

Post-Cold War Arms Recycling and the Genesis of the “Islamic State”

By TETSUYA SAHARA*

In this paper, the author attests to the fact that post-Cold War arms recycling is one of the decisive factors that has reproduced a chain of regional conflicts. When hostilities break out, surplus arms – often obsolete weapons of secondary importance – pour into zones of conflict. After the war, the weapons subsequently move to neighbouring regions of unrest and ignite new conflicts. The Yugoslav War of Succession clearly displayed this pattern. The same mechanism is present in the on-going Syrian Civil War, where the used arms from the Libyan battlefield have played an important role in the deterioration of the situation. As the Syrian Civil War became a quagmire, the increasing external arms supply to the rebels eventually gave rise to the Islamist extremists and prepared the way for the ascendance of the “Islamic State” (IS).

I

The latest research attests to the abrupt proliferation of regional conflicts and terrorist attacks in the last few years.¹ The increase in the number of conflicts and terrorism may suggest a profound structural transformation of the capitalist global system, as the simultaneous rise of the two different types of violence has shown a tendency towards their merger.

The traditional point of view based on comparative conflict studies holds the presupposition that armed conflicts and terrorist attacks are two different phenomena. The former is mainly considered as a form of politics, and is embodied, par excellence, by state factors. On the other hand, the latter is seen as a kind of criminality carried out by non-government groups or individuals motivated by particular kinds of ideology. Yet the last two decades have seen the rise of armed conflicts carried out by non-state actors, making the old theory of war obsolete.² The concept of “New Wars” has been challenged by the concurrent upsurge in terrorist attacks that are conducted by non-state parties engaging in regional conflicts. The non-state actors in the armed conflicts intentionally mobilise suicide bombers as a part of their war tactics. Thus, the demarcation line between armed conflicts and terrorism is becoming increasingly blurred, and civil targets, often far away from the battlefields, are prone to being attacked as a part of well-defined strategies.

The rise of the IS symbolises the new tendency, as it has pursued its “global jihad”

* Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University

¹ As for the increase in the number of armed conflicts, see: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), <http://ucdp.uu.se>; The increasing trend in the number of terrorist attacks has been ascertained by several key pieces of research: Global Terrorism Index 2015, Institute for Economics & Peace, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>; Терроризм в XXI веке, РИА Новости, <https://ria.ru/infografika/20160122/1363384811.html>; and the Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/images/START_GlobalTerrorismDatabase_2015TerroristAttacksConcentrationIntensityMap.jpg

² Kaldor, *New and Old*; Münkler, *The New Wars*.

composed of the building of territorial states and the destruction of socio-political orders by instilling fear among the citizenry through the concerted and global actions of terrorism.³ Since the early 1980s, several Salafi-jihadi groups have started their state-building endeavours. They have tried to establish statelets governed by their version of Sharia rule inside the territories that they control. All their efforts, except for the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al Shabab in Somalia, were either short lived or meaninglessly small in scale.⁴ But from 2010 on, jihadi proto-states started to achieve relative success in many localities. The most successful case is that of the IS. Since its inauguration as a “Caliphate” in June 2014, the IS has deeply infiltrated a wide swathe of land in Syria and Iraq and has consolidated its self-styled Sharia rule. Moreover, the IS has announced its will to expand its territory beyond its key lands, and has amassed oaths of loyalty (bay’a) from among the chieftains of jihadi statelets scattered over the various parts of Africa and Asia.⁵

At the same time, the IS has incorporated various types of terrorist attacks into its campaign to expand its “Caliphate.” Originally, the IS’s use of terrorist tactics was limited to Muslim-populated areas. The IS suicide bombers targeted the Shiite population and Christian minorities in the Middle East, inflicting heavy civilian damage and provoking hostilities against the Sunni community. They subsequently made use of the rift to induce the Sunnis to support their cause.⁶ In the fall of 2015, however, the IS embarked on its global terror campaign, effectively expanding its sphere of activities to Western Europe and South-eastern Asia.⁷ This change in tactics will expose a much larger global population to jihadi terror and may cause the further escalation of Islamophobia, producing fertile ground for the IS to recruit its soldiers. Thus, how to prevent IS expansion is an imminent question in terms of global security, and to prevent the vicious cycle from repeating, it is necessary to elucidate its genesis and to destroy the grounds on which the group has hitherto benefitted regarding its ascendancy.

