during World War II, with Hawai'i serving as a vital strategic base in the Pacific theater while simultaneously providing rest and recreation facilities for soldiers[45].

The imperialist notion of the Pacific as the "American Lake" which has been prevalent since the 19th century, was revitalized following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Throughout the war, the U. S. armed forces seized and occupied huge island territories and atolls from Japan, converting them into military bases. Additionally, between 1945 and 1947, the U.S. government implemented policies to assert dominance over the Pacific region, including placing Micronesia, a former Japanese mandate territory, under trusteeship. In the context of the war against Japan and the broader effort to establish dominance in the Pacific, Hawai'i played a pivotal role as both strategic military bases and a haven for soldiers seeking rest and relaxation[46].

2. Construction of a wartime global air network and resumption of Pacific civil aviation

The United States initiated the development and establishment of a global air network in 1941. Following the enactment of the Lend Lease Act of 1941, Pan Am, operating under contracts with both the U.S. and British governments, spearheaded the creation of a South Atlantic and Trans-African air transportation network. This network strategically linked the burgeoning U.S. aircraft industry with British vital bases across Africa and the Middle East. The endeavor encountered no resistance within the United States and was widely perceived as an active measure to bolster support for Britain[47]. On the other hand, the establishment of an air network in the Pacific region aimed to leverage existing Pan Am routes centered around Hawai'i, intending to connect Hawai'i with Australia and New Zealand. These endeavors, initially aligned with the provisions of the Lend Lease Act, were suddenly disrupted by the devastating attack on Pearl Harbor[48].

Based on the Civil Aviation Act of 1938, which positioned commercial airlines as a reserve component of the U.S. air force strength, President Roosevelt mobilized all seventeen domestic airlines of the United States. However, Pan Am, which had been actively expanding routes to Africa and the Middle East, exhibited reluctance towards military mobilization. Pan Am's pursuit of post-war operating rights in Africa, a matter discovered by the British government, further exacerbated tensions, and solidified the British resolve to safeguard their imperial air network. In July 1942, the British government proposed and signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. government to hold bilateral British-U.S. aviation negotiations as soon as possible on the issue of international civil aviation and the right to use bases and airport facilities built with the Lend Lease funds. Shortly thereafter, however, it was discovered that Pan Am had planned and surveyed the

45 Bailey and Farber [1992], pp. 95–130; Lisle [2016], pp. 99–102; Sasaki [2016], pp. 653–654.
46 Dower [1974], pp. 146–206; Takemine [2015].
47 Ray [1975], pp. 340-58; Van Vleck [2013], pp. 148-151.
48 Underwood [1991], p. 171.

construction of an airport in the British protectorate of Muscat-Oman and had applied directly to the Sultan for the right to use the airport. The British government protested vehemently to the U.S. government and demanded that Pan Am be excluded from the Africa-Middle East route. This route was to be operated by the U. S. Army Air Force, Air Transport Command (ATC) and Pan Am was excluded[49].

In response to these developments, the U.S. government established the ATC in June 1942. Tasked with orchestrating a global airlift operation, the ATC, in collaboration with domestic carriers operating under its purview, initiated extensive airlift missions worldwide. Pan Am's involvement in the Africa-Middle East route was terminated in October 1942, and the company was reassigned to participate in airlift operations across the Pacific in conjunction with the Navy Air Transport Service (NATS). The ATC, alongside domestic carriers, orchestrated a sprawling airlift service that expanded significantly over the course of the conflict. By war's end, the ATC had burgeoned from a force of 11,000 personnel to a formidable contingent of 300,000 individuals, facilitating the transportation of 30,000 aircraft to the frontlines in 1942, 72,000 in 1943, and 108,000 in 1944.[50]

The British government demonstrated foresight in addressing the post-war aviation challenge. In late 1942, a resolution in the British Parliament voiced apprehension regarding Pan Am's integration into the British imperial air network, characterizing the aviation issue as being akin to another "Boston Tea Party." Harold Balfour, the Air Minister of Britain, declared that the British government sought to take decisive action on behalf of the approximately one million workers in the aircraft industry. In response, the Interdepartmental Committee on Aviation Policy, convened by President Roosevelt in early 1943, was tasked to develop U.S. aviation policy. This committee was presided over by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle and was comprised of military and civilian aviation experts, including the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Navy, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and a representative from the Civil Aeronautics Board of the Department of Commerce. The overarching objective of the U.S. government's postwar civil aviation policy was to secure landing rights at as many airports as possible, thereby facilitating the transition of airlift operations to civilian demand by assigning international routes to commercial airlines, all while maintaining a robust global military aviation network[51].

However, congressional pressure for base acquisition, coupled with the Department of the Navy's desire acquire island bases to make the Pacific Ocean "the American lake." This led to increased interest in overseas bases constructed and maintained with Lend-Lease funds. The Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted a plan in 1943 outlining the framework for securing overseas bases, which became integral to the U.S. national security system[52]. Meanwhile, the interdepartmental committee submitted a policy proposal to the Secretary of State advocating for securing immediate rights to use valuable air facilities for postwar air commerce. This proposal also emphasized the importance of creating an international civil aviation organization and initiating negotiations with Great Britain[53]. Disagreements arose

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49 Dobson [1991], pp. 128-129; Craven and Cate [1958], pp. 53-54; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, volume 4, The Near East and Africa*, 1963, pp. 531-534.

50 Craven and Cate [1958], p. 19.

51 Berle and Jacobs [1973], pp. 482–83; Takada [2011], pp. 82–83.

52 Stoler [1982], pp. 303–21.

53 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, "Interdepartmental Subcommittee on International Aviation Preliminary Report as Adapted March 1, 1943," Record Group 105 Entry 210 Box 123, pp. 8–9.

within departments regarding the nature of air agreements: The Department of Commerce and the Civil Aeronautics Bureau favored bilateral agreements based on airspace sovereignty, while the Interdepartmental Committee recommended a multilateral approach involving general agreements, including a "fifth freedom" that would allow airlines to operate beyond right— the right to load and unload cargo and passengers between two or more countries[54].

In the postwar era, international civil aviation was shaped by bilateral aviation agreements between the United States and Britain, which were negotiated at the Chicago International Civil Aviation Conference in November 1944 and at the Bermuda Conference in February 1946. At the Chicago Conference, the U.S. advocated for a comprehensive multilateral agreement that included the "fifth freedom" right for airlines. However, the conference resulted in a commitment to bilateral negotiations. Subsequently, the Bermuda Agreement, negotiated between the U.S. and Britain in February 1946, became the foundation for postwar aviation agreements. Although the British government succeeded in limiting beyond rights of the United State in the conclusion of agreement, the latter vigorously pursued bilateral air agreements[55].

The Bermuda Agreement also addressed Pacific routes. The UK secured the right to operate a route from Singapore to San Francisco via Hong Kong, Manila, Guam, Wake Island, Midway Atoll, and Honolulu. Conversely, the U.S. obtained rights to multiple routes, including one from San Francisco or Los Angeles via Honolulu, Midway, Wake, Guam, and Manila to Hong Kong, Macau, and various destinations in Asia. Another route extended from San Francisco or Los Angeles to Dutch Indonesia. Following the Bermuda Agreement, the British government coordinated with Commonwealth countries and the U.S. to establish the Pacific route. Hong Kong emerged as a crucial hub between Asia and Southeast Asia, prompting the UK to develop the Hong Kong Airport to facilitate air travel in the region[56].

In response to the dominant air transport capacity of the United States, the United Kingdom and Commonwealth nations in the Pacific established the South Pacific Airlift Advisory Committee and launched British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines (BCPA) as a joint venture. BCPA aimed to operate a trans-Pacific route connecting Australia and the United States, thus competing with Pan Am in the Pacific region. The Australian and New Zealand governments were reluctant to grant fifth freedom rights to U.S. airlines. However, negotiations between these governments and the United States led to the signing of air service agreements in December 1946 that were like the Bermuda Agreement. This agreement paved the way for BCPA to commence operations, flying a route from Australia and New Zealand to the U.S. West Coast via Hawai‘i three times a week, starting in 1947. Meanwhile, Pan Am continued to operate a similar route twice a week[57].

After World War II, the rapid demobilization of military airlift units in the U.S. Army and Navy led to significant reductions in personnel and aircrafts. For example, the Army Airlift

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54 Dobson [1991], pp. 136–138; Smith [1950], pp. 148-150. On "Five Freedoms of the air" provides (1) innocent passage or over-flight; (2) technical stop for repairs or refueling; (3) the right to pick up passengers from an airline's country of origin and disembark them in territory of the other contracting party; (4) the right to pick up passengers in the other contracting country and disembark them in the airline's country of origin; and (5) the right to pick up passengers from the other contracting party and carry them forward to a third-party destination. The Fifth Freedom is also known as "beyond rights." See, Dobson [2017], p. 36.

55 Dobson [2017], pp. 52-55.

56 Wang [2022] pp. 45-46; Guyana (Bermuda I) Air Transport Agreement of February 11, 1946, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/g/gy/114284.htm.

57 Orders [2003], p. 177–178.

Command, which had 300,000 personnel and 3,700 transport aircrafts on September 2, 1945, saw its force shrink to 60,000 personnel and 1,500 aircrafts within a year. The focus of airlift routes shifted to the North Atlantic, Europe, and the Pacific, with reduced operations in the latter region limited to routes such as the North Pacific Great Circle route from the U.S. West Coast and via Hawai‘i. Airlift operations in the South and Southwest Pacific were handled by the Royal New Zealand Air Force Airlift Command, which operated a smaller fleet of 600 aircraft in 1947. Similarly, the U. S. Naval Airlift Command faced rapid demobilization and budget cuts and operated only 116 seaplanes in 1947[58].

As military airlift operations demobilized, efforts were made to convert airlift activities to meet civilian demand. Bilateral air agreements with countries such as Ireland, Canada, and the United Kingdom allowed the U.S. to secure landing rights, and the Civil Aeronautics Board assigned routes to commercial airlines. In the Pacific, Pan Am established a monopoly before the war. However, post-war routes were allocated to multiple companies. Pan Am and Northwest Airlines were assigned routes from the North Pacific Great Circle to Tokyo and continuing to Shanghai and other parts of Asia. Another carrier, United Airlines, received permission to fly a route from the U.S. West Coast to Hawai‘i. Subsequently, both Pan Am and Northwest were granted permission to fly to Hawai‘i, with Pan Am receiving approval in the same year, followed by Northwest in the following year in 1947[59].

Between 1945 and 1946, the airline industry experienced a brief period of growth and expansion. Eager to attract new customers, airlines demanded the production of modern airliners, leading to the introduction of state-of-the-art aircraft such as the Lockheed Constellation. Transcontinental and Western Airlines even rebranded itself as Trans World Airlines (TWA) and began operating Lockheed Constellation aircraft. By 1947, the market dynamics had shifted dramatically due to the rapid demobilization of military airlift forces, which flooded the market with surplus transport aircraft, notably the DC-3. These used aircraft, though considered obsolete for military use, found new demand in the civilian sector as they could be converted into passenger planes at a low cost. This led to an overproduction of planes and financial challenges for airlines, which was only exacerbated by stagnant passenger traffic growth and reduced demand for civil aviation[60].

The viability of international civil aviation was further complicated by regulatory issues. While the Civil Aeronautics Board granted permission for airlines such as Pan Am and Northwest to fly to Japan in 1946, the General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) in Japan was slow to act. It was not until April 1947 that GHQ/SCAP allowed these airlines to operate flights to and from Japan. GHQ also limited the use of civilian airport companies to Haneda Airport in Tokyo, which was under U.S. military control, while other airports, such as Chitose Airport in Hokkaido in northern Japan, Osaka Airport (Itami), and Fukuoka Airport, were placed under military authority[61]. Moreover, to avoid accusations of monopolizing Japanese civil aviation, GHQ/SCAP permitted other international airlines, including British Overseas Airways Company, Canadian Pacific, Qantas, Philippine Airlines, and China Airlines to operate flights to and from Japan, albeit restricting them to Haneda Airport[62].

58 Williams [1999], pp. 15, 18; Orders [2003], p. 175.
59 Davies [1972], pp. 376-377; Mak [2008], p. 15.
60 Bright [2020], pp. 79–80; Hühne [2017], p. 151.
61 NARA, Record Group (RG) 218 Entry UD 4 Box 28, Enclosure, “Appendix A: Discussion,” 11 October 1945, pp. 6–10; NARA, RG 331 UD 1148 Box 386 G4 Files, “Request for Use of International Civil Communications by Northwest Airlines, Inc., and Pan American Airways, Inc.,” February 18, 1947, pp. 1–2.
62 Davies [1997], p. 464.

After World War II, the Pacific Ocean came under significant American influence, with islands that were once fiercely contested now occupied by U.S. forces. Guam, which had been occupied by Japan during the war, was also reoccupied by U.S. forces. The U.S. Navy strongly advocated for the annexation of the Pacific region, particularly the islands of Micronesia, which had been under Japanese rule since World War I. However, the State Department opposed annexation, arguing that it would violate the rights of the island peoples to self-determination; instead, it supported the idea of establishing a trusteeship system. This difference in opinion between the military and the State Department led to controversy within the U.S. government regarding the Micronesia situation[63].

While some military officers advocated for the cultural Americanization of Micronesia through white American settlement, the U.S. used the region as a nuclear test site, profoundly altering the culture, traditions, living conditions, and ecology of the region's Indigenous inhabitants[64]. Bikini Atoll, located in the northern part of the U.S.-occupied Marshall Islands in Micronesia, was chosen as the site for the first post-war nuclear tests due to its remoteness from the Pacific transportation network and its small population, thus minimizing potential casualties[65]. President Truman approved the proposal in January 1946, and preparations were made to conduct the tests. Despite domestic protests and international criticism, the first atomic bomb test was conducted on July 1 of that year, targeting decommissioned U.S. Navy ships and Japanese and German battleships, followed by a second test conducted on July 25, 1946[66]. The United Nations did not recognize the United States' international trusteeship of Micronesia until 1947, and the U.S. military's continued nuclear testing in the region may have been aimed at erasing the political and cultural influence of the Japanese mandate[67].

After the atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll, the onset of the Cold War became evident in Europe and the Middle East in late 1946 and 1947. In response to the growing threat of communism, President Harry S. Truman announced the "Truman Doctrine" in March 1947, which aimed to provide military assistance to nations worldwide in resisting communist expansion. To prepare for the challenges posed by communism, the Truman administration developed a national security structure, leading to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act resulted in the merger of the Departments of the Army and Navy and the creation of a new branch, the Air Force. Recognizing the critical importance of aviation in both military and civilian sectors, Truman established the Air Policy Commission, also known as the Finletter Commission, led by Thomas K. Finletter, who had served as a special assistant of Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and a consultant at the United Nations Conference on International Organization as San Francisco, to formulate national aviation policy. In December 1947, the Finletter Commission issued its report titled "Surviving the Air Age," outlining its recommendations for a comprehensive aviation strategy[68].

The Finletter Commission noted the duplication of the Army and Navy airlift forces and recommended that airlift forces be integrated with the creation of the Air Force. The committee also emphasized that the combined transport capabilities of the present Army and Navy airlift forces and civilian airlift companies were inadequate for strategic airlift

63 Foltos [1989], pp. 317–323.
64 Friedman [1997], pp. 49–70.
65 Teaiwa [1994], pp. 84–109.
66 Graybar [1986], pp. 888–907.
67 The South Pacific was militarized and suffered nuclear testing–induced radioactive contamination. It was not until the mid-1970s that the area was developed for international civil aviation. Kissing [2014], p. 38.
68 Crackel [1998], pp. 63–64.

operations responsible for rapid logistics in preparation for future wars, and it recommended that the transport capabilities of civilian airlift companies be enhanced and mobilized to conduct airlift operations as they had been during World War II. The Air Policy Board recommended that the Military Air Transport Service, which integrated the Army and Navy airlift forces, oversee airlift activities to meet the needs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Based on these recommendations, the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) was established under the Air Force to oversee airlift activities for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Secretary of Defense Forrestal issued a decision in January 1948 to consolidate the Army and Navy airlift forces and establish the MATS. Airlift routes were divided into three regions: Europe, the continental United States, and the Pacific. Hickam Air Force Base in Hawai‘i was designated as the starting point for flights to Tokyo in the Pacific region, reflecting the strategic importance of Hawai‘i in post-war military operations[69].

The intensification of the Cold War brought about challenges such as the Berlin Blockade, during which West Berliners faced shortages of essential supplies like food, fuel, and medicine. The Soviet Union hoped that these difficulties would force Western powers to withdraw from West Berlin. However, MATS spearheaded a massive airlift operation known as the Berlin Airlift, which played a crucial role in ensuring the survival of West Berliners by airlifting supplies into the city. The Berlin Airlift demonstrated the significance of strategic airlift operations in the context of the Cold War, highlighting the capability of the United States to sustain its allies in the face of Soviet aggression. Following the success of the Berlin Airlift, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 further underscored the importance of airlift operations[70]. The Korean War led to the establishment of a close partnership between the military and civilian sectors in conducting airlift operations. Additionally, the conflict prompted further militarization of the Pacific region, as the United States sought to bolster its presence and capabilities to counter communist aggression. Overall, the challenges posed by the Cold War propelled the revitalization of U.S. military airlift capabilities and underscored the critical role of airlift operations in the strategic defense and support of country’s allies.

3. The Korean War and Militarism and Tourism in the “American Lake”

The Korean War played a significant role in facilitating the establishment of military alliances in the Pacific region. The approval of Japanese commercial airlines was an outcome of the San Francisco Peace Conference and the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, which provided for the permanent use of U.S. military bases in Japan. Additionally, Australia and New Zealand, foreseeing competition for operations in the Pacific, strengthened its relations with the United States as British military power in the region declined. Both countries contributed troops to the Korean War as part of the UN’s forces. Emphasizing the importance of building alliances in the Pacific, the U.S. government signed security treaties (ANZUS) with Australia and New Zealand, further solidifying regional partnerships[71].