II

One of the evident facts that has enabled the IS to infiltrate the war-torn regions in Asia and Africa is the abundant supply of firearms. Where has the group secured its huge cache of arms and ammunition from? It is logical that some of their arsenal came from the army bases in Iraq and Syria that they captured. But a brief look at the inventory of arms the IS fighters wielded during the battle of Kobani from September 2014 to January 2015 shows us that a significant number of their weapons came from East European countries.⁸ How did these weapons travel from the dusty shelves of military depots in former Socialist satellite countries to the battlefields of the Middle East, ending up in the hands of jihadi soldiers? To answer this question, we need to follow the relatively long history of the recycling system of obsolete arms that were originally produced to fight against “Capitalist enemies.”

Christopher Carr illustrated the mechanism through which the Soviet model of assault rifle, the AK47, came to dominate the battlefields around the globe in his excellent book,

³ Sahara, “The international.”

⁴ Lia, “Understanding jihadi.”

⁵ Azoulay, *Islamic State*.

⁶ Sahara, “The international.”

⁷ Towkiw, “List.”

⁸ Sahara, “International arms.”

Kalashnikov Culture.⁹ A new model of automatic rifle designed by Mikhail Kalashnikov in 1947 was adopted by the Soviet forces, and is still used as regular equipment in the Russian army. During its long history, the AK47 underwent several modifications but kept its basic structure. Solid and sturdy, as well as easy to maintain, the rifle was preferred by Pro-Communist rebels fighting against the colonialist masters in the 1960s and 1970s. The generous Soviet policy of allowing the production of replica products by its allies has helped with the further proliferation of the gun. But the real inauguration of “Kalashnikov Culture” came after the fall of the Soviet Union. The AK47 increased its presence on battlefields all over the world and travelled repeatedly from one conflict zone to another.

The “Kalashnikov” symbolises the post-Cold War pattern of recycling “used” arms. When a regional conflict broke out, arms and ammunition (usually of secondary importance to the cutting-edge military technology) poured in from surrounding countries. When the conflict ended, the surplus arms would move to other conflict-affected regions, almost instantly.

The wars for Yugoslav succession clearly followed this pattern. For an entire decade starting from the early 1990s, the land of the former Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia saw incessant waves of bloodbaths. The first sign of Yugoslavia’s demise came from Slovenia, where the local forces clashed with the Federal Army over the control of the international border. The “Seven Days War,” as it was later called, was actually a series of small skirmishes, and the Slovenian authorities did their best to describe the hostilities as mass resistance against an oppressive Socialist military. Notwithstanding, they had long since prepared for the battle, making use of external resources to enhance their military ability to a level that could compete with the federal forces.¹⁰

Socialist Yugoslavia had a unique defence system composed of two different but theoretically intermixed structures. The federal forces (army, navy and air force) were professional armed forces based on the nationwide compulsory draft. To supplement them, a civil militia, called the Territorial Guard, was set up in every corner of the federal state. While the federal forces had a monolithic and highly centralised command structure covering the Federation, the Territorial Guards were organised along the lines of republics, with the municipality as their basic unit. Under the command of reserve officers, all the citizens of military age were eligible for service. In peacetime, republican guards existed only on paper, but once an emergency was declared, civilians were called up to take up arms.

Within the multi-ethnic society of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia occupied a unique position with almost a pure concentration of ethnic Slovenians. This allowed Slovenia’s newly elected nationalist government to transform its Territorial Guard into a regular army with an independent command system. The Slovenian government carried out a secret mission to construct a formidable force, smuggling in vast amounts of military equipment from all over the world, but mainly from neighbouring Hungary.

Croatians followed the same path, but they could not make full use of their Territorial Guard asset. The republic had a decent-sized ethnic Serb minority and the Serbs dominated in some municipalities. The nationalist government of Franjo Tudjman thus devised an unprecedented method to transform the republican police structure into a paramilitary organisation. The first step was to ethnically cleanse the structure of Serb elements, under the pretext that the Serb policemen were disproportionately represented. At the same time, a massive reinforcement of auxiliary police was underway through the recruitment of

⁹ Carr, *Kalashnikov Culture*.

¹⁰ Sahara, *Bosnian*.

young Croats, many of whom had a criminal background. The third step was to secure arms and equipment, and this task was assigned to the Interior Ministry. The entire republican security structure then worked to coordinate arms smuggling on a massive scale, resulting in a huge number of arms from the arsenals of East European countries being transported into Croatia, thus enabling the nascent Croatian military to wage a full-scale war against the federal forces.¹¹

The Croatian War of Independence soon spilled over into Bosnia. The tripartite nationalist coalition government could not maintain its fragile accord and had lost its control over the territory. Many municipalities were divided along ethnic lines and the substructures of the Territorial Guard were merged into three different ethnic military entities. The process was accompanied by the elaborate construction of paramilitary forces under the command of nationalist parties. The Croatian Democratic Union, a Bosnian branch of Tadjman's party, organised its own private army inside the municipalities of Croat plurality. With the help of the Zagreb government, Bosnian Croats were well equipped with arms that were transferred from Croatian battlefields. The federal units evacuated from Croatia were redeployed in the Bosnian Serb regions and subsequently handed over their weapons to local Serb forces. The Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) constructed their own forces, partly by reorganising the Territorial Guard, but also by constructing a private army of the Party of Democratic Action.¹²

The Bosniak force was at a disadvantage in terms of military supplies. It could not secure a reliable route for arms smuggling and was devoid of eternal patrons.¹³ This explains why the Bosniaks could not take advantage of their numerical superiority during the early stages of the war. This handicap, however, was subsequently overcome with the help of Washington. The Clinton administration started covert operations to supply arms to the Muslim forces. With CIA coordination, Iranian arms were smuggled into Bosnian territory on a massive scale.¹⁴

The legacy of the arms-smuggling routes of the Bosnian Civil War together with the foreign mercenaries of the Mujahedeen were inherited by the Kosovars. The US intelligence services gave their full support to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) by equipping and training its soldiers at a military base in Albania over the course of the Kosovar Crisis of 1998–1999. An off-shoot of the KLA appeared in Macedonia in 2001.¹⁵

In this way, the successive wars in the former Yugoslavia were mutually connected by a chain of arms transfer. The arms travelled from one battlefield to another, constituting a clear pattern of recycling. The “Yugoslav domino” usually means incessant waves of ethnic hatred, but the real factor that caused the repeated conflicts was this chain of arms transfer, rather than the Balkanisation of nationalist politics. With the unending supply of arms and the extrajudicial paramilitary units in their hands, the militant nationalists could claim maximum political gains, rather than seeking possible concessions through negotiations.

III

The origins of the IS go back to the second US invasion of Iraq. The Iraqi affiliate of Al

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Hoare, *How Bosnia*.

¹⁴ John R. Schindler, *Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad* (St. Paul, Zenith Press: 2007); Wiebes, *Intelligence*.

¹⁵ Deliso, *The Coming*.

Qaeda, led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, was originally a small group of little significance with a limited sphere of activities. The popular resistance to the US occupation transformed the group into the dominant element among the alienated Sunni communities. Zarqawi had established control over the Anbar Province by 2006 and had declared the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October. With the ebb of the resistance movement followed by the US evacuation, however, his successor, Abu Omar al Baghdadi, faced challenges from rival Sunni factions, and his statelet was about to collapse. The tide of change came in 2011 when the Syrian Civil War broke out. Making use of his Iraqi base, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi launched an incursion into Syrian territory and successfully consolidated his power over a wide swathe of land across the Euphrates. The process demonstrates how effectively Zarqawi’s group and his successors were able to capitalise on the warring situation for their state-building goals.¹⁶

As we have seen in the case of former Yugoslavia, wars precipitate arms recycling. When a war breaks out, arms begin to inflow from the outside world into the conflict zone. Often, the arms accumulated in nearby battlefields are among the first to be delivered. The case of the Syrian War is no exception to this rule.