The war significantly heightened both U.S. military and civilian airlift operations. MATS and mobilized civilian airlines played an increasingly crucial role in transporting supplies

69 Williams [1999], pp. 22–23.
70 Williams [1999], pp. 25–27.
71 Orders [2003], p. 190.

and personnel to Japan, which became a frontline base for the conflict. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the Pacific Division of MATS airlifted an average of seventy tons of munitions per month to Japan. However, after the war began, Hickam Air Force Base in Hawai'i saw its role strengthen as MATS' Pacific Division commenced wartime operations. Aircraft from various parts of the world, including mobilized civilian planes, landed at Hickam, which became key military airlift hub on the frontline. In 1952, during the Korean War, the Air Force established a system for mobilizing commercial airlines for military purposes. Companies such as Transocean Airlines and the cargo-focused Flying Tigers were among the first to participate in military airlifts as chartered flights. Additionally, major commercial carriers like Pan Am, Northwest, United, Seaboard & Western, and Overseas National also contributed to military airlift operations between the U.S. West Coast and Japan. By September 1950, 345 commercial aircrafts had been chartered for these purposes, although MATS soon faced budgetary challenges[72].

A committee was formed within the U.S. government on the request of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chairperson of the National Security Resources Administration to respond to the need to ensure wartime airlift capability. In March 1951, President Truman issued Executive Order 10219, which mobilized civilian airlines for military service. This led to a significant increase in trans-Pacific flights, with 40 percent of them being conducted by commercial airlines. Notably, among the passengers transported were 35 U.S. soldiers liberated from a North Korean prisoner-of -war camp for whom Hickam Air Force Base became a symbol of relief and joy[73].

Hickam Air Force Base played a significant role in the post-World War II era, serving as the home base for MATS, which was organized in 1948. In the late 1940s, housing developments were constructed for military families not only in Hickam but also in garrisoned areas and occupied territories of Japan and Germany. Hickam Base notably became the site of the first military family housing project in the United States. Various amenities, such as dormitories for single soldiers, military family housing, restaurants, gymnasiums, schools, movie theaters, and day care centers, were established on the base. The housing was designed to resemble suburban housing on the U.S. mainland, featuring spacious layouts, large gardens, and tropical plants from the South Seas. This initiative reflected the broader aim of creating "Little America" residential areas around the world that would mirror typical suburban lifestyles found in the continental U.S.[74].

In addition to its role as a residential hub, Hawai'i also served as a crucial training base. In 1951, the U.S. Army established the Infantry Training Center at Scofield Barracks to mobilize and train personnel from various regions, including the mainland U.S., Hawai'i, Guam, and American Samoa. The military and the Hawaiian territorial government anticipated that military personnel visiting Hawai'i would contribute to tourism. Interestingly, the military even referred to trainees as "tourists in military uniforms." However, the mobility of military personnel, who often move between bases on the mainland and overseas, presents a challenge: it is difficult to accurately account for their presence. Consequently, military personnel stationed in Hawai'i or visiting for training or transportation, who may not be officially recorded by immigration authorities, effectively become transient tourists and consumers during their time in the region[75].

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72 Crackel [1998], p. 69.

73 Priddy [1994], pp. 12–15; Krejcarek and Chute [1985], pp. 42, 76.

74 Alvah [2007], pp. 21–34; Gillem [2007], pp. 73–121; Krejcarek and Chute [1985], pp. 78–92; Blower [2017], pp. 457-458.

75 Man [2018], p. 80; Morris-Suzuki [2010], pp. 123–124.

The militarization of Hawai‘i during the Cold War era was intertwined with the dynamics of local politics and the struggle for democratization. Prior to this period, the political and economic power in Hawai‘i was concentrated among the haole, especially the Big Five, haole sugar plantation owners and landlords, who were Republican. After World War II, however, there was a shift in power dynamics driven by the emergence of labor unions and the mobilization of demobilized soldiers. Postwar Hawai‘i witnessed the organization of plantation and dock workers into unions that aimed to address economic exploitation. However, union leaders were often targeted and labeled communists, leading to the suppression of labor movements. In response, demobilized World War II veterans, including Japanese and Chinese Americans, began to advocate for full U.S. citizenship and spearheaded the statehood movement. This movement gained momentum, culminating in the victory of the Democratic Party in the 1954 Hawaiian congressional elections, known as the "Bloodless Revolution." The success of the statehood movement led to its admission as the 50th state of the United States in 1959. However, this outcome disappointed Native Hawaiians who had sought decolonization and the restoration of Hawaiian sovereignty. Meanwhile, Asian Hawaiians, who played a significant role in advocating for statehood, valued their relationship with the federal government, particularly the military[76].

The facilitation of statehood and alignment with federal interests, including the military, contributed to the process of militarization in Hawai‘i. As a result, the expansion of military bases and functions in the Pacific region, including the establishment of new training bases, became intertwined with the political and social developments in Hawai‘i during the Cold War era. Veterans played a significant role in shaping Hawai‘i's military landscape, given their affinity for the military and military bases. The U.S. government and military extensively expanded Hawai‘i's military capabilities, with Oahu alone hosting sixteen military bases. Substantial portions of the military budget were allocated to Hawai‘i, highlighting its strategic importance in Washington's Asia-Pacific policy[77].

Hawai‘i also emerged as a crucial hub for U.S. nuclear forces in the Pacific, marked by multiple nuclear tests conducted in the region. Beginning with the atomic bomb test at Bikini Atoll in 1946, the U.S. conducted 106 nuclear tests, which had significant environmental and health implications for the region. The Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test in 1954, conducted during the Eisenhower administration, had particularly far-reaching consequences, with radioactive fallout affecting various areas, including Micronesia, Japan, Australia, India, and Hawai‘i. The presence of as many as 3,100 nuclear weapons in Hawai‘i further proved its pivotal role in U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War[78].

Moreover, the growing political influence of the Asian population in Hawai‘i became increasingly significant in shaping U.S. Cold War policy toward the U.S.-Soviet Union, especially in the context of Asia's rising importance. The establishment of the People's Republic of China, the end of the Korean War, and the First Indochina War, and the emergence of newly independent Asian and African nations critical of the U.S.–Soviet Cold War dynamics, highlighted the need for a racially fair approach. In response, commercial airlines in the United States, such as Pan Am, began reassessing their policies, including diversifying their workforce to include second-generation Japanese Americans cabin attendants for the Asia-Pacific routes to accommodate the growing passenger traffic from Asia, marking a shift toward greater inclusivity and engagement with the region[79].

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76 Klein [2003], p. 248; Man [2018], pp. 81-82; Skwiot [2010], pp. 161–162.
77 Skwiot [2010], pp. 161-162; Lind [1984/1985], p. 37.
78 Klein [2003], p. 309; Norris, Atkin & Burr [1999], p. 30; Fitzgerald [2022], p. 91.
79 Yano [2011], pp. 2-3.

Pan Am ordered the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 jetliners in 1955. Following Pan Am, many commercial airlines upgraded from using four-cylinder propellor-engine airliners to jet airliners. This was the arrival of the first jet age. The transition to jet aircraft revolutionized air travel and tourism in Hawai'i and the broader Pacific region. While the United Kingdom initially led the jetliner market with the de Havilland Comet, a series of accidents tarnished its reputation, allowing American manufacturers like Douglas and Boeing to dominate the industry. Pan Am's introduction of the Boeing 707 marked the beginning of the intercontinental jet era, with its service reaching Honolulu International Airport in 1959, coinciding with Hawai'i's statehood[80].

Despite the growing political influence of Asian Hawaiians, the economic influence of the haole community remained significant. This was evident in the rapid development of tourist infrastructure, including large hotels like the 650-room Holiday Inn, the 31-story 1,900-room Waikiki Sheraton, and others like the Hawaiian Regent and Hyatt Regency. United Airlines' introduction of DC-8s and its efforts to attract more passengers, such as sponsoring a Professional Golf Association tournament in Hawai'i, further boosted tourist visits to the islands. The military played a crucial role in the development of Hawa'i's tourism industry, as the introduction of jet aircraft and the expansion of tourist hotels were often driven by military-related initiatives. This convergence of military and civilian interests contributed to the popularization of Hawai'i's militourism, or mass tourism, which had its roots in the facilities and infrastructure established by the military during and after World War II[81].

The period between 1950 and 1959 witnessed a significant surge in tourism in Hawai'i, with tourist spending increasing by 350% and the number of visitors rising from 34,000 in 1945 to 243,000 in 1959. United Airlines played a role in this growth by introducing various initiatives, including family fare discount programs and the introduction of the coach class, which made air travel more accessible to families and individuals alike. Additionally, military visitors to Hawai'i, not accounted for in official tourism statistics, also contributed to the island's tourism industry, as MATS was actively involved in military airlift operations across the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans[82].

In 1962, three years after Hawai'i attained statehood, the last atmospheric nuclear test in the Pacific occurred amid heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union over Cuba. The detonation of nuclear devices led to the forced relocation of residents from Bikini Atoll and Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. U.S. servicemembers stationed in the region witnessed these tests from proximity, with some stationed as close as ten miles away. The Atomic Energy Commission portrayed these nuclear tests as public spectacles, even allowing local families and schoolchildren to observe tests conducted in Nevada. The 1962 atmospheric hydrogen bomb test conducted on Johnston Island, just west of Hawai'i, was visible from the islands and American Samoa. Witnesses described the sky turning vivid colors, ranging from lime green to lemonade pink and finally red, creating a surreal and alarming sight. Reports detailed how residents, tourists, and individuals who resembled soldiers watched the test unfold from Waikiki Beach. This event underscored Hawai'i's inclusion in the broader Cold War landscape of nuclear testing and geopolitical tensions[83].

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80 Engel [2007], pp.173–174; Davies [2007], pp. 40–41, 50–52.

81 Allen [2004], pp. 37–40; Mak [2008], p. 16.

82 Klein [2003], p. 245; Lust [2009], pp. 153–159; Williams [1999], p. 37.

83 Nye [1994], pp. 232-234; "Space bomb in color: EERIE Spectacle in Pacific Sky," *Life*, July 20, 1962, pp. 25–34.

Conclusion

This paper comprehensively examined the formation of militourism in Hawai‘i, tracing its roots back to the annexation of Hawai`i by the United States in the 19th century. It highlighted how settler colonialism and the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i paved the way for white American rule and military control in the region. Japanese immigrants in Hawai‘i, who were also spreading across the Pacific as part of Japan’s imperial expansion, became a focal point of concern for the white elite in Hawai‘i. The U.S. government and military capitalized on tensions with Japan to assert control over Hawai‘i, further militarizing the islands and seizing land for military purposes. This expansion of military control over Hawai‘i reflected a renewed imperialist conception of the Pacific as the “American Lake” in the 20th century. The Pacific region, including Micronesia, was brought under the influence of the U.S. military, with Oahu emerging as a key strategic base. Pearl Harbor, serving as the home port of the Pacific Fleet, and Hickam Air Force Base, established in the 1920s, were pivotal in the military’s operations in the Pacific. Additionally, the expansion of Schofield Barracks during the Korean War further solidified Oahu’s role as a critical military hub. Throughout World War II and the Cold War, Oahu’s military base functions were enhanced, underscoring its significance in U.S. military strategy in the Pacific region.

The aftermath of World War II saw a clash between the United States and Great Britain over international civil aviation, particularly in the Atlantic Ocean. This conflict led to the establishment of the Chicago–Bermuda system, which established the framework for the postwar international civil aviation. Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the United Kingdom sought to counter U.S. influence through the establishment of the British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines (BCPA) with the Commonwealth realms. In the Pacific theater, the United States granted operating rights to Pan Am and Northwest Airlines for routes between the U.S. West Coast and Japan. United Airlines was also permitted to operate routes between the U.S. West Coast and Hawai‘i. However, Pan Am attempted to monopolize the civil aviation market in postwar Japan, exacerbating tensions in the region. The situation was further complicated by the outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent involvement of the United States. This geopolitical context heightened competition and strategic maneuvering in the Pacific, particularly in the realm of civil aviation.

The Korean War had significant geopolitical ramifications, particularly in the Pacific region. This led to the signing of the U.S.– Japan Security Treaty, which transformed Japan into a strategic ally for the United States and further militarized the region. Additionally, military alliances with Australia and New Zealand further bolstered the Pacific’s military capabilities. Furthermore, the war increased military activities in the Pacific, with Hickam Air Force Base in Hawai‘i becoming a crucial hub for airlift operations to Japan and Korea. Civilian airlines played a substantial role in troop transport during this period, contributing to their experience and involvement in Pacific routes. Moreover, Hawai‘i’s military function was strengthened after World War II, with the islands becoming a center of air mobility in the Pacific. The development of infrastructure and recreational facilities in Hawai‘i catered to the needs of soldiers and their families stationed there, earning it the nickname “America Town.” Political developments within Hawai‘i, including the growing influence of Asian Hawaiians of military veterans, emphasized cooperation with federal

government and the armed forces. Simultaneously, economic interests, primarily driven by the haole minority with significant economic power, prioritized tourism, and land development, including alliances with mainland capital for hotel construction. Hawai'i is being granted statehood further facilitated the growth of tourism, which was heralded by the introduction of jet service by passenger airlines such as Pan Am.

This paper scrutinized the intricate relationship between Hawai'i's transformation into a tourist destination and its role as a key U.S. military base in the Pacific. The militarization of Hawai'i, particularly through bases like Pearl Harbor Naval Base and Hickam Air Force Base, played a significant role in shaping the island's tourism industry. Military personnel stationed in Hawai'i, although not traditionally counted as tourists, contributed to the local economy and tourism sector. The military's presence in Hawai'i, especially after the Pearl Harbor attack, led to the development of tourism infrastructure and activities catering to soldiers and their families. This dynamic would have persisted during subsequent military engagements, such as the Vietnam War, further underscoring the symbiotic relationship between militarization and tourism in Hawai'i. Further research on this topic could provide valuable insights into the complex interplay between military activities, tourism development, and local economies in regions with significant military presence. This could pave the way for a more comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted impacts of militarization on tourism and society at large.

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In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II: Its Historical Significance and Future Tasks

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This article focuses on the nighttime precision bombing campaign using a latest radar conducted by the United States Army Air Forces at the end of World War II. Previous studies have paid little attention to this campaign, which lasted from late June 1945 until the end of the war. This article shows that it has historical significance in that the mobilization of science, technology, and industry made possible certain tactics that were previously considered unfeasible. This campaign also suggests that the state of science, technology, and industrial policies determined the way the war was fought. This paper presents the future tasks whose completion is necessary to illuminate the overall picture of the campaign. First, it is necessary to clarify how the scientific, technological, and industrial bases that enabled these tactics were put in place and, second, to elucidate why oil-related facilities were selected as targets for nighttime precision bombing operations. By answering these questions, we will be able to offer a full perspective of nighttime precision bombing operations with the radar and, by extension, understand the characteristics of how the American military fought the war.

Introduction

This article discusses the strategic bombing campaign against Japan conducted by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) in the final months of World War II. Particularly, it focuses on the nighttime precision bombings of petroleum facilities beginning in late June 1945, summarizes these operations and results, examines their strategic impacts and historical implications, and clarifies future tasks that should be accomplished.

To offer an early conclusion, the operations against petroleum facilities had little influence on the consequences of the war. Therefore, previous studies have only referenced them briefly, if ever, and they failed to examine their historical significance[1]. Although the official history of the 315th Bombardment Wing details the personnel, training, and

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[1] Craven and Cate [1983b:1955]; United States Air Force [1953]; Werrell [1996]; Crane [2016]. The latest study of the history of the U.S. precision attacks and strategies does not refer to this campaign at all. Rogers [2023].

missions of the unit (information on which this article depends heavily), this study does not detail any industrial, scientific, or technological bases that could elucidate their operations, and it fails to identify their historical implications[2].

However, these operations did have historical implications in that they demonstrated the importance of science and technology, as operations previously considered unfeasible were made possible with the newly developed radar. In addition, to perform the operation required not only technological developments but also a certain amount of equipment to be produced, that is, industrial mobilization. As historian Paul Kennedy suggests, the feasibility of certain tactics or operations depends on scientific and technological efforts, and identifying them is important, despite tending to be underestimated[3]. Indeed, the performance and success of the nighttime precision bombing depended on many factors. That is, exaggeratedly, to paint a complete picture of these operations reveals how the US fought the war.

Concerning the American way of war, especially strategic bombing during World War II, most previous studies focus on the transition from precision tactics to indiscriminate ones. Quoting Paul Fussell's literature, Eiko Ikui points out that the US military placed value on accuracy in the early stages of the war, but in the latter phase, accuracy and precision was not considered important and the way of fighting changed to one that prioritized efficiency and consumed large amount of munitions[4]. Some authors accuse the US military of performing strategic, especially indiscriminate bombing as immoral act[5]. For them, the US and the Great Britain (also Germany and Japan) violated international laws stipulating that any military had not to target innocent civilians. By reflecting the strategic bombing campaign during World War II from this perspective, however, such authors dismiss the US' efforts to pursue a precision attack as a way of more economical and humanitarian tactics. After World War II, the US military have continued to do so. As James Patton Rogers suggests, analyzing the American pursuit of precision "reveals rare insights into the intellectual history, evolution, and character of American warfare[6]." Therefore, this article sheds light into the American way of war by examining previously overlooked operations during World War II.

1. Summary of the Strategic Bombing of the Japanese Homeland

To place in a context the nighttime precision bombing during the last stage of World War II, this chapter summarizes the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. First, what is a "strategic bombing"? Attacking an enemy from the air is generally defined as two methods. One is "tactical," to support a fighting on the front line, and it involves targeting enemy forces themself, as well as the roads, railroads, and bridges used to transport personnel and supply. Although roads, railroads, and bridges are the targets of "strategic bombings," the aim of a tactical attack is to support ground forces.

The second method is strategic, aiming to diminish the enemy's war-fighting ability. In modern wars, especially in total wars, which are fought with all the strength of a nation,

2 Swann [1986].
3 Kennedy [2013].
4 Ikui [2018: 2006] pp. 168-179. See also Schaffer [1985].
5 See Grayling [2006] and Arai [2008].
6 Rogers [2023] p. 2. As mentioned above, however, Rogers does not refer the nighttime precision bombing campaign with a radar during World War II.

continuation of the war requires industrial productivity to supply munitions and labor forces to support the productive capability. Therefore, the desirable targets for strategic bombings are as follows: military arsenals, powerhouses, fuel factories, cities, and civilians. Bombing cities also has the purpose of demoralizing the civilian population to raise war weariness among them, leading to a quick end to the war.

Furthermore, strategic bombing consists of two methods: precision bombing and area bombing, where the former aims for the targets mentioned above accurately and with minimum bombers, bombs, and sacrifices of enemy civilian. As detailed later (3-1), the USAAF preferred this method of bombing from an economic and humanitarian perspective, but it is technically difficult to pinpoint a target with bombs from the air. Meanwhile, area bombings target objectives and the surrounding neighborhood, destroying them certainly. This means area bombings produce greater civilian losses and they are indeed applied to destroy a city itself and kill its civilians as a demoralization tactic.

In both European and Pacific theaters, because the Allies could attack the German and Japanese homelands only by bombing from the air, strategic bombing garnered high hope from the war's onset. It was reflected by the fact that while the US produced about 300,000 aircrafts during the war, it weighed long-range bombers, such as B-17s, B-24s, and B-29s used primarily for strategic bombing[7]. Among these, B-29s were the latest and most long-range, so they were most appropriate for attacking Japan proper. The Twentieth Air Force (20th AF) was responsible for bombing Japan, and all heavy bombers received by the 20th AF were B-29s. During the war, approximately 3,700 B-29s were produced, and over 1,000 among them were delivered to the 20th AF[8].

As such, the 20th AF was organized to perform strategic bombing against Japan. The war against Japan had many theaters, including China-Burma, the Pacific, the Far East, and Alaska, and Air Forces were deployed to each. This meant that each Air Force was subject to the policies of the commanding general of each theater. In contrast, the 20th AF was solely responsible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top military decision maker, and they could then engage in the bombing of Japan, regardless the policy of each theater. Further, the 20th AF had two bomber commands (BC), the 20th and 21st, the former of which placed its headquarters at Kharagpur, India, and conducted a bombing campaign against Japan, East Asia, and Southeast Asia as a whole from forward bases, such as Chengdu, China. In addition, the 21st BC, based on the Mariana Islands, which were conquered in July and August 1944, carried out a bombing campaign against the Japanese homeland. As chief portions of the 20th BC were incorporated into the 21st BC later, this article examines mainly the actions of the 21st BC.

The 21st BC consisted of five bombardment wings (BW): the 73rd, 313th, 314th, 58th, and 315th Wings, in order of deployment to Marianas. Each BW comprised four bombardment groups (BG), and each BG was authorized to have 45 B-29s, totaling a maximum BW force of 180 B-29s. However, each BW or BG began operating before their force was complete, and the build-up of each force advanced gradually[9].

The commander of the 21st BC was Haywood Hansell, Jr., who was an enthusiastic advocate of "precision" bombing[10]. Because the Japanese aircraft industry was set as the

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[7] Approximately 35,000 long-range bombers were produced during the war. The total airframe weight of long-range bombers was 35% of that of all aircrafts built by the war's end. Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] pp. 352–353.

[8] Muelen [1995]; Office of Statistical Control [1945] p. 179.

[9] Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 522.

[10] Haun [2019] p. 220.

primary target at the headquarters of the 20th AF, the 21st BC engaged primarily in precision bombing against the installations relating to the aircraft industry in the first phase of the campaign. On November 24, 1944, 21st BC ushered its first operation with 111 B-29s against the Nakajima Aircraft Musashi plant. This operation, however, could not produce a significant result, so the Musashi plant was attacked repeatedly. Three days later, the 21st BC targeted Musashi plant again, but no airplane could drop bombs on the primary objective. Due to heavy clouds, the units could not conduct visual, that is precision, bombing, so they dropped their bombs on an urban area set as the secondary target of the mission. Many similar cases were seen. For example, the original target of the Ginza air raid on January 27, 1945, was the Musashi plant. These facts represent the reality of "precision" bombing campaigns[11].

The 21st BC changed its policy clearly in late February 1945, and in January 1945, Hansell was replaced by Curtis LeMay as head of the 21st BC. The headquarters at Washington hoped that LeMay would make a difference through massive incendiary attacks on large cities, instead improving "precision" bombing. However, LeMay did not begin the area bombing operation using incendiaries immediately upon his arrival as the commander. While he "tested" the incendiary bombing against cities twice, he waited for the number of B-29s necessary to conduct such an operation to be deployed and readied. On February 25, his "test" had achieved success with 229 B-29s, so he decided to conduct a full-scale operation against Tokyo[12]. Thus, 325 B-29s took off from Mariana Islands toward Tokyo on the night of March 9, dropping their bombs at midnight from a low altitude (about 9,000 ft), and their bodies were made lighter by removing their arms so they could carry more incendiaries. The extent of the damage caused by this operation has been well documented.

Beginning with the Tokyo air raid, the 21st BC conducted successive operations against urban areas of large Japanese cities: Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and again Nagoya. However, the 21st BC involved not only the incendiary campaign, but also some additional operations. First, the Command engaged in a "tactical" bombing of the Kyushu airfields as a part of the Okinawa campaign, which began in April 1945 and continued to the middle of May[13]. Second, the 313th BW assumed the mining campaign on Japan Sea, Inland Sea, and more from late March, and it was continued until the war was over. The official history of the USAAF during the World War II, *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (hereafter, *AAF in WW II*), described that the mining campaign had achieved meaningful results[14].

Concerning the incendiary bombings of large cities, the 21st BC targeted the Nagoya urban area on March 18 and Kawasaki and Tokyo on April 15. After an interval of about a month, the 21st BC resumed the campaign with raids against Nagoya on May 14 and 17. A month after that, the incendiary campaign against "large" cities ended with attacks on Osaka and Amagasaki, flying 511 superforts[15]. Since then, the 21st BC aimed at middle or smaller cities populated from 31,350 (Tsuruga) to 323,200 (Fukuoka) with incendiaries until the war ended[16]. While attacks against large cities were conducted by almost all forces available to the Command (300–500 B-29s), middle or smaller cities were bombed by one bombardment wing (100–180 B-29s). Until the war ended, over 60 cities had been burned out.

11 Koyama [2018] pp. 29–30.
12 Fujita [2021].
13 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 627–635.
14 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 662–674.
15 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 608–627, 635–644.
16 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 653–658, 674–675.

Despite LeMay's policy change, precision bombing of war industries, such as aircraft plants, was not abandoned, and this kind of operation was conducted repeatedly over several months. For example, the 21st BC engaged in precision bombing operations against the Musashi plant and Tokyo Army arsenal on August 8, Ogikubo plant of Nakajima and Tokyo Army arsenal again on August 10, and Hikari Navy arsenal (Yamaguchi) and Osaka Army arsenal on August 14. LeMay modified the operational method, such as lowering bombing altitude and using far heavier bombs to achieve far more meaningful results than Hansell's operations[17].

As stated above, 21st BC involved many kinds of bombing operation since LeMay had assumed the role of commander. This was possible because personnel and aircrafts were deployed one after the other to the Mariana Islands, and readied to begin these missions. The 313th BW, a second unit that arrived at Marianas, began its operation on February 4, 1945. In addition, the 314th BW joined the "test" incendiary attack against Tokyo on February 25, leading to the air raid on March 9 conducted by three BWs. Nighttime precision bombings with a newly developed radar against oil facilities by the 315th BW were carried out in the context of building forces and diversifying operations. The next chapter describes in detail all the operations of the 315th BW based on *AAF in WWII*, *A Unit History of 315 Bomb Wing: 1944-1946*, and the documents of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)[18].

2. Missions of the 315th Bombardment Wing

The 315th BW, activated on July 17, 1944, was deployed incrementally from March to April 1945, having received B-29Bs, a variant of the B-29 dedicated to nighttime operations and equipped with a new radar device, the AN/APQ-7, to carry out nighttime precision bombings of oil facilities. The BW consisted of four bombardment groups, the 16th, 501st, 331st, and 502nd, in order of deployment at Marianas. The 16th and 501st BGs conducted their first operations on June 26 and the 331st and 502nd on July 19. It took about a year from the activation of the BW to the beginning of actual operations, indicating that engaging required various preparations, including the deployment of B-29s, the construction of bases, and training. These issues will be discussed in another paper.

Table 1 shows all missions by the 315th BW, that is, 15 missions aimed at 9 targets. Total sorties were about 1,200 and total weight of bombs dropped was 9,084 tons. Bomb weight per one aircraft was relatively heavy due to using B-29Bs, which were deprived of most arming to conduct nighttime bombings. Their first mission targeted Utsube River Oil Refinery (Second Navy Fuel Arsenal, Yokkaichi, Mie), with 35 bombers of the 16th and 502nd BGs and dropping 223 tons. The damage of this mission on its own was unclear, but combined with the damages of mission number 209 on June 17, which attacked Yokkaichi city, issuing collateral damage to this oil refinery, and mission number 218 on June 22, which aimed it for a secondary target, the 315th BW's first mission destroyed 34% of the roof area and rendered 1.6% of the oil capacity (33,870/2,073,080 barrels) unavailable. This target was bombed on July 9 again, and because of all these missions, half the roof area was destroyed and 4% of the oil capacity was rendered unavailable (according to

17 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 646–653.

18 The USSBS documents used in this article are mainly Damage Assessment Reports. All have been collected by the National Diet Library, Japan. Its Digital Collection is made almost entirely available (https://dl.ndl.go.jp/collections/A00018).

Table 1. All Missions by the 315th Bombardment Wing

Date of Mission (Mission Number)	Primary Target	Sorties	Number of B-29s which dropped bombs against primary target	Weight of Bombs Dropped (tons)
June 26（232）	Utsube River Oil Refinery (Yokkaichi)	35	33	223
June 29（238）	Nippon Sekiyu Oil Refinery (Kudamatsu)	36	32	209
July 2（245）	Maruzen Oil Refinery (Shimotsu)	40	39	297
July 6（255）	Same as above	60	59	442
July 9（261）	Same as number 232	64	61	469
July 12（267）	Kawasaki Petroleum Center	62	55	452
July 15（270）	Same as number 238	71	61	494
July 19（281）	Nippon Oil Refinery (Amagasaki)	86	85	702
July 22（283）	Ube Coal Liquefaction Co.	82	74	637
July 25（291）	Mitsubishi Oil Refinery and Hayama Petroleum Company (Kawasaki)	85	77	668
July 28（303）	Shimotsu Oil Refinery	84	78	658
August 1（310）	Same as number 267	130	121	1,025
August 5（315）	Same as number 283	113	108	938
August 9（322）	Same as number 281	109	97	918
August 14（328）	Nippon Oil Refinery (Tsuchizaki)	143	134	954

Source: Koyama [2018]. There are some cases in which the number of sorties and the weights of the bombs dropped differ from those mentioned in the text.

Damage Assessment Report 141, 41.6% of the capacity had been “removed” before the attacks, but in the reports, the amount “removed” was counted as “damage”)[19].

The second target was Nippon Sekiyu Oil Refinery (Kudamatsu, Yamaguchi), attacked on June 29 and July 15, and these missions rendered 60% of the oil capacity (349,000/58,7000 barrels) unavailable[20]. Then, on July 2 and 6, Maruzen Oil Refinery (Shimotsu, Wakayama) was attacked by the 315th BW. Like earlier missions, the first of two made a trivial difference, but the latter destroyed 79% of the roof area. Total tank damages showed that 51.5% was classified as “destroyed” and 37% as “damaged” (total tank capacity was about a million barrels)[21]. Curtis LeMay described the latter mission as the most successful radar bombing ever[22], foreshadowing the overall success of nighttime precision bombing campaigns with the most advanced radar.

[19] Damage Assessment Report, no. 141, mission 261 (July 9–10) combined with 209 (June 18), 218 (June 22), and 232 (June 26), July 17, 1945.
[20] Damage Assessment Report, no. 179, mission 270 (July 15–16), combined with 238 (June 29), August 15, 1945.
[21] Damage Assessment Report, no. 142 mission 245 (July 2) and 255 (July 6), July 21, 1945.
[22] Werrell [1996] pp. 199–200.

The next target was Kawasaki Petroleum Center, a complex of Standard Vacuum Oil Co., Nippon Oil Co., Mitsui & Co., and Rising Sun Petroleum Co., toward which 60 B-29s flew, 53 of which dropped 452 tons on the primary target. However, this attack destroyed or damaged only 6% of tank capacity (total 1,334,000 barrels) [23]. On July 19, the operation against Nippon Oil Refinery (Amagasaki) produced "excellent results," according to a mission resume[24], and the Amagasaki plant was bombed again on August 9, with the Damage Assessment Report (no. 191) recording the total damage of these missions at about 70% of the original total oil capacity (1,175,400/1,496,700 barrels) [25].

Ube Coal Liquefaction Co., "the largest synthetic oil producer in the Japanese inner zone outside Manchuria," was the next target of 80 airborne aircraft, 90% of which dropped 620 tons on the primary target[26]. Although the results of this mission itself are unclear, the strike attack report of this operation noted that "excellent results are indicated by scope photos[27]." On August 5, the 315th BW carried out a second raid against Ube plant that resulted in "100% of refinery units and 80% of the stores and workshops damaged or destroyed[28]." According to the Damage Assessment Report (no. 175), the combined results of the 315th BW's missions (54.5%) with previous removal (45.5%), the plant became completely inoperative[29].

On July 25, the 315th BW attacked Kawasaki, an operation to which two additional bomber groups joined. Many targets were bombed, including Mitsubishi Oil Refinery and Hayama Petroleum Company, toward which 83 B-29s flew, 75 of which dropped 650 tons on the primary targets[30]. In addition, on August 1, Kawasaki Petroleum Center was bombed again with 1,017 tons by 120 B-29s (of 128 airborne). According to the damage assessment reports, the combined results of these missions are as follows: 537,400 barrels, 38% of Mitsubishi's original capacity (1,404,400 barrels) was damaged or destroyed; 334,000 barrels of 761,600 barrels at Hayama plant was rendered unavailable; and half of Kawasaki Petroleum Center's tank capacity, all combined with the damage by the mission in mid-July[31]. Between bombings of Kawasaki, on July 28, the 315th BW attacked Shimotsu Oil Refinery (different from Maruzen Oil Refinery) and damaged and destroyed 75% of the total capacity (927,300/1,246,000 barrels)[32].

The last target of the 315th BW was Nippon Oil Refinery, located in Tsuchizaki, Akita prefecture. This mission was the "longest and largest raid of the war" by 315th[33], considered generally successful, as 70% of the original capacity was destroyed and damaged, and "[t]he buildings of the refinery were 98% affected, 87% destroyed and 11%

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23 Damage Assessment Report, no. 157, mission 267 (July 12–13), August 3, 1945.

24 Mission Resume for mission 251 (July 19–20). The damage assessment report for this mission recorded the damage of the attack as 39% of tank capacity (587,300/1,496700 barrels). The history of the 315th BW, however, notes, "Post-mission photo-reconnaissance showed the wing mission on Amagasaki had mixed results." Swann [1986] p. 102.

25 Damage Assessment Report, no. 191, mission 322 (August 9–10), August 21, 1945.

26 Target Information Sheet, Ube Coal Liquefaction Company, July 20, 1945.

27 Strike Attack Report, no. 130, mission 283 (July 22–23), July 27, 1945.

28 Mission Resume for mission 251 (August 5–6). This attack also damaged or destroyed half of the Ube Iron Works Co.

29 Damage Assessment Report, no. 175, missions 270 (July 15–16), 283 (July 22–23), and 315 (August 5–6), August 14, 1945.

30 Mission Resume for mission 291 (July 25–26), August 3, 1945.

31 Damage Assessment Report, no. 173, missions 291 (July 25–26) and 310 (August 1–2), August 10, 1945; Damage Assessment Report, no. 184, mission 310, August 18, 1945.

32 Damage Assessment Report, no. 172, mission 303 (July 28–29), August 12, 1945.

33 Swann [1986] p. 113.

gutted and seriously damaged[34]." On the same day, when the Japanese government decided to surrender, the 20th AF carried out full-fledged attacks on various targets with over 800 B-29s. The commanding general of the USAAF, Henry Arnold, hoped "as big a finale a possible" against Tokyo; he planned to call on the Eighth Air Force, a part of which had been transferred to Okinawa from Europe[35]. However, his subordinate, Carl Spaatz, argued that Tokyo was not appropriate for such an operation and proposed to attack various targets, which Arnold accepted[36]. As such, the 315th BW completed their mission as usual.

Concerning the achievement of 315th BW, *AAF in WW II* concluded:

> On the whole, the experiment was markedly successful. The formations were able to attack the primary target on every mission, and while the results varied they were generally good… USSBS statisticians calculated that 315th Wing bombardiers had achieved an accuracy rate of 13.5 per cent, as compared with 5.4 per cent achieved, under more difficult tactical conditions, with the Eagle [AN/APQ-7] radar in Europe[37].

Moreover, as with the accuracy of the campaign with the AN/APQ-7, military historian Kenneth P. Werrell states, "Eagle demonstrated accuracy approximating that of visual bombing, and on occasion exceeding it[38]." The accuracy of the 315th BW's missions depended on many factors, so it should not be attributed only to the performance of the EAGLE radar[39]. However, LeMay was overly impressed by the achievement of the unit, so he planned to change the targets of the 315th from oil to nitrogen plants and bridges and to install the EAGLE radar in the B-29s of the other wings[40].

3. Some issues of nighttime precision bombing

In this chapter, the author describes three issues of nighttime precision bombing, the first of which is the USAAF's strategic bombing doctrine. Second, it is important to identify how this kind of campaign was made possible and, third, why oil-related facilities were targeted.

3-1. Strategic Bombing Doctrine of the USAAF

The purposes of strategic bombing are, as noted in Chapter 1, destruction of the enemy's war capacity by attacking directly the political and industrial core and by demoralizing the population through targeting non-combatants. Then, precision bombing and area bombing were assumed as means to accomplish these ends. Precision bombing literally means dropping bombs on a target, such as a war plant, "precisely," whereas with area bombing, bombers attack the surrounding "area" of a target. Because the method also hurts the civilian of the area attacked, it is used to target non-combatants directly.