In April 2011, popular unrest broke out in Hama. Albeit a Western media flare-up of a Syrian off-shot of the “Arab Spring,” the uprising was essentially an armed revolt organised by the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The revolt was followed by a series of defections in the ranks of army officers and Baathist leaders. With the help of Turkey and some Gulf countries, the defectors organised paramilitary formations and called themselves the “Free Syrian Army” (FSA). The FSA was a puppet force rather than a form of popular resistance, and it relied heavily on external support. Through the connection to Ihvan and Al Qaeda, foreign mercenaries headed to Syria and established themselves firmly inside the FSA structure. Merged with the local extremist elements, Salafi–jihadis became predominant among the rebel groups. The most prominent of all was the Nusra Front. Abu Mohammad al-Golani, former adjutant of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, established the group on 23 January 2012, and swore a pledge to Ayman al-Zarqawi, the successor of Osama bin Laden. But the preponderance of Nusra did not last long. Early in 2013, al-Baghdadi came to Raqqa and declared the merger of Nusra and ISI into the “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant” (ISIL). Capitalising on the affluent arms supply to the Syrian rebels, ISIL started flash counteroffensives on its Iraqi front, captured several strategic cities, including Mosul, and firmly established its position as the new champion of global jihadism.¹⁷

As this process testifies, the Syrian Civil War has been a revolt of Salafi–jihadi extremists from the onset. Lacking popular support, the movement has been hugely reliant on external resources that were mainly provided by the foreign governments that aspired to topple the Bashar Asad regime at all costs.¹⁸ Thus, they staged covert international operations to supply arms and ammunition to the Syrian rebels.

The initial supply was to come through the Libyan route. On February 2011, the “National Transitional Council,” an opposition group, rose up in arms against the Qaddafi government. The rebel forces were an unstable coalition of local tribes and many of them had Islamic extremist orientations. Some groups had tangible connections with Al Qaeda and its affiliates.¹⁹ Regardless of that fact, the Western and Gulf sponsors lavishly armed

¹⁶ Sahara, “The international.”

¹⁷ Moubayed, *Under*.

¹⁸ Hoff, “2012 Defense”; A leaked e-mail of Hilary Clinton’s by Wikileaks, see: <https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/3774>

¹⁹ Pargeter, “Are Islamist.”

the rebels and a huge number of lethal weapons were distributed among the militant jihadis.²⁰ Moreover, when the Qaddafi force withstood the initial assault and started its counteroffensive, NATO intervened in the war under the pretext of maintaining a “No Fly Zone.” The Western fighter jets and drones systematically destroyed the government forces. Under NATO’s air cover, the rebels took control of the main cities, including the capital. Qaddafi was killed by mobs on 23 October 2011, effectively ending the Civil War.²¹ Since then, the country has been thrown into permanent chaos and a state of anarchy exists that has constantly gained in momentum. The major source of turmoil was the preponderance of militant jihadis who had been empowered by the external supply of arms. They established Islamist fiefdoms in several parts of the country.²²

Faced with this sinister development, the US administration conceived a plan to transfer Libyan arms to Syria, expecting that it could simultaneously reduce the risk of disorder in Libya and increase the combat abilities of the Syrian rebels. The operation was composed of two parts. One was to collect the weapons that had been indiscriminately distributed among various rebel groups during the Libyan War. The other was to transport the retrieved arms to the Syrian battlefields. Consequently, Barak Obama authorised the CIA plan to supply arms to the “Syrian opposition” forces in early 2012.²³

The CIA started to coordinate the operations in which Turkey, Saudi, Qatar, the UAE and Jordan took part.²⁴ With the help of Gulf money, the CIA agents were to purchase weapons from the Libyans. The retrieved arms were subsequently to be shipped to Turkey and stockpiled at the headquarters that had secretly been opened in Adana, a South-eastern Turkish city. The weapons were subsequently to be handed over to the Syrian rebels who the CIA deemed as “moderate.”²⁵ On 11 September 2012, however, Christopher Stevens, the US Ambassador to Libya, who had directed the arms-gathering mission, was killed in Benghazi by a jihadi group, and the operation was temporarily halted.²⁶