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34 Damage Assessment Report, no. 205, mission 328 (August 14–15), September 10, 1945.
35 Maurer [1983b] p. 463.
36 Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 732.
37 Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 661.
38 Werrell [1996] p. 200.
39 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil and Chemical Division, *Oil in Japan's War*, pp. 121–123, National Diet Library Digital Collection. This report lists factors that led to differences in accuracy between the European and Pacific theaters (315th missions), including bombing altitude, opposition violence, and bomb size. In the European theater, altitude was higher, opposition was more violent, and bombs were lighter than in the Pacific.
40 Werrell [1996] p. 200.

Within the US Army, the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), which was originally established as the Air Service Tactical School in 1920, studied the doctrine of strategic bombing. This group was called the "Bomber Mafia," one of whom was Haywood Hansell. They established precision bombing as their doctrine, as well as put forth the "Industrial Web Theory," which assumes that the various parts of a modern city are connected to and interact with each other complicatedly like a "web." Therefore, they considered the destruction of one important part of a city enough to spread the effect throughout, and they thought it was technically possible to bomb precisely thanks to the new availability of B-17, the then-newest long-range bomber, and the Norden bombsight by the middle of the 1930s[41].

Moreover, the international law and the moral of a bombing from the air was took into consideration. In an interwar period, although any treaty that prohibits the bombing of civilian was not realized, major powers discussed whether or not it was justified, resulting in Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923) that stipulates that "Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring non-combatants is prohibited[42]." As Arai Shin'ichi suggests, this Rules functioned as the guides for air warfare of many states[43]. In particular, the US government disliked the bombing of civilian from moral perspective. Henry L. Stimson, then-secretary of state, strongly condemned Japan for bombing of urban arears of Chinchow and Shanghai during the Manchurian Incident, and the President Frankin D. Roosevelt, in 1939, demanded the belligerent nations not to "undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian populations of unfortified cities…[44]" Against this backdrop, the ACTS developed precision bombing doctrine[45].

In a sense, World War II was a spectacular testing site for demonstrating that the strategic bombing doctrine of the USAAF would work well. Then, both in Europe and the Asia-Pacific theater, it became apparent that the doctrine was only theoretical and ideal. Although the USAAF engaged strategic bombing operations with the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Europe, US precision bombing, that is, daytime visual bombing from a high altitude, was not only safe but also precise. The RAF, which was involved in strategic bombing against Nazi Germany from an earlier stage of the war, had already changed the policy from precision to nighttime area bombing using a radar[46]. The USAAF, however, was adamant that its original method was superior. However, in the daytime, bombers were susceptible to enemy intercepts, and from a high altitude, crews could not drop bombs on targets precisely. Although the USAAF continued precision bombing only officially, it launched de facto area bombing with an attack against Münster in October 1943—this resulted in the Dresden bombing in February 1945[47].

Daytime visual bombing from a high altitude, which had not worked in Europe, was applied in the war against Japan for certain reasons. First, the headquarters in Washington set the Japanese aircraft industry as one of the primary targets. Second, the commander of

41 Biddle [2002]; Crane [2016] pp. 14–30; Morris [2017] pp. 112–197.
42 Henke [1993] p. 17.
43 Arai [2008] pp. 73–79.
44 Nakazawa [2014] pp. 81–96; Bennett [2019] p. 22.
45 In addition, economic constraints within the Army Air Corps made precision bombing doctrine desirable. Biddle [2002] p. 183; Crane [2016] pp. 21–22.
46 Schaffer [1985] p. 35; Webster and Frankland [2006: 1961] pp. 381–417.
47 A military historian Ronald Schaffer detailed that the USAAF's bombing policy had changed from precision to area bombing in the European theater. He pointed out that moral consideration had little impact on the process. Although the USAAF conducted de-facto area bombing, it did not carry out nighttime bombing in Europe. Schaffer [1985].

the 21st BC was Haywood Hansell, who had been one of the Bomber Mafia and was an adherent of the doctrine. Third, B-29s were not deployed in the field enough to carry out area bombings successfully against a city on a broad scale[48]. In any case, as mentioned above, Hansell could not garner an achievement with precision bombing and so was replaced by LeMay as the commander. While he engaged in an area bombing campaign with incendiaries, LeMay continued precision bombing missions to bring successful results gradually. Even he, however, could not succeed with nighttime precision bombings[49].

By placing in this context nighttime precision bombing with a radar by the 315th BW, its historical significance becomes clear. That is, it can be said that a series of missions by the BW is the best example that the latest technologies overcame various difficulties involved in daytime visual (precision) bombing. These missions had a minor impact on the result of the war because they were carried out in the final stage of the conflict, and they were aimed at oil-related facilities, which had not been considered essential targets, as will be detailed later[50]. However, this example demonstrates that science and technology are crucial factors in modern war in that they can make possible operations previously viewed as impossible. If the war had not ended in August 1945, the USAAF might have returned to its doctrine and produced results with minimum civilian losses. In other words, if nighttime precision bombing had been feasible earlier, the USAAF would not have changed its policy to area bombing with incendiaries. In this sense, this case shows that science and technology have a considerable impact on methods of conducting a war. It will be discussed how the success of the missions by the 315th BW influenced the US's later methods of engaging in war[51].

3-2. What made nighttime precision bombing possible

In the previous section, the author notes that science and technology had overcome the obstacles involved in daytime visual bombing, a process that can be summarized as follows: the Radiation Laboratory established at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology succeeded in developing the AN/APQ-7 (EAGLE) radar, which had a higher resolution than the existing radar system, the AN/APQ-13; Western Electric received an order for the mass production of the EAGLE; it was decided that the B-29B, a variant of the B-29 for nighttime operations, would be equipped with the EAGLE; Bell Aircraft was asked to produce all B-29Bs, and 653 B-29s were manufactured by September 1945, 311 of which were B-29Bs[52]. This meant that nighttime precision bombing could be achieved by mobilizing not only science and technology but also the industrial capabilities that could mass-produce these radars and the bombers equipped with them. Although it is important that scientific, technological, and industrial bases could influence the way a war is fought, this aspect will be examined in other articles. Here, this paper summarizes the facts

48 Fujita [2021].

49 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 546–576, 646–653; United States Air Force [1953] pp. 169–172. A historian John W. Dower said that the news of repeated bombings against cities and massive destruction and Japanese victims numbed the sensibilities of public and media. For example, on May 30, 1945, the *New York Times* reported the 6 bombings on Tokyo caused the deaths of a million, or perhaps 2 million of Japanese. Dower points out that despite the highly exaggerated numbers, neither the quality paper which reported it nor the American public who read it had any doubts. Dower [2010] pp. 183–184.

50 A USSBS's report concluded that "[t]he contribution of the bombing offensive against oil to the Japanese defeat was therefore negligible. The war had already been won by the blockade." USSBS, *Oil in Japan's War*. p. 65.

51 In the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force tried nighttime operations, including precision bombing with short range navigation (SHORAN) radar. USAF [1953] pp. 197–211.

52 The number of B-29Bs produced by Bell was determined from the following websites, Aircraft Serial Number Search (http://users.rcn.com/jeremy.k/serialSearch.html) and USASC-USAAS-USAAC-USAAF-USAF Military Aircraft Serial Numbers--1908 to Present (https://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/usafserials.html).

concerning the development of the radar and the production of B-29Bs.

To begin with the development of EAGLE, recommended by Vannevar Bush, who was then-president of the Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C., President Roosevelt established the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) in June 1940 and the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) in June 1941 to mobilize scientists and engineers in preparation for war. The role of both institutions was not research and development, instead enabling studies by personnel and research institutions for certain research and issuing contracts for such[53]. The OSRD's funding amounted to half a billion dollars by the end of the war[54]. It was the NDRC that recommended the establishment of a laboratory to research primarily microwaves, that is, radar, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), eventually becoming the Radiation Laboratory (Rad Lab). In sum, the OSRD funded 114 million dollars to MIT, which was made the biggest contractor of the OSRD[55].

EAGLE was developed at Rad Lab, after which flight experiments were successfully completed in May 1944. Western Electric initially received an order for 612 EAGLEs, but it eventually took on the responsibility to produce 1,660. This, however, did not proceed smoothly. The idea of a higher-resolution radar with high-frequency microwaves had been embraced as early as November 1941, meaning it took about 2 and a half years to complete the flight experiments. One reason for such a long time needed was that because the feasibility of the EAGLE was considered questionable within Rad Lab, it was not necessarily highly prioritized. Although MIT and Rad Lab were abundant funding, economic and human resources were naturally so limited that Rad Lab had to set priorities based on the importance and feasibility of each development. The relatively low priority of EAGLE inevitably led to the delay of the research and development of the equipment and the achievement of more precise bombing operations[56]. To make clearer the picture of nighttime precision radar bombing, it is necessary to place in this context the overall policy and direction of Rad Lab or the OSRD, but this point will be examined in other articles.

Concerning the production of B-29B, as previously noted, it was B-29B, a variant of the B-29, that was equipped with an EAGLE, and Bell undertook the production of them all. Originally, it was Boeing that developed and manufactured B-29s, so why did Bell sign a contract to produce them? As it happened, not only B-29s, but also many goods saw their production charged to companies under license contracts other than those that developed them. In the case of B-29s, Boeing produced them at the Wichita second plant in Kansas and the Renton factory in Washington. In addition, government-owned factories were constructed at Omaha, Nebraska, and Marietta, Georgia, where Glen L. Martin Company would operate the former and Bell the latter. It was called government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) when private companies operated plants funded federally[57]. Thus, the production of B-29s and B-29Bs had to be placed in the context of U.S. industrial mobilization.

Since the author has few primary documents to clarify why Bell was charged to produce

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53 Stewart [1948] pp. 7–51.

54 Larry Owens notes that the OSRD issued almost 2,300 contracts with 321 industrial institutions and 142 academic and other non-profit institutions. Owens [1994] pp. 526, 565–576.

55 Owens [1994] p. 565.

56 Brown [1999] 192–193; Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, Division 14, *Radar: Summary Report and Harp Project*, vol. 1 of Summary Technical Report of Division 14, NDRC, pp. 75–77 (Downloaded from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2015490937/ [Last access, March 15, 2024]).

57 For GOCO, see Wilson [2016] pp. 62–83.

B-29Bs, this paper describes how Bell came to produce B-29Bs and the pace at which they were manufactured. In January 1940, the U.S. Army Air Corps envisaged a Very Heavy Bomber (VHB) having a higher performance than the existing Heavy Bombers, such as the B-17 (Boeing) and B-24 (Consolidated Aircraft Corporation). The USAAF signed a contract with Boeing for prototype aircrafts in September, but concerned with the speed of completion, the USAAF reached agreement with the company for the construction of the Wichita second plant in June 1941 before prototype flying, and in July, it ordered 1,050 B-29s. Martin and Bell was also asked to build the B-29s[58]. In December 1941, the construction of a new factory at Marietta was planned, and then in May 1942, it was decided formally that Bell would operate the plant. Due to the delay in the completion of the new plant and the lack of manpower, it was as late as November 1943 when Bell produced their first B-29[59]; eventually, the Marietta plant would deliver 205 B-29s by the end of 1944, all of which were ordinary B-29s.

As late as around October 1944, the USAAF considered the production of B-29Bs and B-29Bs equipped with EAGLE[60], and in November, it was decided to organize a unit of EAGLE-equipped B-29Bs. Then, in December, the 315th BW was notified that the special unit would be their own[61], and the first B-29Bs by Bell–Marietta were delivered to the 315th BW in February or March 1945[62]. Further, the 16th BG, one unit of the 315th BW, received an almost authorized force (45 B-29s) by May, and on June 26, the 315th BW began its first mission. Therefore, it was impossible for the 315th BW, dedicated to nighttime radar precision bombing, to be ready begin start their operations without the effort of Bell in mass-producing B-29Bs, totaling over 300. However, questions remain: why was Bell asked to manufacture B-29Bs, what challenges did Bell face with the change in specifications, and what was the position on B-29B production in the overall B-29 production plan? These are future issues.

3-3. Why were oil-related facilities targeted?

That nighttime radar precision bombing became possible with technological and industrial bases is a completely different issue from the fact that oil-related facilities were targeted for operations. In this section, the author explains the reasons for the latter.

The Army Air Corps had adopted precision bombing as its strategic bombing doctrine, based on which the USAAF identified power plants and oil facilities as important targets in the European theater. However, the USAAF did not consider oil plants essential to the bombing campaign in the war against Japan. Thus, in November 1943, a report of the Committee of Operation Analysts (COA)[63] listed merchant shipping, steel production, the antifriction bearings industry, urban industrial areas, aircraft plants, and the electronics industry as strategic targets to be prioritized. The following October, another report of the committee set the aircraft industry, urban industrial areas, and shipping ("by all available means, including mining") in order of priority[64], but neither mentioned oil-related facilities.

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58 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 6–7.

59 Muelen [1995] p. 54.

60 Lauris Norstad to Curtis LeMay, October 5, 1944, 20th Air Force-Official File (2), Pentagon Series, Project Subseries, Box 27, Lauris Norstad Papers, 1930–1987, National Diet Library, Japan.

61 Swann [1986] p. 27.

62 Swann [1986] p. 40; Mann [2004] p. 30.

63 COA was created by the directive of Henry Arnold in late 1942 to discuss and recommend bombing target and analyze "the rate of progressive deterioration that should be anticipated in the German war effort as a result of the increasing air operations." Craven and Cate [1983a:1949] pp. 349, 353–354.

64 Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 552.

This is because a blockade or attack on oil tankers directly was more efficient than bombing inland oil plants, at least concerning the Japanese oil industry. In fact, Japanese oil production capacity was already reduced by these operations by the time the 21st BC undertook its operations. Nevertheless, oil-related plants were attacked from June 1945, but why? To answer this question, *AAF in WWII* explains:

> By April, however, AAF intelligence had come to the opinion that the petroleum industry in Japan was in so critical a state that the destruction of facilities and stores would react immediately upon the tactical situation. Consequently, LeMay and Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles, who came to Guam as the deputy commander of the Twentieth Air Force, eventually decided that during its combat-testing period the 315th Wing would devote its efforts exclusively to oil targets. This decision had the enthusiastic indorsement of Gen. Carl Spaatz, slated to command all B-29's under USASTAF [U.S. Army Strategic Air Force], who had been an ardent advocate of the oil campaign in the ETO [European Theater of Operations] [65].

The argument that the destruction of oil plants had become "critical" is unsound because they were bombed sporadically by then, and the Japanese oil production capacity further worsened due to other operations, such as blockades and mining around the Japanese waters[66]. Two reasons can be offered for why oil facilities emerged as the target of nighttime precision bombing with EAGLE.

First, there remained few targets that the 21st BC could attack, as the top-priority target, the aircraft industry, was near utter destruction due to the ongoing efforts of precision bombing under LeMay's command. For example, because of missions toward the Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Nagoya Engine factory and Musashi plant of Nakajima on April 7, as well as Musashi again on April 12, the Musashi plant's operations came to a halt[67]. Then, on July 24, the final precision bombing of aircraft factories was carried out when 625 B-29s destroyed seven targets. LeMay had modified his tactics, such as using 2,000-pound bombs and lowering the bombing altitude to ensure a precise result. Thus, missions against the aircraft industry by the newly arrived 315th BW would have a negligible effect.

Besides, by June 1945, the targets of nighttime area bombing shifted from larger cities to middle and smaller cities, and it was decided at the end of 1944 that B-29Bs equipped with the EAGLE would be deployed to the 315th BW. In contrast to precision bombing, area bombing did not necessitate precision attack, and this is because area bombing could be carried out in nighttime with an existing radar. Therefore, it must be nonsense that an EAGLE-equipped unit would carry out such missions. Over 60 Japanese cities were leveled by area bombing campaigns, despite a study of new targets in June 1945 listed only 25 cities. In retrospect, the destruction of over 60 cities can be judged excessive. The incremental build-up of the 21st BC led to the excessiveness. Sorties of the 21st BC per month had risen steadily, along with the number of B-29s deployed to Marianas (Figure 1). If the 315th BW had joined the campaign against middle or smaller cities, only some less significant cities would have been added to the list of cities destroyed. In sum, it would have been unnecessary for the 315th BW to attack existing targets with other units.

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65 Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 660.
66 USSBS, *Oil in Japan's War*, pp. 45-66.
67 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 647–648.

Figure 1. Sorties per Month and B-29s Deployed to 20th AF



Source: Koyama [2018] and the Office of Statistical Control [1945].

Therefore, another target system for the 315th BW was needed, but oil plants showed little reason to be attacked. Nevertheless, they were chosen as targets for the unit because they were considered best for the "test" of the newly developed radar set, which is the second reason oil plants were selected. Furthering this point, an official history of the 315th notes, "Japan's oil refineries provided ideal test targets because they were relatively undamaged, well-defined, and located near the coastline," so bombardiers could easily identify their targets with EAGLE[68]. Werrell suggests that if the war had not ended in August, the 315th BW, which completed the test successfully, would have conducted missions to more significant inland targets, including bridges[69]. Indeed, the USAAF set railroads and stations as primary targets in the final days of the war, and on August 14, the last day of the war, the 21st BC bombed the Marifu railroad yards (Iwakuni station) in Yamaguchi with 115 B-29s, a mission that implies a gradual shift in priority from urban areas to transportation systems.

There were other cases in which modern technologies or embraced tactics were "tested" in battlefields. For example, the firebombing against Tokyo on February 25, 1945, was carried out as test of area bombing with incendiaries, and the success of this test led to the March 9–10 air raid. (Other tests were conducted on Nagoya on January 3 and Kobe on February 4, but they were judged as failures.) More explicit instances include the atomic bombings. Where and how the atomic bombs would be used was discussed from April 1945. Further, it was decided in an earlier phase that the bombs would be used against cities of a certain size. When desirable cities were selected, the condition was that any

[68] Swann [1986] p. 123; Werrell [1996] p. 199.
[69] Werrell [1996] p. 199; Swann [1986] p. 122.

target city should face minor damage from strategic bombing by the time of the atomic bombings, so the suffering from the nuclear attacks could be examined. Because this would be impossible if target cities were leveled, strategic bombing missions were prohibited against cities listed for the A-bomb, including Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Kokura. These facts suggest that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not the most important strategic targets for destruction as early as possible, which was the case with petroleum facilities.

Conclusion

This article summarizes the nighttime precision bombing campaign using the new radar by the 315th BW, which demonstrates its historical significance and suggests the challenges to painting a clearer overall picture. Although this campaign had a negligible impact on the consequences of World War II, it is of great historical significance in that the industrial, scientific, and technological mobilization enabled the realization of missions previously considered impossible. The way of engaging in war itself depended on the wartime mobilization of industry, science, and technology, and importantly, the timing of the missions and their feasibility depended on the priorities in research and development and the pace of weapons and equipment production. If the USAAF had achieved precision bombing earlier, would it have carried out an area bombing campaign on such a scale?

To clarify the overall picture of the nighttime precision bombing campaign with radar, the following problems must be addressed. The first is how industrial, scientific, and technological bases were established to make possible such a campaign. Rad Lab at MIT developed EAGLE, so the history of its development should be clarified by placing it in the context in which the Rad Lab was set up and the overall research trends at the time. In addition, Bell assumed the production of B-29Bs equipped with EAGLE, so it must be explained how and why the AAF contracted with Bell. In doing so, the contract should be placed in the overall picture of the development and production of B-29s. Second, it must be understood in detail why petroleum facilities were chosen as the targets of EAGLE missions. As already mentioned, the choice of oil facilities strongly implies that the missions had an experimental aspect, which seems to reflect how the U.S. military engaged in war. Therefore, it can be said that a clearer understanding of the precision bombing campaign with EAGLE would shed light on how the war was fought by the U.S. military.

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Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during the Cold War: Focus on Technology Transfer and the Development of Highly Skilled Talent

By HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI*

What led India to produce highly skilled people during the Cold War? Why did some "brain drain" into the United States? During the Cold War, private foundations and universities worked with the U.S. government to develop a systematic technical assistance policy based on industry-academia-government cooperation. The diplomatic intention was also to bring India, which had maintained non-aligned neutrality, into the Western camp. U.S. technical assistance led to the establishment of the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, the "MIT of India," and the training of Indian scientific and technical personnel proceeded smoothly. However, India did not have the industrial infrastructure to absorb such highly skilled talent. On the other hand, the United States has faced a serious shortage of human resources in critical fields that are crucial to national defense. As competition with the Soviet Union intensified during the Cold War, it became critical to attract young scientists and engineers from home and abroad became critical. The imbalance in the supply and demand of high-level human resources between the U.S. and India, along with changes in U.S. immigration policy, has resulted in the incorporation of many highly skilled Indian talents into the U.S. scientific and technological community.

Introduction

The presence of Indian immigrants in the modern U.S. economy is large. Especially in high-tech sectors such as Information Technology (IT), Asian immigrants are remarkably active, and many Indian engineers work for GAFAM (Google, Amazon, Facebook (now Meta), Apple, and Microsoft), big tech companies that are taking the world by storm. They are highly skilled, specialized, well-educated, and well-paid, leading to the name "model minority." In the past, there was a one-way brain drain from India to the United States. In recent years, however, there has been a growing trend of "brain circulation," where outgoing brains return to India and generate profits for the Indian economy, and "brain retention," where the brain stays in the country as the Indian economy develops. Thus, the "brains" from India that have driven the U.S. economy are no longer easy to secure. Given the global talent competition, there is great research interest in whether the United States

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will continue to attract highly skilled talent from abroad.[1]

Why has the number of highly skilled immigrants from India increased? One of the reasons for India's emergence as a repository of highly skilled human resources was the influence of development and technical assistance from Western countries on developing countries. During the Cold War, the United States positioned South Asia as a bulwark of democracy. India, in particular, has gained strategic importance, partly because of the expectation that it would become the world's largest democracy. With the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the outbreak of the Korean War, strengthening economic ties through economic aid and technology transfers to India became an important diplomatic issue in halting the expansion of the communist bloc. Technical assistance, mainly through the exchange of people and technology, was seen as a cheap and effective way to create an environment in which private capital could enter the country. The amount of aid to India increased from $89.8 million in 1958 during the late Eisenhower administration to $194.6 million in 1960 and to $465.5 million in 1962 during the Kennedy administration.[2] Large private foundations, multinational corporations, and universities cooperated with the U.S. government to develop a systematic technical assistance policy. Ramnath was positive about the influence of Western technical assistance, arguing that the training of Indians in American companies and the training of engineers in India by Western experts as career engineers in companies supported the "birth of the profession in India."[3] Kumar emphasized the great influence of the soft power of the giant American foundations that played a role in introducing the U.S. education system in India, which replaced the British system after World War 2.[4] Western governments were involved in the establishment of the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) to increase their influence, and the United States supported the establishment of IIT Kanpur to create the "Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) of India," envisioned by President Nehru. It was a national project under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) playing a central role in providing support. Thus, with the support of western countries, numerous IITs and other institutions of higher learning for highly skilled personnel have been established. Western-style systems of education and research, as well as advanced science and technology, have been introduced in India. However, India lacked the industrial infrastructure to absorb these highly skilled human resources, and some opted for a brain drain, seeking to use their skills and careers in the U.S.

U.S. immigration policy provided the institutional basis for the absorption of these "brains." When the Immigration Act of 1965 opened the way for permanent residences in the United States, many Indian scientists and engineers, including IIT graduates, were absorbed into the American scientific and technological community.[5] Thus, there was a demand on the U.S. side that controlled the brain drain, including a favorable research environment and high wages in the United States, changes in immigration policy, and declining birth rates.[6]

However, brain drain from the Third World has rarely been discussed regarding new immigrants in the study of immigration history.[7] According to immigration historian

[1] Widener [2019] pp 35–40.
[2] Merrill [1990] pp. 3-5.
[3] Ramnath [2017].
[4] Kumal [2019].
[5] Bassett [2009] pp. 803-804.
[6] Sukhatme [1994] pp. 48-52.
[7] Suga mentioned the impact of brain drain in analyzing the congressional debate on immigration reform, but there are few such studies. Suga [2002] pp. 274-275.

Zolberg, lawmakers did not anticipate that the influx of Asians would be so large and that non-Europeans would become so dominant and a majority.[8] According to Economist Timothy J. Hatton, the elimination of the country-of-origin quota system by the 1965 Immigration Act, the use of quota caps, an increase in the number of immediate relatives through family-based petitions, and an increase in the number of refugees and illegal immigrants were unexpected.[9] The increase in Asian and Mexican immigration and demographic changes was not anticipated by Congress at that time.

However, given the state of U.S. science and technology at the time, there is no coincidence that the United States revised its immigration policy in 1965 to increase the priority quota for highly skilled personnel. In *"Science-The Endless Frontier,"* Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and a professor at MIT, warned that the United States would enter the postwar period with a serious shortage of trained scientists.[10] A decisive blow came in 1957 with the Sputnik Shock. Once the United States fell behind the Soviet Union in terms of science and technology, the training of scientists and engineers became a national project. To establish U.S. dominance in science and technology, the budget for the development of science and technology related to national defense was significantly increased, beginning with the passage of the National Defense Education Act in 1958. The recruitment of young scientists and engineers, both at home and abroad, became a critical issue in the United States to survive the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

This paper highlights the critical importance of the U.S. brain drain from India in the supply and demand of scientists and engineers in the United States and abroad in the 1950s and the 1960s. This paper specifically focuses on IIT graduates from India, which has produced a large number of scientists and engineers. In doing so, it illustrates the impact of the brain drain from India to the United States and the steady supply of highly skilled immigrants from Asia in the U.S. economy.

1. The Cold War and the U.S. manpower situation

How did the U.S. deal with the shortage of scientific personnel during the Cold War? Before entering this discussion, it is important to understand that the shortage of human resources in science and technology became a national issue during World War II and that measures to address this issue have been sought ever since. As scientific expertise and technological innovation have become more closely linked to national security, there has been growing interest in improving science education in the United States. In response to the shortage of engineers, chemists, physicists, and production supervisors during World War II, the development and training of students for national defense became an urgent issue. In 1940, the "Engineering Defense Training" program was launched. In 1942, it was expanded into the Engineering, Science, Management War Training (ESMWT) program under the supervision of the U.S. Department of Education. Union College faculty and consultants from General Electric created a variety of courses to meet the needs of wartime production, including drafting, tool design, and radio communication. More than 1.5 million men and women took courses in the program from 1940 to 1945 to prepare for

8 Zolberg [2008] pp. 337-338.
9 Hatton [2015].
10 Bush [1945].

scientific and technical work in war-related industries.[11] The Department of Education invested $60 million in this program to expand the armed forces and provide vocational and technical education.

Vannevar Bush, who had emphasized the importance of federal support for scientific research since World War II, proposed to President Roosevelt at the end of the war the development of a scientific and technological workforce and a new vision for a federal scientific organization to maintain U.S. scientific superiority. This led to the establishment of the National Science Foundation (hereafter NSF) in 1950. The U.S. scientific and technological community has been clamoring since the war for public funding to strengthen basic research, create scientific knowledge, and nurture talented young scientists. The postwar U.S. economy saw a significant increase in science and engineering employment, reflecting advances in electronics, jet aircraft, space technology, guided missiles, and communications, as well as a growing demand for engineers and skilled workers in these fields. Nevertheless, the education and training of domestic scientists and engineers have been lagging. The 1952 NSF Annual Report contains the opinions of representatives of 16 major industries employing scientific and engineering personnel, who expressed concern about a serious shortage of scientific and engineering personnel, with only 36 percent of the needed scientific and engineering personnel available. The report also noted that government agencies, including the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission, faced similar challenges, and that the shortage of scientific and technical personnel forced serious changes in future expansion plans. According to the report, the number of engineers with engineering degrees in the United States declined each year and was expected to fall to 15,000 by 1955, approximately half the desired level of 30,000 per year. In the Soviet Union, the number of engineering graduates was expected to increase from less than 9,000 in 1943 to nearly 50,000 in 1955. The low birth rate during the Great Depression and the loss of tens of thousands of science Ph. D.s during World War II were the main reasons for the shortage of scientific and technical personnel in the United States.[12] Although the Soviet economy had always been slow to industrialize, in 1928, under Stalin's leadership, the First Five-Year Plan was launched to train engineers. By the 1950s, the Soviet Union was producing more scientists, engineers, and specialists than the United States, with more than twice as many graduates in these fields each year.[13]

The Sputnik Shock of 1957 made the development of human resources in American science and technology a major national issue beyond the scientific community. In fact, on October 4, 1957, just hours before the launch of Sputnik I, a presidential commission released its "Report on Soviet Scientific Superiority," which revealed that the Soviet Union not only had more professional engineers than the United States but was also actively providing technical assistance to developing countries. The Soviet Union built technical institutes in Bombay (now Mumbai), India, and Rangoon, Burma (now Yangon, Myanmar), each with 1,000 students and faculty. In addition, by 1957, there were 1.3 million science university graduates in the United States, compared to 1.5 million in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, 15,000 students from China and Soviet satellites were studying in the Soviet

11 Armsby [1946].

12 *National Science Foundation* [1952] *The Second Annual Report of the National Science Foundation*, Washington, D.C.: GPO, pp. 25-27.

13 Scientific and Technological Manpower News ROUND-UP, National Committee for the Development of Scientists and Engineers, Vol. 1. No. 14, December 1, 1957, p. 2 (hereafter only title, volume, number, and date), Records of the National Science Foundation, Record Group (hereafter RG) 307, Box 1, Office of the Director, Records of the President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers, 1956-58, Records of National Record Administration (hereafter NARA) .

Union, while 12,000 foreign students were studying in the United States.

Many intellectuals were concerned about the increase in Soviet scientific and technological capabilities. Edward Teller, a Hungarian-Jewish nuclear physicist famous for developing the hydrogen bomb, declared in 1957 that the Soviet Union had been leading the United States in scientific talent for a decade and that the Soviet Union would be the world's leader in science for the next decade.[14] Among them, the United States was most concerned with Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology. By August of the following year, it had reached a level where the Soviets had launch capabilities.[15] How was the Soviet Union able to build a modern nuclear weapons system at such an astonishing rate almost a decade after the start of the Cold War? One of the reasons for the Soviet Union's advantage over the United States in missile development was the massive recruitment of German experts, the "spoils of war" from Germany. Ichikawa, the leading Japanese historian of science, pointed out that the process of jet aircraft development involved a huge scale of "plunder of technology" by a victorious nation from a defeated nation.[16] Consequently, the Soviet Union successfully produced rockets, jet planes, and nuclear weapons.[17] The Soviet Union also took advantage of the brain drain from Germany to rapidly increase its scientific and technological capabilities, and the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a large-scale competition to develop and acquire human resources during this period.

The Soviet Union also seems to have better prospects than the United States in science and technology. Washington columnist Robert Spivak, writing in the *New York Post*, highlighted the gap between American scientific and technological capabilities. Only 25 percent of American students majored in science, compared to 60 percent in the Soviet Union. During the previous decade (1950–60), the Soviet educational system produced 1.2 million qualified engineers and scientists, compared to 900,000 in the United States. Between 1929 and 1954, the Soviet Union's growth rate was 1,300 percent, dwarfing the growth rate of the United States by 225 percent. Spivak pointed out that the shortage of engineers in the United States would continue until 1965, given the "lean generation" of the 1930s, which had a particularly low birth rate.[18]

The federal government's painful experience of falling behind the Soviet Union in science and technology led to the promotion of science and technology education. The development of highly qualified human resources in science and technology had become part of a national project. An example of this focus is the "National Defense Education Act" of 1958, enacted the year after the Sputnik Shock. The purpose of the law was to increase the number of students in science, technology, mathematics, foreign languages, and other fields of study; to provide technical education important to national defense; and to affirm the superiority of the United States, especially in the fields of science and technology. Title VIII of the National Defense Education Act, through its Regional Occupational Program provisions, intended to train students to work in "highly skilled technical occupations" essential to the defense of the nation and requiring scientific knowledge. The number of students enrolled in Title VIII technical occupation programs

14 ROUND-UP, Vol. 1. No. 3, March 1, 1957, p. 1.

15 ROUND-UP, Vol. 1. No. 13, November 15, 1957, pp. 1-3.

16 For further information, see especially chapter 4 of Ichikawa [2018].

17 Meanwhile, the U.S. was devoting financial and human resources to the production of high-speed computers that would lay the foundation for today's computer technology. Ichikawa [2018] p. 7.

18 Robert Spivack, "Sputnik Underscores U.S. Shortage of Scientists," Records of the National Science Foundation, RG 307, Box 1, Office of the Director, Records of the President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers, 1956-58.

increased from 48,000 in 1959 to 148,426 in 1962. By discipline, reflecting the development of computer technology and the demand for trained engineers in this field, electronics accounted for nearly half of all programs, followed by mechanical and electrical engineering. Together, these three fields account for 75 percent of the total.[19]

As we have seen, the results of this professional training were certainly accumulating, it was not always possible to ensure a stable supply of scientists and engineers who could compete with the Soviet Union. For example, according to the 1961 Bureau of Labor Statistics estimate of the demand for scientists and engineers in the civilian economy, the growth rate of scientists and engineers was about four times that of the labor force as a whole, with a 75 percent increase from 314,000 to 548,000 between 1959 and 1970 for scientists and a 90 percent increase from 782,000 to 148,000 for engineers. The total number of scientists and engineers was expected to increase by about 85 percent, from approximately 1,096,000 to 2,032,000.[20] A second study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which produced more detailed and accurate demand projections, arrived at the same conclusions as the first study, with minor differences in numbers. Between 1960 and 1970, fewer than 765,000 new scientists and engineers were available to fill more than one million job openings, and the shortage that was evident in the 1950s and the early 1960s may have worsened, according to the Division of Labor Statistics.[21] While the demand for scientists and engineers continues to increase owing to space exploration and economic growth, the supply of scientists and engineers remains insufficient. Many were retiring or changing jobs, and 14 percent of engineering graduates found jobs in other fields. Therefore, the need to recruit not only new graduates with bachelor's degrees in science and engineering but also those with degrees in other fields as well as non-college graduates working in technical occupations had to be met by any means possible. Indeed, within a few years of the enactment of the National Defense Education Act, it was not possible to fully meet these manpower requirements. Therefore, the government has begun to serious search for foreign scientists and engineers.

2. Global technology transfer and high-level talent development network

This section describes the process of developing a workforce from Asia, especially India, that could compete with the Soviet Union, which occurred concurrently with the development of scientific and technological human resources.

During the Cold War, the United States positioned South Asia as a bulwark of democracy and implemented aggressive development and technical assistance policies. India, in particular, gained strategic importance, partly because of the expectation that it would become the world's largest democracy. The Soviet Union's involvement in India's economic development since the mid-1950s and private diplomacy were instrumental in supporting and promoting socialist modernization. On the Indian side, the Soviet Union was also seen as a key player in India's security against the Chinese Communist Party and pro-U.S. Pakistan.[22] From this Indo-Soviet cooperation, large private foundations, corporations, and universities worked with the U.S. government to develop a systematic

[19] U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Education for a Changing World of Work*, Appendix I Technical training in the United States, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1963.
[20] Michael [1962] p. 420.
[21] Stambler [1963] p. 1282.
[22] Dyakonov [2023] p. 90.

technical assistance policy. U.S. technical assistance to developing countries was primarily the work of private companies and foundations. There was a reason why government officials placed so much emphasis on private organizations in their economic assistance activities abroad. Foreign governments were more receptive to the advice of private organizations, which were unofficial ambassadors of the United States abroad than to official representatives of the U.S. government.[23] In an attempt to strengthen mutual understanding with other countries without jeopardizing strained international relations, the role of private contractors in local relationships and personal networks was important. In this way, private organizations played an important complementary role in U.S. diplomacy by establishing good relationships with foreign governments and local private organizations before U.S. government foreign assistance began in earnest.