The second route that was opened ran through the Balkans. From November 2012 to March 2013, a secret mission to smuggle arms from Croatia into Turkey was carried out. Various weapons from the Croatian Army as well as from other countries were gathered at a military base near Zagreb airport in late 2012. Some of them came from Great Britain and other Western countries. But a significant number of them came from Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. The collected arms were subsequently transported to Ankara by Jordanian military flights and as chartered Turkish Air Line (TAL) cargo. The entire operation was coordinated by the CIA.²⁷

IV

From the onset, Turkey strongly supported the Salafī–jihadi elements, including ISIL, in the Syrian Civil War. Turkey provided the major transit route for foreign fighters, smuggled arms and ammunition into Syria, imported contraband crude oil and secured the extremists’ financial resources.²⁸ The self-radicalised Western jihadis, Arab and African Salafī fighters,

²⁰ “Arms Dealer” in *The Daily Mail*, 13 Oct. 2016.

²¹ Welzenbach, “The Dreadful.”

²² Wehrey & Alrababa’h, “Rising”

²³ Hersh, “The Red Line.”

²⁴ Miller & de Young, “Secret CIA.”

²⁵ Giglio, “Did the CIA.”

²⁶ Taştekin, *Suriye*.

²⁷ Žabec, “Zagreb.”

²⁸ “Exclusive,” in *The Canary*, 16 Sept. 2016.

as well as extremists from former Soviet countries, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Chechen, all came to Turkey and were then sent into the rebel-held territories in Northern Syria.²⁹ TAL carried thousands of jihadis to Istanbul, from where they went on their journey to transit centres such as Kahramanmaraş or Sanliulfa.³⁰ The agents of the IS and other rebel groups steered them to the border and smuggled them into Syrian territories with the help of Turkish border officials.³¹ The rebels were allowed to set up their headquarters inside the Turkish border and were trained by Turkish officers. Several border towns opened underground hospitals for the Syrian fighters and Turkish ambulances transported those who were wounded on the Syrian battlefields.³² The petrol stolen from the Iraqi and Syrian oil fields was carried by Turkish tanker trucks and sold on the black market.³³ Istanbul served as the centre of money laundering for the ISIL/IS and other extremist groups.³⁴

Turkey also provided the main corridors for the weapons and other military equipment earmarked for Syrian jihadis. As we have seen in the case of the Zagreb connection, some of the arms were brought in as civilian TAL cargo at the Esenboğa International Airport in Ankara. The arms were then loaded onto the lorries chartered by the Turkish Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) and sent into Syrian territory.³⁵ The other arms were shipped to Turkish ports such as Iskenderun and Ceyhan, and dispatched to the rebel-held territories.³⁶ Pro-Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP or the Justice and Development Party) charities, such as İnsan Hakkı and Hürriyet vakfı (İHH), took part in the mission, and their convoys smuggled arms and ammunition disguised as humanitarian aid.³⁷

The following incident gives us a clue as to how deeply the Turkish administration is committed to these arms-smuggling operations. On 19 January 2014, the local gendarmerie halted three trailers ostensibly carrying medical materials near Adana. When the officers opened the containers, they discovered a huge amount of ammunition under a thin layer of medicine boxes. The ammunition consisted of mortar shells, various bombshells and bullets. The Adana prosecutor started the investigation and the truck drivers witnessed how the containers that were loaded onto their trucks had been delivered by a foreign air cargo company at Esenboğa International Airport. Further details remain unknown, as the governor stepped in and the investigation was halted. The governor explained to the prosecutor that the order to halt the investigation had come directly from Prime Minister Erdoğan.³⁸

Subsequently, the Turkish government issued an official communiqué claiming that the load was humanitarian aid for the Syrian Turkmen minorities. Somewhat later, however, the Trade Minister modified the comment and admitted that a part of the load consisted of rifles and pistols.³⁹ More than a year later, an opposition paper, *Cumhuriyet*, published an article titled “Look, They Are the Weapons Erdoğan Claimed Were Non-existent” on 29 May 2015. The article covered the stories of the gendarmes and the prosecutor together

²⁹ “Eren Erdem” in *Birgün*, 29 June 2016.

³⁰ Acarer, “İŞİD”, “2013-2014 arasında,” in *Birgün*, 7 July 2016.

³¹ “Leaked,” in *RT*, 14 May 2016.

³² Acarer, “Cihatçılar.”

³³ “ISIS,” in *RT*, 25 April 2016; O’Connell, “How ISIS.”

³⁴ Cocker, “How Islamic.”

³⁵ “Türkiye,” in *Cumhuriyet*, 14 July 2016; “Rusya,” in *Sputnik*, 7 June 2016; “İşte İŞİD’e r,” in *Cumhuriyet*, 27 April 2016.

³⁶ “İŞİD’e,” in *Cumhuriyet*, 16 Oct. 2015.

³⁷ “Silahlar,” in *Özgür Gündem*, 24 Oct. 2015.

³⁸ Dunder, “İşte,” “Suriye’ye,” in *Sol*, 13 Oct. 2015.

³⁹ “Turkish,” in *Today’s Zaman*, 29 May 2015.

with photos of the bombshells. A video recording the investigation was uploaded on the newspaper's website.⁴⁰

The leak came as a fatal blow to the cover-up that Erdoğan and his henchmen had been implicated in. The Vice-Chair of the Foreign Diplomacy Committee of the ruling AKP made a remark that the load was actually a particular kind of weapon. Yet at the same time, he insisted that the arms were to be delivered to the FSA, and not to the IS. Per the analysis in the *Nokta* newspaper, however, some of the smuggled ammunition consisted of bombshells for tanks. They were a product of the former Soviet Union and came from the Libyan arsenal. While the FSA had no tanks, both the IS and Nusra possess tanks plundered from Syrian military bases. The *Nokta* editor concluded the shells were earmarked for either the IS or Nusra.⁴¹

On 11 June 2015, *Cumhuriyet* covered another story that attested to the link between the Turkish government and the IS. Two buses chartered by the MIT carried IS soldiers and smuggled them into Syria. On the night of 1 January 2014, a number of IS soldiers came from Syria to a Turkish town, Reyhanlı. They were loaded onto the buses, and passing through the Turkish territory, they arrived at Akçekale near Şanlıurfa.⁴²

The Turkish role as the arms-smuggling hub for the jihadis can be further revealed through examining the following two incidents. On 10 May 2015, a Turkish cargo boat, Tuna I, was attacked by a Libyan jet, and one of the crew was killed. The Turkish government issued a communiqué, and claimed that the ship was carrying plaster boards from Spain and that its destination was Toburg. The Libyan Tobruk government rebutted the claims and disclosed that the ship had altered its route towards Derne. As the ship paid no heed to the warnings to change course, the jet opened fire. At the time of the incident, Derne was controlled by Libyan affiliates of the IS. The UN investigation mission subsequently determined that the ship was carrying arms designated for the jihadis.⁴³ The second incident took place on 2 September of the same year. The Greek coast guard captured a Turkish cargo ship, the Haddad I, in the open sea near Crete. The Iraklion police found the ship was carrying a total of 4881 carbines and 492,000 rounds of bullets disguised as furniture. The ship came from a Turkish port, Iskenderun, and was heading for Misrata, the stronghold of the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The port-parole of the Turkish Foreign Ministry released a comment, claiming that the ship was carrying rifles purchased by the Sudanese police.⁴⁴ One may wonder how the load could possibly travel through the jihadi-controlled area of Northern Libya to reach the hands of the alleged customer in Sudan.