The Ford Foundation, which played a major role in providing development assistance to the Third World on behalf of the government, was a prime example of the impact of private organizations. IIT Kanpur and the Indian Institutes of Management in Ahmedabad, Calcutta, and Bangalore were established with support from the Ford Foundation. This investment, the foundation believed, was necessary not only to support India's domestic future (e.g., combatting poverty) but also to expand the free world, including the promotion of democracy and incorporation into the Western camp. However, the introduction of American-style elite education was intended to foster the production of an Indian scientific and technological elite that would support an anti-Soviet and pro-American stance in non-aligned and neutral India. With this in mind, in August 1965, the Ford Foundation awarded a two-year grant of $1.45 million to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), a world-renowned leader in basic and applied science and engineering, to support the Birla Institute of Technology (BITS). This grant was used to build an international system of expertise with MIT at the helm. During the decade of support from the Ford Foundation and MIT, more than 3,000 undergraduate and 1,000 graduate students were trained.[24]

The Kanpur India-U.S. Program (1962-1972) is a prime example of U.S. science diplomacy during the Cold War. IIT Kanpur was established in 1960 by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with support from the Ford Foundation to promote Indian science and technology. In 1962, nine American universities (MIT, California Institute of Technology, Carnegie Institution of Technology, Princeton University, University of Michigan, University of California, Purdue University, Ohio State University, and Case Institute of Technology) agreed to provide technical assistance to develop the IITs, "Institutes of National Importance." This program aimed to promote individual freedom and growth by creating an intellectually open environment for both students and faculty that could not be achieved within the rigid hierarchical structure of the traditional Indian university system. Many intellectual and psychological conditions for IIT Kanpur were present in U.S. technical education and thus welcomed U.S. collaboration. Funding was provided for U.S. personnel, in-service training for Kanpur faculty from the consortium institutions, and the purchase of equipment, teaching materials, and books not available in India. The program also provided comfortable housing on the IIT campus for U.S. faculty and their families and attracted many talented young researchers.[25] The program was unique in that young faculty members under the age of 40 were hired to facilitate student advising, and up to 25

[23] Jerome Jacobson Associates, The Use of Private Contractors in Foreign Aid Programs, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, U.S. Congress, Senate, 85th Congress 1st Session, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957, pp. 34-59.

[24] Leslie and Kargon[2006] p. 122.

[25] Sukhatme [1994] p. 70.

American staff members provided Indian students with an interdisciplinary research program that met high international quality and research standards. After taking common courses for the first three years, students were divided into specialized areas of study. By 1972, Kanpur had become a leading center in India for the education of engineers and scientists, both undergraduate and graduate, and for research in engineering and science. However, it has been suggested that these interactions with American researchers contributed to the brain drain from India to the United States. At this point, Prime Minister Nehru's vision of building an 'Indian MIT' and developing a highly skilled workforce for India's future has been betrayed.

Thus, the Ford Foundation contributed significantly to the development of human resources in science and technology in India and India's economic independence. At the same time, however, the number of students studying in the United States also increased rapidly from 10 to 15 per year before the war to 800 by 1955. The Ford Foundation's role in fostering human networks between the United States and India has also had a significant impact on the international movement of highly skilled human resources.[26]

Figure 1 illustrates this discussion. Since the 1950s, the United States, as a technical sender has made significant contributions to the establishment of higher research and educational institutions and the development of highly skilled human resources in India through active development assistance and technology transfer. This was because the U.S.-Soviet rivalry was not only about military power but also about socio-economic achievements, such as living standards, levels of industrialization, and cultural and educational development.[27] In other words, India and other Third World countries were involved in technical assistance competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. These activities were mainly carried out by private foundations, corporations, and universities, and academic and cultural exchanges between the U.S. and India stimulated international labor migration. As a result, some Indians trained through U.S. technical assistance were "brain drained" to the United States, following a change in U.S. immigration policy in the 1960s. India, as the recipient of the technology transfer that should have taken place, consequently experienced a loss of human resources. Thus, technology transfer to Asia eventually became a means for the United States to acquire highly skilled human resources.

26 Ford Foundation, *Annual Report*, 1956, p. 102.

27 The IITs, designed to educate advanced, world-class scientists and engineers, were supported by several countries: Kharagpur was jointly established by the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union; Bombay was supported by the Soviet Union; Madras (now Chennai) was supported by West Germany; and Delhi was supported by the United Kingdom. See Yokoi [2022] Chapter 8.

Figure 1. Technology transfer and brain drain of highly skilled personnel



U.S. immigration policy has been one of the key factors facilitating brain drain in developing countries. After World War II, U.S. immigration policy prioritized highly skilled and knowledgeable individuals. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 marked the beginning of the practice of selecting immigrants based on their individual skills. The Act placed skilled immigrants at the top of the immigration quota priority list and created the H visa, which opened the door to the legal admission of temporary labor immigrants. In addition, the Immigration Act of 1965 established a new standard for selecting immigrants who would contribute to the development of the United States. It required all immigrants to obtain labor certifications issued by the Department of Labor for occupations in high demand in American society and established a mechanism for allowing short-term employment for those with special skills that were useful and essential to the United States. This change in the law was motivated by the need for workers in fields that could not be supplied domestically because of the remarkable growth of various industries, including national defense, and the increased demand for scientific, technical, and other professional workers after World War II. While the Department of Labor consistently supported the issuance of immigrant visas to a wide range of qualified scientists and engineers due to nationwide labor shortages, these decisions were based on the prospect of high long-term demand for workers. Demand for workers is expected to grow at an even higher rate in the following decade.[28]

Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz was a leading advocate for increasing the number of highly skilled immigrants through immigration reform. During the 1965 immigration bill debate, Wirtz cited the shortage of doctors, nurses, scientists, and other important professionals in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, arguing that the new

[28] United States Congress, House of Representatives, *The Brain Drain into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians*, Washington, D.C.: United States Congress, House of Representatives. GPO, 1967, p. 13 (hereafter cited as *The Brain Drain*, 1967).

immigration legislation would increase supply in these and other areas. He argued that facilitating the entry of immigrants with particularly useful skills would encourage an inflow of highly skilled immigrants and also serve the interests of American labor demand and welfare, especially in filling positions in industries in which labor was in short supply. In addition, Wirtz further articulated his expectations for addressing skill shortages. In summary, of the approximately 97,600 annual quota immigrants who entered the country between 1959 and 1962, up to 48,600 entered the U.S. labor market. It was positive that the new immigration law would increase the number of admitted immigrants, especially those with higher education and exceptional skills with special experience to fill labor shortages. Under the current law, approximately 8,800 professional and technical workers enter the labor market annually as quota immigrants. Between 1952 and 1961, 14,000 physicians, surgeons, and 28,000 nurses helped alleviate shortages in the medical field. In addition, 4,900 scientists, nearly 1,100 physicists, 12,000 engineers, 9,000 machinists, 7,000 tool and die makers, and other skilled immigrants were admitted to the United States, which was crucial because of the short supply of such professionals.[29] Wirtz recognized the significant contribution of highly skilled immigrants to the U.S. economy in the past, and he intended to bolster supply through immigration reform.

3. Brain Drain from India – IIT as a Case Study

The postwar U.S. immigration policy moved away from earlier race-based criteria and relied on priority criteria based on the recognition that individual knowledge and skills are an important source of national strength. As a result, immigrants of Asian origin were welcomed to fill the shortages of highly skilled workers. In 1966, for the first time in U.S. history, immigrants from developing countries accounted for more than half of all immigrants (51%). By 1970, this amount had exceeded 60 percent. This increase was particularly significant for Asian immigrants, increasing from 16,622 (5.7% of total immigrants) in 1965 to 88,418 (23.7% of total immigrants) in 1970. While the Philippines sent the largest total number of immigrants, the largest jump was in Indian immigration, which increased more than 17-fold, from 582 in 1965 to 10,114 in 1970.[30]

From 1956 to 1966, the number of scientists, engineers, and physicians who immigrated to the United States as immigrants nearly doubled, from 5,373 to 9,534. In 1966, the number of Indian immigrants was 896, more than double that of Filipino immigrants, 397. Indian immigration continued to grow, and by 1970, Indian immigrants accounted for 22 percent of all scientists and engineers entering the United States (see Figure 2).

[29] Statement of W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 500 General Records of the Department of Labor, Office of the Secretary of Labor Records of the Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, 1962-1969, RG 174, Box 278, Immigration and Naturalization 1965, NARA.

[30] Friedman [1973] pp. 39-40.

Figure 2. Percentage of Immigrants by Country of Origin of Scientists and Engineers Entering the United States, FY1970



Source: National Science Foundation [1972] *Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from Abroad: Trends Through Fiscal Year 1970*, Washington, D.C.: GPO, p. 3.

Not only does the number of immigrants increase, but so does the number of temporary residents, including foreign students, on student visas. By 1970, about 40 percent of temporary residents in professional occupations, such as scientists, engineers, and doctors, had changed their status to permanent residences and chose to remain in the United States. Of the 13,372 working in the category of scientists and technicians, 62 percent (8,294) were from Asia, and up to 53 percent of them had a change of status. Another important indicator in the non-immigrant category was the number of aliens who received doctorates in science and engineering from U.S. universities. Between 1960 and 1970, Asian PhDs increased from 44 to 49 percent of the total, with Chinese and Indian PhDs accounting for 70 percent of this increase.[31] This provided a channel for people of Asian descent to obtain work opportunities without entering the United States as immigrants. Gregory Henderson, a senior research officer at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, described primary and student visas as "launching pads for immigration."[32] For example, Asian students studying at American universities remained in the United States after

[31] Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs Division, *Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility: Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974, p. 66 (hereafter cited as *Brain Drain, 1974*).
[32] *The Brain Drain*, 1967, p. 15.

graduation, representing a large knowledge-based industrial workforce.[33]

Why did so many Indians leave the United States? One reason is that neither Indian government research institutions nor domestic industry had an adequate industrial base to absorb advanced human resources. According to India's 1961 Census, the overall unemployment rate for scientists and engineers was 10.4 percent, and 18.6 percent were employed in jobs outside their field of expertise. Developing countries' inability to offer attractive compensation to highly skilled personnel weakened their bargaining power, and they lost their brains to richer countries offering higher wages. *The Times of India*, an English-language newspaper in India, described the brain drain to the United States as a "subtle neocolonialist robbery" and reported on the gravity of the situation.[34] Since the 1960s, many Indian white-collar workers and professionals have emigrated to English-speaking countries including the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. Research has found that 76% of 1.8 million Indians aged 16 years and above in the U.S. and 45% of the same age group among 847,000 Indians in the UK were engaged in high-skilled occupations in 2019.[35] The brain drain of white-collar jobs from India to the West during the Cold War was one of the origins of the Indian diaspora, which continues to this day.

IIT graduates were at the center of the brain drain, as they produced a large number of highly skilled human resources. Although IITs were established to make India self-reliant, many IIT graduates chose to take their careers and skills to the United States. For Kanpur's brightest students, the IITs were only a step toward graduate school in the United States. For IITs, competing with American universities with financial and research resources for Ph.D. students had become a major challenge. Due to Kanpur's close ties with American engineering universities, its graduates went on to work at the forefront of American computer development.

Although it is difficult to quantify the size and impact of brain drain from IIT, a study that followed the path of graduates from 1973 to 1977 found that of the 1,262 graduates, 30 percent had a bachelor's degree, 14.7 percent had a master's degree, and 14.7 percent had a PhD, with the primary destination being the United States.[36] For electrical engineering graduates, the percentage was even higher, with over 40 percent of the graduates migrating abroad. The majority of graduates who remained in India were also willing to enroll in American universities if financially supported, and international labor migration to developed countries was inevitable because of the desire for better working conditions, economic treatment, and guaranteed opportunities for growth as scientists and engineers. The decline in the U.S. birthrate and the oversupply of professional jobs in South Asia, the fact that India's wage levels were one-fifteenth to one-twentieth of those in the United States until the 1990s, and the lack of demand for qualified scientific and technical personnel in the Indian private sector also contributed to the brain drain.[37]

Brain drain has been identified as a more serious problem for developing countries because, compared to developed countries, they do not have a rich pool of human resources at home and lack the institutional means, including financial resources, to retain them.[38]

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33 Biradavolu [2008] p. 9.

34 *Times of India*, April 17, 1969, p. 8.

35 Potnuru, Thakur and Kumar [2023] pp. 2-3.

36 Sukhatme [1994]. There are no exact data with which to compare Kanpur, but it is believed that a similar percentage is likely.; Bassett [2009] pp. 803-804.

37 Sukhatme [1994] pp. 51-52.

38 On the other hand, brain drains are not as serious for developed countries because they can offset them by using their abundant financial resources to bring back human resources or by increasing the domestic supply of human resources. The U.K. and Canada have been able to cope with brain drain to the United States by accepting

The 1967 U.S. Congressional Report on Brain Drains described severe brain drains in developing countries. While the United States provides millions of dollars in financial aid to developing countries, it casually robs the seeds of future leaders in science, medicine, and technical knowledge. Developing countries are reluctant to send their human resources, which are more valuable than food and machinery, to other countries.[39]

Nevertheless, advocates of highly skilled immigration in the United States have some points. The United States could not weaken its economy to discourage immigration and should not reinstate discriminatory immigration restrictions, which facilitated brain drain in the United States. According to a brain drain report, an attempt to correct the injustice of the discriminatory quota system (the Immigration Act of 1965) paradoxically created a new problem. This is because the Immigration Act of 1965 provided a powerful incentive for professionals from developing countries to migrate to developed countries, thus depriving them of their required talent.[40]

How has the brain drain from developing countries benefited the United States? According to *The Brain Drain*, 1967, based on an estimate of about $20,000 per scientist for education and training, a total of 4,390 scientists, engineers, and physicians from developing countries came to the United States in FY1966, contributing about $88 million to the United States. Of these, 2,563 were scientistic professionals from 13 countries that are major recipients of U.S. aid programs, which alone contributed more than $50 million to the United States. This more than offsets the $40,285,000 disbursed in U.S. aid funds, effectively reversing U.S. efforts to help developing countries. This is called "reverse foreign aid."[41] Using India as an example, U.S. economic aid (debt and loan approvals) to India in FY1972 was $428.5 million, but India's cost of educating professionals to emigrate to the U.S. was $107.4 million, and the estimated cost of education saved by the U.S. was $279.2 million.4[42]

The number of Indians immigrating to the United States in the technical and professional workers category rose from 54 in 1965 to 1,750 the following year.[43] The number of Indian students also tripled between 1958 and 1968, from 2285 to 8221, with 35 percent of them seeking permanent residence in the United States. In particular, IIT graduates accounted for 40 percent of all Indian engineering students who immigrated to the United States between 1960 and 1985, and in some fields, this percentage exceeded 60 percent. Thus, IIT graduates were absorbed in the American engineering community and incorporated into the American-dominated science and technology empire. [44]

Conclusion

Many highly skilled individuals who emigrated from India to the United States during the Cold War continued to thrive in the U.S. economy. Many Indian immigrants were scientists, engineers, doctors, and other professionals who entered high-tech fields, such as aircraft,

many professionals from the Third World. *The Brain Drain*, 1967, p. 4.

39 *Brain Drain*, 1974, p. 2.

40 A study on professional migration in Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey found that 50 percent of scientists trained abroad have not returned home, and Argentina has lost 5,000 engineers to migrate in recent years. *Brain Drain*, 1974, p. 35.

41 *The Brain Drain*, 1967, p. 7.

42 *Brain Drain*, 1974, p. 250.

43 Bassett [2016] p. 288.

44 Yokoi [2022] p. 287.

electronic communications, software, and computer development. In the early 1970s, the average per capita income of the Indian community was higher than that of other ethnic groups.[45] IIT graduates have been particularly active in the U.S. business community, including Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google's parent company, Alphabet; Nikesh Arora, former vice president of Softbank Group; and Parag Agrawal, former CEO of Twitter (now X). This economic power and social status have also fueled political activity, and today the Indian community is part of a powerful political lobby, with a strong network of political leaders and parties in their home country.

As this paper shows, the current success of Indian immigrants in the United States is grounded in the development of highly skilled human resources through U.S. technical assistance policies during the Cold War and the change in U.S. immigration policy to accept such human resources. Looking at the domestic situation in the U.S., there was a severe shortage of scientific and technical personnel after World War II, and for the U.S. to survive the Cold War with the Soviet Union, it was necessary to actively accept highly skilled human resources from India and other Asian countries. From the U.S. perspective, the foundation for becoming the world's leading scientific and technological power has much to do with promoting the acceptance of highly skilled human resources from Asia during the Cold War.

These times have changed; however, countries around the world now have preferential admission policies for advanced talent from abroad. Recently, IIT graduates are increasingly doing business in India rather than studying or working in the United States, and the career paths of advanced Indian talent are changing. Brain drain in the United States is no longer as obvious as it was in the past. In contrast, the possibility of brain drain from the United States is now being considered for the first time in U.S. history.

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[45] Sahay [2009] p. 11.