V

Post-Cold War arms recycling is still in force in the wider Mediterranean regions. The surplus arms used in local conflicts are transferred to other zones of conflict and further aggravate the hostilities. In most cases, the USA acts as the main coordinator of arms transfer, with the aim of securing its hegemonic interests without leaving any trace of its involvement. This vicious cycle of arms transfer has prepared the fertile ground for the Salafi-jihadi extremists to proliferate. ISIS is merely the latest product of this vicious

⁴⁰ Dunder, “İşte.”

⁴¹ Erbaş, “Libya-Ankara.”

⁴² “MIT,” in *Today's Zaman*, 11 June 2015.

⁴³ Owen, “Turkish,”; Kirkpatrick, “Turkish Cargo.”

⁴⁴ “Ηράκλειο,” in *Ζωήκλα*, 6 Sep. 2015.

cycle.

Footnote references

Books and Articles

- Acarer, E. “İŞİD İstanbul’da Diyanet’in misafiri,” *Birgün Gazetesi*, 25 October 2015.
- Acarer, E. “Cihatçılar Türkiye’ye kaçıyor,” *Birgün gazetesi*, 5 Oct. 2015.
- Azoulay, R. *Islamic State franchising: Tribes, transnational jihadi networks and generational shifts*. CRU Report. [online] Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, (2015) https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Rivka-Azoulay_Islamic_State_expansion_CRU_April2015.pdf
- Carr, C. *Kalashnikov Culture: Small Arms Proliferation and Irregular Warfare* (Westport, 2008).
- Cocker, M. “How Islamic State’s Secret Banking Network Prospers,” *WSJ*, 24 Feb. 2016.
- Deliso, C. *The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West* (Westport, 2007).
- Dundar, C. “İşte Erdoğan’ın yok dediği silahlar,” *Cumhuriyet*, 29 May 2015.
- Erbaş, E. “Libya-Ankara-Suriye hatında Türk silah tacirleri,” *Nokta*, 15 June 2015.
- Giglio, M. “Did the CIA Betray Syria’s Rebels?” *Newsweek*, 2 December 2013. <http://www.newsweek.com/did-cia-betray-syrias-rebels-63267>
- Hersh, S. “The Red Line and the Rat Line,” *London Review of Books*, 36/8, (2014) <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line>
- Hoare, M. *How Bosnia Armed: The Birth and Rise of the Bosnian Army* (London, 2004).
- Hoff, B. “2012 Defense Intelligence Agency document: West will facilitate rise of Islamic State “in order to isolate the Syrian regime,” *Levant Report*, 19 May 2015, <https://levantreport.com/2015/05/19/2012-defense-intelligence-agency-document-west-will-facilitate-rise-of-islamic-state-in-order-to-isolate-the-syrian-regime/>
- Kaldor, M. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge, 2012).
- Kirkpatrick, D. “Turkish Cargo Ship Attacked off Libyan Coast,” *New York Times*, 11 May 2015.
- Lia, B. “Understanding jihadi proto-states,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* [online], 9/4 (2015), <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/441/872>
- Miller, G. & de Young, K. “Secret CIA Effort in Syria Faces Large Funding Cut,” *The Washington Post*, 12 June 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-move-to-curb-1-billion-cia-program-to-train-syrian-rebels/2015/06/12/b0f45a9e-1114-11e5-adee-e82f8395c032_story.html
- Moubayed, S. *Under the Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad* (London, 2015).
- Münkler, H. *The New Wars* (Cambridge, 2005).
- O’Connell, K. “How ISIS Oil Flows through Turkey and Israel on Its Way to Europe,” *Syndicate News*, 12 Oct. 2015.
- Owen, K. “Turkish Ship Shelled off Libya Coast, Officer Killed, Several Crew Injured,” *RT*, 11 May, 2015.
- Pargeter, A. “Are Islamist extremists fighting among Libya’s rebels?” *Combating Terrorism Center*, (2011) <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/are-islamist-extremists-fighting-among-libya’s-rebels>
- Sahara, T. *Bosnian Civil War: Globalization and Ethno-nationalization of Chaos* (in Japanese) (Tokyo, 2008).
- Sahara, T. “International arms transfer and the ‘Islamic State’,” (in Japanese) *Critique of History* (Rekishi Hyoron), 794, (2016) pp. 62-78.
- Sahara, T. “The international jihadism: A new type of threat and regional cooperation as a remedy,” *METU Studies in Development*, 43/2, (2016), pp. 299-331.
- Taştekin, F. *Suriye, Yılık Git, Diren Kal!* (İstanbul, 2015).
- Towkiw, L. “List of Recent ISIS Attacks: Islamic State Group Hits Targets from Belgium to Syria in 2016,” *International Business Times*, 29 June 2016; <http://www.ibtimes.com/list-recent-isis-attacks-islamic-state-group-hits-targets-belgium-syria-2016-2388059>
- Wehrey, F. & Alrababa’h, A. “Rising Out of Chaos: The Islamic State in Libya,” *Carnegie Middle East Center*, (2015) <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/59268>
- Welzenbach, C. “The Dreadful Chronology of Gaddafi’s Murder,” *Counter Punch*, 5 Oct. 2016, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/10/05/the-dreadful-chronology-of-gaddafis-murder/>
- Wiebes, C. *Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995*, (Münster, 2003).
- Žabec, K. “Zagreb je postao međunarodni centar za dostavu naoružanja sirijskoj oporbi,” *Jutarni list*, 3 July 2013. <http://www.jutarnji.hr/u-4-mjeseca-za-siriju-s--plesu--otislo-75-aviona-sa-3000-t-oruzja/1089573/>