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講演録

明治大学国際武器移転史研究所主催・第10回公開シンポジウム「分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－」
〝異次元の軍拡〟と沖縄～旧日本軍と自衛隊の〝沖縄侵攻〟の比較研究～

前泊　博盛*

はじめに

かつて復帰前のアメリカ統治下の沖縄には1300発のアメリカ軍の核ミサイルが配備されていた。1950年～60年代、アメリカはいざというときは沖縄から中国やソ連など当時の共産国に対し、核ミサイルによる「核威嚇」を公然と行っていた。現在、ロシアのプーチン政権は「核威嚇」によりNATOのウクライナ戦争参戦を阻止している。かつてのアメリカ軍の対ロ・対中戦略と同じ対応である。

岸田文雄内閣が進める43兆円もの「異次元の軍拡」は、誰が何のために仕掛けた軍拡なのか。そして軍拡が、この国に何をもたらすことになるのか。沖縄ではいま凄まじい勢いで自衛隊基地の建設とミサイル部隊の配備が進んでいる。79年前のアジア太平洋戦争で戦場となり、住民の4人に1人が犠牲になった経験を持つ沖縄では、自衛隊の配備に「既視感」すら抱く。沖縄への旧日本軍・32軍の急配備は、米軍から沖縄住民を守るためではなく、本土決戦のための時間稼ぎのための“捨て石”とされ終戦交渉のための「戦果」を挙げる最後の決戦の場とされた。1945年のアメリカ軍の沖縄上陸を前に、旧日本軍は主力部隊を台湾に移動し、長く沖縄に米軍を引き留めるための持久戦、消耗戦を展開した。軍人を超える住民の被害が増大し、軍隊と共に沖縄本島南部へ移動した住民の多くが犠牲になった。自衛隊の配備強化は旧日本軍同様に沖縄を再び“捨て石”にするために部隊を配備する自衛隊による〝沖縄侵攻〟の様相である。

戦後、沖縄の歴史を調査研究した歴史・政治学者のジョージ・H・カーは、その著書『琉球の歴史』で「日本の政府はあらゆる方法をもって琉球を利用するが、琉球の人々のために犠牲をはらうことを好まない」（序文、1953年6月15日刊）と断じ、日本にとって沖縄はいざという時の「Expendable」（支出可能な代用品、消耗品）と評している。では、アメリカにとって日本はどうであろうか。〝台湾有事〟騒動の中で、日本はアメリカのexpendableとなる可能性はないのであろうか。異次元の軍拡の動きの中で、増額された予算の多くがアメリカ製の軍需品・武器・装備品購入に充てられる可能性もある。有事騒動

＊沖縄国際大学経済学部地域環境政策学科教授。1960年11月11日生まれ、明治大学大学院政治経済学研究科博士前期課程修了（経済学修士）、琉球新報記者、編集委員、九州大学大学院助教授（日米安保論）、論説委員長などを経て2011年４月から現職。

が日本をアメリカの軍需産業の「expendable」とするのか。検証を試みた。

１.核問題と沖縄

いわゆる「本土復帰（沖縄に関する施政権の米国から日本への移管）」前のアメリカ統治下にあった沖縄には核ミサイル（メースB、ナイキ・ハーキュリーズ）が配備されていた[1)]。その数は、1300発にも上っていた。核配備の危険性は、有事の攻撃目標となる「基地ターゲット論」に加え、平時における核管理の困難さからくる演習被害（核爆発の危険性）などが指摘されてきた。沖縄においても米軍那覇サイト（現・那覇空港）で、1959年6月19日に核弾頭を搭載した核ミサイルが誤って発射されたことがNHKの取材によって2017年に明らかになった。

史実は沖縄放送局ディレクターの松岡哲平氏らが取材しNHKスペシャル「スクープドキュメント 沖縄と核」（2017年9月10日放送）で公表された。NHKはアメリカ空軍の兵士として沖縄に駐留していたロバート・オハネソン氏（取材時＝74歳）ら1960年代初め、アメリカ統治下の沖縄で、アメリカ空軍の兵士として駐留していた複数の証言者を取材し、アメリカ軍が開発した中距離核ミサイル「メースB」が配備されていた問題を告発した。

メースBは射程距離約2400キロで、ソ連の一部と中国大陸の大部分をその射程内に入れていた。核弾頭の威力は1メガトンで広島型原爆（15キロトン）のおよそ70倍の威力を持っていた。

オハネソン氏は核ミサイルの配備・発射訓練中に那覇サイトで、核ミサイルの誤発射事故が起きたことを明らかにした。核ミサイルは幸運にも爆発はせず、那覇沖合に着水し、米軍によって回収された。事故の際、誤発射されたミサイルによって体の一部を切断された米兵がいたことなどが証言で明らかになった。

当時の沖縄の地元紙「沖縄タイムス」は、事故発生翌日の紙面で、米軍発表による「ミサイル発射寸前に発火」と誤発射を報じたものの米軍から「核弾頭搭載」との広報はなかったが[2)]、NHKスペシャル「沖縄と核」では、当時、整備担当の元米兵の証言として「核弾頭は搭載されていた」「発射に備える訓練中に兵士が操作を誤り、ブースターが点火した」「核爆発を起こしていたら那覇が吹き飛んでいた」との内容を放送した。米軍内部文書から「核兵器の事故はアメリカの国際的地位を脅かす」「全ての情報は関係者以外、極秘と

1）アメリカ国防総省『核兵器の管理と配備の歴史：1945年7月～ 1977年9月』（History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: July 1945 through September 1977）=1999年に国防総省が機密解除した文書。
2）『沖縄タイムス』1959年6月20日。出典は松岡鉄平［2017］『沖縄と核』、新潮社、158 ～ 159頁。

する」との記述も明らかにされた[3]。

翌6月20日の沖縄タイムス紙面では米軍司令部情報部の発表として「ミサイルが水平状態で一部発火、その発射火薬で操作員一人が即死、他の五人が負傷した」としているが、核搭載ミサイルとの情報はなく「事故原因はまだ分からない」との記述にとどまっていた。

当時、整備工として那覇サイトにいた元米軍作業員の男性（取材時＝81歳）はNHK報道を受けた2017年9月の沖縄タイムスの取材に「サイト8（那覇サイト）の点検日で、レーダー施設から発射台に向かったが、手前の兵舎で止められた。兵舎のハウスボーイから『ミサイルから火が出て、黒人兵が亡くなった』と聞いた」と証言している。男性は核弾頭搭載ミサイルとは聞いておらず「騒がれないよう、一部の事実は公表し、核弾頭のことはひた隠しにしたのだろう」と推察している[4]。

一方でもう一つの地元紙「琉球新報」は、核誤射「戦争」指令で1959年の那覇基地ミサイル事故が起きたことを、元整備兵の証言として報道している。元整備兵によると那覇のナイキ基地には、東シナ海に面して2台の発射台が備えられ、少なくとも4発のミサイルが常備されていた。発射台周辺はフェンスや擁壁、丘に囲まれ、「外からは見えない場所だった」という。

一連の報道を受け沖縄県は報道内容の事実関係を、外務省に文書で確認した[5]。

確認内容は以下の通りである。

外務省に対する沖縄県の質問

（1）本土復帰前の沖縄に核兵器は配備されていたか

（2）本土復帰時に沖縄に配備されていた核はどのような方法で撤去されたか

（3）復帰前に1300発の核があったと報道されているが事実か

（4）1959年の核ミサイル誤発射についての事実関係

（5）現在、沖縄に核兵器は配備されているか

（6）有事の際は沖縄に核兵器を持ち込み可能とした「核密約」に関する外務省の見解ーなど。

沖縄県からの問い合わせに対し、外務省は明確な回答がないまま現在に至っている。

沖縄への核配備ついては、沖縄返還交渉の段階で地元沖縄からは「核抜き、本土並み」返還を基本とするスローガンが打ち出された経緯があり、復帰と同時に日本の「非核三原

3）松岡鉄平［2017］『沖縄と核』176頁。出典はHistory of the 6313th Air Base Wing 1 January through December 1962 マクスウェル空軍基地所蔵　請求番号0462340.

4）『沖縄タイムス』2017年9月12日付。

5）「沖縄核配備、沖縄県が質問　外務省に有無を確認」『琉球新報』2017年9月27日。

則」が沖縄にも適用されることとなったはずである。

しかし、その後返還交渉の過程における佐藤栄作政権による「核密約」の存在が明らかになった。核密約によると「米国政府は、核兵器の沖縄への再持ち込みと、沖縄を通過させる権利を必要とする。沖縄に現存する核兵器貯蔵地である、嘉手納、那覇、辺野古並びにナイキ・ハーキュリーズ基地を、何時でも使用できる状態に維持しておき、極めて重大な緊急事態が生じた時には活用できるよう求める。」[6)]

この核密約は、現在も継続されている可能性がある。1969年の沖縄核密約によれば名護市辺野古にある辺野古弾薬庫は、沖縄に再び核兵器が持ち込まれる際の核兵器の貯蔵地の1つであり、2019年以降、辺野古弾薬庫では13の弾薬庫の新設と弾薬組み立てエリアの更新が進められ、2024年3月現在、ほぼ完成している。そのうちの施設は「核弾薬庫特有の回の字型のコンクリート隔壁構造」が指摘されている[7)]。

新たな核弾薬庫整備とされる米軍辺野古弾薬庫

ほかにも嘉手納弾薬庫内にメースB発射基地と同じ構造の弾薬庫の存在も明らかになっており、新たな核配備、核シェアリングの問題も水面下で論議されている。

２.中台危機と米国の「核威嚇」

1958年沖縄配備の米核兵器による中国への「核威嚇」事件も朝日新聞によって2021年５月30日に明らかになった。朝日報道によると米国核戦略家のダニエル・エルズバーグ氏（取材時＝90歳）は、機密文書をもとに、1958年8月の第二次台湾海峡危機の際、米国は中国への核攻撃を検討し、限定的な核爆弾投下でも中国が引かない場合は「北は上海に至るまで深く核攻撃を行う以外に選択肢はない」と米統合参謀本部議長が語っていたと証言した[8)]。

6）太田昌克［2011］『日米「核密約」の全貌』筑摩書房、282頁。
7）『琉球新報』2019年4月24日付（本文中の写真も同記事より転載）。
8）『朝日新聞』2021年5月30日付。

当時のアイゼンハワー大統領政権の核戦略の中心は「いかなる武力衝突も核戦争に頼る」という「大量報復戦略」だったとし、アイゼンハワー大統領自身が「あらゆる戦争は核戦争にならざるを得ない」と語っていたとしている。

第二次台湾海峡危機では、当初は通常兵器による中国の台湾侵攻抑止を試みる方針だったものの、中国側が金門島の主権の主張を取り下げなければ「核兵器を使わなければいけないと考えていた」と、エルズバーグ氏は証言している。

米国の中国に対する核威嚇に対し、当時のソ連のフルシチョフ第一書記は「中国に全面的に味方してあらゆる兵器を使」うと核報復を示唆したが、米国は「核先制使用の結果、台湾や沖縄が消え去っても受け入れるつもりでいた」と証言した。

証言報道の2年後の2023年6月17日、ダニエル・エルズバーグ氏の訃報が伝えられ、新たな証言を得る機会は失われた。

証言したエルズバーグ氏は、1931年4月、シカゴ生まれで米政策研究機関「ランド研究所」に勤務していた際に歴代米政権がベトナム戦争の泥沼化を隠蔽していたことを知り、7000ページに及ぶ機密文書をニューヨーク・タイムズ紙などに提供し、同報道はベトナム反戦運動の機運が高まる一因ともなったとされている。

AP通信は「当時のニクソン政権によって、スパイ行為などの罪で起訴されたが、公訴棄却となった。ハリウッド映画『ペンタゴン・ペーパーズ／最高機密文書』（2017年）のモデルにもなった」[9]とエルズバーグ氏の経歴を報じている。

復帰前、アジア太平洋における核戦略のキーストーン（要石）とされていた沖縄は、米中関係、米ロ関係、そして台湾有事の際に核攻撃の拠点となり、核報復によって消え去る運命にあったという証言は、現在の「台湾有事」報道の中で、看過できない史実として深刻に受け止める必要がある。

戦後、日本本土から切り離されて沖縄が「米軍統治下」に置かれた背景には、1947年9月の「天皇メッセージ」の関連性も指摘されてきた。1947年9月22日、側近の寺崎英成を通してGHQに伝えられた昭和天皇のメッセージである。昭和天皇は寺崎氏を通してマッカーサー元帥の顧問であるシーボルト氏に対し「アメリカが日本に主権を残し租借する形式で、25年ないし50年、あるいはそれ以上、沖縄を支配することは、アメリカの利益になるのみならず日本の利益にもなる」との趣旨を伝えていた[10]。天皇メッセージは、昭和天皇による「日本が自ら沖縄を米国へ提供すると申し出」たものとして記録されてきた。

9）ＡＰ通信　2023年6月17日。

10）「天皇メッセージ」（1947年9月22日）　訳文出典は沖縄県『沖縄県史　各論編７　現代』8-9頁。脚注「天皇メッセージ訳文」　訳文は安仁屋政昭ほか［1987］『沖縄と天皇』あけぼの出版　234頁。

一方で、天皇メッセージに先立つ1947年6月の段階で、日本占領を統括する進駐軍（GHQ）のマッカーサー元帥は1947年6月27日に行われたアメリカ人記者団との懇談で「沖縄を米軍が支配し、空軍の要塞化すれば非武装国家日本が軍事的真空地帯になることはない」と明言している[11]。その際、沖縄について「この諸島の住民は日本人とは民族的に同一ではなく、日本の経済福祉に貢献せず、しかも日本人はこの諸島の所有を認められることを期待していない」と日琉同祖論を否定。「琉球の住民は日本人ではなく、本土の日本人と同化したことがない。それに日本人は彼らを軽蔑している。彼らは単純でお人よしであり、琉球諸島におけるアメリカの基地開発により、かなりの金額を得て比較的幸せな生活を送ることになろう」と踏み込んでいた[12]。

マッカーサー元帥は「琉球人は日本人ではなく、日本人は琉球人を軽蔑している」との認識をもとに、日本人の持つ琉球人への差別意識を戦後の沖縄の分割統治に利用し、奄美大島を含む琉球列島を日本と異なる文化圏、社会圏とみなして分離支配を企図し、実施したとみることもできる。

マッカーサー元帥の日本・琉球観に影響を与えた可能性があるのが、1956年1月1日に沖縄で発刊された歴史・政治学者ジョージ・H・カー（George H.Kerr）[13]の『琉球の歴史』である。カーは米軍に依頼されて琉球の占領政策に向けて琉球王国の歴史を調査、分析し、『琉球の歴史』を執筆している。その序文で「日本の政府はあらゆる方法をもって琉球を利用するが、琉球の人々のために犠牲をはらうことを好まない」と記述し、日本にとって琉球は「expendable（消耗品、支出可能な代替品）」と記述している。

日本にとって琉球（沖縄）は、エクスペンダブル（消耗品）であり、本土決戦のための時間稼ぎとして「捨て石作戦」が展開され、終戦後は、戦後の日本国憲法で放棄した交戦権、軍隊、武力、戦争の手段を補う「非武装国家日本」の軍事的空白を埋める手段として代替機能を持たされていると、米国側が記録している。

台湾有事問題を考える際、「台湾有事は沖縄有事」との言説の下で、岸田文雄政権が加速する自衛隊の南西諸島シフト、ミサイル部隊の先島配備強化、沖縄本島への自衛隊弾薬庫新設、ミサイル部隊配備などをみると米国が指摘してきた「エクスペンダブル＝沖縄」の位置づけが、より現実味をおびてきている。

11）ロバート・D・エルドリッヂ［1999］「ジョージ・F・ケナン、PPSと沖縄」『国際政治のなかの沖縄』（日本国際政治学会編集・発行）、41頁。
12）前掲書、40～41頁。
13）ジョージ・H・カー［1956］『琉球の歴史』琉球列島国民政府、序文。

３.沖縄と本土の温度差

2023年2月、筆者は衆議院予算委員会に野党側から参考人招致された。5兆円規模から一気に6兆円規模へと拡大される「異次元の軍拡」に対する反対、警告の立場から供述した。その中で、沖縄住民と本土住民との間にある温度差について、台湾有事にも自分たちは犠牲にならない、戦争に巻き込まれることがないとして敵基地攻撃能力の保有や異次元の軍拡を容認する本土住民の「傍観者的好戦論」に対し、戦争が始まれば戦場となり逃げ惑うか、シェルター生活を余儀なくされる沖縄住民の「当事者的非戦論」を提示した。

さらに説明を補強すると「傍観者的好戦論」とは、「私たち国民は戦場に行かない」ことを前提に「自衛隊は国民を護る兵力。敵基地攻撃能力は必要。軍事力強化はやむを得ない。いざとなったら日米安保で米軍が日本を守ってくれる」という好戦論と日米安保基軸の安全保障論である。

これに対し「当事者的非戦論」は、「戦争になれば国民は無力。戦場で殺されるか、自国政治指導者に兵にされ殺す側で戦場に行くか、拒否して刑務所で強制労働させられるか、国外逃亡かの選択しかない」との立場に立ち、戦争回避を唯一、最優先の戦略として「外交、経済安保で戦争回避」を主張し、「好戦的政治家の排除」を打ち出すものである。

政府は2024年3月29日、台湾有事など不測の事態に備えて南西諸島住民らが二週間ほど避難できる新たなシェルターの整備指針を公表している。「広域避難が困難で国民保護法に基づく国民保護訓練を実施する沖縄県の先島諸島を対象に、国が設計や建設費用を負担する」という[14)]。

シェルターはミサイル攻撃や航空機からの攻撃、さらに陸上侵攻やゲリラ・特殊部隊からの攻撃に対し、対処できる新築の公共、公用施設で、外壁厚さ30センチ以上の鉄筋コンクリートの建設が想定されている。沖縄を戦場と想定するシェルター建設が既成事実化されて推進されることに対する地元の反応も「歓迎」と「反対」に二分されている。

「なぜいま異次元の軍拡なのか」―そんな問いを国会議員らに投げた。2023年2月16日の衆議院予算委員会終了後、参考人招致され答弁を終えた筆者に駆け寄ってきた複数の自民党重鎮らは口々に「我々もしらないところで異次元の軍拡は決められている」（石破茂・元防衛大臣、岩屋毅・元防衛相）と語っていた。

一体、この軍拡は誰が何のために、党内議論も回避し、国会論戦も回避しながら、憲法違反の「専守防衛撤回」「敵基地攻撃能力の保有」「自衛隊＝軍隊強化」「軍需産業の支援と国営化検討」などを一気に進めているのであろうか。

14）『日本経済新聞』2024年3月30日付。

「安保関連三文書」の改定を行った2022年12月16日の公表文書によれば、日本の軍事予算は23年度から27年度までの5年間に43兆円が投入され、軍備と弾薬が爆発的に整備強化される方針となっている。特に弾薬は2022年度の2,480億円から2023年度には8,238億円と3.3倍に激増している。

2023年度に6兆円を超えた防衛予算は、24年度には7兆7千億円を超え、25年度以降は10兆円規模まで一気に増大する見込みとなっている。増産された武器、弾薬は主に南西諸島に送られ、鹿児島県の鹿屋基地、馬毛島新航空基地、奄美、沖縄本島、宮古島、石垣島、与那国島に加え佐賀県や長崎県など九州全域を巻き込む軍事基地強化が加速している。

九州、沖縄県民にとって「仕掛けられる台湾有事」で、実害を被る可能性が高まっているとの危機感が高まりつつある。

そんな中で、昨年（2023年）11月10日から20日にかけて、沖縄近海では自衛隊最大規模の日米統合訓練・実動演習が実施された。演習には離島防衛専門の水陸機動団（自衛隊版海兵隊）など自衛隊隊員3万800人、軍用車両3500両、艦艇20隻（陸海空の統合作戦）、戦闘機など軍用機210機に、米軍1万200人も参加し中国を念頭に演習を実施している[15]。未曽有の大規模演習に中国側も反発し、軍事演習を行うなど対抗手段を展開し[16]、沖縄周辺は緊張感に包まれた。しかし、大規模演習の実態が大きく報道されることもなく、国民の多くが気付くことはなかった。


2023年11月5日（日曜日）の石垣島祭りのパレード＝自衛隊が参加

大規模軍事演習前の11月5日、石垣島では開催された石垣市民の「石垣島祭り」に、石垣島に配備された陸上自衛隊が軍服でパレードに参加し、軍の存在を市民に強くアピールした[17]。市民生活の中に自衛隊が深く入り込んだことを実感させた。

かつて復帰前の沖縄には、自衛隊基地はゼロであったが、復帰直後に「防空」中心に航空自衛隊など3施設が配備された。「自衛隊＝旧日本軍」とする県民の多くが自衛隊配備

15）「自衛隊統合演習きょうから開始　民間空港・港湾や公道も使って訓練」『朝日新聞』2023年11月10日。https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASRC96SVRRC9TPJB006.html#（2024年5月6日閲覧）。
16）「中国、軍事演習の『常態化』目指す」ロイター配信、2024年1月18日。
17）写真提供、下地幹郎・元衆議院議員。

反対運動を展開し、自衛隊員の制服での成人式参加を阻止、反対する激しい闘争も行われた。しかし、復帰から52年が過ぎ、56施設まで増えた自衛隊基地に対する反発は薄れ、離島住民にまで広く受け入れられるようになっている。

「自衛隊は災害救助隊。台風被害の救済、救助や急患輸送などで世話になってきた。監視部隊という形で島に来てくれるというので誘致した。誘致で数百人規模の自衛隊員が移駐し、児童生徒も増え、複式学級も解消された」と、自衛隊の与那国島移駐を容認した外間守吉・前与那国町長は誘致の利点を挙げた[18)]。

しかし、ふたを開けると「監視部隊ではなくミサイル部隊を配備され、島を戦場にされる危険性が出てきた。話が違うと訴えたが、時すでに遅し。もう自衛隊は止められなくなった」と振り返り、「だまされた」と外間前町長は抗議している[19)]。

与那国に加えて配備された石垣島では、陸上自衛隊の基地がさらに拡大強化され、米軍とも共同使用されることが2023年12月6日、明らかになった[20)]。

沖縄の地元紙の報道によると防衛省は2024年度にも、陸上自衛隊石垣駐屯地（石垣市）の施設拡大に着手し、駐屯地西側の用地を新たに取得し、現在計画中の訓練場を今後さらに広げ、米軍との実動・図上訓練での共同使用も想定している。

2024年度当初予算で関連経費を計上し、警備隊や業務隊のほかに12式地対艦ミサイル（SSM）を扱う部隊、03式中距離地対空ミサイル（中SAM）を運用する部隊が同基地に所属し、中距離多目的ミサイルや81ミリ迫撃砲も備え隊庁舎には地下施設も整備されていることが明らかになった。自衛隊は琉球石灰岩の強度試験にも着手し、基地の地下化の検討を進めている[21)]。

４.重要土地利用規制法の危険性

米軍基地や自衛隊基地が強化、拡充される沖縄県民にとって有事の動きをキャッチするために必要な情報収集手段をも規制する「重要土地等調査法」（令和3年法律第84号）[22)]による注視区域・特別注視区域の指定拡大も脅威となる。軍事基地周辺の土地所有や反対運動などの規制なども行われることから「重要土地利用規制法」と呼ばれ、警戒されてい

18）筆者の質問に外間守吉・前与那国町長が回答　2023年2月11日。
19）同上。
20）「石垣陸自　施設拡大へ　来年度にも用地取得　米軍と共同使用も想定」『沖縄タイムス』2023年12月6日。
21）同上。
22）重要土地等調査法＝重要施設周辺及び国境離島等における土地等の利用状況の調査及び利用の規制等に関する法律(令和3年法律第84号)。

る。

指定は、基地機能の阻害行為を防止することなどを目的に、妨害電波の発信をキャッチし阻止したりするほか、米軍基地や自衛隊基地周辺の一定面積以上の土地の売買の氏名、使用目的などの届け出を義務化するもの。特に基地周辺の外国資本による土地の売買を監視するものとしているが、反対運動なども規制対象となるため「言論の自由」の侵害となり、沖縄県内では辺野古新基地建設に対する反対運動が狙い撃ちされるとの懸念も出ている。

指定は2023年12月の184か所の注視・特別注視区域指定を承認したが、これまでに指定された全国399か所を加え、合計で583か所が指定・承認されている[23)]。今後は外資系を含む基地周辺地域の所有や利用状況などの調査が実施される。

目に見えない形で市民生活への監視体制が徐々に進められている。

筆者が新聞記者時代に入手した秘密文書

政府による特定秘密保護法（2013年12月）の制定によって、政府や官僚による恣意的な秘密指定の乱発、濫用によって国民の知る権利が大きく侵害されている。

政府にとって都合の悪い情報の多くが告発を免れ、国民の権利や生命・財産を侵害する政府犯罪、官僚汚職などが「国家機密」の壁に阻まれ、メディアのアクセスを困難にしている。特定秘密保護法は「知る権利」を侵害し、このままではこの国の国民主権の土台すら揺るがしかねない状況となっている。

５.辺野古新基地建設問題の６つの不合理性

沖縄における米軍基地問題の最大の課題、争点となっている普天間・辺野古問題について簡単に問題点を整理しておきたい。

世界一危険な基地とされる米海兵隊普天間飛行場は、28年前の1996年の日米特別行動委員会（SACO）合意によって返還が10施設とともに合意された。SACO合意を象徴する返還合意であった。しかし、その後の「普天間基地代替施設の建設・提供」条件がネックとなり、返還合意から28年がたった現在も返還実現に至っていない。

23)「土地利用規制、第4弾184カ所」『朝日新聞』2024年3月30日付（本文中の写真はマル秘、指定前秘密など政府内の機密文書の写真＝筆者撮影）。

その背景には、沖縄本島東海岸の米軍キャンプシュワブ沖埋め立てによる普天間基地の代替施設とされる「辺野古新基地建設」を巡る沖縄県民の過半数を超える強い反対の民意がある。

沖縄県民はSACO合意以降、示された辺野古沖埋め立てによる代替新基地建設に対して、国政選挙や知事選挙、県議会議員選挙など全県レベルの選挙では、一貫して過半数が反対の意思を投票結果によって示してきた。また二度にわたる県民投票でも、建設反対の意思を明確に示してきた。しかし、政府は裁判闘争も含めて沖縄の民意を蔑ろにしてきた。

普天間・辺野古問題を整理すると下記のような論点が浮き彫りになっている。

① 法的不合理性⇒環境アセスの不備、裁判の不法性、行政に傅く司法による三権分立の崩壊
② 政治的合理性⇒選挙結果の軽視と無視、県民投票の結果の軽視と無視
③ 軍事的合理性⇒普天間代替機能の不備、辺野古新基地の軍事的機能不備
④ 経済的合理性⇒基地建設費の日本負担、2兆5千億円（県試算）の費用対効果
⑤ 環境的合理性⇒環境アセスの不備、サンゴの破壊、ジュゴンの不保護
⑥ 行政的合理性⇒全体計画・予算の不備、アセスの不備、警備費の水増し

辺野古新基地建設問題については「辺野古基地は、米軍の名を借りた自衛隊新基地建設」（保守市長）との指摘がある。また軍事アナリストの小川和久氏は那覇市内で開催された沖縄県主催の名護市辺野古米軍新基地建設の埋め立ての賛否を問う「2・24県民投票フォーラム」の中で「有事の際には使い物にならないのが辺野古。普天間の半分もない。狭すぎて有事に必要な50機の駐機が不可能。全く役に立たない基地。建設を強行する理由は、サンズイ（汚職）以外には考えられない」と厳しい指摘をしている[24)]。

また辺野古基地建設の困難さは、防衛省によっても埋め立て開始当時から「軟弱地盤の存在」が確認され、7万7千本もの砂杭工事を必要としているものの、日本では水深60メートルまでしか工事実績はなく、辺野古海域での90メートルの水深での工事実績はないため、工事の難航が予想されている。

また辺野古周辺の活断層の危険性も指摘されている。莫大な建設費は2兆5千億円（沖縄県試算）との指摘もあり、政府は当初、県の指摘に対し「大げさ」（防衛相）などと反論していたが、その後は「試算困難」（安倍首相）としたうえで、工事費を当初の3600億円から9300億円（2018年12月）に上方修正している。しかし、この工事費も2023年9月段階で予算の46％を使用しながら工事の進捗率は14％にとどまるなど、沖縄県の試算に

24）沖縄県主催「名護市辺野古米軍新基地建設の埋め立ての賛否を問う県民投票（24日）について考えるフォーラム」（2019年2月7日）での小川和久氏の発言。

近づく内容となっている[25]（辺野古新基地建設工費に関する90頁の図は「東京新聞」2023年9月5日付朝刊から転載）。



また完成後の懸念として米軍が運用上の課題としている「米軍の航空法違反」の可能性も指摘されている。周辺の辺野古弾薬庫や国立沖縄高専の建物で米軍基準高度制限がクリアできない可能性が、当の米軍からも指摘されている[26]。

辺野古新基地建設の長すぎる建設工事期間の問題も指摘されている。政府によると今後、完成までには13年ほどさらに必要で、その間は政府が「世界一危険な基地」とする普天間基地の危険性を放置することになる。米軍は「普天間の代替基地は普天間」（2023年11月、米海兵隊幹部＝記者会見）と語るほど、建設される辺野古新基地建設の必要性について否定的な見解を公表するようになっている[27]。さらに環境破壊問題もあり周辺の7万4,000群落のサンゴの移植も不可能で、ジュゴンの生息域の主食となるアマモの喪失など米国でも保護されるジュゴンの生息域破壊に対する課題も指摘されている[28]。

米海兵隊司令官の中には「辺野古移設も米軍は一度もお願いしていない。逆に第3海兵隊遠征軍はHQのグアム移設が必要になり、逆に迷惑している。辺野古は日本の大手ゼネコンとその族議員が絡んでいるので、辺野古は推進、続行されている。しかも官邸が絡んでいる」と指摘する声もある[29]。埋め立て工事を担うゼネコンの利権について、今後検証する必要がある。

25）『東京新聞』2023年11月6日付。
26）「集落・弾薬庫、高さ制限超　国内航空法も逸脱　辺野古新基地　安全規制は有名無実化」『琉球新報』2018年04月13日付。
27）『琉球新報』2023年11月11日。
「【深掘り】米軍幹部が「普天間維持」に言及で波紋」『琉球新報』2023年11月11日付。
28）沖縄県「辺野古新基地建設問題（普天間飛行場の辺野古移設）について」
ページ番号1017415　更新日 2024年3月13日（https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/heiwakichi/futenma/1017409/1017415.html　参照）。
29）在沖米海兵隊幹部への筆者インタビュー（2021年10月11日　那覇市内）。

米海兵隊の司令官らは「軟弱地盤問題が修正できなければ軍事的な影響を与える恐れもある」「代替施設よりも普天間基地の方が軍事的に優位性が高い」[30]と新基地建設に消極的な立場から直截的な発言を行うようになっている。

そもそも辺野古新基地建設計画は、米海兵隊（1966年）と米海軍（1967年）によって計画書が作成されていた。しかし、当時はベトナム戦争の最中でもあり、沖縄の施政権の日本返還交渉が本格化しつつあったこともあり、建設計画は見送られてきた経緯がある。添付の設計図は、1966年に作成された海兵隊辺野古新基地建設計画図（「GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN MARINE COORPS AIR FACILITY HENOKO,OKINAWA,RYUKYU ISLANDS」1966年1月17日）である。ついでだが、この建設計画で注目されるのは、現在の計画で難航している大浦湾側の軟弱地盤エリアが工事対象から外された計画となっている点にも注目しておきたい。日本政府は、この米海兵隊や米海軍による辺野古新基地建設計画について十分な検討を行っていない可能性がある。そうでなければ、なぜ軟弱地盤を回避した計画を策定できなかったのか。確認する必要がある。



1966年に作成されたアメリカ海兵隊の辺野古基地計画

６.台湾有事と沖縄

ところで、日本が台湾有事に軍事介入する理由は何か。日本と米国は1972年の米中、日中国交回復を契機に「中華人民共和国と中華民国（台湾）は一つの中国」として承認、認識を明らかにしてきた。

それにもかかわらず、台湾問題を「内政問題」としてきたはずの日本が中華人民共和国による台湾問題に武力を伴う介入を想定している理由は何か。「上海コミュニケ」（1972年2月21日）では、米が平和五原則として「一つの中国」の認識を表明し、「92合意（共識）」（1992年）でも「台湾と中国は一つの中国」を再確認している。

30）『琉球新報』2023年11月5日。

習近平政権による台湾への武力介入による統合には「中国の武力介入3条件（習近平政権）」が明示されている[31]。①台湾の内乱、②台湾独立の動き、③外国の介入・内政干渉の３条件である。米国政府の資料によれば、「中国の武力侵攻のトリガー（きっかけ）」は、以下のように想定されている。

①台湾が独立を宣言したとき。
②台湾が国連に加盟申請を行うなど独立に向かう動き。
③台湾内部の混乱。
④台湾の核武装の動き。
⑤台湾が平和維持軍の駐留を要請したとき

その点からは日本と米国による「内政干渉」が、米中関係、日中関係の悪化を招き、台湾有事を日本有事、沖縄有事へとつなぐ動きへとつながっている。

一方で、筆者が2022年末から2024年初頭までの間、共同代表の一人としてかかわってきた台湾や中国の軍事専門家やシンクタンクとの「台湾有事を起こさせない・沖縄対話プロジェクト」の中で中台関係者らから「なぜいま日本は台湾有事と騒いでいるのか」との声を多く聞かされた。日本だけが大騒ぎしているような印象であった。

台湾に至っては、2024年１月に実施された「台湾総統選挙」では対中独立志向の強い民進党が勝利したものの、同時期に実施された立法院議員選挙では対中融和の国民党が過半数を占めるなど、台湾民意の絶妙なバランス感覚が注目を集めた。

対中関係においては、日本と米国のトップによる密接な対話が必要であり、アジアにおける武力行使や戦争回避について、丁寧かつ慎重な外交術の展開が求められている。

まとめにかえて

ここ数年の間に沖縄では自衛隊基地が急速に整備され、ミサイル基地の運用が開始されている。那覇に拠点を置く陸上自衛隊第15旅団は、岸田政権によって旅団から師団への格上げが決定されている。師団とは局地戦を展開できる規模の戦闘能力を持つものであり、かつての沖縄戦を戦った旧日本軍第32軍の沖縄配備と重なるものがある。巨大な部隊の配備は、沖縄を戦場化することにつながりかねないとの危機感が沖縄戦を生き抜いた戦争体験世代を中心に高まっている。

31）岡田充・元共同通信記者、山下裕貴・千葉科学大学客員教授らが論考で指摘（山下は自衛隊沖縄地方協力本部長、東部方面総監部幕僚長、第三師団長、陸上幕僚副長、中部方面総監などの要職を歴任し特殊作戦群の創設にも関わる。2015年、陸将で退官）。

旧日本軍による「捨て石作戦」は、沖縄を本土の人身御供にする計画であった。そしてまた始まった旧日本軍と同じような日本軍（自衛隊）の沖縄への配備強化は、戦後、アメリカの政治・歴史学者のジョージ・H・カーの指摘通り「沖縄は日本のエクスペンダブル（消耗品）」とされようとしているのであろうか。

沖縄の戦場化を想定する「台湾有事」は、いったい誰が、何のために仕掛ける戦争であろうか。そして台湾有事を理由に強化される「異次元の軍拡」は、新たな戦争を抑止するためのものなのか、それとも戦争への準備であろうか。

主権者たる国民は、新たな戦争への道に導かれることがないように、日本政府による意図的な軍拡プロパガンダに翻弄されることなく、国内外の複数のメディアを常にチェックし、「ファクト（事実）とエビデンス（証拠）」に基づく確度の高い情報を精査し、受発信できる情報ネットワークの構築に挑む必要がある。

特に核兵器など武器や弾薬の動き、戦闘機や潜水艦などの輸出入の動きについては十分な警戒心を持って注視したい。（了）

編　集　後　記

第 18 号は論文 2 本、研究ノート 2 本（使用言語はいずれも英語）、講演録 1 本で構成されています。英文による論考が大部分となっているのは、研究インスティテュートとして、世界的視野で研究を発信・発展させたいと考えているからです。

竹内論文は、19C 後半から現代に至る英国の世界的展開を概括しつつ、Brexit 以降の英国の国家間連携のあり方を「アングロ圏」という視角で整理し、それにコミットする日本の問題点も指摘した包括的で意欲的な論考です。

高田論文は、世界有数の観光地ハワイの成立が、米国による太平洋地域の軍事拠点形成と民間航空輸送でのジェット機普及にどれほど依存していたかを、「ミリツーリズム」をキーワードに歴史的に検証した興味深い論考です。

藤田氏の研究ノートは、第二次大戦末期アメリカの B29B 爆撃機による日本の石油施設夜間精密爆撃作戦の背景に、長距離爆撃機の量産化と高解像度レーダー開発があったことを指摘し、作戦と産業動員の関連に着目することの重要性を指摘したものとなっています。

下斗米氏の研究ノートは、冷戦期のアメリカの対外援助や移民政策の変化を丹念に整理し、フォード財団等によるインドの工科大学支援等で育成された科学技術エリートがアメリカへ移動＝頭脳流出するプロセスをデータに基づき解明したものとなっています。

日本語の講演録は、沖縄国際大学前泊教授が本研究所の第 10 回シンポジウムで講演された内容をまとめたものです。「台湾有事」を理由に特に沖縄で現在進行中の「異次元の軍拡」を、再び沖縄を「消耗品」扱いするのか、という厳しい問題提起がなされています。

このように、本号には歴史的検討から現状分析的なテーマまで含まれておりますので、読者からの忌憚のないご意見・評価をお待ちしております。また、昨今の武力紛争の深刻化に対しても、和平のみちを求めて学術的視点から発信し続ける所存です。

（白戸　伸一・しらと　しんいち）

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