TETSUYA SAHARA

Newspaper, Online Sources

“2013-2014 arasında Türkiye’den geçen IŞİD’li sayısı açıklandı,” *Birgün Gazetesi*, 7 July 2016.

“Arms Dealer Says Clinton and Obama Accidentally Gave Guns to ISIS, Al Qaeda and Benghazi Attackers - Then Tried to Scapegoat Him for Their Screw-Up with Failed \$10m Felony Case,” *The Daily Mail*, 13 Oct. 2016, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3833844/Marc-Turi-says-Clinton-Obama-accidentally-gave-guns-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-Benghazi-attackers-tried-scapegoat-screw-up.html#ixzz4MuqimrPY>

“Eren Erdem/Yapılan ihmalleri ispatlamayan şerefsizdir,” *Birgün Gazetesi*, 29 June 2016.

“Exclusive: High-level Turkish Whistleblower Reveals State Sponsorship of ISIS,” *The Canary*, 16 September 2016. <http://www.thecanary.co/2016/09/16/exclusive-first-hand-account-of-turkish-support-for-isis/>

“IŞİD’e silahta yeni rota,” *Cumhuriyet*, 16 Oct. 2015.

“ISIS Shipped Oil from Syria's Jabisah Field to Turkey via Raqqa,” *RT*, 25 April 2016

“İşte IŞİD’e soğan altında giden silahlar,” *Cumhuriyet*, 27 April 2016.

“Leaked Wiretaps of ISIS Agents Show Ankara Routinely Ignores Terrorist Cross-Border Activity,” *RT*, 14 May 2016.

“MİT Providing ISIL Militants Safe Passage through Turkey, Daily Claims,” *Today's Zaman*, 11 June 2015.

“Rusya: Türkiye’den IŞİD’e silah taşıyan konvoy tespit edildi,” *Sputnik*, 7 June 2016.

“Silahlar İHH yardımı adı altında geliyordu,” *Özgür Gündem*, 24 Oct. 2015.

“Suriye’ye mühimmat taşıyan MİT tırlarına ilişkin önemli belgeler,” *Sol*, 13 Oct. 2015, <http://haber.sol.org.tr/turkiye/suriyeye-muhimmat-tasiyan-mit-tirlarina-iliskin-onemli-belgeler-105214>

“Turkish Gov’t Provides Confusing Statement on Arms-Laden Trucks,” *Today's Zaman*, 29 May 2015.

“Türkiye cihatçıları silahlandırıyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, 14 July 2016.

“Ηράκλειο: 5.000 όπλα και 49 εκατ. λαθραία τσιγάρα στο ‘Haddad 1’,” *Ζούγκλα*, 6 September 2015.